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Summary
This thesis is an account of how I researched my clinical practice. In catalyst for 
research, I begin by noticing the difficulty of applying clinical knowledge with due 
regard to the setting of the clinical problem and observe that on occasions my decisions 
are influenced by medical guidelines and on other occasions by the demands of context. I 
suggest that some sort of framework is needed to cope with these competing demands. 
Acquiring the scientific basis of medicine examines my educational upbringing at 
school and university and concludes that I have been taught to recognise as valid in the 
clinical context only certain kinds of knowledge (quantitative). With this in mind, the 
sections medical knowledge and restructuring the meaning of scientific knowledge 
reframes my practice and hospital environment through cultural and historical 
perspectives, which loosens some of my firmly held assumptions about relevant data to 
describe medical processes. The methodology section explores epistemology and 
methodology with reference to one of five paradigmatic positions and concludes that a 
methodology researching practice must generate and integrate data from different 
paradigms. Reflective clinical practice traces my development as a qualitative 
researcher from positivism to constructivism as I sought to explore non-clinical processes 
in the clinic. This results in the development of a three layer conceptual model of doctor, 
reflective practitioner and researcher. I argue that this extended epistemology has enabled 
me to pay greater attention to non-clinical processes that define the clinical landscape and 
to recognise the unique position of every clinical problem. Conclusions seeks to evaluate 
what I have learnt from the research and suggests that the theory underlying this approach 
may deserve wider attention.
CLINICAL DECISION MAKING IN A SURGICAL 
OUTPATIENTS: RELATING THE SCIENCE OF 




About the writer 1
What has been re-written? 2
Why has this happened? 2
What was my initial response to this setback? 6
Why did my level of critique fall? 9
Was this a necessary stage? 12
The demands of free and open inquiry; what to include and
what to cover up 12
The politics of it all 14
INTRODUCTION 16
Decision making-what I mean by the term 16
What is this thesis about? 16
What this thesis is not about. 19
Traditional decision making 20
Format of the thesis and style of composition 22
Who is this thesis for? Who are the audience 25
CATALYST FOR RESEARCH 28
Introduction 28
Trying to be a scientist in a medical setting 28
Relating the science of discovery with the science of implementation 32 
What sort of framework is needed? 33
ACQUIRING THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS
OF MEDICINE 35
Introduction





Making choices; careers and consultation styles 




Medicine, surgery, science, ceremony, ritual, 
sacrifice and magic
Introduction 51
Tonsillectomy, Inca sacrifice, witchcraft and maintaining
belief systems 53
Outpatients as a visit to a temple 59
Anatomy Lesson 63
What is the evidence for believing these observations have 
disturbed some in-built assumptions 66
RESTRUCTURING THE MEANING OF SCIENTIFIC 
KNOWLEDGE n
Introduction 71






Relating rational with intuitive knowledge 77
METHODOLOGY 79
Introduction 79
Ontological and epistemological issues in relation to
research questions 81
What possible approaches are there? 81
What is my ontological perspective as a researcher? 81
Are these paradigms in conflict? Is it possible to accommodate
these several views within a single conceptual framework? 84 
What are the practical considerations in adopting a paradigm





What might be regarded as knowledge or evidence within
the clinical encounter? 93
How does knowledge accumulate? 98
Professional knowledge 100
Knowledge about knowledge 102
What in general terms is my area of research interest? 104
What in specific terms are my research questions? 104
Linking research questions, epistemology and methods 107
What sources of data and methods of data generation are available? 107 




Personal construct approaches 129
Discourse analysis 133
Action methodologies 136




The reflective practitioner 164
Action inquiry 174
Co-operative inquiry 179
Ethics, morality and politics in research design 186
Producing a practical research design 199
My personal clinical practice 200
Head and neck oncology clinic 200
The hospital co-operative inquiry group 204
The postgraduate group at the University of Bath 207
Supported action inquiry 210
Action science/ inquiry 211
How do these three methodological approaches relate to one another 212 
How was this grounded in data 213
Credibility as a researcher of practice 216
Validity 220
Summary of methodology 228
REFLECTIVE CLINICAL PRACTICE 229
Introduction 229
Framework 1 236
Inquiry groups and groups in the clinic 238
Groups in the clinic 251
Patients and their relatives or friends 254
Other doctors in the consulting room 260
Power and medical power 272
Some broad approaches or structures to the study of power 273
Clegg’s approach 274
Agency 275





Some selected philosophers on power 309




White male power 342
The nature of expert knowledge 348
Doctors as experts in their own illness 348
Patients as experts in their own illness 353
Children as experts in their own illness 367
Framework 3 378
Leadership 380
How do patients judge quality 392




What did I set out to do? 411





What was the role of data in this construction? 415
When did the construction and development of theory take place? 416
iv
Was the data illustrative or constitutive of my explanation? 417
How reliable is my report? 418
Can I demonstrate that my analysis is valid? 419
Have I fulfilled my responsibility to produce good quality research? 422 
What kind of generalisations can I make? 422
How have others responded to my research and explanations? 428
Acknowledgements
References 
Appendix 1. David 





I am aged 4 5 .1 qualified in medicine in 1976 and, after a period of training that took me 
from London to Bristol to Liverpool then Toronto, was appointed a consultant surgeon at 
the Royal United Hospital, Bath, England in 1987 and an Honorary Senior Lecturer in the 
School of Postgraduate Medicine in 1991. The department consists of four consultants 
and nine trainees and is part of the South West of England post graduate training 
programme in Ear, Nose and Throat Surgery. Teaching these trainees is a major 
commitment of the department. As a consultant I see approximately 3,500 patients in the 
clinic and undertake surgery on between 400 and 500 per year.
I spent seven years doing research into the non-clinical processes of decision making in my 
practice and submitted this as a thesis a year ago. I have had to resubmit the thesis and in 
this prelude I would like to explain how I tried to make this setback part of the inquiry 
process. In doing it this way, I hope to demonstrate some of the skills of inquiry called for 
by the examiners. For example, it has given me the opportunity to reframe ‘error’ in such a 
way that it becomes an inquiry. The resubmission made me aware of some key issues that 
underpin the thesis as a whole. One issue in particular needs highlighting. I have become 
aware of the fragile research process needed in suspending belief (and criticality) in order 
to shift paradigms but at the same time retaining sufficient criticality to monitor that shift 
in a way that is perceived as credible. There have been substantial changes throughout the 
text but one section in particular has been completely rewritten; the methodology section. 
Whilst re-writing this section, it seemed to me that it was necessary not only to enter at a 
level where I needed to reconstruct what didn’t happen but I also needed to reconstruct 
what did happen but in a way that was authentic and at the same time credible. In 
summary, part of the argument that I put forward when resubmitting this thesis is that my 
experience in the qualitative research arena in the last few years has equipped me with
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sufficient expertise to handle the difficulties associated with resubmission. I see this 
approach as providing a level of methodological coherence with the rest of the thesis. 
Whilst advancing this stance, I am aware of the counter-argument that this approach may 
be regarded as no more than post hoc justification. For these reasons I have written an 
introduction that is at greater length that might at first sight seem necessary in order to 
highlight in more detail some of these issues.
What has been rewritten?
The methodology section has been almost completely rewritten. This shouldn’t imply that 
the methodology itself has been retrospectively reconstructed but the understandings 
associated with the methodology have been. The section on power has also been 
developed. I have also tried to portray the ‘other voices’, those of the patients who I have 
interviewed and with whom I have co-researched, in more detail. These changes alone 
have encouraged me to rethink other sections and I have made many alterations but 
without altering the original structure too much. This process has highlighted the problem 
of clarity versus complexity. In respect of clarity, I am especially aware that the nature of 
the academic process is such that this has to be a last attempt so that I need to be 
sufficiently clear for the purposes of examination. This makes it difficult to resist the 
temptation to pursue it past the point of tidiness. In respect to complexity, on the other 
hand I see the need to avoid becoming so clear that the complexity of what I am trying to 
unravel has apparently escaped. This dilemma is clearly a power issue within the 
examination process but similarities with the doctor patient relationship, where I suspect 
patients struggle to achieve a balance between complexity and clarity, are also not lost on 
me.
Why was a resubmission necessary?
As a qualitative researcher, this was the first question I asked myself. It lead to many other 
questions but one in particular; what kind of PhD had I envisaged? From the beginning, I
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had envisaged a kind of hybrid PhD, a hybrid between a qualitative, organisational 
behaviourist research approach and a traditional medical research approach to outpatient 
processes. There already existed a model for such an approach. Medical researchers 
frequently have recourse to statistics and work with biostatisticians to analyse data, so that 
such a model of collaboration along those lines seemed superficially plausible. I perceived 
that my traditional training as a doctor would enable me to handle the clinical processes of 
decision making and this exploration into the qualitative research field would enable me to 
handle the non-clinical processes of decision making. This conceptual separation of 
quantitative and qualitative features, which I retained until very late into the thesis, was a 
kind of dualism where the clinical issues (‘the one’s that really mattered’) were ‘managed’ 
by the non clinical issues. What I was not prepared for was the major rethink has taken 
place in what I regard as relevant epistemology. Both clinical and non-clinical processes 
now seem to be of equal importance. In retrospect, seeing the PhD as a collaborative 
approach between qualitative and quantitative traditions was a major assumption on my 
part, the first of many it seems. Recognising it, prompts general considerations as to why 
such assumptions arise in the first place and secondly, why, in my particular case, the level 
of assumption was so high.
Assumptions help to make data manageable so that removal of all assumptions tends to 
leave a messy problem to analyse. Underpinning assumption, therefore, is the question of 
choice and the exploration of these assumptions involves the exploration of choice.
Morgan (Morgan, 1983. pi 9-44) has identified five approaches to making sense of the 
diversity found after exploration and understanding. The first approach he called 
supremacy. Different paradigms carry with them a different set of generally agreed 
assumptions so that "one response to the existence of different research assumptions is to 
call for some evaluation or test that will determine their merits.” He concluded that “this 
attempt to evaluate different research assumptions in a foundational sense encounters the 
same kind of relativism as that with which it is attempting to deal." Such a hierarchical 
approach leads to the insoluble confrontation of the relative merits of quantitative versus 
qualitative research approaches. The second he called synthesis. This “is concerned with
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finding an optimal way of conducting research an attempt is made to find ways of
combining the strengths (among different research assumptions) and minimizing their 
weaknesses”. The variety and complexity of different paradigms in social research has in 
part resulted from this kind of activity. The third approach he called contingency. This is 
an empirical approach that adopts the view that “assumptions and knowledge should be 
judged according to their usefulness”(ibid). As I hope to demonstrate, this is very much 
the kind of approach that I had embedded within my clinical practice. Fourthly, he 
proposed a dialectic approach to assumptions. This approach accepts the “diversity of 
assumptions and knowledge claims as an inevitable feature of research and attempts to use 
the differences among competing perspectives as a means of constructing new modes of 
understanding ”(ibid) Such an approach takes advantage of different perspectives with 
different sets of assumptions in the hope that new insights would emerge. Finally, the idea 
that anything goes. This approach adopts a complete relativism, favouring the idea that 
every research strategy may have something to offer, and whether or not we attempt to 
systematise insights is of little real concern. This approach “stems from Feyerabend's 
advocacy of a theoretical and methodological anarchism in science on the basis that there 
is no idea, however ancient or absurd, that is not capable of improving our knowledge.” 
(ibid) A researcher who has come to the conclusion that the search for grand narratives, 
for paradigmatic uniformity is over, might take such a view. Morgan himself concluded 
that “there are no external, fixed foundational bases for deciding what is best and that the 
argument that "anything goes" is quite strong.” (ibid)
I started this research with the assumption that I was capable of acquiring the necessary 
research skills as an extension of the research skills I already possessed. This attitude was 
mistaken. The research skills necessary for conducting my PhD were not simply an 
extension to my current research skills but were developed in association with a 
fundamental shift on my part in ontological viewpoint. As a result, I was slow to uncover 
unaware assumptions that become important when shifting from a positivist or possibly a 
post-positivist ontology, where context has been ‘stripped’, to a constructivist ontology
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where the significance of context is obviously central. Argyris et al have drawn attention 
to this problem when talking about research students.
"Success depends on setting levels appropriately...ordinarily they look to past 
performance. Yet this is precisely where participants run into difficulty. Their perception 
of their performance is likely to be quite different from their actual performance. They 
have been unaware of their theories, the outcomes they produce, and the actions they 
infomn. They are thus apt to believe that they already have the skills or that they will be 
relatively easy to learn." (Argyris, Putnam, et al, 1985. p290-291)
Last o f all I found myself asking whether there was something about the nature of the 
organisation within which I work, in political, cultural, power or whatever terms, that 
permit such a high level of assumption to flourish? As a doctor I hold a rather traditional 
position within society and could be succinctly defined as a white, middle class male 
engaged in a white middle class profession. This whole position brings with it levels of 
assumptions, both personal and organisational, that may not be immediately apparent to 
those who occupy such positions. Others have suggested more clearly what these are:
"one of the things that white, middle class men are taught is to believe that we are
right....led to believe that the world will fall apart unless we hold ourselves together we
have the right to control...defined authority in our own individual terms...ignoring a wider 
set of values... education encourages us to recreate the world in our own image... see life
as the exercise of power, not as learning how to exercise power we have not learnt
that we do not have to be right." (Vince, 1996 p i40)
So in posing the question ‘Why has this happened?’ I find myself immediately confronting 
my expertise as a medical researcher, my high latent level of assumption and my status 
within society, particularly as an arbiter of what is ‘right’. Given this position, what was 
my response to the setback of having to resubmit my thesis?
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What were my initial responses to the setback of having to resubmit my thesis?
These responses included a certain level of embarrassment, both within my own 
department at work and personal. The personal embarrassment arose because this was my 
first real attempt to portray personal feelings and attitudes in the research process and call 
it ‘resiearch’. Whilst I instinctively recognised that this response in itself was going to be 
unproductive, I decided to accept the embarrassment until it became manageable and in 
time a source of motivation. This approach needed support so what support structure was 
I drawing upon during this process? My supervisors were immensely helpful during this 
time and encouraged me to investigate and re-evaluate the situation, as a research 
exercise. As a substantial part of my research had drawn on various forms of action 
science, I naturally turned to this approach.
"once we act (first order), we draw on backup strategies (second order) to manage the 
new situation that our initial actions created....second order strategies providing the 
opportunity to reflect on first order strategies and the situations they yield...protective 
strategies flow from a protective framing of errors.” (Argyris, Putnam, et al., 1985 p292- 
295)
Argyris et al identified four main protective strategies; withdrawing, keeping reactions 
private, making face saving moves and asserting reactions unilaterally, (ibid)
1. Withdrawing and hold others responsible for withdrawing;
“ by withdrawing one avoids errors (or further errors)..but because this strategy
renders experimentation and practice impossible, it is in itself a kind of error....it prevents 
individuals from discovering success that can be experienced in detecting errors and makes 
it easier to distort what one can and cannot do...this strategy cannot create a sense of
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success, .it increasingly generates a feeling of guilt... .to defend against these feelings, 
actors soon begin to blame others for their withdrawal.”
2. Keeping reactions private;
“...reactions that are kept private, consist of negative feelings and defensive attributions 
that serve to legitimate one's actions and take on an assumed to be true nature that lays the 
basis for further reasoning and action...e.g. appeal to one's sense of non competitiveness."
3. Making face saving moves;
"One such move is to criticise themselves while simultaneously criticising someone 
else...couch criticisms in a shroud of ambiguity.... carry with them multiple messages., they 
are informed by rules of polite discourse, because such rules are shared, and because we 
know they are shared and that everyone else knows it too...this multiple message serves to 
put the recipient in a bind... .on the one hand he may wish to be a good sport; while on the 
other hand he may be perplexed by the critique or even see it as inaccurate or unfair, but 
feel he will violate the rules by doing so."
4. Asserting reactions unilaterally;
"... .making views public but doing so in a way that minimizes one's own vulnerability... at 
a high level of inference... making attributions which do not include data e.g. "you let it 
evolve", "you guided this".
(Argyris, Putnam, et al., 1985 p292-295)
I foaind myself carefully considering each one of these options. In doing so, I began to 
recognise that these protective ‘framing of error’ strategies were ones that I seemed to 
have already encountered in myself and among colleagues in medical practice when 
treatments and surgery do not proceed according to plan. The response of ‘withdrawing’
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is equivalent to referring the problem to another colleague; ‘keeping reactions private’ 
often forms part of defensive medical report of a problem; ‘making face saving moves’ 
seeks to extend the blame to other personnel or equipment, especially lack of it. Finally, 
‘asserting reactions unilaterally’ is seen when doctors share stories of various medical 
mishaps with one another but present the story in a way that suggests that the outcome 
was beyond their control, for example an unexpected death from pulmonary embolus.
Such responses have probably developed in clinical practice because they are helpful or 
protective but in the situation I found myself as a researcher, they seemed inconsistent 
with a reflexive approach to inquiry. Furthermore part of my work had involved in depth 
interviews with patient who had experienced major setbacks (discovering that they had a 
life threatening incurable disease) and yet who sometimes seemed able to manage such 
setbacks sufficiently well to turn these into opportunities to learn. One way to encourage a 
shift in attitude from an irreconcilable position is to consider error as the raw data of 
learning.
"Errors are the raw material for any learning process. Curiously, this is a proposition that 
participants understand conceptually and advise others to follow but virtually all of them 
discard in action...there is no variance ...in how individuals frame mistakes; they simply 
regard them as wrong to make...Errors are considered taboo, and the possibility of making 
one stops them in their tracks.. .an alternative frame regards mistakes as puzzles to be 
engaged and solved, thereby making them opportunities for learning.. .It is not the 
mistakes...but the fact that people act as if these errors are not being made. A heuristic 
that is highly desirable for learning is to acknowledge what it is you are doing rather than 
cover it up."
(Argyris, Putnam, et al., 1985 p288)
Schon refers to the same position as ‘stuckiness’.
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"When he finds himself stuck in a problematic situation...he may construct a new way of 
setting the problem-a new frame, in what I shall call a 'frame experiment', he tries to 
impose on the situation."
(Schon, 1983 p63)
This process o f ‘error reframing’ suggested abandoning the process of reconstructing my 
research into an acceptable format by covering error and instead approaching the 
resubmission task by considering what might be learnt from what happened. It was my 
father though who put it more pithily; “Success”, he said, “was fine, but failure was far 
more interesting!” A useful question to ask in this position was; Why did it happen? One 
principal assertion by the examiners was that the level of critique in the thesis was at an 
insufficient level.
“The treatment of the specific concepts do not reach the criticality that is reasonable to 
expect at this level of scholarship.”
(Examiners report-May 1997)
Assuming for a moment that I am capable of attaining an appropriate level of critique, I 
am led to ask; Why did my level of critique fall?
Why did my level of critique as a researcher fall?
First of all a number of obvious possibilities spring to mind; laziness, inability, lack of time 
within a busy job and inadequate supervision are some of them. However, even if I 
accepted such reasons, which I don’t, as a researcher I would want to look beyond such a 
discouraging analysis. If my critique did fall, was it’s previous level, suitable perhaps for a 
positivist ontology, hindering in any way the development of some other process? 
Certainly in my positivist world I had reached a point where every paper I read, every 
piece of research I encountered seemed to fail one criteria or another of validity. When I 
became interested in qualitative research, positivist perspectives on validity seemed to
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challenge every assertion in the qualitative arena. Qualitative tests of validity such as 
quality, goodness, or trustworthiness made little sense to my quantitative validity 
procedures founded upon experimental reliability. Internal validity criteria such as 
credibility, supported by notions of triangulation and member checks, were difficult to 
comprehend by someone educated to understand controlled trials and p values. In the 
early stages, understanding the meaning of these terms proved to be a serious sticking 
point in trying to understand a qualitative ontology such as constructivism.
"It is necessary to examine and reframe the way we typically evaluate research there is
a tendency for the criteria traditionally used to evaluate positivist research to be applied in
the judgement of all knowledge claims the existence of such a foundational view
hinders the development of research strategies seeking to produce different kinds of 
knowledge and hence hinders recognition and exploration of the full range of choice open 
to the researcher.”
(Morgan, 1983 p392)
The only course of action I could adopt when I was undertaking this PhD research that 
allowed progress to be made, was to suspend belief in these positivist principles such as 
what constituted ‘real’ data or validity criteria and see where this led. There was a need to 
suspend for a moment beliefs in order to shift paradigms and this may be related to 
temporarily suspending criticality. A consequence of this had to be a lowering of critical 
standards, in particular a willingness to accept data uncritically, to make unsubstantiated 
interpretations readily and to constantly overlook assumptions as part of the process of 
shifting ontology. By lowering the level of critique, it allowed me to start accepting certain 
phenomena as ‘data’ and start to make new and qualitatively different inferences.
It must be remembered that all my previous research before I had embarked on this PhD 
process had involved identifying context (or bias) and then, in research terms, ignoring it. 
This resulted in a natural tendency of mine to regard bias as unimportant, unscientific, not 
subject to critique. Certainly, when I reviewed the initial thesis submission, I noticed how
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disconnected my inference was from my data and the high level of conjecture present. In 
contrast, as I struggled to make the work of “sufficient scholarship”, I also became aware 
of losing my ability to make interesting conjecture because of the academic need to 
substantiate conjecture with data. I found myself missing this lightness of touch.
“Books need not be subjected to totalizing judgements but would rather find criticism of 
scintillating leaps of the imagination so that they would not be sovereign dressed in red but 
would catch the sea-foam in the breeze and scatter it.”
(Kritzman et al, 1977-84. p323-330)
As I began to unpick my assumptions when resubmitting, everything began to lose shape; 
data, theory, methodology, values, power were all dependent upon one another. I 
particularly noticed this in two ways. Firstly, I found myself eventually questioning the 
validity of the five main paradigmatic positions of positivism, post-positivism, critical 
theory, constructivism and participatory research ( Guba, Lincoln, 1994 p i05-117; Heron, 
Reason, 1997 p274-294) as nothing more than a peculiarly western way of looking at 
theory generation. Who was to judge whether this multi-paradigmatic perspective was any 
better than the single paradigmatic perspective I had striven to abandon. Secondly, as I 
sought to add validity to assertion by referring to data, ‘everything’ appeared to be 
relevant. Almost any example of text could be used to shore up any argument. Every line 
of interview transcription was loaded with gender, power and medical discourse.
As a partial, though unsubstantiated defence of the original submission, I also have a sense 
that the level of critique rose in the latter stages of the research process but the earlier 
uncritical approach made as part of the process of change, carried over into the text of 
original submission. This early research approach was more seductive than might at first 
appear because it was, in a sense, a development of a pattern of practice that forms part of 
the actual practice of medicine. Clinical practice can in one sense be viewed as a watered 
down version of ethnographic research.
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"All ethnographers must impose meanings on their settings specifically they make
inferences about the actors, guided by what ever theoretical perspective has helped them 
to frame their data. They do not publicly test their inferences (or the theories on which
they are based) with the actors They end up imposing meanings on participants that
may not be accurate, and thereby reducing the probability of learning on the part of both
reader and practitioner........ chains of reasoning may go untested "
(Argyris, Putnam, et al. 1985 p i58-189)
This style of ethnographic research would seem to typify what actually happens in a clinic 
(Carter, 1997) and might appear to some to have the hallmark of good, patient orientated 
medical practice. This association with what has been perceived as good clinical practice 
may have reinforced the impression I had that what I was doing was ‘real’ qualitative 
research.
Was a lowering of critique a necessary stage?
For a researcher in my position it is possible to argue that lowering of critique may have 
been necessary to make the transition from quantitative to qualitative research methods. 
Equally necessary was the jolt back into an appropriate level of critique, exemplified by 
the rewrite. I can only propose that to abandon the process half way through, and not 
complete the rewrite, would have prevented me from sufficiently developing the process. 
The research cycle would have been incomplete. It was this instinctive feeling of being on 
the threshold of making this transition back to a higher level of critique (and 
understanding) that made me so determined to resubmit.
The demands of free and open inquiry-what to include and what to cover up.
The inquiry approach to resubmission outlined above enabled me to regard my initial 
‘mistake’ as raw data that led to ‘error re-framing’ which in turn started to uncover some 
critical basic assumptions about my research. This still leaves unanswered the question
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about what to include and what not to include in the interests of space in the rewrite and 
finally what, if anything, to cover up.
"Consider the demands of free and open inquiry. Participants must be able to retrieve 
largely tacit inferential processes; they must be able to deal openly with challenges and 
conflicting views; they must reveal information that might expose their own or other's 
vulnerabilities; they must be able to recognise and acknowledge when they are wrong; they
must feel free to choose among competing views these requirements will foster
learning, but they will also put participants at risk of disagreements, conflict, 
embarrassment, and failure, evoking defences to minimise such risks. The dilemma is that 
these defences come in forms that themselves threaten the process of inquiry.... might 
conceal upsetting information, minimize or cover up conflict, go along with views they 
actually oppose, hesitate to submit their own views to criticism." p238 
(Argyris, Putnam, et al. 1985 p238)
In order to appreciate what I might include and what I might wish to cover up or be 
unable to reveal, it is useful to put forward the basic methodological model which I see 
myself constantly using. I have tried to regard myself as working at three levels.
1. In my position as a doctor I operate at one level as a positivist (positivist theory 
generating data production).
2. At the same time I have tried to work as a reflective practitioner/ action inquirer 
(constructivist theory underlying nature of data and data production)
3. And finally as a researcher I try to develop an awareness of the ontological position I 
am adopting. This may be described as theory behind theory in that it represents an 
awareness of the assumptions circumscribing a particular paradigmatic position.
These levels are unravelled by constantly asking myself the question, "What is the theory 
behind the theory behind the data?" This simple formulation, and the inconsistencies within
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it (for example can one be a constructivist and a positivist at the same time?) will be 
developed in more detail in the methodology section.
In this submission I have included very little reference to my practice as a positivist 
medical practitioner, utilising physiology, biochemistry, pharmacology etc. I see this 
aspect of my work as peripheral to the body of the thesis as a whole. In respect of my 
positions as a ‘reflective practitioner/ action inquirer’ and ‘researcher’ I have tried to 
adopt an approach that is as open as I can manage but there will always be some aspect of 
this process that I would regard as too personal to discuss. As a researcher, I have always 
felt mostly comfortable to be critiqued, admit error, re-evaluate any situation and in this 
role the level of conscious filtering feels much lower, but as a researcher I notice how hard 
it is to prove this.
The politics of it all
In addressing this issue I need to make one thing clear. The process involved in 
undertaking the rewrite has been enormously useful in clarifying many understandings I 
had only partly grasped. It has been a most useful and satisfying stage in my research. 
However, no discussion of the nature of a rewrite is complete without at least a reference 
to the political and disciplinary power issues in relation to the position of academic gate- 
keeping.
"Tension between recognition and failure, persistence and compromise demonstrates how 
disciplinary gatekeeping maintains academic structures so that they continually reproduce 
themselves as the same, and marginalise or reject any challenge."
(Banister, Burman, et al. 1994 p i33)
In struggling to stand outside the disciplinary constraint of medical discursive practice and 
question it, have I fallen prey to the disciplinary constraints of academic discursive 
practice? This is not a good moment to marshal argument and persuasion about what
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should and shouldn’t happen at this level on a rewrite. I do however permit myself one 
observation. The whole examination process has taught me to be wary of trying to be too 
innovative in style and I am definitely conscious, as I rewrite this thesis, of slipping back 
into the traditional academic formats of critiquing and scholarship in order to complete 
this sort of work. As I do so, it leads me to start asking questions. As my level of critique 
rises once more, am I once again going to be prevented from seeing unexpected data, new 
levels of inference and interpretation, novelty that was once denied to me by my 
overdeveloped positivist ontology, from which I have struggled to escape? It illustrates 
the delicate balance that exists between being able to infer at a high level of critique and at 
the same time remain open to innovation. As I develop as a researcher, I also remain 
aware that I should not necessarily be seduced by constructivism in the same way I was 
seduced by positivism. By overtly eschewing a quantitative perspective in favour of a 
qualitative one, I have stepped outside typical behaviour as an ENT surgeon and possibly 
‘transgressed’ the arena of acceptable values. Such transgression is neither a “denial of 
existing values and the limits corresponding to them nor an affirmation of some new 
realms of values and limits” it is a "contestation" of values th a t" carries them all to their 
limits." (Cutting 1994 p22) Such ‘transgression’ is, according to Foucault, “an affirmation 
of human reality, but one made with the stark realisation that there is no transcendent
meaning or ground of this reality Transgression is essentially tied to intensity... and is a
direct consequence of transgression." (ibid)
With this backdrop in mind, it is time to start the main body of the thesis.
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INTRODUCTION
Decision making-what I mean by the term
The description ‘decision making’ is a wide, ill-defined phrase that incorporates many 
different ideas of what is meant by the term. The purpose of this first section is to make 
clear what aspect of decision making I propose to research. This clarification also includes 
a brief discussion of those aspects I have chosen to exclude. To emphasise this I have 
undertaken a brief review of the more conventional approach to decision making in clinical 
practice, for example the use of mathematical models, computers, algorithms. Finally, 
there is the mandatory section on how this thesis is presented in format and style and I 
have taken this opportunity particularly to emphasise the problems associated with trying 
to convey a change in practice by the use of the written word. With this in mind I have 
considered the various audiences for which this is written.
What is this thesis about
The initial purpose of the thesis was to find a series of frameworks that permitted me as a 
doctor to practice medicine in a scientific and well informed manner but enabled the 
patient to influence, shape, control or take charge of the decisions in an authentic way. Of 
course, it could be argued that every doctor should be striving to achieve the same 
objective, so why was I choosing to make this the subject of a detailed study? The short 
answer is that it is not easy to do this every day, with a variety of problems, and with each 
and every type of patient a doctor would be expected to encounter. The problem in trying 
to do this is encapsulated in the minor title of the thesis; ‘Relating the Science of 
Discovery with the Science of Implementation’. What then is meant by the terms ‘Science 
of Discovery’ and ‘Science of Implementatio
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I accept that there exists within medicine a core body of scientific knowledge and, like 
many, am interested in extending, developing and refining this core knowledge within my 
specialty. I undertake conventional scientific research, regard it as important and enjoy it. I 
use the term ‘Science of Discovery’ to describe this process. As I became increasingly 
better informed about my subject at a scientific level, it was clear that non-scientific 
influences that should form an important part of any decision, were becoming increasingly 
marginalised. For example, it should be important to understand the way patients would 
interact with me as a doctor, man, married man, family man, even family man with children 
who had undergone surgery in explaining how certain decisions relating to surgery were 
reached. So that it was not enough in itself to have the requisite medical knowledge 
because the process of applying such knowledge was a science in its own right; this is 
what I mean by the term the ‘Science of Implementation’. This science of implementation 
was a different kind of science; it wasn’t the ordered, logical kind of science I was used to 
considering. It certainly was not taught to me or, to the best of my knowledge, to anyone 
else as part of the curriculum for undergraduate or postgraduate medical education. I, for 
one, had qualified as a doctor assuming that decision making was a process akin to that 
depicted in Figure 1, instead I was finding that decision making was much more akin to 
the process depicted in Figure 2. When I began examining my reasons for making certain 
decisions, they didn’t seem to make sense, at least not logical, rational sense.
At first sight there seemed to be only two outcomes. Should I compromise the scientific 
element of my medical practice and remain a ‘realist’? Alternatively, should I compromise 
the humanistic side of my medical practice, the art of medicine, and continue as a technical 
rationalist? Neither of these possibilities seemed acceptable so this thesis became a 
personal search for a model or models that allow the science and art of medicine to work 
together more satisfactorily. It is about a search for a framework that enables me to 
remain a scientist but practise as an empathetic doctor. It is about finding a ‘science of 





NO  SURGERY  
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Figure 1
C onventional clinical decision  m aking trees look  like this and suggest
that the process is neatly structured.
Surwrv
F igure 2
Quite often decision  m aking in the clin ic appears to be m ore like this !
For the patient, I hope, this thesis is also about providing a series of frameworks that 
permits a flexible degree of empowerment over which they have some control. This is not 
as straightforward as it sounds. The currently popular model of patient empowerment is 
based upon a ‘consumer model of rational choices’. A doctor is encouraged to provide a 
series of options, together with their advantages and disadvantages, so that the patient is 
able to make an appropriate choice. A doctor who fails to do this properly, or who 
encounters problems when acting in an intentionally benign, directive manner, is becoming 
more likely these days to find themselves the target of litigation. So adherence to this 
consumer model can also mean that doctors are sometimes reluctant to make more 
directive suggestions for treatment, fearful that they might unduly influence the patient and 
be subsequently open to criticism. I certainly recognise that patient empowerment based 
on choices is an important model to consider but I find that if I practice this way all the 
time, I know that I am being less effective, less useful for the patient. Besides, as I will 
discuss later, there is evidence that when medical practitioners become patients they do 
not generally wish to be offered choice. They will frequently seek out an expert and take 
the advice uncritically. It suggests an instinctive understanding that something is lost on 
being offered choices in this way. This sounds as if I am interested in producing a charter 
for doctors to take control once more over the doctor patient relationship, but this is not 
my wish at all. I am seeking a different position. I am seeking a state of mutuality, when 
both the doctor and the patient can contribute to the medical input with equal status. From 
the research perspective, the challenge was to do this without setting quantitative and 
qualitative traditions in opposition to one another except as a dialectic to generate 
understanding. One was looking for theoretical triangulation.
"Theoretical triangulation embraces multi-theories and breaks through the parameters and 
limitations that inevitably frame an explanation that relies on one theory. It recognises 
complexity and diversity and that multiple realities exists."
(Banister, Burman, et al. 1994, p 145-149)
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It meant looking for a practice enriched by theoretical triangulation so that one used both 
positivist and qualitative perspectives in deciding what to do. This would hopefully 
increase the degree of context richness. Of course a constructivist would argue that this is 
nothing more nor less than disguised constructivism but this is a position that I will 
address later in the methodology section.
What this thesis is not about
Because the term ‘decision making’ is such a general term, it is necessary to state clearly 
those aspects of decision making I have chose to exclude. This is particularly important 
because most of the medical literature on the subject reflects those aspects of decision 
making that I have deliberately chosen not to study. These articles fall into two main 
groups; the use and selection of medical information to make decisions and the use of 
algorithms or computer driven programmes to assist decisions.
First of all, this study is not about the use or selection of medical knowledge to make 
decisions. It is not therefore about evidenced-based medical practice or an analysis of the 
medical thought processes that take place to make a medical decision. Secondly, it is not 
about the other general area of decision making; decision making trees and computer 
based programmes to assist in making decisions. In the past few years there has been a 
profusion of articles in the medical literature adopting this approach and being of a 
mathematically inclined type I have found myself reading them. This has made me aware 
that there is an element within the ideas presented here that is mathematical, mechanistic 
and sequential in nature and this is evident in the diagrams used later in the thesis to 
summarise the different frameworks.
Both these general areas of decision making research are useful and interesting and I do 
draw upon some of these ideas in day to day medical practice. This is the tradition from 
which most doctors, including myself, will emerge and represents the quantitative end of 
the spectrum that makes up decision making. Because this thesis sets out to explore in a
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qualitative manner the subject of decision making, a brief review of the traditional medical 
approach to the subject would be important as part of the background from which I was 
educated and from which this study emerged.
Traditional decision making
In a review of the literature, I found 67 articles on the subject of clinical decision making 
in the years 1970 to 1980. In the following ten years, from 1980 to 1990 the number had 
risen to 379 (source Medline Silverplatter). Virtually all were analytic in approach with a 
focus on bivariate relationships which are generally assumed to be linear and causally 
unidirectional.
In the earlier years 1970-1980 articles on decision making fall into a number of broad 
groups. There were those based on the use of computers ( Black, 1980. p91-8; Murray, 
1977. p262-4; Card & Mooney, 1977. pl627-9; de Dombal, 1979 p33-57; Gorry, 1973. 
p45-51; Gleser & Collen, 1972. p i80-189), and others with a more economic interest in 
mind particularly with respect to the allocation of resources. ( Card & Mooney, 1977. 
p i627-1629; Nagumey et al, 1979. p727-736; Crane, 1975. p i -33; Pauker & Kassirer, 
1975. p229-234), It is possible to detect the beginnings of a process in which the authority 
of the doctor to decide is questioned ( Baron, 1979. p337-365; Anonymous. Ed., 1975. 
pl91-2; Vertinsky et al, 1974. pl21-134; Klein, 1978. p73-74; Schoolman, 1977. pl03-5), 
and nearly all of them look at clinical decision making as a series of logical steps, 
"branching chain logic" of the kind depicted in Figure 1 to resolve problems in a logical 
stepwise fashion. ( Holmes, 1979. pi 131-8). The nature of the doctor patient relationship 
was examined, particularly the contractual nature of it ( Burke, 1980. p615-624; 
Baumgarten, 1980. p i80-4; Churchill, 1977. p i29-132) but no real interest was shown in 
the way that qualitative factors came to influence decision making.
In the 1980’s papers using computer methods continued to develop (Fryback, 1986. p27- 
33; Carpenter, 1986. p843-850; de Vries & de Vries Robbe, 1985. p57-64; Kassirer et al
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1982, p251-9; Pauker & Kassirer, 1981. p i831-7) but reservations about their widespread 
application were voiced. Sadler expressed the view that it was important to write your 
own algorithms in order to reflect your own philosophy and clinical practice and not rely 
on algorithms developed by others (Sadler, 1986. p545-7). Most of the work produced 
on the subject tended to be more interested in the use of computers in the diagnosis, or 
medical management where large amounts of data are required ( Pauker & Kassirer, 1981. 
p 1831-7; Sher, 1980. p420-3). Fryback developed programs that handled uncertainty and 
Kassirer and colleagues collected as verbal transcripts the thoughts of experienced 
clinicians to formulate theories that were embodied into computer programmes. Again 
these programmes only looked at the way physicians handled information in reaching a 
diagnosis. An important medical educator of the time, Laurence Weed, pointed out that it 
was important not to overlook the fact that there were many variables in the whole 
process of decision making that were only known to the patient and unique to them. It 
was important that patients had a more central role in the process of medical care (Weed, 
1986. p55-79). In a sense the same dilemma preventing pure science being directly applied 
to clinical situations in a humanistic fashion that I encountered in my own practice 
emerged in those trying to employ computers. A clue to this can be found in an early 
article in 1972 on the use of computers in medicine, which concluded that;
“clinical diagnosis contains a large element o f ‘pattern matching’ and that diagnosis that 
could not identify such patterns would be “ineffective in roughly one third of all cases of 
acute abdominal pain.”
(Staniland et al, 1972. p393-8).
In the literature today, articles about decision making have become much less common. As 
the rhetoric of health care has changed, they have given way to articles about purchasers, 
providers, allocation of resources, costs. This approach has become possible as computers 
have permitted the handling of vast amounts of information to enable these problems to be 
addressed. Perhaps that is, for the moment, the true role of computers (Schon 1983 p43). 
The problem of handling qualitative data, recognising patterns, analysing bias, judging the
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non scientific elements of a situation that I encountered in medical practice and discuss 
later cannot be solved by this approach.
Finally, because analytic clinical decision is broadly mathematical in approach, it may be 
more than coincidence that this interest in clinical decision making coincided with the 
development of the computer. Not only have computers looked at the decision making 
process, they may also may have been highly influential in the way that the decision 
making process has been regarded. As well as their use as a mathematical tool, computers 
have influenced thinking in a more subtle way. In 1978 Microsoft launched it’s operating 
system, DOS and five years later
“even popular science spoke of health as the state of a biological system” “Systems
analysis fostered new notions of and practices in healthcare, but also surreptitiously 
affected people’s perceptions of themselves.”
(Illich, 1995. pl652-3).
The language of computers became incorporated into the language of healthcare. The 
metaphors of computers became some of the metaphors for health. In the 1950’s a 
definition of death was based on cessation of the heart, extinction if you like of the 
emotional centre of the body, but in the 1990’s a definition of death was based on the 
cessation of brain function, extinction of the intellectual computer centre of the body. 
Perhaps this simple redefinition of death, and by implication life, encapsulates the shift 
from emotional to rational approach to medicine, influenced, I suspect, by the introduction 
and use of computers.
Format of the thesis and the style of composition
There is a fundamental problem that I have to address. It is the question of how to convey 
a change in practice by the use of written descriptions. I have attempted to tackle this
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problem by attention to three aspects. The format of the study, the techniques of argument 
implicit in the writing style and finally by recourse to Aristotle.
The format of the thesis is essentially narrative in style in that it broadly follows in 
historical sequence my change in understandings. I am aware of the risks in presenting my 
work in this way but felt it important to draw attention to a number of things. I have done 
a fair amount of conventional medical research and know that when preparing the 
manuscript some ‘cleaning up’ of the data and arguments takes place, which whilst 
necessary when submitting work for a journal, nevertheless removes some important 
information. For example, changes in behaviour do not always follow a logical series of 
steps and so the progress towards change is not presented logically. There is a randomness 
about obtaining insights into your own behaviour and utilising the narrative methodology 
gives insights into the uneven nature of such progress. Nevertheless, when preparing the 




Catalyst for Research 
Acquiring the Scientific Basis of Medicine 
Research question Medical Knowledge
Extending the Meaning of Medical Knowledge 
Methodology Methodology
Results/Discussion Reflections of Clinical Practice 
Conclusions Frameworks for Clinical Practice
Some Conclusions and the Future
It should be noted that much of the discussion is interwoven throughout the results 
section. This approach is consistent with my practice because reflection in action is about 
sense making in the moment, not afterwards. In addition because the methodology
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evolved as the study developed, these moments of change are indicated throughout the 
results section. This, I would argue, is consistent with the emergent nature of qualitative 
inquiry,
With all this in mind I would next like to consider the techniques of argument. These 
techniques of argument exist at both superficial and deep levels. At the surface level, the 
archaeology of argument loosely follows the conventional order as already mentioned. The 
deeper arguments lie within the sentences and are dependant on the use of “active or 
passive forms, positioning of adverbs, the choice of first or third person, referencing 
patterns” (Horton, 1995. p 985-6) and I have been less analytical and more intuitive in my 
selection of these influences. An editor when preparing articles for publication would 
demand a uniformity of style, of choice of first or third person, present or past tense etc. 
which creates a slightly bland but authoritative and ‘objective’ style. It seems to me that 
this was inappropriate when presenting a research project of a more personal nature such 
as this. I have therefore utilised the first or third person, present or past tense whenever it 
seemed appropriate and the importance of preserving this freedom has recently been raised 
(Heath I. 1996)
These deeper arguments are also dependent upon referencing patterns. The medical 
literature will by and large draw upon a body of references that frequently refer to one 
another and do not often dip into other philosophical schools of thought. I really noticed 
this in my database of conventional medical references obtained from Medline. There are 
few references to be found from the qualitative schools of research in any of these 
quantitative studies. For example, from 116,000 ‘hits’ to the search word ‘surgery’, 434 
included the keyword ‘qualitative’. I have tried to break away from this world of mutual 
referencing. For example I have used references from everyday life, from the television, 
from radio, the newspapers, from books that caught my attention. I have not attempted to, 
or wished, or even could be exhaustive in this respect given the rich nature of data 
available. For these reasons, there may be, from time to time, a style that may be 
incongruent but I have attempted no special analysis of this. This is probably largely due to
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the timescale of the project being, as it is, set over a six year period and is most evident in 
the diary sections. Even when it is obviously present, I have left it as it is.
Despite my attempt to try and present a change in practice in a convincing manner, I 
recognise, as others have done, that this may be an impossible task to accomplish. Perhaps 
this can only be experienced by witness.
“Practical Knowledge, knowing how, is the consummation, the fulfilment, of the 
knowledge quest.. .for a skill, knowing how to do something, can never be reduced to 
written descriptions of doing it.”
(Heron, 1996. p21)
In the end it may be necessary to draw upon Aristotle for support. Aristotle provided 
insights into the rules of the style of composition when he grouped proofs into one of 
three types. These were a presentation of the arguments themselves; secondly, the 
character of the author, who should be seen as fair-minded and balanced in outlook; and 
thirdly, the emotional state of the reader. All three can be appealed to by speculations 
about the clinical importance of the results and the implications for future research. I am 
happy to be judged by these criteria but this research is principally for my own benefit and 
I hold no illusion regarding its importance beyond my own personal experience. As a 
trainer of future surgeons I am in a position to influence them, so that I have taken the 
opportunity to formally present this work for external review. Of course this immediately 
raises the final question of this section. Exactly who is this thesis for?
Who is this thesis for? Who are the audience?
I am aware of three separate audiences, each with different perspectives, who have to be 
considered when preparing this work. These three audiences are myself, the University 
and finally other doctors, who may wish to read it. I will consider, for a moment, each of
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these audiences and how it has been necessary to modify the thesis to accommodate these 
different audiences.
For myself it is an opportunity to carefully consider my assumptions, to organise, to refine 
and clearly define my ideas upon the subject o f ‘decision making’. It is a personal 
statement of how I see the way that I practice. That had been a relatively straightforward 
task. I am conscious, when presenting this for academic view, that it is evaluated not as a 
personal statement but as a work in relation to other published works. Because I am using 
the perspective of one academic department, the School of Management, to look at the 
activity of another, the School of Medicine, assessing the work in this way might be 
problematic. Against what body of work is this thesis going to be compared; previous 
work on decision making from the world of medical practice, ideas from the world of 
management or both? I have tried to maintain a balance between these two different 
perspectives by selectively drawing texts and references from both Schools. In effect the 
work occupies the middle ground between these two disciplines. It is difficult to defend 
such middle ground and from both perspectives my use of the literature might appear 
superficial. I would accept that criticism but would wish to make one observation. I 
started out with a ‘gut’ feeling that it would be interesting to undertake a study of one 
discipline from the perspective of another and in my experience this approach has been 
rewarded. What I have learnt from this study is that with only a modest understanding of 
issues such as ‘power’ from an organisational perspective it is possible to acquire valuable 
new insights into medical practice.
I would be disappointed if this attempt was interpreted as naive, because throughout the 
thesis I have also had to bear in mind that at the end of the day I am a practising doctor. 
Any work written by a practising doctor has to consider its the final audience, that of the 
medical profession. In considering an audience of doctors, it seemed necessary to draw 
upon the traditional literature of medicine so that this point of view is to a degree 
acknowledged. Doctors are suspicious of managerial theories and jargon, which is ironic 
given the extensive use of theories and jargon in medical life, so it seemed necessary to be
26
careful about the use of these. Nevertheless, I hope to convey some of the fascination that 
can be experienced and usefulness that can be achieved by only a modest understanding of 
organisational theory. This point obviously touches on the subject of generalizability. At 
the heart of positivism is the idea of the grand solution and it is important to distance 
myself from such an idea. The place of generalizability in the quantitative methodological 
literature appears to be that it is unimportant, unachievable or both. Nevertheless, I would 
hope that the concept of generalizability is best thought of as ‘fit’, which others see as 
relevant enough to consider the possibility of applying concepts and conclusions of this 
study for themselves and of course in their own way. (Schofield 1993. p200-225)
It would be my hope then that something in what I have written would trigger their 
interest to start and consider the same issues that I have done and in doing so move the 
ideas forward. In this respect the ‘fit’ has to be seen from the medical perspective as well. 
Whilst I have not formally tested the degree of fit yet with my colleagues, I would claim a 
general awareness of what would be generally acceptable and what would not.
So what then stimulated my interest to consider all these issues? How did I come to 
collaborate in a research project between a Department of Postgraduate Medicine and a 




This section explains what triggered my interest in decision making and why it became 
necessary to find an alternative definition of what constituted relevant ‘medical 
knowledge’. Trying to be a scientist in a medical setting commences by explaining 
what happens when I tried to practice medicine in a way that was more and more 
‘scientifically rigorous’ in a clinical setting. It became increasingly difficult to do so in a 
way that paid attention to the context in which the problem was set. The choice appeared 
to be one of either continuing to practice as a scientist and ignore the context or 
alternatively pay attention to the context at the expense of the science. In Relating the 
science of discovery with the science of implementation the problem is seen in terms of 
finding a new science to manage within a suitable framework the traditional science of 
medical practice. Finally, in What sort of frameworks are needed? I conclude with a 
discussion of the kind of framework or frameworks that are needed to accomplish this.
Trying to be a scientist in a medical setting
My medical training had taught me that medical science believes that health and disease 
can eventually be completely understood in terms of a set of scientific, medical principles. 
These principles are derived from a process of observation, measurement, induction, 
hypothesis formulation and testing claiming to be in the positivist paradigm. This means 
that the term ‘positivist’ is used to describe a medical practice built on a foundation of 
‘evidence’ based data of the kind produced by a methodology of randomised, double 
blind, controlled clinical trials. Each new set of data allows these principles to be 
understood in greater and greater detail. Each research contribution allows us to more 
closely approximate to a reality where health and disease is completely understood and so 
it appears that all that is needed is sufficient effort to complete the task. Eventually the
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knowledge produced by this positivist approach reaches the point where ‘victory’ over 
disease is complete. This rationale leads to a belief in the supremacy of the positivist 
approach. However, in day to day practice, it is acknowledged that clinical medicine 
cannot be a precise science, which suggests a post-positivist position, nevertheless one 
that still regards positivism as the ultimate, regulatory ideal. My own role in all this 
appeared to be clear. As a scientist and doctor I was invited to make a small contribution 
to this overall understanding. Perhaps with luck I would write a definitive sentence in the 
definitive paragraph of the definitive chapter of the definitive book.
To begin with this idea was sustainable. The process of accumulating knowledge through 
postgraduate exams together with research that all trainees are obliged to do created the 
impression that I was starting to make my own particular contribution. After a while this 
approach became difficult to sustain. I clearly remember one case in particular when I 
began to seriously challenge this perspective. About one year after I had qualified I was 
doing a locum in general practice and was asked to see a young child with earache. It was 
about midnight when I arrived and the child and the family were in a considerable distress. 
Contemporary medical literature was starting to make the point that it was unnecessary to 
treat an infection of the middle ear with antibiotics. Practice based upon strict adherence 
to scientific principles would advocate that antibiotics should not be prescribed in this 
situation but I ‘felt’ I could not leave the family without giving the child some penicillin 
even though the ‘evidence’ pointed to the fact that this was unnecessary. There appeared 
to be no means within a positivist ontology to be able to consider the question of context 
when, as I saw it, context played a deciding role in what was to be done.
What struck me at the time was that in all the studies I had read about ear infections, the 
context of the medical problem was never acknowledged as important in determining the 
need for treatment. Indeed great efforts had been made to exclude the question of context 
by formulating it as ‘bias’ and hence inadmissable in the analysis of the problem. I had 
chosen to follow a paradigm that excluded context.
29
"In the most general terms positivism is a collection of prohibitions concerning human 
knowledge, intending to confine the name 'knowledge' or 'science' to the results of those 
operations that are observable in the evolution of the modem sciences of nature." 
(Kolakowski 1993. p7)
However, the extent to which I had been paying attention to the role of context in science 
was not an all or none phenomenon. There was a range of activities that gradually paid 
regard to context. Work has shown that a doctor faced with a patient suffering from, for 
example, malignant disease will contemplate a hierarchy of progressively less positivist 
options. They will order detailed x-rays (scientific experiment); obtain information from 
previous studies (controlled trial); perhaps organise a trial of chemotherapy to see what 
happens (quasi experiment); make use of various diagnostic algorithms (system aided 
judgement); seek an opinion from a multidisciplinary head and neck clinic (peer aided 
judgement) and perhaps obtain an opinion based on experience from his principal 
physician as to whether or not he will ‘do well’ (intuitive judgement). (Hamm, 1988. p87). 
The process will be constantly shifting up and down this continuum and in practice does 
not mean choosing one particular mode of practice and sticking with it. The closer the 
selected mode of inquiry was to ‘scientific experiment’, the more analytical, visible and 
structured it was and perhaps more accessible to understanding by an outside third party. 
Consequently, research on the usefulness or otherwise of investigations such as x-rays or 
systematic reviews of controlled trials are relatively commonly encountered. Research on 
‘intuitive’ judgement is, in contrast, relatively rare. In order to make medical judgement 
more visible and hence accountable, there has been a tendency to try and evaluate system 
aided, peer aided and intuitive judgement in more positivist terms. The resurgent interest 
in ‘evidence based medicine’ is one testimony to the increasing importance of the outside 
third party in shaping and influencing the doctor patient interaction to be more scientific in 
this way. As I will later discuss, all this may be part of the increase in the practice of 
surveillance that seeks to make individual discursive practice more visible.
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In the twenty years since I have been qualified, the traditional science based medical 
literature is beginning to acknowledge that all practice cannot be positivist based. 
Furthermore, by ignoring the place of, for example, ‘intuition’ it can mean the loss of 
useful information. The idea that intuitive judgement takes place much of the time is one 
that few would question but only occasionally will medical journals report an attempt to 
examine ‘scientifically’ such phenomena. In a recent example, surgeons were asked to 
predict the outcome of an operation according to ‘gut feeling’ and this was compared with 
a scoring system to quantify risk ‘objectively’, the POSSUM (Physiological and Operative 
Severity Score for enumeration of Mortality and Morbidity. (Hartley & Sagar, 1994. 
p277-8). The study showed that surgeons intuitively assessed outcome rather well. It may 
be ‘unscientific’ to approach a problem like this using an intuitive parameter such as ‘gut 
feel’ but it was surprisingly accurate in it's application.
If surgeons are beginning to acknowledge the importance of intuition in decision making, 
is there a need to consider the intuitive judgements of patients? There is also the question 
of context in which the whole problem is set and here there appear to be many factors to 
consider. They include factors such as age of the patient, previous experiences with 
treatments by doctors and by other healthcare workers, acceptability of treatment, 
compliance, cultural factors, expectations, need for information, mental state, social and 
family circumstances, place within the family, interpretation of problem by the relatives, 
impact of problem on the relatives. In addition there is the importance of clinical setting 
including the role of room size, room layout, chair size, dress code of doctor, and 
presence of others in the room. Then there are those factors pertinent to the doctor such 
as communication skills, previous experience, expertise skill and lack off, mental health, 
workload, relationship with other health care personnel including referral source, 
uncertainty, time factors, time of the day, day of the week. How then does a doctor 
develop a scientifically based practice and at the same time pay attention to all these and 
the many other parameters too numerous to mention?
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It has been said that we explore the world through experience, reasoning and research. 
Experience may be personal, or give way to authority such as books or teaching and 
reasoning may be deductive or inductive or inductive/deductive. (Cohen and Manion,
1989. p4-9) I had tried to research the problem of trying to apply findings I had obtained 
from the medical literature in my own way. Like many other doctors, I suspect, I had 
undertaken this in a clinic in a self-regulating and self-referencing manner in the hope that 
resolution of this problem would be obtained by experience. Such an approach suggests a 
passive response to inquiry in that answers come ‘with time’.
Such an approach can lead to "an uncritical acceptance of authority opinion and an over 
dependence upon personal experience." (Cohen & Manion 1989 p5) Because such a 
critically naive approach is systemic both within one’s practice and within the system (all 
doctors sit in clinics isolated from one another after the first few years of training) what 
are the alternatives open to a doctor?
One solution may be to pursue a career in which this dilemma is less apparent and this 
particular strategy is briefly discussed later. Alternatively, it may be necessary to embrace 
a new perspective, a new way of looking at the problem and throw the process open to 
external review.
Relating the science of discovery with the science of implementation.
In summary, in developing a scientific foundation for clinical practice I had been 
encouraged to control or ‘eliminate’ unwanted bias when undertaking research but later it 
became necessary to accept the importance of all this ‘bias’ when medical facts were 
reintroduced into context. This has been identified as the gap between “the sciences o f  
discovery and the sciences o f implementation.” (Jones R, 1995. p2). Thus the practice of 
clinical medicine carries with it the difficulty of trying to work within a positivist 
paradigm, paying attention to all the published work, and at the same time acknowledging 
the existence of other qualitative factors that cannot be ignored. The appendices at the end
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of this thesis are transcriptions of interviews made with three patients, David, Patrick and 
Valerie. These were made in order to explore the role of non-clinical issues such as power, 
‘gut’ feel and others that impinged upon the decision making process. Each one of them 
had to make difficult decisions about their treatment. How does David decide whether to 
leave his sinus tumour untreated so that in the short term he can enjoy and active life or 
take a risk and opt for extensive surgery in the hope of a small chance of a cure? 
(Appendix 1) How does Patrick decide if he should accept medical advice and have 
radiotherapy after his operation or follow his instinct and leave well alone? (Appendix 2.) 
How does Valerie decide whether she should have a heart and lung transplant or not? 
(Appendix 3).
Even a viewpoint that accepts some role for non clinical processes in conventional clinical 
medicine, simplifies the reality encountered in a clinic. What should be the response on 
encountering a patient with an entirely different medical ontology to that of Western 
medicine? A positivist description of disease and treatment doesn’t always make sense to 
someone whose world view is based upon ‘natural explanations’ of disease and treatment 
utilising for example homeopathic treatments, or diet treatments or Eastern medical 
perspectives. This position alone certainly challenges one assumption of positivism, that is 
the belief in the unity of the scientific method. (Kolakowski 1993 p2)
Whatever paradigm is adopted, there is the need to manage the potential tension produced 
by such differing points of view, the view of the doctor and the view of the patient; the 
tension produced by a positivist and hermaneutic perspective. In the end it needs a 
framework in which qualitative and quantitative processes can operate so that it may 
become an exploratory device of use to both parties.
What sort of framework is needed?
The interest for me came in trying to find a framework to behave in a way that pays 
attention not only to scientific principles but also places the medical problem properly in
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context. By this I do not just mean context in the sense of positioning the medical problem 
in everyday context such as occupation or lifestyle but the context of the context. This 
means developing an awareness of the cultural and historical context of medicine, how this 
has influenced the way that language has and is used to convey meaning and the way that 
medical power has come to be used by the actors. The challenge is to accomplish this 
without managing to disempower the patient further by becoming an even more 
sophisticated manipulator of other people’s perspectives, a criticism that has occasionally 
been levelled at certain kinds of qualitative research. In order to effect a radical reappraisal 
of what I believed, it became necessary to examine the way I had acquired my own 
knowledge and how in the process of acquiring it, I had chosen to believe in certain things 
and not in others.
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ACQUIRING THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF 
MEDICINE
Introduction
The previous chapter highlighted the problem encountered by strictly adhering to a 
scientific medical practice based solely upon positivist principles. Such a medical practice 
will regard as relevant to the decision making process only certain kinds of knowledge and 
data. How did I as a medical student come to adopt this approach? In the sections, Early 
development and schooling and Medical School, I examine how I have come to ‘frame’ 
certain information to regard only that knowledge as relevant, as scientific, in the pursuit 
of good medical practice.
I notice the effect of increasing specialisation in focussing on problems in a smaller and 
smaller aspect of body function, which seems to make the problem of considering context 
even more difficult. In Making choices; careers and consultation styles I suggest that 
this ‘problem’ may be side-stepped by pursuing a career that is technical and non context 
based or context based and non scientific. Choosing to pursue a technical specialty and 
pay due regard to the importance of context meant reappraising my ontology to permit 
other ways of seeing the world. This change needed an appropriate ‘jolt’ or insight and 
this moment is described in Intuitive Knowledge as science.
Early development and schooling
The development of a positivist epistemology in medicine is very much helped by 
discarding those issues, many of them qualitative, that do not seem to fit in with the idea 
of positivist sense making. This means making assumptions about what is and what is not
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important to regard as data and it is these assumptions that “make messes researchable; 
often at the cost of great oversimplification, and in a way that is highly problematic." 
(Morgan 1983 p377) The process of discarding and disregarding certain items is done in 
the interests of clarity and neatness and this process is part of the characterisation of 
medical knowledge. What does this mean in practice? It might mean, for example, 
disregarding the patient’s interpretation of what is wrong simply because the idea is not 
expressed in medical language. Alternatively, it may involve the wholesale disregard of 
medical healthcare systems that have stood the test of time for thousands of years such as 
acupuncture. This is an interesting example because it illustrates how a practice 
(acupuncture), previously marginalised, only became accepted after it was re-framed in the 
positivist paradigm. Acupuncture, as a form of treatment was completely disregarded by 
the conventional medicinal establishment until the early 1970s when the ‘gate theory’ of 
pain control outlined by Wall provided a positivist basis for why it should work. After this 
discovery, acupuncture became much more acceptable.
This process of discarding data that does not fit into a particular belief system I see as 
starting from early on in life. I illustrate this by a small event that occurred one day when I 
was with Laurie, my son then aged one year. We were playing together when he suddenly 
stumbled across to a waste paper basket and picked out a piece of paper. It was a shiny 
coloured cellophane wrapping of the kind that is used to cover a small present. This piece 
of paper was reflecting brilliantly as it caught the sun shining through the window. Whilst I 
had noticed this beforehand as it lay in the waste paper basket, it wasn't until he started 
studying it carefully that I saw it as an object of interest. Because the piece of waste paper 
was in a waste paper basket, I had automatically categorised it as ‘waste paper’ and 
therefore not worthy of attention. Without this preconception, Laurie had seen it 
differently and saw it for what it was as an unusual and interesting phenomenon. My 
immediate instinct made me want to take the piece of paper from his hand and throw it 
away again but instead we decided to look at it carefully together. It was a prosaic 
everyday reminder to evaluate carefully what is being disregarded but in principal was no
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different to an occasion when years later as a researcher I took a second look at some data 
that had been ‘thrown away’
I had arrived at Toronto University in 1985 as a Fellow in the Department of Surgery with 
an international reputation for a particular kind of operation. This reputation was founded 
on the good results obtained in the removal of a rare type of brain tumour. Over three 
hundred of these had been performed in the previous four years and analysing the results 
of this operation would be of great interest to many other centres and certainly worthy of 
publication. Naturally I offered to undertake this retrospective analysis only to be informed 
that the Fellow from the previous year had chosen to undertake this. All that were 
remaining from the complete set of case notes were the twenty patients left out of the 
study because they had been considered too old for surgery. They were categorised from 
the medical standpoint as belonging to the ‘waste paper basket They were not of medical 
interest because they were patients in whom treatment was not being contemplated. My 
initial disappointment gave way to interest when I appreciated the possibilities in studying 
the outcome of a group of patients whose tumour remained untreated. How quickly did it 
grow? What were the complications as the tumour grew? These were important 
unanswered questions for patients, particularly the elderly, but perhaps not obviously so to 
a medical profession orientated towards treatment and treatment success. So that for good 
reasons it was important to look at such a group and the study revealed that the untreated 
elderly patient did rather well. (Nedzelski et al.1986).
This simple illustration of the ‘discarded notes’ makes one consider the way that patients 
are represented by certain kinds of data. The medical representation of patients is in the 
form of notes. This privileged space in medical terms is a representation of the patient in 
the form of a disease profile. In its capacity to represent it is nothing short of a medical art 
form, a piece of medical art work (Flynn 1994). In hospital organisations, patients are 
represented by their notes and I have witnessed the distress in patients when the notes are 
lost and on these occasions patients are made to wait until their identity is found again.
This representation is also an interpretation, a conventional positivist interpretation, of the
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medical condition. This means that notes convey both representation and interpretation. 
Whose interpretation? It is an interpretation of the medical staff and this may explain why 
it is usual for patients to be denied access to notes; the phrase “Not to be seen by the 
patient” is written on the front cover. The unilateral nature of interpretation made in the 
notes and the lack of access to these notes by others might go some way to explain why 
the notes of the untreated group remained un-researched. It does not appear to be 
common practice to ask a group of patients with a particular condition what they would 
like to be researched. If it were, I suspect it would not have been long before some 
patients with brain tumours would have wanted to know the results of ‘no treatment’.
Hospital notes also demonstrates a contingency approach to data; it is neat and generally 
manageable data. It has taken me many years to appreciate that in the process of acquiring 
data, whether it is in the form of history taking, examination of patients or examination of 
data, there is a process of discarding data that doesn’t seem to fit. In fact this process is 
institutionalised. Controlled studies will clean up data in this way, calling it bias or 
qualitative data. Indeed the language of statistics used to assess data echoes this with 
words like Fishers exact test, linear regression etc. Where do we get this desire for 
neatness in results and why did I find it so satisfying to produce work that was neat in this 
way?
At school there appeared to be an emphasis on precision, on exactness, on neatness. This 
neatness was both explicit and implicit and this implicit neatness it seems to me is part of 
the positivist paradigm that educates you into believing that solutions are precise. For 
example, I learnt to know when an answer was correct because it became possible to ‘feel’ 
when this happened. I see this in simple examples as I help my daughter Rachael with her 
homework. The awkward sum:
5.037 divided by 1.679 becomes the neat answer = 3.
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The correct answer is neat and exact. There are no ‘fuzzy’ edges around it. This 
exactness, neatness and resolution of form is used to convey subtly to the student that the 
answer is correct. It didn’t take long before I began to believe that all answers in science 
have this neatness of form. In the end, I started to analyse, be critical of, and reject certain 
‘unscientific’ facts in order to adhere to this neatness of form.
Medical School
In medical school the idea that solutions were neat, describable, positivistic was 
transferred from mathematics, physics and chemistry to the human body. The early part of 
medical school began with an introduction to anatomy, biology and physiology. Apart 
from the strange surprise at discovering that we are after all just like animals below the 
surface I began to see in the human form a collection of individual components. We 
appeared to be made up of levers, of pulleys, of servos, of engines, of pumps, of shock 
absorbers and of filters. In doing so gradually I began to abandon the idea of regarding the 
human form as a single entity.
This way of teaching medicine may have had an underlying purpose. Prior to about 1800 
disease was classified as species with no necessary connection to the body. Diseases were 
perceived as transferring to the body when their qualities are in line with the patient’s 
temperament. This spatialisation of illness was conceptual so that disease was ordered 
hierarchically into families, genera and species in terms of analogies and resemblance. The 
patient was a potential obstacle to the perception of the disease. After 1800, clinical 
medicine was to see the body as the natural space of the origin and distribution of disease; 
a space determined by the anatomical atlas. Anatomico-clinical theory was developed 
where disease indicated lesions in specific tissues.
Contemporary medical teaching reflects the way medicine organises itself to form medical 
knowledge. So that at one level the purpose of anatomy dissection was to assist learning 
about muscular and bony form, the position and relationship of various organs, but at
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another it also resulted in a shift from a holistic view of human form to a mechanistic, 
classical science view of human form. This sense of positivism was reinforced by 
mathematical concepts such as Fourier analysis of anatomical forms in biology, physical 
concepts such as partial blood gas pressures in physiology and chemical concepts in 
biochemistry. As attention was focussed upon acquiring knowledge of a certain type, 
attention was diverted from what is being overlooked. What was being overlooked were 
the assumptions of positivism. These are determinism, empiricism and the principle of 
parsimony (Cohen & Manion 1989 p i8). Determinism assumes that all events have causes. 
Empiricism pays attention to that which is verifiable by observation and experience.
Finally, the principle of parsimony states that if a phenomenon can be explained by two 
laws rather than three, then the more economic explanation is accepted. These 
assumptions are carried over into clinical practice. The role of observation is continually 
emphasised in outpatients, the ward, the theatre and the post-mortem room in order to 
find the cause of the disease. The principle of parsimony expresses itself in the notion that 
a single diagnosis is sought to explain all symptoms and signs even to the point where 
multi-system disease is grouped under an all embracing diagnosis. I am not arguing at this 
stage that the principals of determinism are inappropriate, just that they carried with them 
these assumptions that circumscribed the way I was being taught to consider what was 
data and what was appropriate analysis.
Yet even within this scientifically based framework of medical education, there were 
moments when I realised that it became unsustainable to believe that everything could be 
described in this way. An example of this arose in considering brain as nothing more than 
the equivalent of a large computer. The term ‘fuzzy’ had been applied to a kind of logic by 
Zadeh some six years previously in an engineering paper called ‘Fuzzy Sets’ (Zadeh, 1965. 
p338-53) and was brought to my attention by a mathematical friend, who had become 
interested in the topic. I could already appreciate that there was evidence that the brain 
didn’t function cognitively in an exact and accurate fashion, like the computers that were 
emerging at the same time. This could be demonstrated by considering the letter ‘a’. When
I am taught to read the letter ‘a’, I may be given a number of examples such as; a, a, a, Cl,
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a/, until eventually I might become good at recognising these various ‘a’s. But if we 
function entirely mechanistically, then no amount of teaching can prepare you for an ‘a’ 
that has never seen before, such as; A  and yet it is immediately recognised as an ‘a.’ 
Fuzzy logic at least seemed to provide a description of this problem but not a solution in 
recognising inaccuracies around the edges of function that was useful when it came to 
pattern recognition. The brain would seem to have a degree of fuzziness in it’s function to 
be able to do this and seemed to be escaping from the idea that it worked mechanistically 
as a large computer
Even if brain function could be reduced to the equivalent of a large computer, it would 
encounter another problem that software writers were beginning to appreciate. Large 
software programmes would inevitably contain a small proportion of machine code or 
software error. Finding and correcting these errors would have another chance, albeit 
small, of creating another error. There would come a point when the programme was so 
large that the error rate in correcting errors would be equal to one another. In other 
words, very large programmes could never be error free, something that programmers 
today have come to realise. This was anticipated by a corollary of Godel’s Incompleteness 
Theorem, formulated in the 1930’s asserting that ‘no consistent system can formally prove 
it’s own consistency.’ When this idea is applied to software programmes, it seemed to 
anticipate the problem of producing error free large software programmes and when 
applied to brain function suggested that we could never demonstrate that we functioned in 
an error free manner. Even if we did function in an entirely consistent, positivist, 
mechanistic, error free manner, we would never be in position to demonstrate it.
Despite these occasional nagging doubts, at that time I did not seriously question the 
positivist basis for medicine. The way that medical knowledge organises itself also reflects 
the way that medical departments organise themselves. The subjects of biochemistry and 
physiology emphasise the idea that we are constructed of discrete, although interrelated, 
mechanisms. These physiological and biochemical systems dismantle human function into 
cardiovascular, respiratory, gastro-intestinal and many more elements. This process of
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gradually dismantling the human form continues through to postgraduate medical 
education so that in my current position as a consultant in ear, nose and throat surgery I 
have come to specialise in the middle ear. This is a part of the body measuring hardly more 
than one centimetre by one centimetre. If my whole medical world is now centred upon a 
single such component in the body, the middle ear, it is hardly surprising that it is hard to 
shake off the idea that the whole of the rest of the body is made up of other ‘building 
blocks’. It is, if you like, the logical extension of dismantling the body in a way that starts 
at medical school with anatomy and ends up with becoming a specialist ear surgeon.
For those whose interest in medicine takes them towards the holistic end of the spectrum, 
for example family medicine, this super-specialisation frequently comes in for criticism,
“But when a technical expert concentrates his attention on a single aspect of life, there is a 
fundamental difference. He doesn’t have the unseen background containing everything 
else. Other things are ‘not his field’ and he simply doesn’t know about them at all. 
Exclusion is inherent in his specialism.”
(Willis J, 1995. p23)
If I do wish to practice holistic, context based medicine how are those factors that 
characterise a holistic approach to treatment going to be meaningfully considered by 
someone with a specialist knowledge of such a small region of the body? This problem 
suggests a number of competing variables. These include the degree of specialisation one 
is prepared to adopt, the attention one may wish to give to context and the extent to 
which one adheres to positivism. These may well be reflected in the branch of medicine 
one chooses to follow.
Making choices; careers and consultation styles
One of the attractions of medicine as a career is that within the broad field of medicine are 
a wide variety of different kinds of job. All these specialties vary enormously in the degree 
of commitment needed, patient contact experienced, sensitivity to non-medical processes,
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manual dexterity required and in many other ways. Some are perceived as more important 
than others but possibly the most important is the degree of patient contact the trainee 
wishes to have. It can vary from none at all, as in pathology, to the considerable contact 
experienced in general practice. The pathologist in his or her laboratory can practice 
positivist medicine for much of the time because it is hard to imagine that the importance 
of context that characterise general practice will impinge on the pathologist’s day to day 
task. The tumour on the pathologist’s microscope slide does not have to be placed in the 
context of the patient’s lifestyle, only in the context of the organ from which it was taken. 
By contrast, the general practitioner will have to constantly place the disease or problem in 
context. It seems likely that general practitioners will have much more difficulty than the 
pathologist adhering to the requirements of practising positivist medicine. These simple 
hierarchies are portrayed in general terms below.


















Small room in a 
hospital
Context orientated medicine Community
The biochemist does not have to confront the need to place their knowledge in the context 
of everyday life in the same way that the neurologist will. The counsellor will have less 
need to pay regards to the requirements of positivist based medicine. The difficulties 
associated with practising scientific medicine in context, can be more easily disguised at 
each ends of this spectrum. However, the problem is made more apparent when one
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chooses, as I have done, to take up a more technical, science based specialty such as 
surgery and try and develop a practice that is more holistically orientated. I am asking 
myself to place what I do much more in context, in the context of the patient’s life and at 
the same time pay attention to the positivist aspect of my practice.
This difficulty is highlighted in a study in which experts in tumour treatment were all asked 
to consider a number of treatment options. The question of context played an important 
role in determining treatment outcomes and this was reflected in the variability of response 
seen in the clinicians, who took part. By the use of questionnaires, 40 clinicians with 
experience of treating tumours were asked to produce their views on treatment in three 
hypothetical situations.
" A 42 year old barrister, who drinks a bottle of wine a day and who is married to a 
physician presents with a poorly differentiated (cellularly aggressive) carcinoma of the 
floor of the mouth measuring 4cms in diameter. Glands on both sides of the neck contain 
tumour that has spread from the original site. There is no distant spread (e.g. lungs) but 
there is local pain at the site of the tumour."
(Maher EJ, 1990, 356-9)
If 40 clinicians suggests treatment protocols for three different clinical cases, 120 different 
protocols are possible. In this study, 119 different treatment schedules were put forward, 
suggesting very little overlap between clinicians views of correct treatment. At first glance 
the case above would seem like a reasonable description of a problem to invite a treatment 
protocol but why have certain pieces of information been included? Why barrister and 
why married to a physician? What difference should it make to the clinical treatment 
options if the patient is a barrister or even married to a physician? The implication, as I see 
it, is that this scenario will encourage the surgeon to think carefully about the options, 
come up with the most favourable treatment protocol and be prepared to logically argue 
such a position with a healthcare professional and a legal mind. But shouldn't doctors be 
doing this all the time ? Of course they should but I suspect that they don't and so the
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question implicitly, or even explicitly, acknowledges the existence of prejudice of at least 
one sort in thinking about treatments options. It was hardly surprising that there were so 
many different treatment protocols suggested because it comes as no surprise to learn that 
we are all going to react in different ways to this kind of qualitative input.
Furthermore the idea that a treatment plan can be adopted without a significant input from 
the patient was never raised in the study. This is odd because the treatment of such a 
condition is based around two broad options with key implications for the patient’s 
lifestyle. The first option is major surgery, a treatment plan that is painful for the patient, 
potentially disfiguring with only a small chance of cure The second option is to accept that 
the disease is terminal and opt for a palliative approach. This is a dilemma in treatment that 
occurs quite frequently and one, which we encounter in a patient later in this thesis 
(Appendix 1). Clearly such decisions are value laden that can only be made by the patient 
themselves and yet in such a study there was no opportunity to obtain this input from the 
patient.
In the discussion section of the paper it was suggested that "...case histories were 
abbreviated and real patients giving their own histories might have led respondents to 
different plans of management". (Maher EJ, 1990, 356-9) The suggestion is that this may 
be an inappropriate factor to consider in a research setting. What emerged in the study 
was that treatment plans were heavily influenced by previous personal experience on the 
part of the physician accounting perhaps for the wide variety of answers given. One can 
also obviously propose that previous experience on the part of the patient could also lead 
to a wide variety of treatment options and in my opinion they frequently do, even for the 
most apparently simple of problems.
The same study reappeared in a supplementary paper based on the same questionnaire but 
published in a ‘softer’ medical journal. In this report it was noted that there was a 
"difference as to which symptoms were perceived to be the most troublesome, and 
therefore in need of palliation.” and “overestimating the more objective "treatable"
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symptoms and underestimating more subjective problems of anorexia and fear of growing 
cancer, when patients and doctors were compared".
(Maher EJ, 1990, 185-9)
It isn’t necessary to have a complex medical problem such as the above to encounter these 
issues because, even before I embarked on this research project, I was finding that they 
could emerge in apparently the simplest of clinical problems. For example, the medical 
literature at the time would advocate tonsillectomy only for those patients who were 
experiencing more than four attacks of tonsillitis per year for more than three years 
(Paradise J.L. et al. 1978. p409-413). Yet there seem to be patients who did not strictly 
fulfil this criteria who might be expected to benefit from such an operation. By contrast 
there were patients who more than fulfilled the criteria for tonsillectomy and yet who were 
far from sure that this was the right treatment for them. It is possible to argue that most 
patients who were visiting outpatients had already made the decision to proceed with a 
tonsillectomy. If this was assumed and, as the surgeon, I described the operation, 
discussed operative risk, and recommended or not a tonsillectomy, the consultation would 
be over in a few minutes. I noticed that trainee staff, when they joined the department and 
started to see patients in the clinic, would frequently select such patients from the pile of 
notes because they did seem so straightforward. However, I found that if I were to adopt 
a less concrete position at the beginning of the consultation and introduced the idea of a 
more flexible approach e.g.
"J would like you to know that I  do not see it as my role to tell you that you need a 
tonsillectomy. That is a decision only you can make. I  am here to provide you with more 
information to help you make that decision. "
this approach would frequently unearth unexpected problems, benefits, anxieties that 
would I am sure, have remained unexpressed and hence unevaluated. Deciding what to do 
could suddenly become far from straight forward. So simply being familiar with the 
literature on the subject was insufficient. By creating an opportunity for patients to express
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a significant input into the decision making process, I found that I was frequently unable to 
implement what I thought was the intellectually appropriate answer because ‘it felt 
wrong’. The ‘intuitive recognition’ that it was the right treatment choice was absent even 
while the ‘intellectual’ basis for a good decision was there.
This started to generate a problem. My whole medical education had encouraged me to 
pay attention to the rational, analytical, positivist based approach to treatment and here I 
was finding that it was sometimes necessary to arbitrarily abandon it. Instead of using my 
scientific education as a yardstick for making decisions, I was resorting to what ‘felt 
right’. Nothing to date had taught me that the use of intuition in this way was appropriate, 
so how was I to judge the appropriateness of such an action? More importantly, how was 
I going to equate practising in this way with new data that I would acquire from reading 
the journals? How was the intellectual, rational ‘science of discovery’ going to relate to 
the feeling ‘science of implementation’?
I had two choices. On the one hand I could continue to practice medicine in this way, 
vaguely and rather randomly paying attention to either the literature or my intuition 
depending upon how I felt on that particular day. I could trust that my ‘experience’ would 
permit some kind of order to emerge or at the very least no serious mistake to be made. 
Alternatively I could continue by examining more systematically the relationship between 
intuition and evidence based practice and, as this thesis indicates, in 1990 I chose to 
explore the latter option.
Before I could even begin to consider qualitative research, I felt a need to break free from 
the idea that the only kind of knowledge that mattered when making a decision was 
positivist knowledge. Today as I write this, I wonder why I ever thought there should be 
any difficulty at all in accepting this but to someone educated to be ‘objective’, such a leap 
was difficult to make. It needed a moment of insight, a ‘jolt’ and this came with a 
condition, a medical condition, called Capgras’ syndrome.
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Intuitive Knowledge as ‘science’
One day whilst considering the problem of what to do when ‘intuitive recognition’ and 
‘intellectual recognition’ seemed to be at odds with one another, I read about Capgras's 
syndrome. Reading about this syndrome became a bridge that spanned the ‘old’ and the 
‘new’ ways of thinking. Because it was a medical syndrome it contained a language and 
logic that I could understand and so provided just that sufficient impetus to encourage me 
to reconsider where I stood on the question of what was meant by ‘knowledge’.
Capgras's syndrome was first described in 1923. In his first case, he described a 53 year 
old woman, who complained that her family was being replaced by identical doubles. Later 
she began to experience the same feeling about friends and neighbours and felt that she 
existed in a world of impersonators. About 300 other cases have since been identified 
including one, in which a son was so convinced that his father had been replaced by a 
robot that he cut open his throat to try to find the wires. At first it was thought that such 
individuals suffered from a form of paranoia but it is now thought that such individuals 
suffer from a failure o f ‘intuitive recognition’. Identification of objects, people, ideas, not 
only involves an ‘intellectual recognition’ but an ‘intuitive recognition’ or a sense of 
‘aha!’. The ‘aha’ feeling in these individuals is absent. Capgras's syndrome seems to arise 
from damage to a ‘sense of familiarity’ pathway in the brain and modem brain imaging is 
beginning to understand this more accurately. The reverse possibility of having ‘intuitive 
recognition’ but not ‘intellectual recognition’ also exists and is called Prosopagnosia. We 
occasionally obtain insights into this phenomenon when we experience deja vu.
What is the significance to me of this rare syndrome? Whilst reading about this I could 
see that I had been working and thinking in a world to which I only gave credence to 
‘intellectual’ recognition and understanding of phenomena. The medical world lends 
weight particularly to double blind, randomised, controlled trials and regards them as the 
only acceptable way of unravelling and understanding phenomena and disease to provide 
insights into what would be an appropriate treatment. For example, decisions to treat by
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surgery, radiotherapy or chemotherapy were to be based on the results of controlled 
randomised trials. No credence at all is given to the so called ‘aha!’ feeling, in fact this is 
regarded as an unscientific prejudice and all studies will endeavour to remove any such 
‘intuitive prejudice’. Capgras’ syndrome described what happened when the intuitive 
recognition pathway was damaged. I started to appreciate that when viewing any object, 
for example a tree, that not only was I processing light from the tree as it landed on my 
retina to produce an image that was a tree but before I could say to myself that “ah! haa! it 
is a tree.”, an additional process o f ‘intuitive recognition’ was needed.
My own belief system that I called ‘science’ was called into question by this insight. As I 
had been taught, from school, to university and thereafter I had been encouraged to think 
and act in a certain positivist way so that eventually I would only give ‘intuitive 
recognition’ to a certain kind of science. I might notice findings that didn’t fit in with this 
positivist view of science, even be interested in them, perhaps comment upon them, but I 
had learnt not to give them this ‘intuitive recognition’ of science and thus learnt to ignore 
them. Any finding that wasn’t positivist in construction would not be given that ‘ah! haa!’ 
feeling and that this response was a learned\ conditioned response. I was beginning to 
realise that I had become too narrow in my definition of what constituted ‘knowledge’. It 
was necessary to begin to break away from this narrow circumscribed definition of what 
constituted knowledge.
In a sense then, my approach to the question of knowledge, what constituted relevant 
knowledge had come full circle and I see this in relation to the changes I see in one of my 
children. I started this thesis shortly after my second child Laurence was bom and I cannot 
help but draw parallels between his development from baby to infant to boy and the 
development of my own PhD from germ of an idea to more organised thoughts. Both have 
taken about five years. But in one important way both he and I have gone in opposite 
directions. He has developed his ideas about the world by changing his experiences, 
thoughts and ideas from an apparently random collection of encounters to one of an 
organised world with meaning. I have taken to some extent the opposite path by taking my
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organised world, with for example specific definitions of what constituted knowledge, and 
expanded these into a somewhat disorganised world of knowledge. As he learnt to make 
inference from data, I was appraising data and the inference derived from it. As he was 
being conditioned, I was recognising the degree to which I had been conditioned. In order 
to make progress on this issue, it was going to be necessary to re-evaluate what 
constituted medical knowledge. How was this going to be done?
This process starts by asking a number of basic questions. Why has medical education 
concentrated on the development of a scientific approach? If this is a deliberate strategy 
then what is the purpose behind this strategy? If there is a purpose behind teaching this 
kind of medical approach to students, then what is the purpose underlying the practise of 
medicine itself and are they linked? Is it possible to start thinking whether medicine fulfils 
some other purpose other than the apparent one of healing? If this is so, then will an 
understanding of this purpose become important when considering the whole subject of 
decision making?
This approach enters a world where knowledge may be institutionally determined by 
traditional, cultural and historical practices, where intention and purpose may serve to 
influence what is accepted as knowledge and what is not. This meant beginning to see 
relevant clinical data as a particular interpretation circumscribed by a set of assumptions. 
This called for an approach that explored these assumptions and the historical and cultural 
influences that underpinned them.
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MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE
Medicine, surgery, science, ceremony, ritual, sacrifice and
magic.
Introduction
This is perhaps a curious and provocative subtitle for a section that is purporting to try 
and answer some of the questions posed at end of the previous section. What have 
ceremony, ritual, sacrifice and magic got to do with teaching medical students or the 
underlying purpose of medicine? The last section suggested that medical training shapes a 
particular positivist viewpoint, to the exclusion perhaps of other viewpoints in the medical 
student and doctor. This culminates in the belief that the only ‘medical knowledge’ that 
matters is knowledge based upon a structure of anatomy, physiology and biochemistry. I 
am suggesting that this epistemology may be too exclusive to be always useful in the 
practice of everyday medicine. This section represents an exploration into purpose behind 
medical practice. Such purpose might include the need for ritual, ceremony, magic, 
sacrifice, spiritual engagement or whatever. By paying attention to the possibility that 
other needs may play a part in the process, the concept of relevant ‘medical knowledge’ 
may be widened. What follows in this section is an attempt to broaden the notion of what 
is happening in a clinical encounter beyond the apparent one of a medical interaction 
where a doctor simply treats a patient. To do this I have attempted to once again look at 
everyday events in the hospital with a phenomenological perspective.
At the heart of phenomenology is a reflection on essence (universal properties) and their 
connections. This reflection requires ‘eidetic reduction’ and “by means of eidetic 
reduction, we shift our attention from a particular instance of a property to the abstract 
property (essence) itself’ (Grossman R.G. 1995 p658-660) This approach was an 
invitation to look for some indirect knowledge underlying the direct experience of the 
practice of medicine. In other words, what is the practice of medicine really about?
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Phenomenology begins with a general prescription to look at things again without 
prejudice, to try and loosen any paradigmatic assumptions that have so far limited 
interpretations. Such reflections try to get at the ‘essences’ and their connections with 
different cultures, with different ceremonies, and with other historical practices. In 
adopting this approach, I have attempted no special study of the relationship between such 
‘essences’ I felt might be present, for example common to surgery and sacrifice, although I 
did consider doing this at one time. The reason for not pursuing this approach was that 
such knowledge was almost certain to be non-empirical and such a journey would almost 
certainly have completely divorced me from my colleagues. These thoughts then represent 
some early ideas in a narrative account that served to jolt me out of a world bounded by a 
more conventional, medical interpretation of what was happening and should be viewed as 
such.
The first section Tonsillectomy, Inca sacrifice, witchcraft and maintaining belief 
systems takes an everyday operation, tonsillectomy, and looks at how the indications for 
this operation have changed over the years. As one indication becomes discredited, 
another emerges and I suggest that there may be reasons for this that connect what we do 
with the activities of other belief systems. This leads one to suggest that part of the 
underlying purpose behind medicine may be fulfilling a need for ritual, magic or sacrifice. 
This idea is extended to other areas of hospital activity in Outpatients as a visit to a 
temple. In Anatomy lesson I hypothesise that these underlying purposes are implicitly 
understood by the medical world and are introduced during training. I put forward the 
suggestion that the way medical students have been taught not only fragments a holistic 
view of human function but prepares them for the implicit role as a modem day priest.
This might partly explain the way that doctors view themselves and the way that doctors 
are viewed by others. In Validating these Observations I try to raise some arguments to 
substantiate these conjectures. In reading this it should be remembered that this whole 
section charts an attempt to completely re-examine the professional world I inhabit.
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Tonsillectomy, Inca sacrifice, Witchcraft and maintaining belief systems
Some time ago (1991) I was engaged in some traditional mainstream medical research.
The study examined sleeping disorders in children. There are a group of children, usually 
between the ages of three to six or seven years old, who have tonsils and adenoids that are 
so large that they cause problems. During rapid eye movement sleep and when muscle 
tone in the muscles of the pharynx diminishes, they will experience obstruction of their 
breathing. The oxygen levels in the blood will fall and they will gradually become aroused 
from sleep. Eventually they will wake up, regain pharyngeal muscle tone, open up the 
airway, start to breathe again and oxygen levels will return to normal. If this pattern is 
reproduced time and again during the night, there was evidence that severely effected 
individuals experienced heart and lung disorders of an irreversible nature. This is known as 
the sleep apnoea syndrome. Severely effected individuals are rare but it is much more 
common to see children who are more modestly affected by sleep apnoea. It was assumed 
that in these individuals the condition was also harmful. An understanding of this problem 
meant statistically analysing the results of overnight oxygen measurements, urinary growth 
hormone levels and a host of other parameters. But the question I started to ask was; Why 
had it taken until the late twentieth century to recognise this condition?
Tonsillectomy is a traditional operation of ear, nose and throat surgeons and has formed a 
substantial part of their day to day practice. What I noticed was that as recurrent 
tonsillitis, the traditional rationale for tonsillectomy, was falling slightly out of favour, a 
new more ‘scientific’ re-interpretation was emerging to maintain it’s place in medical 
practice. Kuhn has maintained that scientific thinkers may be prepared to consider 
alternatives but continue to have a protective attitude towards established theory. He 
called this protective attitude secondary elaboration and one function of this is to maintain 
a belief system. (Kuhn, 1972. p78). Was this an example of secondary elaboration to 
maintain a belief system? An examination of the operation in it’s historical context might 
help decide if this was the case.
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Tonsillectomies and partial tonsillectomies have been performed for at least three 
millennia. Ancient Hindus about 1000 BC advocated removal of one third of the tonsil. 
Celsus in 50 AD, Galen (AD 121-201), Aetius of Amida (AD 490) and Paulus Aegineta 
(AD 625-690) all describe the operation and suggested developments in the technique to 
remove the tonsil. Guillotine tonsillectomy was described in 1828 by Physick and the 
contemporary method of removal by dissection was described in 1897 by Ballinger. 
Reasons why tonsils were removed in ancient times are unknown but in recent times, in 
the last two hundred years, the main indication has been for recurrent tonsillitis but 
tonsillectomy has been advocated for a wide variety of other conditions. These include 
frequent head colds, recurrent ear infections, glands in the neck, recurrent fever, recurrent 
hoarseness, frequent nosebleeds, frequent headaches, restlessness, rheumatic fever, 
growing pains, rheumatic carditis, loss of appetite, failure to thrive, mental retardation and 
bed wetting at night. (Barrington-Ward, 1922. pi 101-6; Paterson & Bray, 1928, 1074-5; 
Bartlett, 1928. p26-35; Kaiser, 1930. p837-42; Guymer, 1934. p85-113; Clein, 1952. 
p568-73; Paradise, 1983. p992-1006). Furthermore, chronic infection in childhood could 
lead later in life to “psychosis, gastric and duodenal ulceration, pernicious anaemia, urinary 
stones, acne, optic neuritis and Meniere's disease”. This association was based on the idea 
that chronic infection in one part of the body could, by transmission of the micro­
organisms or toxins, lead to problems in another (Billings, 1916.). Nevertheless, despite 
these curious and constantly shifting indications for removal of tonsils the operation 
continued to be very frequently performed. In 1931 a study observed that one third of 
school leavers in London had had their tonsils removed and in the twenty years between 
1920 and 1940 the tonsillectomy rate was about 50% (Collins & Sydenstricker, 1927). 
This could vary between 1.6% to 61% depending upon the area from which the children 
came, or depending upon the examining doctor. In highly selected privileged groups, it 
may even be higher. In 1938 it was reported that on average 75% of boys entering Eton 
public school had undergone tonsillectomy prior to admission. There were also great 
variations in incidence of tonsillectomy from one country to another. During the same pre­
war period, tonsillectomy was much less common in Germany for only 0.5% of secondary 
children in Munich had undergone a tonsillectomy (Glover, 1938. p 1219-36). This brief
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review should make it clear that although there has always been a great variation in the 
incidence of tonsillectomy depending upon social background, doctor, current medical 
belief systems, country etc. the operation has been performed for three thousand years in 
many different countries.
Most of the reasons for tonsillectomy promulgated in the past seem ludicrous to us today 
but what seems to have happened is that as ‘progress’ took place, the reasons for 
tonsillectomy would alter and indications for tonsillectomy appropriate for the scientific 
viewpoint of the day would displace ‘outdated’ notions. This obviously led me to consider 
whether or not my own work on tonsillectomy was yet another ‘secondary elaboration to 
maintain a belief system’. Did the strategy to justify tonsillectomy alter whilst the purpose, 
the real purpose, remain unaltered?
It was already clear that there was a certain sustainability about tonsillectomy as a 
procedure that seemed to go beyond it’s apparent function in the surgical portfolio. As an 
operation “it wouldn’t die easily.” Was a threat to the need for such an operation 
challenging a belief system that went beyond the bounds of rational science? Was 
challenging this ancient operation as a surgical procedure challenging not only the 
operation but surgery in general? Was surgery itself an elaboration to maintain a belief 
system? If so what was the underlying belief system that was being challenged by 
challenging the role of surgery in this way? Was the ritual itself part of a belief system? 
Nadel and Firth have both attempted to define the notion of ritual and it would seem to me 
that surgery, or at least some surgery, may be fulfilling these requirements.
“When we speak of ‘ritual’ we have in mind first of all actions exhibiting striking or 
incongruous rigidity, that is, some conspicuous regularity not accounted for by the 
professed aims of the actions. Any type of behaviour may thus be said to turn into a 
‘ritual’ when it is stylised or formalised, and made repetitive in that form. When we call a 
ritual ‘religious’ we further attribute to the action a particular manner of relating means to 
ends which we know to be inadequate by empirical standards, and which we commonly
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call irrational, mystical or supernatural”(Nadel, 1954.) Firth saw ritual as “as a rite or 
verbal formula projecting man’s desires into the external world on a theory of human 
control, to some practical end, but as far as we can see based cn false premises.” (Firth R. 
1958. pi 24) The sustainability of the operation of tonsillectomy leads me to consider 
whether the operation has a strong ritualistic, spiritual or magical component to it.
My search for some underlying purpose has resulted in a profusion of words here; ritual, 
spiritual, magical, all of which may be to some extent interconnected. It might be 
appropriate to start with perhaps the least contentious notion and look for the role of 
ritual in surgery. Is a surgical operation a rite according to the definition of such a 
procedure as “a rite or verbal formula projecting man’s desires into the external world on 
a theory of human control, to some practical end, but as far as we can see based on false 
premises.” (Firth 1958. p i24)
Surgery as a ritual would seem to be a relatively straightforward point to begin. Some 
operations with religious connection are clearly ritualistic. A circumcision in Western 
countries and clitorectomy performed as part of an Islamic adolescent coming of age are 
clear cut examples of rituals. But there are operations where the sense of ritual may be less 
obvious but may be signifying transitions in life. Vasectomy in men and hysterectomy in 
women may be denoting the passing of the procreative phase in life. Other operations 
might also denote transition points in life; prostatectomy (ejaculation generally ceases after 
the traditional prostatectomy) suggests the cessation of biological sexual function; gall 
bladder removal and coronary artery bypass grafts are statements about transitions from a 
lifestyle that produces diseases of excess intake. Sometimes, at the end of life there is the 
ritualistic surgical attempt to stave off death by malignant disease or coronary artery 
bypass surgery; transitionary surgery from life into death. Could tonsillectomy be part of 
the transition into adolescence? I am not suggesting that the need for ritual constitutes the 
sole reason for surgery, but I am suggesting there is something here about passage and 
rites of passage.
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For myself, I have little difficulty in appreciating the ritualistic element in surgery but I 
would like to take this hypothesis a little further and suggest hidden within all this there is 
something else happening. For want of a better word I call this sacrifice. Put another way, 
I am asking whether there are ‘essences’ in contemporary medical practice that can be 
related to a more traditional notion of sacrifice? Here I am on really tricky ground 
because there is no real evidence as such for speculations of this sort, other than observing 
and experiencing hospital life both as a patient and as a doctor.
I have just read a most moving account of the discovery of the remains of a young girl, 
probably no more than eight years old, who was found 19,000 feet up Nevado Ampato in 
the Peruvian Peaks. She was found resting in a tomb, surrounded by valuable objects, and 
was thought to be part of a sacrifice to the Inca Gods nearly five hundred years ago.
“In the morning, she may have taken a drink of chicha; if so, the alcohol would have
clouded her mind We can only suppose what the girl’s last moments were like.
Although she must have been frightened, she may have felt honoured to be selected as a 
sacrifice, imagining that she was entering a glorious afterlife with the gods in a palace 
within the mountain.”
(Reinhard, 1996. p79)
In the article, there are accompanying pictures of her small pairs of shoes and other 
artefacts associated with a small girl. She might not have entered the palace she was 
hoping for but she elicited a most moving response in a twentieth century surgeon as he 
types away at his word processor five hundred years later and no doubt many others who 
also read the article. I have no way of knowing whether the priests carried this little girl up 
the mountain would know that eventually this act would re-emerge as an experience for 
others many years later, but the power of such an event, the influence of sacrifice of this 
sort is clear to me. Although I would have previously regarded such action by the Inca 
priests as quite divorced from my function as a twentieth century surgeon, given the
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aforementioned frame of mind, I find myself asking whether my actions as a surgeon is in 
any way equivalent to the behaviour of those Inca priests five hundred years ago?
I began to consider for a moment the operation of adeno-tonsillectomy frequently 
performed on young children and asked myself; Is there anything about this activity that 
could be equated with the notion of sacrifice? As I see it, the answer is that there may be. 
Such surgery carries with it a small risk of death, is a seasonal operation so is more 
common in the winter (possibilities here of seasonal sacrifice for a good summer harvest), 
more likely to be undertaken on social class three, four and five (less powerful ? 
dispensable members of the community), children (sacrificing to the Gods my best/most 
precious animal/possession), young children (pure and unsullied), fasted and given a 
premedication (something to cloud the mind), anaesthetised (made senseless by magic 
concoctions), undertaken by surgeons (high priests/druids etc.), who have spent years 
training (initiation rituals), in operating gowns (ceremonial dress), surrounded by nurses 
(virgins), in hospitals (temples). It can be seen that this is a heady concoction of archetypal 
themes that can at least echo the activities of the Inca community or any other community 
that we might regard as ‘primitive’. I accept that each of these associations with 
contemporary practice may well be justified on scientific grounds but I could also argue 
that they may be little more than secondary elaboration to justify a more fundamental 
archetypal need; perhaps the need for sacrifice of some sort.
But why, one is led to ask, do we need sacrifice? It has been suggested that the need for 
such sacrificial ritual might be ‘to ritualise man’s optimism’ in the face of problems. 
(Malinowski, 1925. p90). This may, or may not, be true but there is no doubt that 
maintaining such a need for sacrifice in this manner carries with it certain risks. If that is 
so, then what is the attitude of the general population to this risk? For if society accepts 
such risks, this may say something about perceived need or benefit.
One constantly needs reminding that surgery is a procedure with substantial risk. 
Nevertheless, I have always found it difficult to appreciate why society seems to accept
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that death will sometimes happen at all. For example, the risk of death from tonsillectomy 
is usually considered to be in the region of 1:15,000 but to me this risk seems enormously 
high. As a surgeon, who undertakes many tonsillectomies, I take the view that a single 
death during a tonsillectomy would negate all the benefit from 15,000 successful 
tonsillectomies. Curiously though, society seems to accept this level of risk for in one 
study “over 90% of the parents felt that they understood the risks of anaesthesia, that the 
discussion of the risks would have no effect on their decision to proceed with surgery.” 
(Waisel D. 1995. p200)
The surgical literature seems to accept that an occasional death is an acceptable price to be 
paid for successful surgery because each year in this country three or four children will die 
whilst undergoing a tonsillectomy. Put like this, I start to wonder what it is that makes the 
attitude and practice of earlier societies such as the Inca society 500 years ago dissimilar 
from ours to today. Suddenly within the midst of a scientific subject, I find, “the rebirth of 
ancient topics of craft, artistry and myth-topics whose fate positivism once claimed to 
have sealed.” (Schon. DA. 1983. p48). Suddenly “treatment can be viewed partly as a 
magical system.” (Posner, 1984. p50).
If for a moment it can be accepted by the reader that there is at least a small number of 
surgical procedures that have a ritualistic, ceremonial or sacrificial component, what 
further evidence can be gathered from more mundane practices within a hospital? Where is 
the ceremony, ritual and magic in, for example, a simple visit to outpatients?
Outpatients as a visit to a temple.
In more recent times, as early as 4000 BC religions clearly identified certain of their deities 
with healing. The temples of Saturn, and later of Asclepius in Asia Minor, were recognised 
as healing centres. Brahmic hospitals were founded in 431 BC in Sri Lanka and in 230 BC 
in Hindustan. The modem concept of the hospital dates from AD 331, when Constantine
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following his conversion to Christianity, abolished all pagan hospitals. The Christian 
tradition of medicine emphasised the close relationship of the sufferer to his fellow man 
and thus illness came to be a matter for the Christian church. Later on, in the middle ages, 
throughout Europe and the Arabic world, great hospitals were established by religious 
foundations, and infirmaries were attached to abbeys, monasteries, priors and convents. 
“Doctors and nurses in these institutions were members of religious organisations and 
combined spiritual with religious healing.” (Encyclopaedia Brittanica. 1991, p890).
Many hospitals today bear testimony to their historical origins with names like St 
Thomas’s, St Martins, St George’s, Mount Sinai etc and it leads one to consider whether 
there is then a connection between the decline in the number of churches and church 
attendance and growth in the number of hospitals and hospital attendance. As churches, 
dedicated to the celebration of death and built to celebrate what we cannot see, decline in 
numbers, hospitals, dedicated to the celebration of life and built to celebrate what we can 
see, increase in numbers. Both celebrate in a sense the same thing; life or it’s antithesis 
death. Hospitals might indeed be considered then as a secondary elaboration from 
churches and built to maintain a belief system surrounding what happens at the moment of 
death.
This relationship, between the structure and the activity undertaken within the structure, 
has been called the ‘edifice complex’. It occurs when the “patients invest the hospital itself 
with a healing function, and assume that whatever goes on within it’s walls is done to help 
them.” (Frank J. 1978) In psychoanalytic terms it is transference to the institution.
Viewed with this new perspective in mind, a visit to outpatients may be seen in a different 
way as a temple, as a church or as a place o f ‘worship’. Just like priests, senior doctors 
and surgeons are usually men. They are located in temples, known as hospitals, the 
importance of which, like temples, is based on size. It has been observed that “western 
therapists commonly utilise the edifice complex to raise client expectations, although they 
are not usually aware of using it.” (Torrey E. p60, 1986) Patients will usually be prepared
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to travel to hospital and sometimes this ‘pilgrimage’ will be a considerable distance and at 
some personal cost. I have known patients travel from Bath to London to see someone for 
less than five minutes and some may well have given up a half a days work, and hence pay, 
in order to make this visit. Upon arriving the patient is met by a courtier/acolyte, better 
known as a receptionist, who with others (nurses) control access to the surgeon. These 
other courtiers are often women who have given up their lives to serve within this 
organisation, many of them are unmarried and wear uniforms and hats that bear a striking 
resemblance to those of religious institutions such as nunneries. There is a crowded 
waiting room full of people waiting for an audience; the more people who wait and the 
longer they wait the more this seems to reflect on the importance of the surgeon.
When the patient enters the consultation room, the furniture is unfamiliar, with a number 
of ceremonial implements on display such as shiny medical instruments. There is a large 
chair for the doctor, small one for the patient, separated by a large desk. The ‘pilgrim’ 
might be asked to take off their clothes, which is then replaced by a long white gown 
looking for all the world just like a pilgrim's gown. Sometimes this is done before the 
‘pilgrim’ even enters the room denying such a patient any opportunity to project 
themselves as an individual. The room is often slightly darkened to make it easier to use 
lights, which are used to shine into orifices e.g. mouth, ear, anus, vagina. In my specialty 
the light is worn on the head like a crown and almost invariably this bright light is shone 
into the eyes and face of the patient as part of the examination. It is interesting to note that 
in cartoons and doctors are often represented by gowned individuals wearing a 
headlight/mirror. In actual practice very few doctors actually use this device. Why should 
this be the case unless it is indicating something else as well as portraying a doctor? The 
picture one conjures up is that of facing someone, who is higher than you, in a larger 
chair, who is shining a bright light into the face which makes it impossible to look directly 
at them.
A detailed history or ‘confession’ is then taken. Sometimes the patient will be sent down 
to the x-ray department, a smaller ‘side temple’ with a ‘magical’ device, and may return
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with an x-ray film. Here one can begin to really connect with other medical cultures, with 
superstition and magic. The doctor now takes the x-ray from the packet and ‘reads the 
bones’. A visitor from outer space might see no qualitative difference between this activity 
and a visit to a native doctor in central Africa, who would also take a history and after 
throwing gorilla knuckles onto the ground, ‘read the bones’, (conversation with medical 
friend). As some have observed it is part of the unconscious medical imperialism that we 
show towards other systems of medicine that “we implicitly and automatically assume that 
therapy that goes on in an office in a modern skyscraper or in a complex medical centre 
must be scientific, whereas therapy that goes on in a grass hut must be magical. If one is 
magic then so is the other.” (Torrey E. p 11-12, 1986)
In fact we embrace superstition and magic in our everyday lives; we are superstitious 
about the number 13; ten million rabbits foots are sold every year in the United States of 
America; we knock on wood; we walk around ladders; read the astrologers predictions of 
the future; we turn bread and water into body and blood and all are reminders of our 
contact with the world of magic. It would be surprising if we did not expect to find it at all 
in the healthcare system and as Torrey has suggested “it may be that we don’t want to see 
this magic in our lives, so we just see it in witchdoctors and call what we do as ‘science’ .” 
(Torrey E. pl3, 1986)
I find myself beginning to consider that much of everyday western medical practice has it’s 
counterpart in the medical practice of other cultures in the world and to be rooted in 
historical traditions of worship and healing. To see the connection it is necessary to look 
beyond the technology and look at the activity at the level of intent, belief structure and 
archetypal theme, not at the level of syringes, scalpels and x-ray machines. Much as we 
would like to concentrate on the considerable progress in treatment that has been made in 
the last two hundred years, at the deeper level I am left wondering if little has changed 
since the dawn of modern man, a mere 40,000 years ago.
In trying to present the argument that under some of the activity of the medical profession
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lies a deeper need for ceremony, ritual, need for magic and sacrifice, I admit to having 
chosen to highlight those examples where I think that this is more evident. It does not 
mean that I deny the importance of medicine of relieving pain, treating the injured, 
comforting the sick etc. but admit the possibility that other things may be happening as 
well. I would see some hospital episodes as having a significant ceremonial, ritualistic and 
sacrificial components, e.g. a circumcision, and I would see other episodes as having 
virtually no ceremonial, ritualistic or sacrificial component, e.g. treatment of tuberculosis. 
It suggests that an awareness of these other needs may play a part in understanding why 
decisions for surgery may be made.
Anatomy Lesson
My arguments so far are suggesting a more complex role played by the actors than simply 
engaging in healing. If that is the case, then is there ‘evidence’ that this is reflected in the 
way that medical students are prepared to take on this role? In discussing how the medical 
student is prepared for their role of ‘modern day priest’, I have chosen to emphasise the 
subject of anatomy. The reason for doing this is historical and personal. It is historical 
because the subject of anatomy has played an important role in the systematisation of 
medical thought. It is personal because my own response to taking part in dissection first 
made me conscious that something more than anatomy was taking place.
Introduction of anatomical dissection was, of course, part of a much wider change in the 
approach of science and scientific thought. The prepositivist Aristotelian attitude of 
‘passive observer’ had lasted for nearly two millennia and was becoming transformed by 
the ‘active observer’ positivist science of Newton and those who followed. (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985. p i8-9). This was reflected in medicine and medical education by ‘active’ 
dissection of human and animal cadavers. So it could be argued that the introduction of 
anatomy dissection in the late middle ages was the first step in the process that changed 
the way the human body was regarded by the medical profession and began the
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mechanistic approach that characterises modern medicine. This analysis of human form 
into discrete and separate components has come to be reflected organisationally, after two 
or three centuries, in the way the medicine is practised at hospital level. Each specialty 
concentrates on certain anatomical areas of the body; respiratory physicians, 
neurosurgeons, renal physicians, urologists, ear nose and throat surgeons all have an 
interest defined by anatomical boundaries. Medical practice could have been classified in 
different ways, for example according to age or sex or star sign or whatever but the way it 
is currently organised probably owes its origins to the study of anatomy. For the last two 
hundred years anatomical form has been principally responsible for the way medicine is 
organised. However, in addition to making the argument that the study of anatomy has 
been instrumental in the fragmentation of the holistic view of human health and disease, I 
am advocating that there is a secondary function in preparing for the role of ‘high priest’. 
It is this secondary role that I wish to discuss in greater detail.
Making the case that the study of anatomy prepares the student for a role of ‘priest’ is a 
difficult argument to make convincingly but the first point to make it that dissection of the 
human body breaks a great taboo, perhaps the great taboo. I found that breaking this 
taboo was accompanied by a certain fascination, some revulsion and not a small degree of 
voyeurism. Historically, this taboo was first broken by dissection of less fortunate, 
marginalised groups so that it was part of the punishment of an executed criminal to be 
dissected in public. The execution was in public and so was the subsequent dissection. 
Rembrandts painting, The Anatomy Lesson o f Dr Tulp was, “..of a horse thief Aris Kindt 
who had been executed in Amsterdam on January 31st 1632. In those days anatomies had 
to be in winter because otherwise the cadaver would stink. Winter was the season for 
anatomies in the same way there were ball and hunting seasons, with the public buying 
tickets to anatomies carried out in theatres just like any other entertainment. Rembrandt
had gone along to make drawings of the corpse It is the voyeurs ultimate dream of
furtive pleasure, looking with impunity through the keyhole of death.” (Morley, 1995. 
pi 40) Medical faculties would be granted a licence to dissect the corpses of criminals, for
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example in 1694 the Edinburgh Town Council granted ten members of the university’s 
medical faculty the corpses of “foundlings, suicides and homicides for dissection.” 
(Newman, 1988. p 63)
In some parts of the world this is still happening today. A colleague recently attended a 
conference in Singapore where surgical demonstrations were conducted on fresh corpses. 
When some delegates inquired how they were obtained for the course, they were informed 
they were executed criminals, who in return for special privileges in the last few days of 
life, had given permission for their bodies to be used in this way. This had made it possible 
for the course organisers to have a corpse that was only an hour or so old. Most delegates 
were deeply disturbed to learn of this fact and a number withdrew from the course. The 
voyeuristic aspect of watching the body being dissected has recently been highlighted by 
the attempted publication, halted at the last minute by legal action, of a film of common 
operations performed in the National Health Service (Everyday Operations. Reference 
unavailable). The panic about the video has been curious. As one commentator remarked
“Commentators have struggled and failed, to mark clear distinctions along the sliding scale
that includes intellectually-motivated curiosity, voyeurism and exploitation It is rather
that this reminds us of how complex the issues are surrounding the public display of the 
human body, its relationship to notions of public decency and its role as an effective forum
for demonstration of intellectual curiosity But it was not so long ago that such
curiosity was deemed the hallmark of the cultivated man.”
(Irving M. 1996.)
What does all this publicity about dissection mean? It means that whatever happens in a 
medical school is very much in the eye of the general public and today, two hundred years 
later, many patients have an inkling of what happens when a student undergoes training. 
This becomes part of the “social sanction for the therapist in the broadest sense and 
reputation in the narrowest sense.” (Torrey E. p63, 1986)
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When I first took part in anatomical dissection, I was immediately struck by the ritualistic, 
primitive nature of what we were doing. Instead of a rite of passage involving tattooing, 
circumcision etc. we seemed to be engaged in a rite of passage involving anatomical 
dissection. It seemed an extraordinary powerful a position to be in, being able to look 
inside a dead body in the most intimate way imaginable. We all seemed to be conscious of 
breaking the great taboo of touching, handling, dismantling people. This was given greater 
impact by the fact that all this occurred on virtually the first day of the course. Perhaps this 
early experience of breaking a significant taboo helped when it came to breaking other 
taboos, such as asking awkward and personal questions of patients. Certainly from my 
point of view, being a witness to dissection left me feeling different in a way that I find 
difficult to describe. Curious, repelled, tainted, touched whatever but effected none the 
less and made more so by the curiosity extended towards you by other students who 
wanted to know “what it was like” and who occasionally secreted themselves into the 
anatomical dissection room to satisfy their own curiosity.
If this process really served a useful purpose in learning anatomy, I should be able to look 
back and say to myself that it may have been an unpleasant but it was invaluable as a 
learning opportunity and this knowledge couldn’t have been acquired in any other way. 
What is retrospectively evident is how little of the information gained in this way was of 
any clinical use in everyday practice. When I embarked on a career in surgery and worked 
for postgraduate surgical exams, it all had to be done again. Dentists, who spend a lifetime 
doing little more than filling teeth, embark on a years’ course studying anatomy of the 
head, with careful dissection of structures that they never see again, acquiring knowledge 
that they never use again. All this certainly makes one raise the possibility that there are 
other purposes for undergoing the ceremony of anatomical dissection.
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What is the evidence for believing these observations have disturbed 
some in-built assumptions?
I am conscious that so far I have engaged upon considerable speculation based on 
personal experience. How do I justify to myself that a reappraisal of assumptions was 
taking place? I recognise that I do so as a kind of emotional response to these ‘insights’, 
usually humour or embarrassment, which I choose for the moment to call ‘emotional 
validation’. What do I mean by this?
When my colleague and I had made the connection about ‘reading the bones’ and x-rays 
related earlier, we had both broken into laughter. This laughter, we agreed, had arisen out 
of a realisation that we had previously failed to notice this particular and real for us 
connection between our everyday scientific practice and something much more apparently 
primitive. This is quite like one form of triangulation that has been referred to as 
respondent validation (Cohen & Manion 1989 p278). However, I mean more than that. I 
have worked in hospitals for many years without even considering the question of 
ceremony, ritual or sacrifice, but once I began to see the organisation within which I work 
I experienced an emotion when I recognised components that suggested these things. For 
example it made me smile with recognition when I saw a traditional nurses hat and ‘saw’ a 
nun’s wimple. It made me embarrassed when I realised that before I was aware of such 
historical influences I would, as a matter of form, fail to introduce myself to patients on a 
ward round. After all, patients should know who I was. In fact most doctors, especially 
the most recently qualified, failed to introduce themselves properly, a pattern of behaviour 
quite different from everyday convention. This began to suggest that feelings of humour, 
embarrassment, irritation, surprise could be hallmarks that suggested a process of change 
or a re-evaluation of assumptions was taking place. I do not take the view that such 
feelings represented rigorous qualities of change of viewpoint but when they occurred 
time and again they began in my mind to be worthy, in this situation at any rate, of being 
considered as responses that confirmed something was happening. Goleman issues a word 
of warning in this respect by commenting that emotions can be regarded as reactions in the
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present for events in the past. ‘Emotional thinking’ of this sort tends to be self confirming 
(Goleman, 1995. p295). If I adopted a new stance, one that suggested that challenging 
previous assumptions about medical practice was a useful one, what was the process that 
validated it for me? How do I justify to myself the statement that ‘emotional validity’ 
exists?
I do so purely on a pragmatic basis but the pathway to this pragmatism is not 
straightforward. Saying that I believe that ‘emotional validity’ exists is a cognitive stance 
that includes both my belief and what I take to be my knowing. Implied within this is an 
attitude towards the strategies and methods necessary to acquire further beliefs and 
abandon old ones. So that if I am told or tell someone that ‘emotional validity’ exists but I, 
or they, do not believe it, the new perspective is unlikely to lead to further insights. This 
leads in turn to a discussion on the source of a right to believe. In my case it arose from a 
starting position that made me unwilling to adhere to my previous epistemology and was 
affirmed by the fact that the early process of loosening my belief in positivism and starting 
to examine the world through other frameworks, appeared to lead to insights that were 
useful. They were useful in that they permitted new inferences that ‘appeared’ to be 
justified. What made them appear to be justified? Firstly they seemed to inform in a 
reliable manner as evidenced by sustainability and usefulness, and secondly they seemed to 
provide a more coherent explanation of my working environment. Certain phenomena 
made more sense when previously they made none.
I don’t propose to enter into a discourse about the taxonomy of justification, except to say 
that if things appear to be that way, then I am likely to adhere to this view until I have 
reason to doubt it. Of course the belief sceptic will respond by advocating that no one has 
a right to any of their beliefs because none are better than others. On this basis any kind of 
justification is impossible. This in turn leads me to be consider whether the whole process 
of validation is asking one to demonstrate that their beliefs align closely enough with 
another’s to be taken seriously. If someone else perceives the world in a way that is 
significantly different from my own perception, then how can I expect to achieve coherent
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validation in their eyes, unless I stick to ‘safe’ conjecture? Others have expressed the same 
thoughts.
"It is fallacious to conclude that the propositions of a system of thought can be proved, 
disproved, or evaluated on the basis of axioms within that system, since the process 
becomes self-justifying. This means that it is not possible to determine the validity or 
contributions of different research strategies in any absolute sense in terms of evaluative 
stances that draw on the same assumptions as do any of the research strategies examined. 
Unless it is possible to find an independent point of reference against which the nature and 
claims of different research strategies can be assessed, all evaluative efforts encounter a 
relativism in which it may be possible to say that one research strategy may be more 
effective for a specific purpose than for another....but ultimately the different research 
strategies do different things, and that as far as their contributions and knowledge claims 
are concerned we should conclude that "anything goes"
(Morgan 1983. p370)
Where is all this leading? It is to point out that this section represents the beginnings of a 
transition of belief from one epistemological stance to another and there has to be a 
moment when belief that this may be an appropriate way forward provides the impetus to 
continue the journey. However, if this transition is examined carefully enough, it may be 
impossible to extract myself from a position of self-referencing justification. Nevertheless, 
in empirical terms, such a loosening of assumptions enabled me to reconsider what I 
regard as relevant ‘data’. I noticed, as I did this, that I was, for a moment, prepared to 
suspend the notion of rigorous justification as I began to shift ontology. So part of my 
argument today is that it may be necessary to reduce criticality by suspending belief to 
effect change but, and this may be difficult, to retain criticality as this shift progresses. The 
same criticality that monitors such a change might indeed be a hindrance in permitting 
such a change. It makes me consider the position of critical awareness carefully because in 
certain circumstances it may become an obstacle to evolution of thought.
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This section represents early moments when my original assumptions about data and 
validity were disturbed and when I began to appreciate the need for a new set of criteria to 
judge validity. Continuing to adhere to positivist principles of validity was going to be 
inappropriate in contemplating qualitative research. Just as Capgras’ syndrome provided 
the ‘jolt’ to consider alternative forms of data as knowledge, ‘emotional validity’ provided 
the jolt necessary to accept new forms of validity criteria.
This section then represent the beginnings of a search for a self inquiry system “that 
illuminates previously hidden core assumptions” (Torbert 1983 p273). It represents the 
beginning of a creativity cycle characterised by three phases of circumspection, “a phase 
of unbounded wild speculation and free association,” pre-emption, a phase of exploration 
and evaluation and finally control. (Banister, Burman, et al. 1994 p i44)
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RESTRUCTURING THE MEANING OF 
‘SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE’
Introduction
The previous sections have suggested that I have been educated to think of relevant, 
clinical ‘knowledge’ only within a positivist perspective and such an approach tends to 
marginalise qualitative based knowledge that cannot be presented within such a 
perspective. This meant recognising that medical knowledge was theory and value driven 
and this implied that the patient’s own medical knowledge would be theory and value 
driven as well. It was an assumption to maintain that the theory and values that 
underpinned medical data were superior to the theory and values that underpinned 
patient’s medical data.
This section explains how I was preparing to shift from a positivist to a constructivist 
ontology. Since part of my early difficulties were related to the separation of theory from 
practice (Argyris, Putnam, et al. 1985 p4) this meant that what I was prepared to accept as 
data began to change. This commenced with acknowledging the work of Heron that 
propositional knowing is dependent upon other forms of knowing and I offer an 
interpretation of this idea within the context of a medical encounter. Using an 
ethnographic approach, I suggest that there exists a complex network of knowledges that 
includes compassionate, organisational, community, traditional, cultural, technical, 
ceremonial, ritual, spiritual and sacrificial knowledges that pervade medical practice to a 
greater or lesser degree.
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An extended epistemology of knowledge
Heron, in his exploration of knowledge introduced a model of holistic knowledge which 
‘‘holds that propositional knowledge, expressed in statements that something is the case, is 
dependent upon three other kinds of knowing; practical knowing, or knowing how to 
exercise a skill; presentational knowing, an intuitive grasp of the significance of patterns as 
expressed in graphic, plastic, moving, musical and verbal art-forms; and experiential 
knowing, imaging and feeling the presence of some energy, entity, person, place, process 
or thing.”(Heron j  1996. p52) Most doctors, I believe, when considering this definition of 
knowledge would recognise the importance of practical knowing and presentational 
knowing in their daily professional lives. The practical skills involved in listening to the 
heart sounds take a long time to acquire and anyone who has made the effort to do so 
understands what has been obtained. Similarly, much diagnosis depends upon the ‘intuitive 
grasp of patterns’ and as medical students we all remember those teachers who had an 
uncanny ability to make the correct diagnosis on the flimsiest of evidence because they had 
intuitively recognised these patterns. I would like to extend this idea, away from the 
straightforward acquisition of medical skills, and suggest that there are other forms of 
practical knowing such as compassionate, cultural, organisational knowing that develop so 
subtly that one is almost unaware of acquiring them. For example, how do you acquire 
‘compassionate knowledge’?
I have to give bad news so often as a doctor that it would seem to me to take a truly 
insensitive individual who did not gradually obtain a more compassionate way of 
delivering such news. Without fully realising how it happens, I suspect that most acquire 
this skill in knowing what to say and saying it appropriately, although I am not aware of 
any study that has specifically looked at this. For example, there would appear to be a 
considerable difference between giving bad news to a single parent of twenty with breast 
cancer and an eighty year old widower with coronary artery disease. The subtle patterns 
that make up these differences and should lead to a more ‘appropriate’ way of delivering
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this information in terms of outlook, use of metaphor etc. are ones that I would expect 
experienced doctors to recognise.
With this in mind, I began to look for other forms of knowledge, cultural, organisational 
and others, that permeates medical practice. In this respect Heron’s definition of knowing 
is useful because it encourages one to extend the realm from which data is normally 
generated. Experiential knowing he saw as ‘knowing, imaging and feeling the presence of 
some energy, entity, person, place, process or thing.’ (Heron J. p 52, 1996) Here, I 
suspect, most doctors, including myself at onetime, would start to falter. Where is the 
place for ‘presence of energy, entity, person, place, process or thing’ in the scientific 
medical world of chloride ion transfer through membranes, double blind controlled trials 
and cisplatinum chemotherapy?
As I have already indicated, I was beginning to see that by placing contemporary medical 
practice in a historical and cultural context in a semi ethnographic fashion, I can ‘see’ 
connections with other belief systems of medicine from other countries and other ages.
One cannot present conventional proof that such connections are present because it is only 
by recognising the patterns that are similar to both that the connections can be 
understood. As described earlier, I ‘see’ surgery in relation to sacrifice; I ‘see’ outpatients 
as religious temples. I understand these connections, these relationships, as operating at 
this ‘experiential’ level. Understanding these experiential insights doesn’t come easily.
If I talk to doctors about any similarity between contemporary medicine with other 
medical systems, some immediately lose interest possibly because they do not wish to see 
themselves as being part of a wider ‘more primitive’ system of healthcare or they disagree 
with me. There seems to be no place for such interpretations within the specific theory and 
values of contemporary medical science. Nevertheless, if I accept for a moment the 
assertion that knowledge is theory and value driven, it suggests that it has to be 
appropriate for other kinds of knowledge, for example the patient’s own medical
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knowledge, to be introduced into the decision making equation. It can no longer be 
dependant upon one perspective, the medical perspective of the doctor.
The sections below represent some early thinking on different forms of knowledge as they 
relate to me as a medical practitioner. They are early articulations at identifying different 
forms of mostly practical knowledge, perceived as important, that cannot be expressed 
through the framework of a positivist paradigm. Although they seem naive now, they 
represent part of the ‘audit trail’ of thought connecting the various sections of the thesis 
together. I acknowledge that many of the inferences are unconnected with supportive data 
and most are self-referencing, but I have taken the decision to include them because they 
form part of the process of personal change and are presented as ‘evidence’ that this took 
place.
Compassionate knowledge
Compassionate knowledge, knowing how to care or appear to care (appearing to care is 
probably organisational knowledge) in an authentic manner is non-authoritative and non­
directive. It could also be argued that it is in practical medical terms ineffective. For 
example, if faced with the victim of a serious care accident someone with just 
compassionate knowledge would be ineffective. However, compassionate knowledge 
permits insights into how people react to medical events that shape their attitude towards 
illness, life, death or whatever. These insights, I have found, will only be obtained when 
the doctor genuinely exhibits compassion in this way. I have obtained such insights about 
my own attitude towards death on those occasions when I have been more genuinely 
involved as a doctor. I cannot as a doctor become compassionately involved with every 
sad experience I encounter, but on those occasions I do, I am aware of learning something 
new by doing so and this increased understanding permits me, I believe, to be more useful 
on the next occasion I become involved.
When doctors who have not obtained a degree of compassionate knowledge have to give 
comfort, it can be highly destructive. I have an acquaintance who lost her husband
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tragically in an accident and one of her continuing causes of pain was reliving the ‘brutal 
and inhumane way’, as she saw it, she was informed of his death.
Organisational knowledge
Organisational knowledge is knowing what to do within an organisation; who to contact, 
how to find the sources of expertise and information, etc. that characterises hospital life.
It is potentially a little more directive in its quality. I see it as the sense that the 
organisation subtly guides and controls what happens within it. When I first joined a new 
hospital, I became aware that I hadn’t acquired such knowledge, and as a consequence felt 
organisationally lost for a month or two. Each year in August newly qualified doctors 
arrive on the wards. Because they do not possess this organisational knowledge they are 
to begin with not very effective and seem to feel disempowered. As patients and new 
qualified doctors wander around corridors looking for x-ray departments, outpatients, etc. 
they are everywhere surrounding by hospital staff apparently purposefully and 
knowledgeably striding to their destination in a way the suggests that ‘I am part of this 
organisation and you are not. ’ When patients become familiar with hospitals in this sense, 
they are often described by medical and nursing staff as ‘becoming institutionalised’, 
suggesting that they know some of the organisational knowledge of the hospital and are 
often referred to as ‘more difficult to handle.’
[Later in the thesis, I will discuss what happens when doctors become patients. They 
appear to use their organisational knowledge to obtain the treatment they need. This 
includes finding out who is the most technically competent, who has the reputation for 
making good decisions and utilising their organisational knowledge to move up a waiting 
list for surgery. ]
Technical Knowledge
Technical or craft knowledge is practical knowledge of knowing how to do a certain 
surgical procedure and the manner by which surgeons judge their work. They know when
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a procedure has been done well or not by a ‘gut feeling’ that it went well. It also includes 
the feeling that what was done is appropriate.
Ceremonial Knowledge
Ritual or ceremonial knowledge is different from organisational knowledge. It is the sense 
that certain processes are ritualised to the point where it can be difficult to change 
anything. The way an outpatient department is set up, the way the patient is prepared for 
surgery, the way the surgeon prepares himself for surgery makes it difficult to interrupt the 
process. I notice this when I go to a funfair. When I go on a roller coaster ride I am 
anxious up until the moment when the harness on the seats lock just before the ride starts, 
for from this moment onwards I can no longer do anything to influence what happens. I 
cannot get off the ride until it finishes. Hospitals have developed a similar sense of making 
it difficult to stop things from happening, once they have started. When patients arrive in 
the hospital on the morning of their surgery, there is a protocol of fasting, undressing, 
consent taking, lying waiting in a bed, premedication, collection by trolley that makes it 
difficult to stop the process. I feel this as a surgeon and notice how very difficult it is to 
re-evaluate the need for surgery at the last moment. It usually results in some anger from 
the patients when this happens even though the decision to cancel the surgery is clearly 
presented as being in their interests. I have little doubt that patients feel the same difficulty 
in questioning the need for surgery at this late stage and indeed may feel that the sense 
they have joined the ‘roller coaster’ of surgery, helps to overcome the natural anxieties we 
all feel about surgery. Ceremonial knowledge is very authoritative in nature and opting to 
work against accepted ritual or ceremonial practice can be difficult.
[Later I tell the story of ‘Hannah’ who decided to stop her surgery just at the point when 
she was due to go to sleep. This clearly was a disturbing event for her mother and the 
healthcare professionals involved. Appendix 3 is an account given by Valerie, who had a 
brain cyst aspirated on the ward. Everything inside her said that she shouldn’t have it done 
but she felt powerless to stop the process.]
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Sacrificial Knowledge
Sacrificial/ Pagan Knowledge is an understanding that underlying the medical interaction is 
an archetypal level of deep-seated need for something else. At this level it may be related 
to marking certain points in life; transitions from childhood to adolescence to adulthood to 
old age to death. There may be equivalents in religious practice, in education, in 
workplace practices, such as confirmation, graduation and retirement.
How, in the early stages, did I begin to consider the ways in which all these different 
epistemologies connected with one another? Initially it was by a process of 
compartmentalisation. In the same way that I, as a researcher, was conducting a dialogue 
with these new epistemologies, I saw this as representing a dialogue between head 
knowledge (positivism) and gut knowledge (all other perspectives). Figure 3 represents in 
simple diagrammatic form how I began to mentally conceive of this. I saw it as a two way 
dialogue so that what we present to the world as propositional knowledge is dependent 
upon this bedrock of difficult to describe and impossible to ‘measure’ qualitative 
knowledge. In making the assumption that this was what was happening, I saw each 
person, each doctor, each patient having their own rules that govern how the two 
interrelate and influence each other for any given situation.
How did this simple model work for me in practice? It worked for me in a manner of 
different ways. Sometimes the appearance of an eardrum suggesting the development of 
serious ear disease (practical knowledge), will override all considerations and become the 
key ingredient in triggering off the decision to undertake surgery. Sometimes there is a 
pattern of disease, lifestyle, anxieties, previous experience, (presentational knowledge) 
that suggest that treatment with antibiotics may be appropriate for an ear infection when 
the published work suggest that this should be unnecessary. Occasionally, a father might 
donate his kidney to his child in order that they may live (sacrifice) when one biological 
argument would suggest that best thing is to have many more children. There are 




Practical, presentational & 
experiential knowledge
Figure 3.
This represents an early model of how I perceived different kinds of 
knowledge relating to one another. Propositional knowledge (or head 
knowledge) was engaged in a 'dialogue' with practical, presentational and 
experiential knowledge (intuitive knowledge)
to the world for decision-making purposes, can be influenced by underlying factors. What 
did this mean for me?
This meant that my whole belief structure that explained how decisions were made in the 
outpatient consultation was challenged. It was not simply a question of considering just 
the medical evidence but it became important to examine the assumptions that 
underpinned what constituted evidence. Decision making shifts from understanding 
knowledge to understanding knowledge in context. This is a clear shift from the positivist 
paradigm of time and context free generalisations to the naturalist paradigm of time and 
context bound statements.
The thesis so far has shown some of the areas of interest that were relevant to my practice 
I wanted to explore. The next section will look at the methodology I used during the 
course of the research to explore these issues and to help me engage in what I now 
describe as a shift in professional operating paradigm. This was a shift from a paradigm 
that acknowledged only one kind of scientific knowledge to one that incorporates this and 
at the same time recognises and pays respect to other forms of knowledge held by 
healthcare professionals and the patient. The belief was that engagement with these 
methodologies might lead to a form of clinical consultation that respected the unique 




I am obliged to begin this section by asking to what extent this is a retrospective 
reconstruction. In one respect everything that is written is a retrospective reconstruction 
and rationalisation but in this case 1 am revising my account of a methodology some time 
after its enactment. How can I hope to justify this and maintain credibility? In the first 
submission I acknowledge that I was overtly espousing a co-operative inquiry 
methodology but in retrospect I can claim to understand more clearly that I was trying to 
work as an action scientist/ inquirer within a research and practice framework outlined in 
the introduction and repeated below. This has meant that I have been able to look at the 
project not only with a level of hindsight but also with a greater level of insight. It 
follows that I acknowledge that certain things were not done well.
It would be useful to remind the reader of the conceptual model that formed the basis of 
my research design. This works at three levels. First of all there is the need to continue to 
operate as a practical doctor, actually doing things and utilising effective biomedical 
understandings and treatments that have been derived from the positivist tradition. 
Secondly, I acknowledged the need to place such knowledge in context, to provide 
freedoms for both practitioner and patient to question the appropriateness of such 
treatment. Thirdly, I operated as a ‘researcher’ with an awareness of the ontological 
position I was adopting as a practitioner. This conceptual model was summarised in the 
introduction section and is reproduced here.
1. In my position as a doctor I operate at one level as a positivist (positivist theory 
generating data production).
2. At the same time I have tried to work as a reflective practitioner/ action inquirer 
(constructivist theory underlying nature of data and data production)
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3. And finally as a researcher I try to develop an awareness of the ontological position I 
am adopting. This may be described as theory behind theory in that it represents an 
awareness of the assumptions circumscribing a particular paradigmatic position.
In attempting to show how this was developed, the methodology section is arranged in 
four broad sections. Each section addresses significant decisions that need to be made 
when developing an overall, practical research design. These comprise;
1. Ontological and epistemological issues in relation to a research question
2. Linking research questions, epistemology and methods
3. Ethics, morality and politics of the research process
4. Producing a practical research design
To track progress through the methodology, the reader will be briefly reminded of this 
overall structure as each of these main sections is commenced.
I would like to make two further points that will clarify what happened. Firstly, it is 
important to know that I set out in 1990 to investigate decision making using a co­
operative inquiry methodology. This inquiry group of hospital doctors, including myself, 
will be discussed in detail in Section 4, ‘Producing a Practical Research Design’. In 1992, 
I took the research decision that a co-operative inquiry research methodology was 
proving to be insufficiently helpful in the clinical context and shifted towards an action 
science/ inquiry methodology. Secondly, central to the research task is the integration of 
medical (quantitative) knowledge with other forms of knowledge (qualitative) and I 
therefore perceived the need to understand a range of methodologies that were typical of 
methodologies to be utilised within different paradigmatic perspectives. These different 
approaches came to be broadly reflected in different clinical consultation styles and 
outlined in the clinical frameworks discussed in the next section, ‘Reflective Clinical 
Practice’. Consequently, this review of methodology aims to place epistemology and 
methodology in paradigmatic context, as a result, it is not until the final section, 
‘Producing a practical Research Design’ that I reconstruct what I set out to do.
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Section 1
Ontological and epistemological issues in relation to 
research questions.
The conceptual research model with three levels of understanding suggests a complicated 
way of appreciating what happens. The model depends upon a clear understanding of the 
ontological standpoint that notices, generates and analyses data. For this reason the first 
questions to ask are;
What possible paradigmatic approaches are there? 
What is my ontological perspective as a researcher?
A positivist would enter his research at the point of methodology but in qualitative 
research it has been argued that "questions of method are secondary to questions of 
paradigm" (Guba & Lincoln 1994 pl05). This point of view suggests that it may be 
necessary to carefully reconsider the basic paradigmatic approach and ask; What is meant 
by ‘paradigm’ and what are the elements upon which a paradigm is constructed. A 
paradigm "may be viewed as a set of basic beliefs (or metaphysics) that deals with 
ultimates or first principles. The beliefs are basic in the sense that they must be accepted 
simply on faith (however well argued); there is no way to establish their ultimate truth." 
(Guba & Lincoln 1994 p i07) Each paradigm encompasses three elements with a coherent 
attitude to the epistemology, ontology, and methodology relevant to that paradigm. 
Epistemology asks questions about the nature of knowledge and in particular the 
relationship between the inquirer and the known. Ontology raises basic questions about 
the nature of reality and methodology focuses on how we gain knowledge about the 
world. (Denzin & Lincoln 1994 p99-104)




Critical theory and related ideological positions 
Constructivism .
(Guba & Lincoln 1994 pl05-l 17)
Each of these is defined by a stance on the three positions of ontology, epistemology and 
methodology. In positivism the basic posture is reductionist and deterministic. The 
investigator and the investigated 'object' are assumed to be independent entities with a 
methodology that is perceived as experimental and manipulative. Findings are believed to 
be ‘true’ and when threats to the validity (influence on either the investigator or object) 
are recognized, various strategies are followed to reduce them. The emphasis in 
methodology is one that permits robust replication. This ontological stance is one that is 
constantly reinforced by most medical research literature with its emphasis on the 
importance of double blind, randomised, controlled trials to generate data. In some 
respects the post-positivist stance is a watered down version of positivism. The ontology 
is essentially the same but is only regarded as imperfectly apprehendable because of 
basically flawed human intellectual mechanisms and the fundamentally intractable nature 
of phenomena. Adherence to the concept of dualism (researcher/ researched) is largely 
abandoned but ‘objectivity’ remains a 'regulatory ideal'; special emphasis is placed on 
external 'guardians' of objectivity such as critical traditions and the critical community. 
The emphasis in the methodology is on 'critical multiplism' (a refurbished version of 
triangulation) as a way of falsifying hypotheses. Inquiry takes place in natural settings 
and the collection of situational information and discovery are key elements in inquiry. 
Any findings are regarded as ‘probably’ true.
In contrast to positivism and post-positivism, critical theory represents a genuine shift in 
ontology. Critical theorists and those with related ideological positions adopt a position 
that has been described as ‘historical realism’, where “a reality is assumed to be 
apprehendable that was once plastic, but was, over time, shaped by a congeries of social, 
political, cultural, economical, ethnic and gender factors, and then crystallized into a
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s-eries of structures that are now taken as 'real', natural and immutable.” (Guba & Lincoln 
1994 pi 10) The conventional distinction between ontology and epistemology now 
disappears. The investigator and the investigated object are assumed to be interactively 
linked, so that the values of the investigator inevitably influence the inquiry. Such 
findings are inevitably regarded as value mediated. The methodological approach 
requires a dialogue between investigator and the subjects of inquiry; that dialogue must 
be dialectical in nature to transform ignorance and misapprehensions into more informed 
consciousness, (ibid)
Social constructivists insist that “all forms of knowledge, including scientific knowledge, 
produce images of the world that then operate as if they were true.” (Gergen, K.L. 1985 
266-75). They end up "being more sceptical of how science operates... and will insist that 
there is always a moral aspect to research.” (Banister, Burman, et al. 1994 p9) All 
research questions are structured by personal and political interests that need to be 
explored rather than hidden away. The position means that exploration in research not 
only "respects the specificities of each case (idiographic research) but should also explore 
the particular meanings that are produced on this occasion (hermeneutic research). 
Knowledge creates as well as describes the world.” (ibid)
Heron and Reason, (Heron and Reason 1997 p274-294) analysed the constructivist vision 
and became concerned at the absence of a place for “experiential knowing; that is by 
acquaintance, by meeting, and by felt participation in the presence of what is there" and 
have recently added a fifth paradigm. They call this paradigmatic stance ‘participatory’ 
and identify its paradigmatic position in the same terms as Guba and Lincoln. A 
participatory ontology appears to be only understood by experience; “knowers can only 
be knowers when known by other knowers”, but in particular draws attention to the tacit 
rules of language and behaviour that govern any “mutual experiential knowing and 
understanding between people.” At the epistemological level, knowledge is “inter- 
subjectively” shaped with four interdependent ways of knowing; experiential, 
presentational, propositional, and practical. Experiential knowing is "direct encounter, 
face to face meeting: feeling and imaging the presence of some energy, entity, person,
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place, process, or thing... creative shaping of the world." Presentational knowing "emerges 
from and is grounded in experiential knowing and is evident in our intuitive grasp of the 
significance of our resonance with and imaging of the world.” This is “symbolised in 
graphic, plastic, musical, vocal and verbal forms.” Propositional knowing in conceptual 
terms is “knowledge by description of some energy, entity, person, place, process or 
thing. It is expressed in statements and theories that come with the mastery of concepts 
and classes that language bestows." Finally practical knowing is knowledge demonstrated 
“in a skill or competence” and it represents the fulfilment of the three prior forms of 
knowing, bringing them to fruition in “purposive deeds”. The methodology, by 
implication, has to be experientially centred, and usually takes the form of collaborative 
versions of inquiry.
Heron and Reason recognised that the three basic constructs of paradigms, ontology, 
epistemology and methodology, concern themselves only with the nature o f ‘truth’ and 
do not consider the question o f ‘values’ as part of the definition. To overcome this 
objection they add a fourth arm to their paradigm analysis, which they call ‘axiology’ and 
advocate that "the participatory paradigm answers the axiological question in terms of 
human flourishing, conceived as an end in itself.” This fourth arm suggests that notions 
of underlying purpose, such as ‘justice’, are missing from conventional paradigms and 
they suggest it is important to introduce such values into research when previously they 
have been conspicuous by their absence.
Are these paradigms necessarily in conflict? Is it possible to accommodate these 
several views within a single conceptual framework?
Proponents of positivism and postpositivism take the position that all paradigms can be 
accommodated within some common rational structure to which all questions of 
difference can be referred for resolution. This posture is “reductionist and assumes the 
possibility of point by point comparisons.” Proponents of critical theory, constructivism 
and participatory paradigms affirm the incommensurability of these three paradigms with 
positivism and postpositivism and take the view that “basic beliefs of the paradigms are
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believed to be essentially contradictory.” (Guba & Lincoln 1994 pi 16) For 
constructivists, either there is a 'real' reality or there is not and these two views cannot be 
logically accommodated because inquiry is either value free or it is not, realist or 
relativist; such contradictory positions cannot co-exist.
The conceptual three level research model I have outlined suggests apparently 
irreconcilable differences and these differences need to be addressed. It seems to me that 
each paradigm represents a set of beliefs (and assumptions) that provide the background 
against which any study operates. The extent to which each of these elements of 
epistemology, ontology and methodology is aggregated around each set of assumptions 
will vary. In the positivist paradigm, the epistemological and methodological position 
will be very proscriptive so that any departure from the norm will be seen as a potential 
threat to the validity of the result. The more descriptive nature of epistemology and 
methodology in the constructivist paradigm will permit a greater degree of tolerance; 
indeed so much so that in a sense there is no body of procedure that can be appealed to in 
the case of disputes.
The part of me as a positivist affirms that the positivist approach to clinical medicine is 
sound. I am witness to a progression of knowledge that is first of all based an anecdote 
(e.g. case histories), then anatomical basis (e.g. clot in the coronary arteries as an 
explanation for heart attacks), physiological understanding (e.g. mechanisms of clot 
production in heart attacks) and finally explanations at the micro-cellular RNA and DNA 
level. As the epistemology departs from one of anecdote to the ‘DNA level’, the 
robustness of the positivist model appears to be strengthened. The problems I have 
described so far as a clinical practitioner can be seen as attempting to utilise constructivist 
epistemologies within a positivist methodology. At the paradigmatic level the two are not 
inherently in tune with one another and the resulting dissonance can be overlooked or 
explored (I am not necessarily advocating at this stage that exploration is the right thing 
to do).
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Some might argue that the first requirement in any research strategy is to develop an 
approach that is inherently coherent; the ontology, epistemology and methodology pay 
consistent attention to a recognised paradigm. Any departure from this position would 
appear to break a key principle of investigative science. In order to comply with this 
academic requirement I need to accept for a moment that explanation can be formulated 
within one single paradigmatic approach. This means that for the purposes of much of 
this study, I espouse a constructivist position but I do not intend to be confined to this 
paradigm forever, indeed cannot be. I still fully recognise the effectiveness of positivism 
and since my fundamental position as a researcher claims that I have developed an 
awareness of my paradigmatic position (my ‘ontology’ is an awareness of paradigm) 
there are two requirements to fulfil. Firstly I need to demonstrate that I understand what 
is meant by an awareness of paradigm and secondly justify this from a philosophical 
standpoint.
It is not easy to do either. Firstly, I ‘know’ from my experience that there are times when 
I consciously adopt a positivist stance and hold it. Twice a year I run a course at Oxford 
that operates almost exclusively within the positivist paradigm. It is marketed as a course 
that adheres to ‘evidence based’ medical principles. When participating in the course, 
which includes analysing research papers, I am aware that I am operating within a set of 
agreed rules and assumptions. It is like playing a certain kind of intellectual game. By 
contrast this body of work, I hope, demonstrates at least some evidence of being able to 
operate as a constructivist. This switching around doesn’t appear to create a problem in 
my own mind, yet within the paradigmatic framework so far described would seem to be 
untenable. So how can I justify this philosophically?
My position suggests that I am appealing to another, superior vantage point from which 
to view the different paradigms but I am not. When one considers as a group the five 
paradigms described so far, it is hard to escape from the notion that they represent an 
evolutionary approach to theory. Positivism seems to evolve into post positivism, into 
critical theory, into constructivism and into participatory paradigms. After all, it was 
Kuhn who argued that when scientists become stuck in one paradigm they invent another
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one to make progress. He could find no logical foundation for this shift and it was left to 
Foucault to rejig this idea by introducing the idea of history of concepts. He advocated 
that, unknown to each other, naturalists, economists and grammarians employed the same 
rules to build their theories. He applied the term ‘archaeology’ to the process of 
excavating unconsciously organised sediments of thought. Archaeology ignores 
individuals and their histories, it prefers to excavate impersonal structures of knowledge. 
He coined the term episteme to define the underground grid or network, which allows 
thought to organise itself. Each historical period has its episteme, which limits the 
experience, what is knowledge, what is truth and governs each science in any one period. 
The Renaissance episteme was resemblance and the Classical episteme was 
representation. The episteme for the modern period is ‘man’ for it is through man that 
knowledge is possible in the experience of life. (Cutting 1994 p7)
It can now be seen that Kuhn and Foucault approach the problem of theory from different 
standpoints. Kuhn advocated that theories are interpretations of data and therefore define 
the concepts in terms of which data is understood; that is what a paradigm is, a set of 
assumptions that circumscribe data and make it manageable. Others such as Foucault and 
Canguilhem adopted a different approach that distinguishes concepts that interpret 
scientific data and the theories that explain them. “Concepts give us preliminary 
understandings of data that allows us to formulate scientifically fruitful questions about 
how to explain the data as conceptualised. Theories then provide different and often 
conflicting answers to these questions.” (Cutting 1994 p7) The example usually given to 
illustrate this is the theory of motion. After Gallileo introduced a new concept of the 
motion of falling bodies (i.e. all bodies fell at the same rate independent of weight, a 
different concept from that of Aristotle), he, Descartes and Newton provided competing 
theories to explain the motion. If the concept is regarded as a function of theory, their 
history will be identical but they can be separated out. For example, Canguilhem 
demonstrated this in the history of reflex action. The concept of the reflex action is at the 
heart of modem mechanistic theories in physiology but Canguilhem shows that the 
modern concept of the reflex is fully present in the distinctly non modern vitalistic 
physiology of Thomas Willis. (Rouse 1994 p92-l 14) Foucault develops this idea in The
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Order of Things and The Birth of the Clinic when he traces the history of the concept of 
physical illness. He links language, biology and economics and goes on to maintain that 
fundamental philosophical concepts such as resemblance, representation and man 
pervade all disciplines of a given period, (ibid)
I hold my current position by taking the view that there is nothing fundamentally ‘true’ 
about paradigms. They all represent constructions, indeed, I see such constructions as 
essentially evolutionary in much the same way as we have developed biologically-like 
biology it is an evolution of complexity. It forms the basis whereby I can justify to myself 
that switching between paradigms is more than disguised constructivism and simply 
reflects different points in the evolution of epistemology. Where one sits on the 
paradigmatic seesaw depends upon appropriateness and appropriateness is justified in a 
number of ways.
At the heart of the problem of justification is the question; How does anyone interpret 
methodological statements? There seem to be three options; description, convention and 
contingency. (Honderich 1995 p434) A conventional interpretation acknowledges that 
there is a body of uncontentious outcomes linked to a recognised methodology. For the 
purposes of this study I cannot find a recognised methodology and so I have abandoned a 
conventional approach to justification. If an interpretation is descriptive, one cannot 
appeal to an uncontentious body of knowledge but instead appeal to a virtuous spiral of 
understanding that permits ‘better’ questions to be asked and ‘better’ methodologies to be 
developed. There may be some evidence of this in this thesis. Finally, if ones 
interpretation is intuitive and founded upon assessments of methodologies based upon 
past success or not, it still leaves the problem of convincing others of the rationality 
underlying it (if such a rationality exists). This is at the core of any charge of ‘self 
referencing’. I would argue that whilst effectiveness, however that is defined, does not 
lend itself to rational description, for someone in the midst of action it can be difficult to 
ignore. In any situation, effectiveness is therefore judged according to the assumptions of 
the paradigm in which one is methodologically operating. For example, if I operate 
within a contemporary medical paradigm of positivism, I might judge life expectancy,
88
with or without treatment, as a parameter of effectiveness, but such a position might 
chose to wholly ignore such considerations as quality of life a parameter of a different 
paradigm. There is a counter argument that paradigmatic inconsistency may be 
acceptable if one has at the very basis of one’s belief the idea that the whole foundation is 
arbitrary anyway (the episteme argument) and that periodically this foundation will 
change as society shifts to some other era of enlightenment.
Bateson (Batson 1997) offers an analysis that suggests that this approach is credible. He 
divided learning behaviour into levels, levels one, two and three. Working as a positivist, 
would be equivalent to working at level one. Developing my clinical practice as a 
reflective practitioner would be equivalent to working at level two and most research is 
conducted at this level. Level two learning frames would suggest that constructivism, or 
positivism or any other paradigmatic viewpoint was the only ‘right’ way to see the world 
and that standards for determining what is relatively true resides in community consensus 
(Heron, Reason 1997 p283). Level three suggests that each of these positions is regarded 
as only one way to see the world. Learning level three is a position in which the mind can 
choose its premise of understanding and action and can detach itself from all frameworks 
to peer into and reflect on their pre-suppositions. It might be argued that a reflective 
practitioner would want to, and could, do this. I would argue that whilst a reflective 
practitioner might shift to positivism from time to time (emergency medicine in an 
unconscious patient) it is the position of a researcher who asks questions about the 
appropriateness of this paradigm shift, that characterises level three learning.
The examiners have forced me to realise that I am working in level three in a number of 
different paradigms at the same time;
1. The positivist world of a doctor-looking in someone's ear.
2. The social constructivist paradigm of grounded theory in trying to learn from people 
out there. Researching into how to do this with better skills
3. The fully self-reflective paradigm that permits an awareness of different ontological 
perspectives.
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I am using a research stance to look at practice in those different domains so that at 
different moments I pay more or less attention to each of these. This may result in 
shifting from being doctor to reflective practitioner to being researcher.
What are the practical considerations in adopting a paradigm as a standpoint to 
enter research?
Each of the five main paradigms outlined earlier has a different ontological, 
epistemological and methodological position in respect of the research qualities required 
in certain key features. These are principally
• Level of participation in the research of the various actors
• The nature of the data
• Who makes sense of the material
• Level of self reflectiveness required by the researcher
• Level of self referentiality
At this juncture there is the need to consider in very general terms the importance of each 
of these parameters in determining a paradigmatic starting point. In this respect there is a 
considerable variation across the paradigms. As one moves from positivism to 
participatory paradigms, the difference between researcher and researched changes from 
being clearly distinguishable to becoming somewhat blurred and the degree to which the 
‘researched’ participates in the researched activity increases. The data shifts from 
quantitative to descriptive. The sense making in positivist research is entirely undertaken 
by the researcher but in constructivist and participatory forms of research the data 
generation and the sense making is typically made by all the actors as well as the 
researcher. In these paradigms there are hierarchies of institutional, political and medical 
power as well.
Perhaps most important of all is when shifting from quantitative to qualitative research 
positions there is an increasing emphasis on the role of interpretation. According to
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Woolgar (Woolgar, S 1988) the gap between objects and our representation of them 
appears in three forms and has been termed the 'methodological horrors'. They comprise 
three problems:
a) Indexicality, in which an explanation is always tied to a particular occasion or use and 
will change as the occasion changes;
b) Inconcludability, in which an account can always be supplemented further and will 
continually mutate as more is added to it; and
c) Reflexivity, in which the way we characterize a phenomenon will change the way it 
operates for us, and that will then change our perception of it.
Indexicality
The usual strategies to counter this include "appealing to a hierarchy of existing scientific 
knowledge that should not be questioned, treating the problem as a technical one or as a 
trivial difficulty, or deferring the task of dealing with it, leaving to others to solve it as a 
philosophical problem." (Banister, Burman, et al. 1994 pi 1) Failure to address these 
issues adequately is likely to lead to failure to satisfy validity criteria and contemporary 
qualitative research prefers to confront them. The approach to the problem of indexicality 
is to "turn it into an aspect of the research itself." Since explanations change as the 
research setting changes, then attempts are made to “theorize” this. The hope is that the 
theory, or some feature of the theory, may have more general application. As a doctor I 
have probably instinctively, though with no awareness, tried to do this all the time in the 
clinic. I have theorised (or hypothesised) the medical settings in which treatments appear 
to work. To accept these arguments means that it is necessary to reformulate what is 
understood by validity and reliability. In quantitive research these terms depend upon the 
possibility of replicating good research but in qualitative research no attempt is made to 
do this. There is an acknowledgement that any repetition of the work is necessarily a 
different piece of work. Any meaning that is produced in the course of research is 
something that has to be followed and recorded carefully and sensitively, and an account 
of the process of tracing and presenting the analysis as the 'results' of the study is an 
account of change. This may involve change in the research tool itself and my account of
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my research hopefully demonstrates this. I commenced my research espousing an overt 
co-operative inquiry but shifted to an action science inquiry methodology as the study 
progressed. This was recognised and acknowledged when the thesis was rewritten. 
Underlining all this is the idea that any "findings of the study are as fragile and mutable 
as real life," (ibid) and, like real life, such findings include an analysis of failure.
Inconcludibility
Engaging in qualitative research starts a process that seems to have no logical end point. 
This is seen as an advantage and qualitative research “draws its strength from the ways in 
which accounts of action and experience reinterpret and understand facts anew, such that 
their shape, function and very nature seem to change." (ibid) This means that one should 
welcome the opportunity for others to supplement their account. This has particular 
implications in respect of sample size. Because the emphasis is on complexity, it is no 
longer deemed a validity affirming requirement to have large sample sizes and it can even 
mean that single case studies are acceptable provided the description is rigorous enough.
Reflexivity
Reflexivity acknowledges that "the ways in which we theorize a problem will affect the 
ways in which we examine it, and the ways in which we explore a problem will affect the 
explanation we give." (ibid) Qualitative research attempts to overcome this by "an 
exploration of the ways in which the subjectivity of the researcher has structured the way 
it is defined in the first place". Reflexivity is seen as both personal and functional. 
Personal reflexivity is an attempt to “reveal rather than conceal the level of personal 
involvement and engagement.” This approach places the values of the researcher at the 
centre of the process of understanding rather than attempts to deny that such bias exists. 
This approach may mean developing a careful balance between a need to be critically 
subjective to empathise with the participants but at the same time be “aware of our own 
experiencing in order to achieve a balance between subjectivity and objectivity”. Failure 
to do this properly may lead to findings that “may merely be a reflection of our own 
subconscious issues disturbed by the research.” (Bannister, Burman et al 1994 p i51) The 
balance between subjectivity and objectivity may be more easily aided by discussion in
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research groups of the issues raised as a means of heightening awareness. The 
postgraduate research group provided a forum for this process to be developed.
Functional reflexivity is the "continuous, critical examination of the practice/process of 
research to reveal its assumptions, values and biases. The focus is on how who we are 
directs and shapes the course of the research." (ibid) This is an acknowledgement that 
research and self cannot be separated from one another, so that research will include an 
exploration of the researcher’s background. This is largely developed by the use of a 
reflexive diary.
Since much of my research and thinking takes place in a clinic, a private space, how do I 
in practice develop a process that permits some of the methodological horrors to be 
confronted? This potentially self referencing position suggests that a methodology that 
was based around the clinical process alone would be insufficient. For example if my sole 
methodology was based around action science, and I undertook this as an isolated 
researcher with no access to supervision then it is unlikely that I would develop sufficient 
reflexivity. In the final analysis my methodology included significant input from the 
postgraduate research group at Bath, a group of qualitative researchers, which became a 
medium in which reflexivity issues could be addressed and challenged.
The methodology section so far has addressed the question of basic paradigm position as 
a researcher. Before individual methodologies can be considered in detail, it is necessary 
to consider two important issues. What might be regarded as data or evidence within the 
clinical encounter and what are the research question or questions? The remaining two 
sub sections of section 1, devoted to ontological and epistemological issues, concentrate 
on these issues.
What might be regarded as knowledge or evidence within the clinical encounter?
This section approaches the issue of knowledge or evidence from three perspectives. 
Firstly, a recap of knowledge from the different ontological positions described in the 
previous section, emphasising that part of the process of examining the nature of data
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became a means whereby my ontological position shifted. As I increasingly believed and 
umderstood that data was theory driven, this ‘data’ generated a paradigm shift towards 
c onstructivism. Secondly, it includes an examination of the nature of professional 
knowledge, especially practical knowledge. Finally, it examines knowledge about 
knowledge, which leads one to ask; What is meant qualitative research?
Epistemology according to different paradigms
Knowledge has been defined “as a body of uncontradicted beliefs, which is socially and 
politically constructed." (Denzin 1983 p i39) This is at heart a constructivist’s perspective 
o f knowledge because implied within the definition is the notion of the agreed socially 
and politically generated assumptions that characterise each of the paradigms anyway. 
This leads one to consider the nature of knowledge according to the different ontological 
perspectives of positivism, post-positivism, critical theory and constructivism. Positivists 
regard as facts or laws only those "verified hypotheses” that have been accepted. 
Reference is made to what is accepted by positivist as a body of non contentious data. 
Post positivists water this down a little, continue to pay lip service to positivism and take 
the position that "non-falsified hypotheses can be regarded as probable facts or laws." 
(ibid) Critical theorists begin by paying attention to the cultural and historical context of 
‘fact’ and regards facts as "a series of structural/historical insights that will be 
transformed as time passes." (ibid) Finally, the diversity that confronts constructivists is 
reflected in the description of facts as "those constructions about which there is relative 
consensus (or at least movement towards consensus) among those competent to interpret 
the substance of the construction.” (ibid) Not only is the idea of multiple perspectives 
important but perspectives that seemingly disagree can coexist when equally competent 
(or trusted) interpreters disagree. This difference is an acknowledgement that the social, 
political, cultural, economic, ethnic and gender factors that differentiate the interpreters 
influences the constructions they generate. This means that consensus is subject to 
continuous revision and is most likely to occur “when relatively different constructions 
are brought into juxtaposition." (Guba & Lincoln 1994 pi 13) It is their epistemological 
positions that most differentiate critical theory and constructivism from the other two 
paradigms.
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In this work the fundamental clinical interaction is the interview, which may be 
structured or unstructured. From this data source, knowledge and understanding of what 
is happening, and what we consider as ‘facts’ are derived. It follows that there is a 
process whereby this interaction is transformed into ‘facts’ and this transformation is 
subject to certain rules that validate this transformation and hence validate these ‘facts’. 
This obviously is dependent upon one’s paradigmatic position. From a positivist 
viewpoint it is regarded as important to isolate data from its context and the more isolated 
from its context this data appears to be, the greater the theoretical rigour such a study can 
claim. Within such a positivist ontology, meaning and purpose for example would appear 
to play no part in an analysis of any data and are excluded in the analysis. From a 
constructivist viewpoint, meaning and purpose play a pivotal role in an analysis of the 
same data. This difference is reflected most obviously in the aim or purpose of an inquiry 
when undertaken within the framework of positivism or constructivism. In positivism the 
aim of the inquiry is explanation whereas in constructivism the aim of the inquiry is 
understanding and reconstruction. (Guba & Lincoln 1994 pi 13) The constructivist 
position suggests that what are considered ‘facts’ derived from data such as a clinical 
interaction is dependant upon the paradigm through which the data is viewed, that is 
theory is data driven or data dependent. Facts are only facts when viewed through a 
particular theoretical window, a position which undermines the ‘objectivity’ of facts. 
(Guba & Lincoln 1994 p i07) Some commentators would extend this and insist that all 
forms of knowledge, including scientific knowledge, produce images of the world that 
then operate as if they were true. (Gergen 1985 p266-275) Such a position adopts a more 
sceptical stance of how science operates and will insist that there is always a moral aspect 
to research. This morality starts right at the beginning, including research questions, 
which are regarded as structured by personal and political interests that need to be 
explored rather than hidden away. (Banister, Burman, et al. 1994 p9)
The theory driven nature of data is an assumption about data that constructivists make 
about paradigms. I am not sure that every positivist, whose assumptions may be 
contingency based, would agree. A positivist engaged upon ‘quark’ research may have
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difficulty seeing his or her research in any other way other than basic, objective, 
fundamental research whose political and moral content is nil. Since very few people are 
in a position to offer a perspective on ‘quarks’ this position is never seriously challenged.
The constructivist would also argue that values and facts are interdependent. Theories are 
themselves value statements. Thus putative 'facts' are viewed not only through a theory 
window but through a value window as well so that the “value free posture of the 
received view is compromised." (Guba & Lincoln 1994 p i07) This becomes especially 
important to recognise in practice related research because knowledge applied in practice 
suggests purpose. “Knowledge should speak to the forming of purposes, not just the 
means by which to achieve them. A science of practice must take up the question of 
choice, and the question of choice necessarily involves the forming of purposes... Once 
we consider purposes, the questions of value can no longer remain peripheral.” (Argyris, 
Putnam, et al. 1985 p234-235)
This suggests that the ethical and moral position of the constructivist shapes the way the 
research is conducted, from the formulation of the research question onwards. This is 
especially relevant in two ways to my conceptual research model because my research 
also involved a clinical activity; I am trying to do something. Firstly in the level of 
participation of other actors, especially patients, envisaged as appropriate in the research. 
Participation might raise difficult ethical issues if understandings lead to insights that 
suggested action was deemed appropriate by the researcher for or on behalf of the 
participants. If these clinical facts are value dependent, it suggests that any researcher 
may be inadvertently generating ‘facts’ that are simply a reflection of their moral and 
political stance. If  then as a positivist doctor I believe that a particular course of clinical 
action is in the ‘interests’ of patients (a value judgement made by me) how do I reconcile 
this with an approach to research that is espousing a degree of mutuality? As a 
consequence of this, I need to consider how, as I shift to different ontologies, do I ensure 
safeguards are in place that make sure that patients come to no harm through 
inappropriate paradigm experiments?
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Secondly, how do I shape the research in respect of language and its relationship with 
power? The issues determining action are mediated through the use of language. The 
biomedical explanation that we take to be medical knowledge is a positivist construction 
reached by transforming the everyday language that patients use to describe their 
complaints into medical syntax. This transformation is largely under the control of the 
doctor. It is one opportunity for a doctor to express his or her power by transforming such 
information according to his or her values. This includes their epistemological position. If 
this position is a unitary positivist stance on the world, then this transformation can chose 
to ignore any information that the patient offers that appears to lie outside such a 
hegemonic position. This means that the decision to adopt a constructivist ontology 
means re-appraising this process and to consider more sensitively information that the 
patient offers that appears to fall outside the positivist perception of knowledge. 
Furthermore, this needs to be included as a factor that determines outcomes and shown to 
do so.
This approach carries with it certain risks. It is more than simply becoming a sensitive 
doctor because there may be moments when action is dependent upon attention to this 
information. If my insights at a clinical level suggest that a certain action is very much in 
the interests of the patient, what do I do if their own interpretation suggests otherwise.
This particular situation is highlighted in the stories encountered in Appendix 1 and 2.
The conventional wisdom suggested that treatment was appropriate for both these 
patients but they, for various reasons, felt that it was inappropriate. If, as a doctor, this 
value position had reflected itself forcefully in the way the options were presented to the 
patient ( i.e. if you don’t have this treatment then the manner of your death will be 
especially unpleasant) then this process is failing to pay due regard to the status of their 
wish not to have surgical or radiotherapy intervention. Thus an awareness of the status of 
‘facts’ as theory and value driven, immeasurably complicates the clinical landscape.
The conclusion I reach is that any methodological model I develop must pay due regard 
to the problem of the value content of data. If I uncritically slip into constructivism, so 
that every viewpoint has the same weight, then I fail to appreciate the risk that this
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strategy places all parties. I can adopt a stance of a constructivist as a reflective 
practitioner but I need to have an awareness of my ontological stance as a researcher in 
order to be more aware of what I am doing. This forms the basis for adopting the three 
level conceptual model, which includes an awareness of the positivist position as a 
safeguard against inappropriate action on my part. The second safeguard was the 
juducious use of a second opinion, an option explored by David in Appendix 1.
How does knowledge accumulate?
When considering a paradigm stance, one also considers the manner in which knowledge 
is expected to grow, because knowledge also has to accumulate in a way that appears 
convincing to others. In the positivist and postpositivist paradigm, knowledge 
accumulates by a process of accretion, adding to the growing 'edifice of knowledge'.
After a while, generalisations can be made, with predictable confidence, to a population 
of settings. For the critical theorist, knowledge grows and changes through a dialectical 
process of historical revision that continuously erodes ignorance and misapprehensions to 
enlarge more informed insights. For the constructivist knowledge accumulates only in a 
relative sense through the formation of ever more informed and sophisticated 
constructions via the hermaneutic/ dialectical process. An important mechanism for the 
transfer of knowledge from one setting to another is the provision of vicarious 
experience, often supplied by case study reports.( Guba & Lincoln 1994 pi 14)
One significant feature of positivism is to establish external validity by generalising any 
finding to other ‘similar’ populations. For example, a study undertaken in the 
Postgraduate Hospital, Hammersmith is expected to be generalisable to one of my clinics 
in Frome, a small community hospital in Somerset. It is part of the politics of the power 
of positivism that such transferrability is assumed and is one way that the institution of 
medicine exerts its disciplinary power through its research and organisational structures.
It dictates what constitutes knowledge and the way it should grow and be applied. The 
generalisability concept of positivism was deeply ingrained within my way of looking at 
knowledge and was in my experience very hard to let go. When I believed that I was truly 
working as a constructivist, I constantly found myself looking to identify ideas that were
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universally transferable. I am conscious therefore as I look at the decision making 
frameworks outlined later in the thesis that there is evidence here that I am still looking 
for transferable rules that are applicable to wider populations
Whilst there are differences in the way knowledge grows according to one’s paradigmatic 
position, are there certain generalisable features about accumulation of knowledge? Are 
there common features between paradigms about the way knowledge grows? As a 
researcher I am interested in the role of conjecture in research. As mentioned above, a 
qualitative researcher will at times adopt both an idiographic approach, which respects 
the specificities of each case, and a hermaneutic approach, which explores the particular 
meanings that are produced. (Banister, Burman, et al. 1994 p2) Understanding is 
developed by the concept of the hermeneutic cycle and when incongruence occurs 
between the parts and the whole, a re-conceptualisation takes place. (Susman and Evered 
1998 p95-l 13) These essentially inductive modes are grounded whenever possible in 
data. Both of these approaches and the deductive-inductive reasoning model that 
characterises positivist thinking have been criticised as not having the basis for 
significant advances in knowledge. Popper claims that significant advances in knowledge 
occur when the inquirer goes beyond the data and performs a conceptual leap of the 
imagination to consider analogies, metaphors, models, myths etc as a way to explain the 
data. Popper called such leaps of the imagination conjectures.(ibid)
This suggests that a balance has to be struck between the level of interpretation supported 
by data and conjecture that goes beyond data if real progress is to be achievable. What 
happens then when choice has to supported by conjecture rather than data, a point that is 
particularly relevant when choosing a methodology? As a researcher I notice that main 
reason I have chosen to enter the qualitative research world is based upon conjecture. I 
have no data to support the idea that qualitative research is going to be useful. Once 
engaged in the qualitative tradition, I have to make methodological choices that are 
similarly based on conjecture. I can try to make the process apparently authentic by 
outlining an ontological and epistemological position post hoc as I have done in the 
thesis. Much of what I have proposed is a retrospective analysis, some of which is based
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upon experience and some of which is based upon conjecture, but this contrasts with the 
position I find myself at the moment of starting the research. When starting out all choice 
is based upon conjecture. So what is the status of the outcome of choice based upon 
conjecture? I don’t know but since in every choice there is a moment where conjecture 
plays a part, even if it means making choices about obtaining the data to make an 
informed choice, one may have to resort once again to an argument based on 
‘usefulness’. If one’s experience of conjecture as a basis for defining choice has been 
successful, then two things are likely to happen. Firstly, one is likely to continue utilising 
the method. Secondly, it might be possible to develop a skill in such a process. I already 
see this in the quantitative world where some individuals seem to develop an instinct for 
identifying research strategies that lead up blind alleys from those that do not. Some have 
developed a skill in successful conjecture but this skill does not appear to be subject to 
rational analysis and certainly not subject to any validity criteria other than past success.
In consequence, as a researcher, this whole research project has made me become aware 
of the high level of conjecture that I display in my propositional thinking. It is both a 
strength and a weakness. It encourages one to be innovative and explorative but it may 
also mean that the distinction between conjecture and grounded interpretation may 
become blurred. Even at the end of my research, I am unsure of the necessary balance 
between the two.
Professional knowledge
I start this discussion on professional knowledge by asking the following question: Is it 
possible to synthesise a working model of practice and remain adherent to the positivist 
paradigm? Even as positivism became increasingly sophisticated and began to recognise 
to what extent observational statements were theory laden, the laws of nature were seen 
not as inherent facts but as constructs to explain observed phenomena. Nevertheless, from 
the perspective of the positivist, practice and the practical knowledge generated by 
practice appears as a puzzling anomaly. Practical knowledge exists, but it does not fit 
neatly into positivist categories. (Schon 1983 p33) Positivism tried to solve the puzzle of 
practical knowledge by reformulating the problem as knowledge of the relationship of
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means to ends. Given agreement about ends, the question, "How ought I to act?" could be 
reduced to a “merely instrumental question about the means best suited to achieve one's 
ends.”(ibid) Disagreements about means could be resolved by reference to facts 
concerning the possible means, their relevant consequences, and the methods for 
comparing them with respect to the chosen ends of action. According to the positivist 
epistemology of practice, craft and artistry had no lasting place in rigorous practical 
knowledge." (ibid)
This approach emphasises problem solving and overlooks the implications of problem 
setting the “process by which we define the decision to be made, the ends to be achieved, 
the means which may be chosen.” (Schon 1983 p40-41) Even when a problem has been 
constructed, it may escape “the categories of applied science because it presents itself as 
unique and unstable”.(ibid) A practitioner must be able to map those categories onto 
features of the practice situation. Problem setting then is a process in which, interactively, 
“we name the things to which we will attend and frame the context in which we will 
attend to them.” (ibid) When the paradigm conflict cannot be overlooked and there are 
multiple ways of framing the practice role, practitioners bound by a positivist 
epistemology find themselves caught in a dilemma, “this dilemma of'rigor or relevence'." 
(ibid) This jeopardises the usefulness of knowledge in complex situations or when 
pluralist interpretations of framing are possible, for example in psychiatry.
An alternative approach is to consider practical knowledge in action and not as a sterile 
academic exercise. If practical knowledge is only useful in action, it suggests that 
knowledge should be understood and assessed in action. This approach at least pays 
attention to the context of practical action. Practical knowledge has been regarded as a 
form of knowledge that packages a great deal o f  inherent complexity economically and, 
whilst generalisable, permits use in a specific instance, the appropriateness of which is 
recognised in action.( Argyris, Putnam, et al. 1985 p233) This can be illustrated with a 
musical methaphor. A pianist will have acquired considerable practical skill in order to 
play a piano well. The skill is specific (music on a page can be accurately translated into 
sound) and yet can be applied to a particular piece of music, and the appropriateness of
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this can be judged by reference to the musical nature, or not, in the outcome. As a pianist 
myself I am aware that I do not by and large see the individual notes on the page, but 
translate passages into a certain feeling in the hands. In this respect the action is also 
economic.
This suggests that professional knowledge (practical knowledge) can be regarded as a 
synthesis of disconfirmable (hopefully) propositions drawn from a single or multiple 
paradigmatic perspectives mediated through action by speech or otherwise. A 
methodology that proposes to research the nature of this practical knowledge should at 
least consider addressing the notion of ‘practical’ knowledge in a way that is not simply a 
reformulation of the problem but also pays due regard to setting. This approach suggests 
that a purely positivist approach would be inadequate and that an action methodology 
might be appropriate.
Knowledge about knowledge
Encompassing all of this is the notion that theories and research methods structure and 
explain the world according to their own internal logic, for they impose their own 
definition on the situation and also constitute what is to be considered scientific 
explanation. Epistemologically, the kind of understanding or knowledge arrived at may 
thus be no more than an artifact of theory or research method, and unrelated to the reality 
observed or favour a particular epistemological stance in suggesting that certain kinds of 
insight, understanding, and explanation may be more appropriate than others. (Morgan 
1983 p i50) Faced with this one is led to ask; What exactly is qualitative research? 
Qualitative research can be defined in a simple, but quite loose, way. It is the 
“interpretive study of a specified issue or problem in which the researcher is central to the 
sense that is made." (Banister, Burman, et al. 1994 p2) The purpose of qualitative 
research is an attempt to capture the sense that lies within, and structures what we say 
about what we do together with an exploration, elaboration and systematization of the 
significance of an identified phenomenon.
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This suggests that the heart of qualitative research is the notion that knowledge is a 
debate about knowledge and implies a strategy whereby social scientists are concerned 
with the realisation of possible knowledge. After all, what is studied and what is learned 
are intimately connected with the mode of engagement, which influences in a 
fundamental way the nature of the debate. The nature of the debate includes a 
commitment to “methodologies, with an emphasis (at least in its pure ethnographic form) 
upon description rather than explanation, the representation of reality through the eyes of 
its participants, the importance of viewing the meaning of experience and behaviour in 
context.” (Henwood & Pidgeon 1993 p i6) So in developing the interpretive structure 
provided by one mode of engagement rather than by another, the social researcher 
directly influences what he or she will "discover" about the phenomenon being 
researched, realising one possible form of knowledge within a wider set of possibilities. 
(Morgan 1983 p367) What are the implications for this standpoint?
This suggested an important consideration to bear in mind as I developed a methodology 
to try and make sense of a more complex clinical situation, occasioned by paying 
attention to non-clinical as well as clinical processes. The research methodology must 
generate an understanding of how I interacted with the situation. As a researcher, I 
believed at the beginning that a co-operative inquiry group of doctors might provide the 
methodology to achieve this. I took my cue for this belief from general practice, where it 
is common for trainees to examine, with other doctors, a video of their clinical 
consultation in order to explore ‘what else was happening’ when patients came to see 
them. In this model, a key voice, that of the patient, is missing and any understandings 
achieved are hampered by the absence of this key actor. Part of the reconstruction of the 
methodology has involved identifying key assumptions I made in undertaking this work 
and it is clear to me in retrospect that I had paid insufficient attention to ‘hearing’ the 
voice of the patient at the onset of the research. When I realised this voice was missing, it 
formed the basis for changing, at a later stage, to an action science/ inquiry methodology.
Having considered what might be regarded as ‘knowledge’ in the clinical encounter, I 
proposed to consider what research question would be appropriate.
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What in general terms was my area of research interest?
This question is naturally dependant upon an assumed ontological and epistemological 
position as a researcher. At the onset of the research, I espoused the position that the 
attitudes, ‘medical’ and more particularly non-medical, of both the patient and the doctor, 
were meaningful in the clinical context and themselves formed meaningful components 
of the wider social world. The discourse in the early part of the thesis suggests that I had 
reached the point where I began to take the view that the institutional components of 
medicine form meaningful components particularly in relation to the exercise of networks 
of power and control of medical knowledge. I also accepted that it was possible to know 
more about such meaningful components by the application of an appropriate 
methodology. These are all propositions that I initially accepted by suspending my 
scepticism at the onset of the research but which became supported by experience as my 
attitude towards data and data generation shifted my ontology towards constructivism. 
Within this assumed framework then my broad topic of research interest becomes that of 
non-medical processes in the doctor patient interaction.
What were, in specific terms, my research questions?
Now that the ontological and epistemological framework have been established, together 
with the broad topic of research interest, the scene is set to focus upon more specific 
research questions. Mason has identified three general types of puzzle around which to 
formulate research questions in qualitative research;
1. Developmental questions; how does it work?
2. Influential questions; what influence does x have on y?
3. Formulate questions to be explored rather than necessarily answered.
(Mason 1996 p i5)
For each of these, I saw three sources of questions that can arise within the clinical 
interaction
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1. Questions based around my perception of what is happening or what is not 
happening.
2. Questions based around the patient’s perceptions of what is or what is not 
happening insofar as I am able to ‘see’ them
3. Questions that arise from this process of interacting
Within this classification a whole host of more specific research questions arose that 
reflect the new complexity of the clinical interaction when viewed as a constructivist 
rather than a positivist or post-positivist. For example; it was my perceived assumption 
that more than simple medical facts determine treatments. Was this assumption justified? 
If that was so, then what was the nature of these non-medical phenomena and what was 
their status with respect to medical intervention? Should a non-clinical process override 
a clear cut medical indication to act, for example, in the case of meningitis? What were 
the influences that govern the weight given to each of these processes? Where did they 
come from and how in specific terms did they impinge on the clinical decision making 
process? Who decided how this is done? How did my upbringing in the positivist 
tradition, and the assumptions this brought, interact with real clinical situations where 
was assumed that we did not behave in a positivist manner? Did I do this in any 
consistent fashion? If so what were the rules I had constructed for myself? Were these 
rules consistent? Did I have to be consistent, after all consistency was a fundamental 
tenet of positivism? What did I do with information from a patient that appeared to be a 
departure from positivist epistemological information? Did I disregard it-obviously, 
subtly, covertly, manipulatively? If I used it, what were the ‘rules’ that governed this 
strategy? Did I construct situations that prevented such information from emerging? How 
was this given voice in the first place? How could this be done better? Was that 
necessarily appropriate? What was the influence of institutions, such as hospitals, 
medical institutions such as the General Medical Council, folklore in allowing such 
information to be presented as epistemologically valid in the eyes of the medical 
professio n? Such questions go on and on. As a researcher I noticed that adoption of a
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constructivist ontology not only raised complexity and immediately raised the level of 
inquiry but it also obliged me to face another issue; the issue of complexity versus clarity.
In general terms one is faced with two choices. On the one hand I could confine myself to 
an in depth analysis of one or two of these questions. For example, How did I manage 
j information from a patient that appeared to be a departure from positivist epistemological
information? This approach might have partly overcome the problem of complexity and 
offered an analysis that had greater clarity but still left me with the problem of precisely 
I which question to ask. On the other hand it was possible to address a list of coherent
questions that would attempted a broad canvass of the whole subject but which might 
have, in the final analysis, attracted the criticism of superficiality.
As a researcher I also noticed how easy it was to generate a large number of questions 
and this consideration led me to start asking questions about the nature of questions 
themselves. What were good questions, what made a poor question? What was an 
| empirically useful question, what kind of questions increased understanding but had no
| utility? When was it appropriate to ask questions and when was it inappropriate? Given
| that this research was taking place during a clinical consultation, then the specific
intellectual puzzle become:
How did I formulate relevant questions in the moment?
Of course hidden within these questions are a raft of other subsidiary questions many of 
which concern themselves particularly with validity criteria such; How is it possible to 
know that this was being done in a reflexive manner? Nevertheless the idea of focussing 
attention onto the nature of relevant questions in the moment fitted in with the notion of 
raising my level of inquiry in this area generally and was also in keeping with a
!
' conceptual model that included a level of asking questions as a researcher. The
‘constructivist’ or ‘reflective practitioner’ was asking questions of the ‘positivist’ and the 




Linking research questions, epistemology and methods
The first section ‘Ontological and epistemological issues in relation to a research 
question’ has considered what constituted data in my chosen qualitative research field 
and explored possible research questions. In this second section, according to the overall 
I scheme of
1. Ontological and epistemological issues in relation to a research question
2. Linking research questions, epistemology and methods
3. Ethics, morality and politics of the research process
4. Producing a practical research design
I looked at ways of linking such data with the various methodologies available to 
developing understandings about what was happening.
What sources of data and methods of data generation are available?
I
j
| I started by considering all the possible sources of data and general methods of data 
generation. It is hardly surprising that hospital environments are data rich for a study of 
this sort. For in addition to the obvious source, the doctor/ patient interaction in the clinic, 
there are a variety of other sources that might provide useful insights and understandings 
of what is happening. Furthermore, most people have at one time or another been a 
patient and this extends the potential sources of data almost limitlessly. The principle 
sources for this study were the following.
Hospital clinics.
My colleagues, 
j My colleagues at work in a multidisciplinary clinic.
My family.
Discussions with friends, medical and non medical.
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From these data sources, data could be generated in the following manner with varying 
degrees of systematic methodological approach and rigor.
My own reflective practice.
Short informal interviews in the clinic.
In depth interviews with patients.
Others watching me in the clinic e.g. medical students, other doctors. 
My colleagues at work in the form of a discussion group. 
Postgraduate research group at Bath.
The literature; medical and organisational.
My supervision sessions.
The examination process.





Rationality, emotion, thought, feeling memoiy, senses,
Consciousness, subconsciousness, instincts,





Representations, cultural or social constructions,
Experiences, accounts,
Stories, narratives, biographies, evolution, development, progress,
Texts, discourses,
Words, codes, communications, languages,
Actions, reactions, behaviours, events,
Interactions, situations, social relations,
Social or cultural practices,
Social processes,
Rules, morality, belief systems,
Institutions, structures, the ‘material’ market,
Cultures, societies, groups, producers, consumers,
Nature, genes, humans, animals,
Empirical patterns, regularities, order, organisation, connectedness,
Empirical haphazardness, spontaneity, disorder, disorganisation, chaos and disconnectedness,
Underlying mechanisms,
One objective reality, multiple realities or versions,
(Mason 1996 pi 1-12)
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The use of and interpretation of such data of course reflected the basis of one’s 
ontological positioning in the world, however, the choice was enormous and I was 
approaching this research without any strong theory to handle this data. Consequently, I 
was faced with the problem of making sense of vast amounts of data. The presence of 
such large amounts of data suggested the development of a mental open-ended indexing 
system “to allow an array of concepts and categories to emerge from systematic 
inspection of the data corpus.” (Henwood & Pidgeon 1993 p21) In conventional 
grounded theory this is undertaken in a more systematic manner, but I proposed that the 
process was helped by considering a variety of sources of data and data generation to 
generate and challenge interpretations. This then suggested the general proposition that a 
significant departure from the general formula of one on one researcher interpretation 
(doctor interpreting what happens in the clinic independently) would be an important 
feature in developing understandings. This indicated the need to obtain interpretations 
from others, either singly from other observers in the clinic, or from an inquiry group. 
This approach, where data is collated from different sources and used to increase 
understandings of social reality, is called data triangulation.
Triangulation, essentially the use of different vantage points, takes a variety of forms. 
Triangulation can take the form of data, investigator, method and theoretical triangulation 
(Banister, Burman, et al. 1994 pl42-159) and time, space and validity triangulation. 
(Cohen & Manion 1989 p269-286) Since the clinical consultation took place usually 
between the patient and myself, and no other people were directly involved, it made it 
more difficult to generate opportunities for triangulation. Consequently, it seemed 
important to generate as many opportunities for triangulation as possible for the study to 
remain credible.
There are opportunities for data triangulation in a number of ways. Firstly, each clinic 
provides an opportunity to collect data from different participants both from my 
perspective and from theirs by asking appropriate questions. This is by far the most 
important source of data in this research. I do approximately three thousand consultations
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per year, so that during the course of the study I have made approximately 15,000 
consultations. Many of these are multiple consultations on the same patient. To 
supplement this, it was also possible to conduct in depth interviews and subsequent 
exchange of transcripts with a few patients to specifically explore areas of mutual 
interest. This process obviously provides an opportunity to question and begin to validate 
some of the interpretations that are made during the course of the shorter consultations 
(average time seven minutes) that are typical of a normal clinic. This was supplemented 
by making video recordings of consultations to review at length, showing them to other 
researchers from non-medical disciplines in order to generate interpretations and data to 
increase the variety of perspectives.
In order to address the criticism that any finding or interpretation may be an artefact of 
the method of data generation, different methods of generating data should be also be 
sought: Hospital life gave me many opportunities to collect this in number of different 
ways. The postgraduate research group of postgraduate researchers, the hospital group 
and my own doctor/patient group were all discussion groups that generated data and 
interpretation about the clinical process and offered a degree of method triangulation. 
These individual groups will be described in detail later in this section.
Finally, theoretical triangulation embraces multi-theories and “breaks through the 
parameters and limitations that inevitably frame an explanation that relies on one theory. 
It recognises complexity and diversity and that multiple realities exists... .Research which 
tests competing theories will normally call for a wider range of research techniques than 
has historically been the case; this virtually assures more confidence in the data analysis.” 
(Banister, Burman, et al. 1994 p i45-149) One is looking in the final analysis for different 
theoretical perspectives to shed light upon the situation and this would be in keeping with 
my conceptual model of positivism, constructivism and paradigm perspective outlined at 
the beginning of this thesis.
This description of triangulation overlooks three other technique of triangulation that 
became empirically useful during the course of the research. At first sight they might
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appear to be procedures for self-referencing but I would like to make an argument for 
their serious inclusion as alternative forms of triangulation. I have termed these 
‘experience’, ‘paradigmatic’ and ‘behaviour’ triangulation.
When I had started the research, I had been qualified as a doctor for fourteen years. An 
approximate calculation indicates that I must have seen in excess of 15,000 patients over 
that time. This represents a body of experience (assumptions as well!) that manifests 
itself in certain patterns of behaviour, attitudes and interpretations, principally on my part 
and possibly on the part of patients. I would like to argue that if one then introduces a 
change in practice, then there is a considerable body of previous experience to which one 
can appeal as a perspective on any change. It is this body of experience that I term 
‘experience’ triangulation. This body of experience is to my way of thinking an 
empirical, utilitarian body of evidence based on perceived usefulness. It will be the 
distillation of many learning encounters, some of which appear to have worked and were 
adopted as changes in practice, others of which did not work and were abandoned. Any 
new interpretation or action generated by another perspective can be assessed with 
reference to this body of evidence. Furthermore, in the final analysis, as a practising 
surgeon, the argument o f ‘usefulness’ is one that I cannot afford to overlook and I do not 
believe that only a constructivist epistemology would generate interpretations that are 
‘useful’. This statement on ‘usefulness’ suggests that the definition o f ‘useful’ is 
universal and straightforward and of course it is not. Who defines usefulness, the doctor 
or the patient, and against what criteria and values? My whole approach to this thesis was 
centred around my concerns about ‘usefulness’ as a doctor and this research was an 
attempt to be more useful in ways that are not judged solely by the doctor. Later in the 
methodology section, I try to address the question o f ‘usefulness’ when discussing 
validating my change in practice with a set of twelve validity criteria I perceived as 
authentic.
The process of shifting from an espoused positivist or post-positivist framework 
represents a paradigmatic shift. If one continues to look at the ‘same’ data but through 
different paradigms then this can be conceived as another form of triangulation. This is
111
what I perceive as ‘paradigmatic’ triangulation. A constructivist would argue that 
positivism is one possible perspective in a constructivists world view but I have argued 
elsewhere that it is possible to ‘play the game’ and be both a positivist and a 
constructivist so that this does represent a true paradigmatic shift. The alternative 
argument is that the ‘data’ is not the same, because an immutable principle of 
constructivism is that no two sets of data can ever be the same. I would argue that at one 
level, the level of process, the data is the same. Every patient coming through the clinic is 
engaged, at an archetypal level, in a medical process that may have for example ‘healing’ 
as its intended purpose. Of course each patient’s espoused agenda, each patient’s context, 
is entirely different, but at the level of purpose there may be similarity. This level of 
purpose can be triangulated through the use of different paradigmatic perspectives.
Finally, what do I mean by ‘behaviour’ triangulation? The hospital and the medical 
organisations within it represent a structure whose origins arise from an espoused 
positivist stance on medical knowledge. It means that as I sit in my clinic adopting a 
constructivist stance, I am surrounded by an organisational network, which implicitly 
questions this approach and constantly reminds me of what is perceived as the most 
‘appropriate’ way to behave in a clinic. I notice this especially when I come to teach the 
trainees, who by and large expect to be engaged within a positivist framework. When I 
teach trainees, I feel perceived as the expert, an institutionally empowered expert. This 
flip-flopping between a reference behaviour that is institutionally acceptable and my own 
behaviour in the clinic, which may be different, I see as a form of behaviour 
triangulation. As a researcher it constantly reminds me of alternative perspectives.
Can I answer the charge that each of the additional methods of triangulation cannot be 
justified on the grounds that interpretation is made with reference only to oneself? I 
would argue that no matter what form of triangulation, be it data, method, investigator or 
theoretical, there comes a point where the interpretation offered by other viewpoints has
\
’ to be re-interpreted with reference to oneself. I can choose to accept or reject the 
interpretation offered by one of the other members of the postgraduate research group or 
occupy an intermediate position and accept part of the interpretation. This may manifest
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itself in what I choose to put in the thesis and what I choose to exclude. Even if I do this 
with considerable reflexivity, there is still a point when I make a choice as the principle 
owner of this work about whether I wish to accept an interpretation or not. My position is 
one based upon what I perceive as authentic behaviour or not. Instead of answering the 
critique that ‘experience’, ‘paradigmatic’ and ‘behavioural’ forms of triangulation are 
illusory, let me ask the question; what happens if I choose to ignore such viewpoints? I 
would argue that I am failing to address a body o f ‘evidence’ that may represent 
interpretive bias and that failure to do so is inconsistent with authentic reflexivity.
Finally, the list of possible data sources produced at the beginning of the section needs to 
be reduced to manageable proportions. Given the ontological and epistemological 








Actions, reactions, behaviours, events,
Interactions,
Social or cultural practices,
Groups,
Underlying mechanisms,
Multiple realities or versions,
I have particularly highlighted the role of groups because of a perceived need to pay 
attention to the level of unsubstantiated interpretation. An interpretive group might serve 
to limit the level of uncritical ‘conjecture’ by challenging it and slowing down the 
process.
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What methodologies are available?
A key theoretical problem underlying my research into clinical practice was to try and 
establish a relationship between the quantitative and qualitative approaches. This means 
that as well as a review of what constitutes ‘data’, it is necessary to review the 
methodologies that generate data in each paradigm. It is on the basis of understanding 
this that I make claims as a researcher to have an awareness of paradigm. Consequently, 
this review of methodologies is rather long but I see it as an important piece of evidence 
to support this third conceptual level of awareness of paradigm.
There are two specific problems to consider when discussing the various methodologies 
available. Firstly, what is my paradigmatic perspective in the first place, so that the 
choice of methodology is coherent with this and with the nature of the data. Secondly, 
how is the choice of methodology to be made, given that there are often alternatives even 
within a single paradigm.
The perspective offered by any qualitative researcher on any methodology arises from a 
paradigmatic position itself. For example, from the perspective of the constructivist, the 
methodology of positivism is seen as "experimental and manipulative”, (Guba & Lincoln 
1994 pi 10) a position that a positivist would not necessarily accept. During the course of 
the research, I became more conscious of the theory and value driven nature of data and 
in the process shifted towards critical theory and constructivist paradigms. My view of 
methodologies portrayed here then is overtly from the perspective of a constructivist. 
However, as a researcher, I acknowledge that each paradigm is a coagulation of agreed 
assumptions that serve the purpose of making data within that paradigm researchable. I, 
therefore, explicitly acknowledge that any analysis made here is made with an awareness 
that this can only be from a particular paradigmatic stance and is of course limited by 
that.
As to the problem o f variety of methodology, I cannot hope to, nor see the value of, a 
careful review of every single published methodology in the qualitative tradition. For
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example there are now more than thirty varieties of action inquiry model that have so far 
been described. I have chosen to handle this review with what I see as purposive choice 
and selected from within each of the five main paradigms representative examples from 
the main schools of qualitative methodologies. This is not completely straightforward. It 
is generally now agreed that the distinction between each of the qualitative paradigms is 
becoming blurred and especially between critical theory and constructivist. It is becoming 
more difficult to attribute each methodology to a strict paradigmatic position. It should 
also be acknowledged that the same methods can be applied in different paradigms. With 
these points in mind, What are the key features underlying the methodologies within each 
paradigm?
The postpositivist approach places an emphasis on “’critical multiplism’, (a refurbished 
version of triangulation) as a way of falsifying hypotheses.” A methodological 
requirement is that inquiry takes place in “natural settings and data is collected 
situationally.” Discovery is considered as an important element in the inquiry process and 
viewpoints are “collated to determine meanings.” (Guba & Lincoln 1994 pi 10) The 
critical theorist sees data as arising principally from dialogue. The dialogue should be 
dialectical in nature with an emphasis on “informing ignorance and minimising 
apprehension.” The constructivist maintains the interactive nature of gathering data but 
places emphasis on the fact that that “construction can only be elicited by and is a process 
of such interaction.” The aim is to collect a consensus construction by a process of 
“distillation” that is both more informed and sophisticated.(ibid) The collaborative action 
inquirer emphasises the importance of democracy in research and one model maintains 
that this collaboration commences at the point of formulating research questions, 
continues into choice of methodology and thereafter. The distinction between researcher 
and researched is minimised, even to the point of being absent. The conceptual image is 
of conscious research ‘cycling’. The use of the methodology in this way illuminates the 
world of each participant’s “practice (practical knowing), which leads to new forms of 
encounter (experiential knowing), which find ways to represent this experience in 
significant patterns (presentational knowing) and which feeds into a revised propositional 
understanding of the originating question.” (Heron & Reason 1997 p283)
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Experiments and quasi experiments
Ethnography
Various forms of action research 
Co-operative inquiry
Although each of these methodologies were considered at or close to the onset of the 
research, the reconstruction made possible by the resubmission of the thesis has allowed 
me to reconsider the part played by each of these methodologies in my research. In 
portraying these methodologies, I have also taken the opportunity to show how they were 
incorporated into my research and, where possible, show how they were related to my 
practice. Each methodology described begins with a general description of the methods 
and leads onto a discussion of aspects of the method I found useful, together with some 
of the difficulties I encountered, during the research.
Observation
For every methodology, observation is a key feature but what characterises observation 
as a methodology in it’s own right is the separation of researcher and researched. There 
are a number of points to consider when contemplating observation as a methodology.
Structuring; this may range from being highly structured and detailed to diffuse 
unstructured observation.
Focus; this may take the form of narrow concentration onto specific aspects e.g. single 
non-verbal clue to broad focus.
Knowledge; Do those being observed have knowledge of the research process?
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Explanations; given to those being observed, which may be ‘full’ to none.
Time scale; one-off to extended observations over a period of time.
Methods used.; note taking, audio, video recorders, checklists, etc
Feedback; given to the observed from full sharing of observations and interpretations to
no contact with participants at all.
In attempting to validate the knowledge gained in this way it is considered important to 
develop a clear “audit trail” which includes:
Describing the context, including physical setting, date, time, weather etc.,
Describing the participants. Who they are, with attention to age, gender, ethnicity, 
clothing, physical description.
Describing who the observer is, including any prior links with the observed,
Describing the actions, including verbal and non verbal clues,
Interpreting the situation by attempting to give an indication of it's meaning to the 
participants and to the observer. This means making as clear as possible the evidential 
basis for the interpretations. In the process of doing so it may be difficult to identify one's 
own projections.
Considering alternative interpretations o f the situation and giving reasons. How would it 
look from another perspective e.g. child, behaviourist etc.
Exploring your feelings in being an observer including your experience of the 
observation. What is very useful here is to notice what is left out in the first analysis, 
which may be seen to reflect natural bias in the observer. (Cohen & Manion 1989 p i29)
The emphasis in observation as a methodology is on the researcher acting as an outsider 
so that in this respect observation has been criticised as "very much 'objectivist' in it's 
standpoint, with the researcher sometimes using the material gained very much for her or 
his own ends." (Banister, Burman, et al. 1994 pl9) I became aware of this objection on 
one occasion during a discussion in the hospital inquiry group. One participant had spent 
the whole time observing the group and recording who had looked at who. Just as the 
group discussion was finishing, he announced what he had been doing and showed
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everyone the finished diagram. The response varied from mild amusement to quite overt 
irritation. On this occasion there had been an opportunity for the ‘researched’ to give 
some feedback to the researcher and this may have been the reason why the exercise, or 
anything like it, was never repeated.
There may be a role for observational techniques as part of a methodology, which I will 
discuss later, but the main methodological concern is centred on trying to observe and 
participate at the same time. When I am taking a clinic, for most of the time there are no 
other participants other than the patient and myself; there is no third party undertaking an 
observational study. To consider straightforward ‘observation’ as the sole research 
methodology, I would have to consider carefully the question of acting as both ‘observer’ 
and interpreter in a situation in which I am also a participant. I am obliged to ask the 
question is this possible and even if it is, is this desirable?
Accounts that typically emerge from participant observations are often described as 
subjective, biased, impressionistic and idiosyncratic. Not only are they criticised in terms 
of genuinely advancing understanding, they are also criticised as lacking precise, 
quantifiable measures that are the hallmark of survey research and experimentation. Such 
impressionistic interpretations are referred to at an extreme as 'going native' (I note the 
cultural superiority implied by the term ‘native’) as a result of role playing within such a 
group. (Cohen & Manion 1989 p i29) It could be argued that someone in my position 
would be commencing a research study having ‘gone native’ from the onset and is being 
asked to disengage from one’s cultural and historical perspective from the position of 
one’s own cultural and historical perspective i.e. no other reference point. “How do we 
know that the observer does not lose his perspective and become blind to the peculiarities 
that he is supposed to be investigating?" (ibid)
As a researcher this raises significant problems of external as well as internal validity. 
External validity is an assessment of the applicability of one piece of research to other 
situations, which is in turn dependent upon internal validity, an assessment that the 
findings represent an adequate representation of the phenomenon (within paradigmatic
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assumptions). Arguments have been already put forward suggesting a relationship 
between data, theory and values so that data and explanation would appear to be ‘theory 
and value5 mediated. It suggests that reliance upon observational techniques may produce 
a perceived reality that is structured through the very framework being utilised. (Banister, 
Burman, et al. 1994 p30) Furthermore, at the heart of observation is the assumption that 
people try to make sense of the world and act in a manner that is always purposive. Our 
everyday experience suggests that this may be true most of the time and that we do 
follow implicitly a set of social rules and conventions that influence our behaviour and 
appear to give it purpose. The methodology of observation does not contain a structure 
that can challenge this assumption.
Nevertheless, throughout the research, I was observing both myself and others and it 
became a methodology that I found important. To try and address some of the problems 
in generating data solely through my own observations, I looked for opportunities to use 
observation of the clinical process in other ways. There were occasions when medical 
students, colleagues, nurses and relatives of the patient were present in the clinic. Such 
participants were not ‘directly5 involved in the clinical process and formed a cohort who 
could to some degree act as ‘observers5. Insights gleaned in this way could initiate 
moments o f ‘conjecture5 that seemed to lead to understandings. For example, a medical 
student once made a comment about the degree of eye contact I was making with patients 
and commented that it was like watching a “born again Christian55. This observation made 
me think about eye contact in general and so I started to ask questions such as ‘What 
determines whether I increase or decrease the level of eye contact?5 This meant that I 
started asking patients about eye contact. I learnt from a number of patients that the 
presence of a computer in the room of many of their general practitioners had reduced the 
level of doctor/ patient eye contact. This was perceived as a reduction in medical interest 
in their problem and interpreted by them as an increase in interest in the cost of their 
problem.
Other forms of observation included showing videos of clinics to other members of the 
postgraduate research group, who would observe and interpret what was happening.
119
Although interpretations were made by members of the research group, no attempt was 
made to validate any interpretation with the patient so that I would accept that there is 
still a problem of checking inference with data. In response to this I would argue that the 
emphasis in the video analysis was largely on my own behaviour and the group would 
offer interpretations of my interpretations as part of a process to try and increase my 
reflexivity. The observations and interpretations’ they made served as a source of 
conjecture and reinterpretation, which could on occasions be shown to have an ‘audit 
trail’ to significant change. For example, it was commented that I would sometimes start 
to examine someone without asking permission. I would lean across and start to look into 
an ear and to an outsider this looked like an invasion of ‘body space’. Afterwards, I 
became very aware just how often I was doing this and so instead would always ask 
permission before taking such action. This was extended to noticing that I would then 
perform procedures without seeking further permission, for example cleaning out an ear, 
so that part of the process of seeking permission for intervention involved explaining 
what all the equipment was and what I was proposing to do and why. These changes were 
extended further when, in my capacity as a teacher in the department, I raise this issue 
when discussing patient examination. Eventually it led to considering how clinical space 
was managed so that the presence of equipment in a room was an expression of medical 
power. Observation in this was became useful as a mode o f ‘conjecture’ that led to 
change.
Surveys
In this review on survey methodology, I have chosen to exclude interviewing 
methodologies, which I have considered separately as it is central to the doctor patient 
interaction. Surveys as a methodological technique are already familiar to me in positivist 
research, especially in the field of retrospective medical note analysis. In qualitative 
research, surveys have been defined as methods of gathering data at a particular point in 
time with the intention of;
“(a) describing the nature of existing conditions, or
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(b) identifying standards against which existing conditions can be compared, or
(c) determining the relationships that exist between specific events, which vary from 
those that provide simple frequency counts to those which present relational analysis." 
(Cohen & Manion 1989 p97)
This can be done in a variety of ways such as structured or semi-structured interviews, 
self-completion or postal questionnaires, standardised tests of attainment or performance 
and attitude scales. With the exception of interview data, the data generated by survey 
methodology would, it seems to me, to be essentially epistemologically post-positivist or 
attempting to be positivist. The general intention is to handle the data by a process of 
quantification after which an attempt is made to tease out simple relationships between 
factors deemed to have some bearing on the phenomena in question. For example, 
correlational techniques are intended to answer three questions about two variables or 
sets of data.:
(a) Is there a relationship between the two variables or sets of data? If the answer is 'yes', 
then two questions follow:
(b) What is the direction of the relationship? and What is the magnitude of that 
relationship (Cohen & Manion 1989 p i54-157)
In the ‘Conclusions’ section, I draw attention to the considerable proportion of qualitative 
research in the medical literature that is dependant upon this approach. The argument in 
favour of such research is that there may be a need to “discover or clarify relationships 
and where correlation coefficients will achieve these ends. It is especially useful in the 
initial stages of a project and may become a source of hypotheses or when the objective 
or one set of objectives, is to achieve some degree of prediction." (Cohen & Manion 
1989 p i64-165). Prediction studies may be considered suitable where a group as opposed 
to an individual is the focus of a project but in which case a firm knowledge base is 
present
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My particular interest in engaging in qualitative research was to further my understanding 
of a situation inductively. The essentially deductive approach of data gathering and 
hypothesis generation that characterises survey did not offer sufficient difference of 
approach to suggest that this methodology would be especially useful. Its essentially 
postpositivist position still paid lip service to the standards set by positivism and failed, it 
seemed to me, to get at the meanings embedded in action, at the logic of action. ( Argyris, 
Putnam, et al. 1985 p20) It didn’t seem to have the methodological basis to explore action 
and practice. For this it seemed to be necessary to have a methodology that was usable in 
the moment and whilst retrospective research is powerful and helpful it is still 
retrospective. As a researcher I appreciate that in one sense, analysis of outcome in all 
research is retrospective, from astronomy to participative research. But I would argue that 
in certain methodologies the emphasis may be different so that some are more 
retrospectively orientated than others. I was looking for a methodology that asked What if 
I do this now as a test of a position, what is the outcome? This needs to be coupled with a 
level of inquiry that enables exploration to be conducted there and then. A survey 
methodology obviously does not offer such opportunities.
Finally, there is a low level of participation by the actors involved. This commences in 
the formulation of the research question, the method of analysis, interpretation and sense 
making of the responses and what happens to the data afterwards. My experience of 
surveys in the positivist arena had already taught me that to include a significant level of 
participation on the part of patients was going to be much more difficult even when 
overtly espousing a constructivist stance. Last of all, but important at a personal level as a 
researcher, after fifteen years, I was bored with doing, and supervising surveys.
Interviewing
The interview is important to consider because it represents an extension of what I am 
already doing in the clinic. Interviews, a special form of survey, has been defined as "a 
two person conversation initiated by the interviewer for the specific purpose of obtaining
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research-relevant information, and focused by him on content specified by research 
objectives of systematic description, prediction or explanation.” (Cohen & Manion 1989 
p3 07-3 08) Not all qualitative researchers would agree with this definition of a research 
interview with its emphasis on detachment and distance between researcher and 
researched and some might argue that such emphasis on separation of researcher and 
researched may be “rudely challenged by the face-to-face interview." (Banister, Burman, 
et al. 1994 p49)
An interview is an important part of many methodological approaches but what is 
expected from an interview might depend on the different ontological positions of the 
researcher and the reasons for conducting interviews. A more positivist or post-positivist 
researcher might expect to;
1.Measure what a person knows (knowledge or information), what a person likes or 
dislikes (values and preferences), and what a person thinks (attitudes and beliefs).
2. Test hypotheses or to suggest new ones; or as an explanatory device to help identify 
variables and relationships. (Cohen & Manion 1989 p318)
Such a perspective might also be reflected in the approach to bias. One position is to 
regard the interview as ‘pure information transfer’ in which the process from the 
perception of the researcher is characterised by accurate data with bias largely eliminated. 
A second conception recognises the inevitable place of bias and attempts to ‘recognise 
and control it’ by conducting interviews with a range of interviewers with different 
biases. These approaches to bias "regard the inherent features of interpersonal 
transactions as if they were obstacles to sound research and therefore to be removed, 
controlled or at least harnessed in some way." (ibid)
A constructivist or participatory researcher might adopt a different approach and use such 
‘interpersonal transactions’ in interviews to illuminate:
1. Subjective meanings rather than eliciting responses.
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2.Exploration of issues that may be too complex to explore through quantitative means.
3. Salutatory lessons in research involvement and practice.
4. Power relationships. (Banister, Burman, et al. 1994 p50-51)
The approach is to consider the interview as an encounter necessarily sharing many of the 
features of everyday life. This position takes the view that there are features of all 
interviews that are unavoidable and should not necessarily be regarded as problems. An 
interpretation attempts to generate a “theory of everyday life that takes account of the 
relevant features of interviews.” (Cohen & Manion 1989 p311-312)
A number of factors shape this approach. The first one is the level of structure in the 
interview. A highly structured interview, with questions that encourage short, even yes/no 
answers, allows virtually no opportunity for the interviewee to exert control on agendas 
and areas of interest. Interesting and unexpected lines of exploration may be overlooked. 
A loosely structured interview would implicitly and explicitly acknowledge that research 
is set up and conducted within power relationships that are identified, acknowledged and 
negotiated by both interviewer and interviewee at the onset and as the interview 
progresses. Such an approach acknowledges that participants hold and use their positions 
within the research relationship. Such an approach might empower the interviewee, who 
is neither passive nor unknowing about their positioning and who may use this to achieve 
specific outcomes within the interview. As an interviewer one is then forced to confront 
one’s own participation within the research and a change in participation may be 
reflected in the move from designating the people “who form the focus of research as 
‘subjects’ to ‘interviewees’ or ‘participants’ or ‘informants’ or ‘co-researchers’.” This 
emphasises the fact that research is set up within power relationships. (Banister, Burman, 
et al. 1994 p52-53)
With this in mind, Bannister (ibid) has identified four general approaches that inform 
interviewing practice in qualitative research. These different approaches reflect different 






In an ethnographic approach there is a clear role of demarcation between researcher and 
researched in determining the research topic and outcome. In 'new paradigm' research, 
the relationships are viewed as a collaborative enterprise involving “full participation of 
the interviewees as the researcher strives to carry out research in a non-exploitative, non­
dehumanizing way.” (Reason and Rowan 1981) In feminist research issues of power are 
placed central to the research. Finally, postmodernist approaches might include social 
constructionist or narrative approaches which questions the presumptions that 
participants within research share the same research goals. “Research is subordinated to a 
preconceived or more or less imposed interpretive framework, which may not be of 
immediate benefit to the informant at whose expense careers are advanced.” (ibid)
This raises the whole question of assumptions that structure all research. In interviews 
there is a chance to recognise these assumptions both beforehand, in the moment and 
afterwards. Beforehand, by planning and articulating such starting assumptions; in the 
moment during the interview by developing an approach that encourages one to question 
assumptions that become apparent as part of an interviewing process; and afterwards as a 
reflective practice. By raising one’s level of attention to the many assumptions that 
underlie research it encourages an attempt to theorise the impact of such assumptions 
upon the research process. Such an awareness ‘demands great reflexivity’. (ibid)
In developing such reflexive analysis, Bannister identified a number of points to consider. 
These included recording what's lost (and gained), which particularly relates to written 
transcriptions, and taking care not to over-interpret, including manipulation to produce 
meaning that isn't there. A thematic interpretation from one person alone may undermine 
credibility so that the reactions of other participants to interpretations is regarded as 
important. This may result in multiple readings that may make overall interpretation very
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cumbersome so that one becomes stuck in the "quagmire of relativistic nihilism, which 
disempowers us from using the research to say anything." For this reason it is useful to 
try and separate out readings from intentions, which might include an analysis of the 
researcher’s own motives in presenting any material. Some researchers may have 
' privileged access so that the issue of exploitation needs to be addressed and finally, there 
is the danger of “fetishing particular strategies” by selection and interpretation of 
! material. (Banister, Burman, et al. 1994 p63-67)
f
[
Such awareness in interviewing has considerable significance as a researcher in a medical 
clinic. The medical interview that takes place between a doctor and a patient is highly 
structured already. It is used principally to obtain medical information that is used within 
a positivist paradigm. “What colour was the discharge from the ear?”, “Did you measure 
your temperature during the episode of fever?”. If at the same time as a doctor one is 
trying to develop a practice that is more reflective, that is more constructivist in ontology, 
such a structured ‘medical’ interview forces one to confront one’s own participation 
| within this process. To what extent does a highly structured medical interview 
| disempower the interviewee? Is this appropriate? At the same time one is asking, as a
r
i researcher, What ontological position am I adopting here? Is it positivist, post-positivist, 
i  constructivist or even participatory? Whatever ontological position I perceive myself to 
be adopting, Am I using an appropriate model of interviewing?
Such a complex interplay between the highly structured medical interview and the more 
constructivist approach to interviews that was developed as a reflective practitioner and 
researcher, suggested that it may be necessary to conduct separate interviews about the 
medical interaction. In this way the whole process of being in a clinic, being in a hospital, 
considering different forms of treatment could be examined in detail and the medical 
‘problem’ could to be put aside for a moment. This approach made sense to me so three 
extensive interviews were made with David, Patrick and Valerie (Appendices 1,2 &3).
126
There are a number of ways in which selecting interviewees/ participants can be 
undertaken and they have been divided into probability and non-probability based 
methods;
Probability based
1. Simple random sampling. Selected using some random number selection. Everyone 
has an equal chance. The complete list of the population is needed before sampling can 
take place.
2. Systematic sampling. Involves sampling in a systematic fashion e.g. every 20th case
3. Stratified sampling. Dividing the population into groups then subjecting the groups to 
random sampling.
4. Cluster sampling. Randomly selecting from a cluster that may present largely through 
convenience or some other reason.
5. Stage sampling. An extension of cluster sampling in which samples are taken from 
samples in a systematic fashion.
Non probability based
6. Convenience (or accidental) sampling. Usually captive audiences.
7. Quota sampling. Attempting to obtain representatives of the various elements of the 
total population in the proportion in which they occur.
8. Purposive sampling. Handpicking of cases on the basis of judgement.
9. Dimensional sampling. Extension of quota sampling. Involves identifying certain 
factors of interest and obtaining at least one respondant for each of these interests.
10. Snowball sampling. A small number are indentified with the characteristics of 
interest and these are then used to identify others.
(Cohen & Manion 1989 p97-123)
At one level my method of sampling to obtain these three extensive interviews is 
potentially a difficult area to justify and at one level it is not. I would argue that my 
selection was ‘purposive’ sampling but this immediately raises the question “Whose 
purpose? My (the researcher’s) purpose?” This question involves an analysis that is at
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least partly linked to the ethical position of being a researcher. In the process of 
‘purposive’ sampling such choices may be based upon convenience, lack of expected 
dissension from the interviewee and exploitation on my part. I have chosen to present 
interviews from three individuals for a number of contrasting reasons and these reasons 
represent an opportunity to look at some of the differences such contrasting views 
; generate. I knew all three interviewees well because I had either looked after them as 
I patients for a number of years (David and Patrick) or known them as a friend (Valerie).
| The first interviewee (appendix 1), a businessman my age, had a particularly difficult
i
' treatment choice that interested me and who appeared to discount a positivist analysis in 
deciding what to do. The interview is fairly structured. The second interviewee (appendix 
2), older than myself, had a scientific background, and seemed to adopt a more positivist 
approach to problem solving. This was an assumption I agree but I would argue that an 
espoused positivist approach from a patient might represent a different ontological view 
from the first patient. The interview is semi structured in nature. Finally the third patient 
| (appendix 3), a woman about my age, faced a decision that was similar to the other two 
; but might have a perspective as a woman that would have significance for me as a male 
; researcher. She was the only one who had not been looked after by me as her doctor. The 
; interview was unstructured other than a broad statement on my part about the nature of 
| my research and my interest in hearing her story in detail. There are many other variables 
that one could be justified in including e.g. race, class, childhood attitudes, different 
interviewers, but the interviews are presented in this thesis mainly as an example of the 
kind of reflexive interview I was trying to develop.
|
The other form of interview was the ‘medical interview’ of the clinical consultation and 
approximately 15,000 were conducted during the period of the research. These form the 
basis for much of the interpretation found in this thesis. Such moments when 
understandings emerged, usually appeared as a surprise. Cohen does not include a 
category o f ‘surprise’ sampling. If my judgement (and in this respect sampling was 
purposive) suggested that something interesting was happening in the consultation, then a 
moment might be taken to explore this. For example, if a patient talked about ‘instinct’ or
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‘instincts’ or ‘gut feel’ or started to use the word ‘feel’ rather than ‘think’ in relation to 
deciding what to do, then I might take the opportunity to inquire about this in more detail.
Personal construct approaches
When I was considering a methodology to explore decision making, I was made aware of 
personal construct methodology by a colleague. We were exploring the possibility of 
using this methodology in relation to some other research work and as a consequence I 
considered whether or not it might play a role in my PhD research.
Personal construct approaches developed from the work of George Kelly in 1955, who 
took as his starting point the assertion that;
"objective reality is a myth. Our subjective reality is based on the meanings we have 
attached to previous experiences. It is the meaning that is influential, not the event itself.” 
p73. (Banister, Burman, et al. 1994 p72-91)
In our relationships with others “we are constantly searching for meaning and apply our 
own personal theories in an attempt to understand what is happening. We constantly 
restructure our frameworks, understandings and meanings to increasingly develop a 
! world that operates in a way that is useful to us” (ibid) and results in more effective 
communication and interaction with others. It is essentially a dynamic search for personal 
understanding gained by recognising similarities and differences in our experiences.
(ibid)
Personal construct approaches are developed on the basis that "our personal frameworks, 
or construct systems, are made up of a vast collection of similarity-difference dimensions 
or bipolar constructs. We each uniquely yet systematically hierarchically network our 
constructs" (ibid) These bipolar constructs may be may be “logically or idiosyncratically 
opposite. In this way our current construct system frames our reality, aspects of which 
will be clear and appropriate whilst others remain unclear or incompletely described.”
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(ibid) Its ontological perspective will be constructivist because the method implicitly 
acknowledges that there are alternative ways of viewing the same situation, which are 
judged only in terms of their usefulness and not as elements of an absolute truth. Each of 
these viewpoints is acknowledged as a valid construction, so this approach recognises the 
richness, relevance and complexity of personal experience.
This methodology calls for a considerable degree of reflexivity on the part of the 
researcher in order to engage with the participants in a collaborative manner, with a 
degree of mutuality to try and gain an understanding of the participant’s reality. The 
completed research is a more or less useful construction, which is, of course, “open to 
reconstruction.” The whole approach “encourages the democratisation of the process of 
research. The subjectivity of both researcher and researched is embraced. People are dealt 
with as complex beings rather than reduced to isolated variables. Participants 
constructions are valued, not seen as requiring modification and adjustment to fit more 
easily into another's framework." (ibid)
One method of developing such constructs has been through the use of repertory grids. 
Although they have been mostly used quantitatively, some have advocated that they can 
be used qualitatively. The approach involves a number of stages:
1 Choose a topic of concern, which has the potential to offer insight, e.g. relationships 
with doctors.
2. The participant chooses an appropriate range of elements or roles e.g. various 
experiences with the different doctors or healthcare workers they have had in their lives. 
These include doctors they have liked as well as disliked, communicated well with or 
otherwise etc.
3. A grid is then constructed using contrasting qualities e.g. Clear communicator- 
rambling, good negotiator-directive, weak-strong, etc.
4. The individuals are then scored according to whether they were more like one end of 
the scale.
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An attempt is then made to look for patterns, e.g. a clear doctor may be a directive one; a 
powerful doctor may be a clear one. A more participative approach involved exchanging 
the grids for others to complete, so called 'exchange grids', where both participants and 
researcher set up the grids together and fill them in before exchanging them with one 
another e.g. a doctor with a patient. (Thomas, L.F. 1979) These grids can form the basis 
for further grids.
Other personal construct methods may involve either 'self characterisation', in which the 
participant is invited to "write a character sketch of themselves" from say the point of 
view of a close friend; language can be entirely replaced by, for example, the use of 
drawings. These are used to assess how the person construes and are analysed co­
operatively with the researcher. (Banister, Burman, et al. 1994 p72-91) Bannister feels 
that this methodological approach may make it very difficult, perhaps impossible, to 
break out from our own constructions. Apart from implicitly accepting the ‘truthfulness’ 
and ‘validity’ of our own constructions (as well as others) as constituting ‘reality’, these 
constructions themselves form the basis for any analysis of future reconstruction, future 
interpretation or future action. This means that our present and future reality is framed by 
own idiosyncratic construction which might be useful in drawing attention to interesting 
phenomena but might equally limit our attention or fail to illuminate our assumptions to 
other aspects. Furthermore; "all the techniques rely on the ability of participants to 
introspect, to reflect on their experiences and assume....that this can be captured and
communicated via language Some experiences are completely beyond words: e.g.
listening to music, "(ibid). Such an approach is also very dependant upon the ability of the 
participants to relate effectively with one another and may make it difficult to assess 
unconscious motives. Who unearths them, who assesses them?
Bannister et al highlighted a number of other problems. The method encourages a belief 
in 'reification' the belief that some objective truth has been uncovered rather than a 
construction of a section of someone else's understanding. Such constructs also tend to 
oversimplify experience because there "are dimensions, not either/ors." This approach 
hinges on the idea that the world is comprised of processes (constructs) rather than things
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(concepts). These methods can also be criticised as neglecting the socio-cultural context 
in two respects. Firstly "the format of Kelly's language and his use of language illustrate 
his firm grounding in the times and his personal biography." Secondly, whilst Kelly 
recognised that "he was aware of the impact of culture on people's construing....the 
emphasis is on individuals as agents of their own actions, shaping themselves by 
attaching personal meanings to what is going on rather than shaped via social 
construction; that is a personal rather than a social construction." This may mean that by 
relying on personal construct approaches "we may fail to consider how our particular 
position in our sociocultural context frames our reality and limits our choices." In defence 
it is argued that "the accounts we gain from personal construct approaches are explicitly 
subjective, which is indeed the aim and all that research can ever gain." (ibid)
Such a methodology seems inappropriate for this study for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
there were practical difficulties. My clinical practice was essentially composed of 
numerous short consultations. It might be possible to collect considerable quantities of 
data using repertory grids, but there would have been little opportunity to test the 
inferences developed during the research with the same group of patients who made them 
in the first place. The qualitative strength of the methodology rests principally with the 
interchange of data, with for example exchange grids, and the transient nature of patients 
in clinics would make such exchange impractical. In practice, this would mean that the 
data generated by such a methodology would essentially belong to, and be interpreted by, 
the researcher. Secondly, the essentially retrospective nature of the analysis did not allow 
a high degree of inquiry in the moment, during the clinic itself. This does not fit well with 
the intended research objective to ask more effective questions. Thirdly, there was no 
opportunity for myself, as the researcher, to test or be tested about the position I adopted 
both historically and culturally, and to gain a perspective on the ‘value driven5 nature of 
the data obtained. Finally, since the methodology depended upon a high degree of 
reflexivity, an inability to ask sensitive questions in the first place, how would I both 
develop and assess my own reflexivity during the research?
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Discourse analysis
In 1992,1 attended a qualitative health research conference and listened to a number of 
presentations that had utilised a methodology based around discourse analysis. This led 
me to consider whether a formal approach using discourse analysis might play a part in 
the research project. Discourse analysis treats the social world as text that can be 
systematically 'read' and takes the view that language is so structured as to produce sets 
of meanings, discourses, that operate independently of the intentions of speakers, or 
writers. "It is the discourses that 'form the objects of which they speak', and not authors 
who speak through the text as if the text were a kind of transparent screen upon which the 
writer's intentions are displayed.” (Banister, Burman, et al.1994 plOO) Most texts convey 
assumptions about the nature of the individual’s psychology, which can be at least partly 
understood by careful analysis. Such discourse is created in a number of ways and may 
be analysed by examining;
1. The officially recognised idioms (i.e. ways of talking about needs, rights and interests)
2. The vocabularies available (e.g. feminist, therapeutic, religious etc)
3. The paradigms of articulation that are accepted as authoritative
4. The narrative conventions available for constructing the individual and collective 
stories that constitute people's identities.
5. The modes of subjectification: or the ways in which various discourses position the 
people to whom they are addressed as for example, 'normal' or 'deviant'.
(Vince 1996 pl34-135)
Discourse can be seen as an expression of the relationship between language (in a very 
broad sense) and power." (ibid). For example, if I say “I am dizzy, therefore I have an 
illness,” I am employing a medical discourse. If I say "I am dizzy, therefore I cannot 
work,", I am employing a psychodynamic discourse. If I say "that patient is dizzy and this 
is a more common complaint in women, " I am employing a sexist discourse. A phrase " 
that female patient is dizzy, thinks that they are seriously ill, but there is really nothing
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wrong with them and they should be back at work," then all three discourses are at work. 
The task in discourse analysis is to separate out these discourses.
Discourse analysis seeks to uncover the network of relationships that people, institutions 
and different social worlds develop as they interact. An analysis of texts or speech 
identifies discrete relationships that are at work and which may have otherwise passed 
unnoticed. These might be rational rule following, parental, developmental or medical so 
that discourse analysis would also include an assessment of; "where and when these 
discourses developed, a description of how they have operated to naturalise the things 
they refer to, that is how they 'form the objects of which they speak' and how discourses 
have a role in reproducing institutions. Also how these discourses might subvert those 
institutions, which leads onto an exploration of who would benefit and who would be 
disadvantaged by such discourses and who would want to support or credit such ways of 
talking." (Banister, Burman, et al.1994 pl03) In the medical world, development of 
‘evidence based medicine’ can be seen as a bulwark against ‘charlatanism’ (alternative 
medicine) and as a defence of a ‘correct’ medical practice. Medical institutions such as 
the Royal College of Surgeons do not simply structure social life, they also constrain 
what can be said, who can say it and how people may act and conceive their own agency 
and subjectivity. In this respect discourse analysis is useful because it acknowledges the 
connection between language and power. "The concept of power is vital to discourse 
analysis via the theoretical connection between the production of discourses and the 
exercise of power.”( Jupp & Norris 1993 p48) This whole notion has been considerably 
developed by Foucault who asserted that "Power produces knowledge, they imply one 
another: a site where power is exercised is also a place where knowledge is produced" 
(Foucault, M. 1975).
What are the limitations of discourse analysis? Discourse analysis assumes that there is 
no such thing as a fundamental and universal discourse which is shared by all. In this 
sense discourse analysis is at odds with a structuralist position which holds that language 
has an underlying structure and therefore is a common code. This does not mean that 
there is no possibility of a universal code, simply that discourse analysis “rejects the
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notion that universality is inevitable." (Jupp & Norris 1993 p47) This alerts one to the 
possibility that texts are not as coherent as they first seem and are constructed out of 
cultural resources, e.g. scientists use empiricist (resting on evidence) and contingent 
(relying on intuition) arguments to account for their choice of theory to the scientific 
community.(Squire,C. 1990 p33-46) It can be argued therefore that knowledge and 
discourses must be analysed in terms of different points or stages in history, and also in 
terms of social relations prevailing at these points rather than in terms of individual 
constructions. Such an approach would be impossible by relying on the analysis of 
speech or text alone.
Discourse analysis has a superficial attraction by virtue of its semi logical common sense 
and the way in which the analysis presupposes what it pretends to discover. This can be 
regarded as a tendency to reification, an emphasis on self-referencing, as well as the 
assumption that the ‘analyst knows best’, an assumption incidentally that guides much 
positivist research. In the search for explanatory clear analysis, the method may overlook 
resistance and contradictions in the reader and the writer of any text.(Bannister &
Burman et al 1994 pi 03) Validation of any discourse analysis is a problem and much of 
the analysis may be speculative especially if the work is done alone, which given the 
nature and time constraints of a clinic might well be the case. One possibility to 
overcome this would be to have taped the interview and examined at a later stage a 
transcript. My preoccupation, during the early stages of the research, with a methodology 
that explored inquiry in the moment meant that I put aside this approach. In the latter 
stages of the thesis, when the importance of the relationship between power and language 
became clearer, I returned to this idea and made videos of consultations and longer 
interviews (mentioned earlier). I do not claim to have approached the task of analysing 
the text in a systematic manner demanded by a rigorous discourse analysis methodology, 
however, I do claim it stimulated my interest in the power relationships that underpin 
language. These relationships are discussed in more detail later in the thesis when I 
attempt an analysis of clinical power relations. Finally it is almost self evident that; "there 
is more variability in human action and experience than can be expressed in language; as 
researchers we construct our own image of the world when we reconstruct 'discourses';
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and we have some responsibility for how our analysis will function." (Banister, Burman, 
et al. 1994 p i06)
Action methodologies
This final group of methodologies form one pole of a range of methodologies 
characterised by two features in particular; they are both more prospective in intention 
and they emphasise the importance of action. The methodologies described so far have by 
and large been retrospective in nature; observation, surveys, discourse analysis all seek to 
throw light on processes in a retrospective fashion. Any understandings of a situation are 
framed by an attitude that is embedded within a methodology that is forever analysing 
retrospectively. At one level all understandings and analysis are retrospective but in the 
methodologies that are about to be described there is an emphasis on attempting to 
understand in the moment and such understandings in the moment provide the 
opportunity for inquiry in the moment and intervention in the moment. There is thus an 
emphasis on exploration rather than testing of hypotheses. Secondly, the methodologies 
described so far avoid considering in detail the place of action or what has been called 
intervention effects. Analysis has a more static flavour and the place of knowledge 
related to action or intervention or practice is by and large ignored. The following 
‘action’ methodologies seek to place more centrally the role of action as a feature of 
everyday experience and in particular professional practice. For these reasons I perceived 
that an action methodology of one sort or another would be likely to play a central part in 
the research undertaken in this thesis.
Within these action methodologies the whole range of paradigmatic approaches can be 
found, from positivism to participative. For example, at one pole ‘experiments, quasi 
experiments and single case research’ can be seen to arise from the positivist tradition of 
experimentation, although in their qualitative application they might be positioned as 
post-positivist in terms of paradigm. The researcher and the researched are regarded as 
separate, and agendas are researcher controlled. At the other pole, the co-operative 
inquiry model of action research seeks to adopt a democratic approach to agenda setting
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and examines the politics and power structures of researcher and researched in an attempt 
to regard all participants as co-inquirers. These action methodologies will be reviewed in 
turn, starting with the more positivist orientated and finishing with the more participative 
action methodologies.
Experiments, Quasi experiments and single case research
This group of methodologies is characterised by a basic design of baseline assessment 
followed by intervention which is then repeated over a period of time. This continuous 
assessment of some aspect of human behaviour over a period of time requires, on the part 
of the researcher, the administration of measures on multiple occasions within separate 
phases of a study. “They involve what is termed intervention effects which are replicated 
in the subject over time. Continuous assessment measures are used as a basis for drawing 
inferences about the effectiveness of intervention procedures." (Cohen & Manion 1989 
p210) The methodology may be undertaken with groups or the individual. "The single 
case research design is uniquely able to provide an experimental technique for evaluating 
interventions for the individual subject. Moreover such interventions can be directed 
towards the particular group and replicated over time or across behaviours, situations or 
persons." (ibid)
As a doctor, such a design seems very familiar. It seems to me to describe the implicit 
methodology one ‘instinctively’ employs as a doctor. A patient will present a problem to 
the doctor in the clinic after which the doctor makes an assessment and then recommends 
an intervention such as medical treatment or surgery. After a suitable period of time, the 
patient will be reassessed and further interventions will be considered and tried. The 
method is validated by discharge from the clinic, indeed a current indicator of 
effectiveness of a doctor or a medical unit is the ‘finished consultant episode’. Use of 
such a methodology would offer no more than a more rigorous application of what is 
already happening. It seemed to me that if my espoused approach was to try and develop
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a research protocol that sought to offer an alternative ontological viewpoint, such an 
approach, firmly based in the post-positivist paradigm, would fail to do so.
Ethnography
Ethnography originates from the cultural and social anthropologists of the late nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century. Their characteristic approach was to collect data 
firsthand. Ethnographers concluded that “understandings of the character of non-Western 
societies were shaped by Western interest and the various motives that underlie those 
interests.” (Atkinson & Hammersley 1994 p249-250) Furthermore these understandings 
themselves also reflected the influence of historicism for central to this approach is the 
assumption that people of the past were different in culture from the people of today. This 
is not just a matter of recognition of differences but also the judgement that these 
differences cannot be properly understood by seeing them in terms of the “deviation from 
the norms of an observer's different historical perspective nor as signs of cultural 
backwardness.” (ibid) It was not long before this cultural and historical perspective was 
applied to contemporaneous societies and to the study of one's own social surroundings 
as well. From the ethnographers perspective all knowledge has to be understood within 
its cultural and historical framework, (ibid)
In practice then, what are the components of an ethnographic approach? At its simplest;
"It is a basic form of social research involving making observations, gaining data from 
informants, constructing hypotheses and acting upon them.” (Bannister & Burman, et al. 
1994 p34) but in practice a multimethod approach is used that is characterized by:
1. Gathering data from a range of sources, e.g. interviews, conversations, observations, 
documents.
2. A strong emphasis on exploring the nature of particular social phenomena, rather than 
setting out to test hypotheses about them.
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3. In the early stages, using an unstructured approach to analysing data. This is data that 
has not been coded at the point of data collection in terms of a closed set of analytic 
categories. This is so that key issues can emerge gradually through analysis.
4. Analysis of data that involves explicit interpretation of meanings and functions of 
human action, the product of which mainly takes the form of verbal descriptions and 
explanations, with quantification and statistical analysis playing a subordinate role at 
most.
5. Comprising an in-depth study of one or two situations
(Banister, Burman, et al. 1994 p34-48; Atkinson & Hammersley 1994 p248-261)
The first issue to consider is the degree of participation on the part of the researcher and 
in this respect there is considerable variation. At one pole, ethnography refers to a 
paradigm to which one makes a total commitment; "it has to be involved, committed, 
relevant, intuitive, but above all it has to be alive." (Reason & Rowan 1981 p35) It is 
believed that this involvement and commitment ensures “that theories are developed and 
tested during the process of research itself' (Glaser & Strauss 1967) At the other pole 
participation may be much capricious so that ethnography represents “a method that one 
uses as and when appropriate.” (Atkinson & Hammersley 1994 p248-249) Of course 
there are intermediate positions within these extremes.
An attempt has been made to clarify this degree of participation and a fourfold 
topological description has been developed ranging from “complete observer, observer as 
participant, participant as observer to complete participant." (ibid) Even this approach 
fails to appreciate the multitude of variations of participant involvement possible such as 
“whether the researcher is known to be a researcher by all those being studied, or only by 
some or by none; how much, and what, is known about the research and by whom; what 
sorts of activities are and are not engaged in by the researcher in the field and how this 
locates him or her in relation to the various conceptions of category and group 
membership used by the participants; what the orientation of the researcher is; how 
completely he or she consciously adopts the orientation of insider of outsider." (ibid)
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Some would argue that it is ontologically impossible to act as a researcher without being 
able to avoid having an effect on the social phenomenon being studied. This point of 
view suggests that it is better to understand, rather than overlook, the effects of the 
researcher. Reason and Rowan (Reason & Rowan 1981)have also argued that attempts to 
make it 'scientific' by setting up experimental method, quasi-experimental method tests of 
significance, dependent and independent variables destroys the quality of research and 
leaves only 'dead knowledge'. Understandings are also strengthened if "the findings are 
based on several different sources of information in a corroborative mode." (Banister, 
Burman, et al. 1994 p37)
Given this assertion then, one might argue that the ethnographer aspires to participate 
actively in the research environment but does not structure it; the approach is discovery 
based, the aim being to depict the activities and perspectives of actors. (Banister,
Burman, et al. 1994 p34) In practical terms one approach to this would be to more clearly 
position oneself as a ‘researcher’ and adopt a role that regards participant observation as a 
mode of being in the world characteristic of researchers. Within this framework the 
researcher should be alive to the degree of participation in a reflexive manner and in the 
process be aware of adopting a research stance that may be 'scientific' (essentially 
observer/researcher) or engaged advocacy (essentially researcher/participator) or critical 
stance (intermediate position). (Atkinson & Hammersley 1994 p249) These basic 
positions place the researcher within a post-positivist, constructivist or critical theory 
paradigm respectively. Given the range of paradigms possible with ethnography, it would 
seem particularly important to understand ones paradigmatic standpoint so that the 
ontological, epistemological and methodological positions were coherent.
This approach may be acceptable when engaged in what has been called the 
‘enlightenment model’ of ethnographic research but becomes more complex if as 
researcher one finds oneself engaged in the process of change. In the ‘enlightenment’ 
model, knowledge obtained during the course of the research is regarded as useful for its 
own sake and contributes towards disciplinary knowledge rather than solving practical 
problems. However, this model has been criticised as lacking sufficient impact and has
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gi'ven rise to more collaborative, participative and involved forms of ethnographic 
research. This makes the question of participation much more problematic, for in this 
kimd of research the researcher may be obliged to consider when to intervene or represent 
otlhers when ethical and political responsibilities arise from knowledge obtained during 
the course of the research. (Atkinson & Hammersley 1994 p253) This is precisely the 
position I might find myself having to consider when engaged in research of a process in 
which I am not only a participator but also a significant protagonist. It suggests that stand 
alone ethnography might be to permit ethical and political issues to emerge, be discussed 
and if necessary acted upon.
The historical and cultural origins of ethnography suggest all understandings have to be 
understood within a cultural and historical framework, which would seem to encourage 
an ontology that is multi-perspectival. This evolution of perspectives resulted in a 
profusion of types of ethnographic research. Ethnographers “meet and coalesce to form 
various 'schools' or subtypes of ethnography; they engage with different theoretical 
movements and fashions (structural functionalism, symbolic interactionism, cultural and 
cognitive anthropology, feminism, Marxism, ethnomethodology, critical theory, cultural 
studies, post-modernism and so on). There is never an orthodoxy... .such research is 
marked by diversity rather than consensus" (Atkinson & Hammersley 1994 p257)
For example “feminist ethnographers have argued that the findings of much research
simply reflects the masculine assumptions of workers the whole perspective is limited
by their male point of view.” (ibid) This diversity, as I see it, is both a strength and a 
weakness. The attraction of ethnography is that it constantly reminds the researcher about 
the connection between values, power, history and ‘facts’. It emphasises the context of 
any epistemological position. The problems arise because this approach eventually makes 
one question the context of the methodology itself. Is the methodology utilised to 
generate knowledge itself a value mediated, culturally influenced historically imprisoned 
methodology? If so then one should certainly go on to question the status of knowledge 
generated by such a methodology. For example does my position as a white middle class 
professional male in the late twentieth century in a profession such as surgery, that may
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be action and decision orientated, influence me to chose a methodology with a high 
degree of intervention and participation to study social phenomenon? The answer is 
likely to be ‘yes’, so that "the ways in which we theorize a problem will affect the ways 
in which we examine it, and the ways in which we explore a problem will affect the 
explanation we give. " (Banister, Burman, et al. 1994 p i3) Such an approach has been 
criticised on the grounds that the diversity of the ethnographic approach encourages naive 
inquiry. So how does one avoid naive inquiry?
In order to avoid the charge of naive inquiry, it has been argued that "knowledge should 
include empirically disconfirmable propositions that can be organised into theory and 
falsified by practitioners in real-life contexts." (Argyris, Putnam, et al. 1985 p232) This 
means in practice that participants should be given the opportunity to accept or reject 
propositions made about them. An action scientist might argue that ethnography, as a 
methodology, does not contain a sufficiently consistent and validated theory to overcome 
this problem. The ethnographer might reply that the principle of reflexivity, that is how 
the researchers position themselves within the context, process and production of the 
research, is of central importance and that if this is done sufficiently well then naive 
inquiry is avoided. (Banister, Burman, et al. 1994 p37) Naive inquiry is also made less 
likely by aiming to make a virtue out of such subjectivity by "an exploration of the ways 
in which the subjectivity of the researcher has structured the way it is defined in the first 
place.” In this manner "subjectivity becomes a resource, not a problem." (ibid)
This is particularly relevant when one considers for a moment the nature of my practice 
and how I was researching it prior to the onset of this more formal research project. At 
one level my clinical practice and understandings that developed within this practice 
represented a form of ethnographic research. Some might argue it was weak ‘research’ 
because it lacked sufficient reflexivity. As a clinical ‘ethnographer’ I would attempt to 
impose meanings on the clinical settings and specifically make inferences about patients, 
guided by whatever theoretical perspective has helped me to frame this data, largely 
positivist or more likely post-positivist. This meant making little or no attempt to publicly 
test my inferences (or the theories on which they are based) with the patients and
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ultimately ended up imposing meanings on situations that may not have been accurate. 
This made real learning less likely. “All ethnographers must impose meanings on their 
settings, specifically such chains of reasoning went untested .” (Argyris, Putnam, et al. 
1985 p 158) This approach may have mirrored the way I had been taught.
When considering ethnography as a methodology, I was left thinking that it would be 
insufficient as a stand-alone methodology for a number of reasons. It does not provide a 
suitable framework to handle ethical and political issues that might arise during the 
course of ‘enlightenment’. It may be difficult to question the degree of participation I 
take as a researcher and participator. There is no mechanism to develop and validate the 
degree of reflexivity I may or may not display. It contains no mechanism within the 
methodology to analyse the meaning o f ‘knowledge in action’ that would seem to be 
important in any study of professional practice. Finally, and most important of all, I 
intuitively appreciate, the method is insufficiently different from what I was already 
engaged in trying to do to provide that ‘jolt’ that leads to real change in perspectives.
One is left to consider the possibility of a hybrid methodology which includes 
‘participant observation’, in particular, which many researchers see as synonymous with 
ethnography, as forming the base method, while ‘interviewing and action research’ form 
later stages. Such a model would be consistent with a constructivist ontology and 
epistemology. (Banister, Burman, et al. 1994 p35)
I have chosen this point to consider the methodology utilised by my supervisors in the 
supervisory process of my own research. In the formal model of supervision, we would 
meet to discuss the project (data collection), infer (construct hypotheses), suggest a plan 
of action (act on it) and arrange to meet again (repeat the process). The sample for the 
study (me) is a single, in depth study conducted over a long period of time. Supervision 
like this (but not participation in the post graduate research group to be discussed later) 
would seem to be a simplified if not especially rigorous form of ethnographic research. 
So within this methodology, what degree of participation do I expect or experience from 
the supervision process? Where, within the fourfold typology of participation, do they
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position themselves and where would I position them; complete observer, observer as 
participant, participant as observer or complete participant? This question may be 
particularly relevant as one (Peter Reason) has espoused in print the belief that 
ethnographic research needs to be genuinely participative, involved and committed. If so 
then to what degree am I subject to the political and ethical stance that my supervisors 
adopt? Similarly to what extent are they subject to the political and ethical stance that I 
adopt? These and other questions suggest that it is necessary for the supervision process 
itself to have a methodology that allows such issues as these and others to have a voice. It 
suggests that my own methodology must at least consider if not develop a strategy to 
evaluate this position.
Action research
Within the formal term ‘action research’ are several action methodologies which each 
claim to possess a distinctive approach and these have from time to time coined particular 
terms for themselves. For example, Argyris, concerned at the way that action research 
had separated theory building from testing, preferred the term ‘action science’ to 
distinguish this approach from mainstream action research. (Argyris, Putnam, et al. 1985 
pix-xv) This short review will aim to examine the methodological approaches that 
characterise action research but will also review three approaches in particular. These are 
the ‘action science’ methodologies of both Argyris and Schon because of their emphasis 
on professional practice and the ‘action inquiry’ methodology of Torbert because of its 
espoused usefulness in situations involving groups and it’s attention to justice.
Action research developed from the work of Kurt Lewin. His basis for developing an 
approach that challenged contemporary social science thinking in the 1940’s was concern 
about the power relationship between researcher and researched. At the heart of this was 
the perceived notion of the day that researchers were identical, infallible, unbiased 
measuring instruments. These assumptions gave any research findings a kind of scientific 
rigor and, as a result, qualitative research “tended to devalue the accounts from
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researched in favour of those from 'professionals'.” (Banister, Burman, et al. 1994 pi 10) 
In paradigm terms, such an approach would be regarded as essentially post-positivist 
although the proponents of such an approach might have seen themselves as positivist or 
neo-positivist. Lewin recognised the fallibility of this approach and advocated that “a 
pluralist approach was a consequence of the fact that researchers needed to 
interact”.(ibid) In such an interaction bias, fallibility and difference were all recognised 
features of any researcher just as they are features o f ‘the researched’. In this sense, this 
can be seen as the early beginnings of a change in approach which has culminated in the 
current belief, which “accords 'equality of status' to those who are researched.” (ibid) 
With this in mind, he proposed the idea that social phenomena could be studied by 
“changing them and observing the effects, which in essence is the argument that in order 
to gain insight into a process one must create a change and then observe the variable 
effects and new dynamics." (ibid) This position advances the view that bias and 
difference cannot be eliminated and so are best appreciated by introducing change within 
a situation and adopting a critical interpretative view. In this respect action research 
makes an important assumption; it assumes that action and interpretation are 
distinguishable. This may not be wholly tenable for whilst analysis and action may be 
conceptually distinguishable, they are “inextricably intertwined in practice”, (ibid) 
Problems associated with this apparent separation continually challenge the 
methodological integrity of action research.
How, then is ‘action research’ defined? In broadly methodological terms it has been 
defined as “a way of trying out changes and seeing what happens”. This means that it is 
research that it is an “essentially on-the-spot procedure designed to deal with a concrete 
problem in an immediate situation” (Cohen & Manion 1980 p47). In this respect, it 
emphasises the situational aspect of action research; it is concerned with diagnosis of a 
problem in a specific context. In determining context, important questions outlining the 
degree of collaboration and participation of all members need to be addressed. Some 
members may wish to be more collaborative or more participative and this degree of 
interest is likely to be related to the question of purpose, purpose in participation, for 
collaboration or in doing research.
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Carr and Kemmis have identified three main reasons for groups or practitioners to engage 
in action research. These include aiming to improve “the rationality and justice of (a) 
their own social or educational practices, (b) their understanding of these practices, and 
(c) the situations in which these practices are carried out.” (Carr & Kemmis 1983 p 151 - 
202) Feminist researchers have developed this somewhat and identified five varieties of 
engagement in action research that can also shed light on underlying purpose. They have 
called these ‘action research’, ‘participatory/collaborative research’, ‘prevalence and 
needs assessment’, ‘evaluation’ research and ‘demystification’. (Reinharz 1992.) In 
action research, action and evaluation proceed separately but simultaneously. 
Participatory/ collaborative research specifically emphasises that the people studied make 
the decisions. The particular ethical stance here is that they are co-researchers rather than 
research subjects. Prevalence and needs assessment varieties of action research seek to 
determine the absolute or relative number of people with a particular experience or need. 
Such research doesn’t rely on surveys but on people meeting to understand their own 
experience and develop common themes, which lead in time to the size of the problem 
becoming evident. The act of gathering data and the manner in which it is gathered form 
the first part of a process leading to significant change. Evaluation research aims to assess 
the effectiveness of different types of action in meeting needs or solving problems. This 
leads to data based advice on what to do in certain situations e.g. “how to stop a rape and 
such information may be disseminated to other organisations.” (ibid) Finally, 
demystification action research advocates that the very act of obtaining knowledge 
creates the potential for change. It is the converse of the belief that if the views of certain 
groups are unknown then they have less opportunity to influence certain situations. 
(Reinharz 1992)
The above considerations of context, collaboration, participation and purpose are not 
unique to action research and form components that need addressing with most forms of 
qualitative research. The key feature, which some might argue to be both the unique 
strength (and weakness) of action research, lies in the self-evaluative nature of the 
methodology. It can claim to “give 'practitioners' the kind of knowledge they can apply to
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their own behaviour in the midst of on-going events, in such a way that it helps them 
acquire more effectively with others about their common purpose." (Banister, Burman, et 
al. 1994 pi 10) Self-evaluation is a necessary component of action research because only 
the researcher (in the broad sense of participant researcher) is able to evaluate his or her 
behaviour, which in turn leads (hopefully) to improved behaviour as a practitioner. This 
self-evaluative model can lead to self-referencing validation if no attempt is made to 
develop a sense of critical self-evaluation, and much of the methodology devotes itself to 
addressing this issue.
Action research is carried out as a stepwise process that monitors change over varying 
periods of time and by a variety of techniques. These include the use of “diaries, 
interviews, case studies, discussion, etc.,” to generate feedback that leads to critical self- 
evaluation which may be “translated into modifications, adjustments, directional changes, 
redefinitions as necessary.” (Cohen & Manion 1980 p47 ) The process is one of 
systematic, cyclical change. The research 'question' arises out of the problem of 
practitioners. The immediate aim of the research, as opposed to more long term 
secondary aims outlined above, is to understand these problems, and the researcher, who 
may or may not be the actual practitioner, “formulates speculative and tentative general 
principles about the problems that have been identified.” From these speculations 
hypotheses are generated about the outcome and what action is likely to lead to desired 
improvements. The action can then be tried out and data on the expected and unexpected 
outcomes collected, which is used to revise the earlier hypothesis and generate new 
hypotheses.( Banister, Burman, et al. 1994 pi 10)
What constitute what Carr and Kemmis (Carr & Kemmis 1983 p i59-160) have called the 
‘objects’ of action research? What is to be examined, what is to constitute data, what 
form the basis for hypothesis building? The 'objects' of medical action research are 
medical practices. These are not mere techniques nor expressions of practitioners' 
intentions and perspectives in relation to particular historical circumstances nor behaviour 
as a technical means to a desired end “but a specific social practice to be defined in a 
particular situation.” By 'a specific social practice', is meant “a strategic act; an act
147
consciously and deliberately undertaken on the basis of rational reflection by the 
practitioner, rather than on the basis of custom, habit, unreflective perception, or heresay. 
A human action, as opposed to mere behaviour, is a 'probe' into an unknown future.” 
(ibid) Strategic action is “constructed” and essentially risky. It takes place “in the space 
between the foreseen and the unforeseeable, the intentional and the actual, the ‘is’ and the 
‘ought.’ It reconstructs past action on the basis of observation and future action in the 
light of reflection." (ibid)
What is the role of theory in determining a) explanation and b) justification of such 
‘strategic acts.’ Behaviour “might be retrospectively explained by reference to theoretical 
or empirical propositions, but it cannot be justified by appeal to these propositions.”
(ibid) In other words, theory can inform and explain action and even challenge action but 
cannot determine whether an action is justified or not. Practical action “must be justified 
by reference to the practical judgement of the practitioner as well as the circumstances 
and determinants which constrain action.” (ibid) This suggests that practice has 
embedded within it, a kind of knowledge, a personal knowledge of justification, which is 
inaccessible to theoretical critique. “It implies that the actor alone has to be the final 
arbiter of the truth of an interpretation, not rules or principles of theories.” (ibid) It does 
not imply that the “actor is impervious to the rational reflection of others” but that in the 
final analysis acceptance or not is dependent upon whether the arguments are sufficiently 
“compelling in the light of his or her authentic knowledge.” (ibid)
This argument is closely allied to the criteria discussed a little later that determine 
validity. These are largely based on plausibility so that it is hardly inconsistent if the 
practitioner expects any arguments that inform action to be equally plausible. This 
suggests that in order to convince others it is important to pay attention to interpretation 
that goes beyond the level of personal experience to dismantle a charge of self- 
referencing interpretation. A key process here is to collect data that will inform the 
researcher in a way that goes beyond personal experience, to challenge personal 
assumptions, but in a way that does not significantly undermine practice. (Banister,
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Burman, et al. 1994 pi 14) In other words that an act of interpretation does not in itself 
constitute ‘action’. Of course, this may not necessarily be so, so what is to be done?
One important way to partly overcome this difficulty, and which certainly makes the 
conceptual separation of practice and interpretation less of a problem in theory, is by the 
use of tape or video recordings. In a way, such recordings hold time constant and allow a 
shift in place so that ‘events’ can be examined afterwards at a moment independent of 
action. Such a procedure can achieve a certain separation of interpretation and action. It 
allows some slowing down of interpretation to be made but also allows an opportunity for 
triangulation because others may offer alternative interpretation that challenge the 
researcher’s ontology, (ibid) What is the methodological justification in doing this? Does 
it really constitute a sound methodological approach given the impoverished perspective 
even a good video recording might offer one? For even if one is sympathetic to the 
approach, there is still the possible reaction “You should have been there.”
However, using recordings may be justified in two ways. Firstly it might overcome the 
problem of “relating retrospective understanding... to prospective action and plans for 
action.” It bridges the “gap between past and future in systematic learning." (Carr & 
Kemmis 1983 p i63) As such it is seen as essentially a transitory phase to enable a critical 
self-evaluative mode to be developed. Secondly, it forces the practitioner to focus on and 
question how an action is verified. “The pragmatist theory of verification requires that we 
act on our beliefs to see whether they produce consequences that we should expect of our 
beliefs are warranted.” (Susman 1983 p i00) This process is undertaken through 
hindsight, during which our actions are affirmed or transformed by an analysis that 
suggests different actions if we are faced with similar circumstances. Such a retrospective 
challenge to our interpretations that may be offered by others is thought to encourage the 
development of a critical self-evaluative approach. “It is the capability of the planner 
rather than the validity of the plan that is being improved by the process", (ibid)
This in turn suggests a twofold approach to assessment. On the one hand, professional 
practice continues to hopefully improve by attention to what is happening at the
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professional level. In my case I am working to become ‘better’ at being a doctor by 
understanding developments in medicine, by communicating with patients more 
satisfactorily, by becoming more aware of their concerns and desires, more aware of my 
own assumptions and much more. This relies on a model that is self-evaluating but also 
self-referencing. At another level, action research suggests it is possible to develop good 
research practice by paying attention to the level of evaluative critique that determines 
what is seen to be justified or not. Can I be sure that this is what is going on? Is my 
interpretation of what is happening in the patient’s mind fully justified, even if they agree 
with my interpretation? What is my level of assumption here? The extent to which this 
second level can be developed would seem to be dependent upon the opportunities for 
alternative interpretation to enter the equation. I f ‘enough’ alternative explanation is seen 
to enter the equation through input from others then such a model may still be self- 
evaluating but may also periodically break out of a loop of self-referencing justification. 
Arguments might begin to be seen to be plausible.
This leads one to ask the question; Can action research be undertaken as a solitary 
exercise? The above discussion would suggest that it may not be possible. For as 
Habermas has written; "the self-reflection lone subject...requires a quite paradoxical 
achievement: one part of the self must be split off from the other part in such a manner 
that the subject can be in a position to render aid to itself...in the act of self-reflection that 
subject can deceive itself." (Carr & Kemmis 1983 pl71) It would appear that “the 
quintessence of both critical social science and action research is the group process of 
deliberation.” What is the position of the sole practitioner anxious to develop his or her 
practice? Such arguments would indicate that some component of the methodology must 
have access to the interpretation of others.
How does all this relate to the actual procedures of action research? Susman and Evered 
(Susman & Evered 1978) identified five stages of diagnosing, action planning, action 
taking, evaluating, and specifying learning. They regarded the diagnosing stage as a 
problematic stage that “provided the energy needed to work on the problem." Action 
planning and action taking was “a search for the best solution to what appears to be a set
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of conflicting requirements between a social and a technical system.” (ibid) This 
approach takes the stance that any difference that exists between two systems is more 
apparent than real because they are based on different epistemological assumptions. This 
is a useful approach to adopt because clinical medicine offers an interpretation that is one 
of espoused positivism. In adopting a constructivist epistemology as an alternative 
explanation it may be possible to produce knowledge which, whilst not easily translatable 
or comprehensible to the other, is likely to be informative. It may produce understandings 
that are not otherwise attainable.
The process of evaluating process asks four key questions;
1. Did the actions bring about the conditions that the sociotechnical model led us to 
hypothesize will produce the outcomes desired?
2. Were the desired outcomes produced?
3. If so, how confident are we that it was the hypothesized conditions that produced 
them?
4. If not, what aspects of the socio-technical model should be re-examined?
The final process of specifying learning draws attention to what has been learnt not just 
in terms of what has been transformed by the inquiry, but what methodological 
capabilities have been developed by actually undertaking the inquiry. (Susman 1983 
pi 10)
In emphasising a more co-operative approach to action inquiry Cohen and Manion have 
developed a number of discrete stages to be considered in action research undertaken 
within groups;
1. Identification, evaluation and formulation of the problem.
2. Preliminary discussion and negotiation among interested parties. Objectives, purposes 
and assumptions need to be made clear to participants.
3. Review of the research literature for evaluation of comparable studies
4. Modification or redefinition of the original 'problem'. This may emerge as a testable 
hypothesis.
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5. Selection of research procedures; sampling, administration, choice of materials, 
methods of teaching and learning, allocation of tasks.
6. Choice of evaluation procedures to be utilised.
7. Implementation of the project. This stage includes conditions and methods of data 
collection; the monitoring of tasks an the transmission of feedback; the classification and 
the analysis of data.
8. Interpretation of data; inferences to be drawn; overall evaluation of the project.
They also identify various means of intervening to generate change. These include 
interventions that;
1. act as a spur to action
2. address itself to personal functioning, human relations and morale
3. focuss on job analysis
4. are concerned with organisational change
5. are concerned with planning and policy making
6. are concerned with innovation and change
7. concentrate on problem solving in virtually any context
8. provide the opportunity to develop theoretical knowledge.
(Cohen & Manion 1989 p218-219)
Theory building is developed around the four key moments of action research, which 


















The theory axis is the discourse axis during which outcomes are assessed during 
reflection and new hypotheses are generated during planning to gradually develop theory. 
(Carr & Kemmis 1983 p i63-164) It seems agreed that a series of cycles are needed to 
develop a sufficiently rich interpretation. Some have expressed doubt whether “a single 
loop can be considered as action research at all.” For “if what is learned in one cycle is 
not applied judiciously in further cycles of modifying plans, implementing them, 
monitoring the ammended action, and reflecting again, then the action research process 
disintegrates into mere problem solving or exercises in rationalisation of action. We call 
single loop activities 'arrested action research.” (ibid) Even so, such arrested action 
research may still be useful in that it may prompt questions as to why it failed to develop. 
What was it about the organisation that discouraged such an approach and how does this 
inform the researcher? Is there something about the institution that served to maintain the 
status quo?
Finally, how does action research address the status of propositional knowledge? Some 
might argue that this is not even necessary. After all the aim of action research is to 
inform the practitioner and simply partaking in an action inquiry will in some way do 
this. Others, however, might take the opposite view and consider that "knowledge should 
include empirically disconfirmable propositions that can be organised into theory and 
falsified by practitioners in real-life context." (Argyris, Putnam, et al. 1985 p232) In
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practice this means that participants should be given the opportunity to accept or reject 
propositions made about them.
Carr and Kemmis have drawn on the work of Habermas and suggested three separate 
criteria for the evaluation of action research; through discourse, enlightenment and 
prudent decision making. Firstly, “the truth of statements is evaluated through the 
discourse which raises, recognises, and redeems 'validity claims'.” Any assertion is 
dependent upon the following for its claim to validity (after Habermas)
1. Is what is stated comprehensible?
2. Is what is stated true?
3. Is what is stated right and appropriate?
4. Is what is stated sincerely and truthfully stated?
Secondly, at the level of enlightenment, “the criterion is authentic insights, grounded in 
participant’s own circumstances and experiences.” Lastly at the level of organisation of 
action, the criterion is prudent decision making."
(Carr & Kemmis 1983 p i78-179)
With this general picture in mind, I propose to examine in more detail the ‘action science’ 
methodologies of Argyris et al and Schon and ‘action inquiry’ as described by Torbert.
Action Science
Argyris et al introduced the term ‘action science’ because of concerns about the 
separation of action research from theory building and testing. They observed that in 
order to "conduct their empirical work by following current ideas about standard 
scientific research and to attain a certain level of rigor, the methodology may become so 
disconnected from the reality it is designed to understand that it is no longer useful." 
(Argyris, Putnam, et al. 1985 px) They saw the root cause of this as the separation 
between the work of the basic scientist who generated “fundamental generalizable
154
knowledge” that is then put into practice by the applied scientist. This process, this 
relationship “reinforces a pernicious separation of theory and practice.” (ibid) This is 
exemplified in the emphasis placed upon knowledge gained from the use of 
questionnaires. Such knowledge, they felt, “cannot rest solely on the analysis of social 
statistics. It is necessary to get at the meanings embedded in action, at the logic of 
action." (Argyris, Putnam, et al. 1985 p26)
Action science is a theory about human action, which can be tested in a number of ways; 
through group activity, one to one consultation, in learning environments etc. This 
interaction results in data that is then used to test whether the theory is generalisable to 
other groups in other situations. A key feature then was to develop "empirically 
disconfirmable propositions that are organised into theory. Knowledge that human beings 
can implement in an action context” that lead to the development of “alternatives to the 
status quo that both illuminate what exists and inform fundamental change, in light of 
values freely chosen by social actors." (Argyris, Putnam, et al. 1985 p36-79) Attention is 
shifted from the ‘outcomes’ of an action science inquiry towards an emphasis on 
‘process’ in action inquiry. The action scientist is seen as an interventionist, who 
promotes learning “by creating conditions for valid inquiry in the context of practical 
deliberation by members of client systems." The practice of action science involves 
“teaching others the skills needed to practice action science." (ibid)
A particular feature of this skill is to understand the place of defensive routines, which 
were seen as serving to maintain the status quo which researchers may encounter. They 
asserted that “as the primary object of science is to describe reality, it cannot describe the 
defensive routines that protect the status quo against change.” Even when social scientists 
recognised defensive routines, “to point to the positive aspects of defensive routines as 
reasons for not studying how to change their negative aspects may itself be a defensive 
routine." The culmination of this may be when social scientists are denied access by 
subjects to research material, and are excluded from research projects when groups, 
preferring to leave issues undiscussed, unite against a researcher. (Argyris, Putnam, et al. 
1985 pxii-xiii) The powerful message of Argyris work is that “these defensive routines
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are alterable.” (Ryan 1985) This approach places action science firmly within the 
paradigm of the critical theory, propective transformation tradition.( Watkins 1988)
The task of developing an action science to make practical knowledge “explicit and 
testable” is aided by focussing upon the three main features that constitute an 
epistemology of practice. Argyris highlighted problem setting, tacit knowing and 
reflecting and acting. Problem setting means particular attention to framing the context of 
the problem. Questions are framed in such a way that they not only ask “Why is it like 
this?” but also at the same time ask “How is it possible to change what is discovered?” 
Such framing then, not only defines the problem and “defines what is to count as a 
solution" but it may also “elucidate the actor's purpose.” It is this notion of 
“purposiveness” that is central to the concept of action. “Purpose in context leads to 
meaning”.(Argyris, Putnam, et al 1985 p45) An assumption underpins this position. It 
presupposes that intention and purpose is followed by a strategy that is necessarily linked 
to that purpose to achieve that end. That may be fair but it also assumes that this linkage 
is reducible to an analysis that explains this linkage in a coherent manner, one that holds 
plausibility. Is this always the case? For example, the actions of a madman appear to be 
‘mad’ to the rest of us because behaviour (strategy) may not be coherently linked to 
purpose. It is an assumption we make that there is a sharp distinction here between the 
sane world and the mad world and that those in the sane world do not, from time to time, 
adopt a strategy that is not coherently linked to purpose. I am not sure that this is 
necessarily the case because it would depend upon a rather naive definition of madness.
The second epistemological feature is tacit knowing. "It is characteristic of action that 
most o f the knowledge informing it remains tacit.” (Argyris, Putnam, et al. 1985 p50) 
Argyris likened this to the ability to “recognise one face among thousands despite the fact 
that we cannot tell how we know.” It seems to me this simile is highlighting a distinction 
between recall and recognition for tacit knowing is ‘knowing that we know’ rather than 
being able to ‘recall what we know.’ It seems to me that it has much more to do with 
recognising that out of the many solutions or courses of action possible in a given
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situation, we ‘know’ that the one selected is appropriate; it is about recognising certain 
patterns of action.
Finally, reflecting and acting “is a way of making explicit some of the tacit knowledge 
embedded in action so that the agent can figure out what to do differently." In this respect 
action may be a probe, a move or a hypothesis. The cycle is then repeated with a process 
of reframing. (Argyris, Putnam, et al. 1985 p5) In empirical terms this process is 
manifested largely through talk. The significance of this in clinical life is encapsulated by 
one cf the amazingly simple insights about medical treatment; it is conducted in 
language. Talk is action and like all action, talk is meaningful. Failure to understand the 
interpretive nature of talk leads to problems of understanding and Argyris suggests a 
useful conceptual device, which he terms “the ladder of inference.” This is a 
representation of the steps that we make when trying to develop meaning in everyday 
life.
1. Observable data e.g. sentence uttered by someone
2. Cultural meaning of that utterance (meaning that everyone in that cultural community 
understands)
3. Meaning imposed by the hearer (e.g. that utterance was 'blunt' or 'insensitive')
Argyris emphasised the importance of obtaining agreement at each level of the rung. 
Firstly, agree on what constitutes data, then obtain general agreement on cultural 
inference before finally trying to agree on meaning by the hearer. (Argyris, Putnam, et al. 
1985 p5 8) An appreciation of the interpretive nature of talk expressed in this way, meant 
that I began to pay more attention to the way meaning was conveyed and the power 
issues embedded within it.
Patients may well present a history at either the level of observable data or at a level of 
cultural meaning. For example, one patient may describe their nasal symptoms more at 
the ‘data’ level in terms of being ‘blocked’ or ‘runny’ with a ‘painful’ face. Another 
patient may describe the same symptoms at a level of cultural meaning in terms of
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‘sinusitis’ or ‘allergy’; they have in the process made an assumption about the cause of 
such symptoms. Three issues arise here. Firstly, the process of presenting data on the 
second rung, the rung of cultural inference, means that assumptions are made by both 
parties about what is meant by this inference; we can both easily assume that we agree on 
what we mean by ‘sinusitis’ or ‘allergy’. This agreement may not be valid if it is tested 
and this was reflected in a change in practice that sought to go back to data to seek 
agreement. What exactly do you mean by sinusitis? Could you use everyday 
unambiguous terms so that I really understand what you mean by being “dizzy”? 
Secondly, the conversion of data to the level of ‘cultural inference’ is the first part of the 
process that converts everyday language into ‘biomedical’ language, a form of 
knowledge that has medical control and power embedded within it. It may become much 
more difficult for non-positivist data to re-enter the positivist inference. For example, if 
the discussion between the patient and the doctor is utilising terms such as ‘sinusistis’ or 
‘alleigy’ this level of inference has already set up barriers that make it difficult for 
information such as ‘acupuncture points’ to be accepted. Finally, I began to appreciate 
that the biomedical inference I sought to impose on data was a theory and value 
dependant process supported by a belief in ‘usefulness’ determined by my criteria. This 
opened the way for me to take seriously other ‘medical’ interpretations made by the 
patient but utilising other theories and values on the same set of data, that data being the 
patient’s symptoms of disease.
However, making interpretations is not thought to be straightforward. In trying to 
understand action or practice, action scientists draw a distinction not between theory and 
action but between two different theories; “those that people espouse and those that they 
use. Both theories may be consistent or inconsistent and furthermore the agent may not 
even be aware of any inconsistency." (Argyris, Putnam, et al. 1985 p82-83) They name 
these different theories, espoused theory and theory-in-use. Espoused theories are those 
theories “that an individual claims to follow, but theories in use are those that can be 
inferred.” Theories in use are regarded as “tacit cognitive maps by which human beings 
design action.” (ibid) The process of action science is to uncover such theories-in-use by 
learning to reflect-in-action, “making explicit the theories-in-use that inform it, and
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learning to design and produce new theories-in-use for reflection and action.” (ibid) How 
is this done?
All action has consequences and these consequences can be intended or unintended, 
productive or counterproductive. Particular interest is focussed on those consequences 
that are unintended or counterproductive. This is usually perceived as error, and the “first 
response to error is to search for “another action strategy that will satisfy the same 
governing variable e.g. suppression of unintended conflict. If agents wants to suppress 
conflict (governing variable) and to this end avoid saying anything that might be 
controversial (action strategy), but others raise threatening issues (mismatch), the agent 
may try the strategy of talking volubly about issues on which everyone agrees." An 
alternative approach here is to emphasise open inquiry rather than engage in suppressing 
it. They call this approach double loop learning for in this situation error is regarded as 
the raw data for learning. By focussing on double loop learning it becomes possible to 
examine the theories in use that inhibit it. (Argyris, Putnam, et al. 1985 p86) What is the 
relevance of this to clinical practice?
This concept of double loop learning began to influence the way I behaved as a doctor in 
certain situations, by turning a defensive or conflict situation into one that generated 
inquiry. If I sensed that the patient had begun to lose confidence in my abilities as a 
doctor I have two approaches; single loop learning or double loop learning. A single loop 
learning response would be to work hard to try and cover up conflict, probably talk more, 
suppress any conflict, all parts of a process aimed at denying to myself that a loss of 
confidence exists. My espoused theory is to ‘gain confidence7, my theory in use is to 
‘cover up7 loss of confidence. I saw that a ‘double loop7 learning response would be to 
ask a question such as; I have a feeling that you have lost confidence in me. If this is the 
case would you like to suggest why this may be so? This served a number of purposes. 
Firstly, it checked out the third level of inference, the meaning imposed by the hearer. For 
if this inference is not correct, that confidence has not been lost, then the espoused theory 
(acting to gain confidence) needs to be addressed. If indeed confidence has been lost,
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then the process reverts to an experimental intervention designed to throw light on why 
confidence has been lost, which may, in the process, elicit other theories in use.
Argyris developed five rules that assisted the process of eliciting theories in use. These 
are summarised below.
Rule 1. "Interrupt interactions on-line, direct attention to internal processes, and generate 
the impetus to explore them."
Rule 2. "Elicit the attributions and evaluations being made about self, other, or situational 
factors (such as task, time, and so forth)...we probe for these attributions.”
Rule 3. "Regard causal explanations as hypotheses to be tested. As unreliable as self­
explanations can be, we cannot a priori assume that they are inaccurate. They should be 
regarded as worthy of test like any other hypothesis... search for data that might falsify 
the proposition."
Rule 4. "Slow down and focus on the inferential steps individuals take in going from the 
data to their conclusions, since the very skilfulness of their inferential processes can cut 
individuals off from them... can help individuals spell out tacit processes... they may find 
that they focus on one kind of data... .or are predisposed to take predictable kinds of 
inferential leaps from data."
Rule 5. "Slow down and focus on individuals' emotional reactions; in doing so we can 
more fully grasp what individuals are up against, as well as how they manage such 
reactions. The problem is that these reactions are so automatic that we stop attending to 
them... to publicly retrace and make public these processes involves risks that themselves 
evoke emotional and defensive reactions that hinder the retrieval of these processes and 
make it difficult to report them to others." (Argyris, Putnam, et al. 1985 p246-247)
I found it possible to take each of these rules and explore its use in the clinical context. 
For example, I have already given an example that illustrates the use of rule 1 and rule 5 
by inquiring about loss of confidence in the clinical environment. From time to time in 
the clinic, I would have a visitor, medical student or other doctor, sitting in with me. It 
was useful to formally ask them to examine one aspect of my clinical style, e.g.
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communication and invite them to make comment. Such a process provided an 
opportunity to look at any difference between my espoused theory (what I thought was 
happening as I communicated) and my theory in use (developed from inferences that 
others might have made). Argyris et al believed that attention to action science would 
eventually lead to a point where the practitioner is able to distinguish his or her own 
theories in use from espoused theories as part of a reflective practice. Are there ways to 
encourage reflective experimentation?
According to Argyris, the action scientist does this by becoming ‘vulnerable’ and by 
taking seriously any responses that are forthcoming. By vulnerable is meant an inquiry 
that might proceed along such lines as; "this is my view. I think it's right but I might be 
wrong, so let's take a look at it." Such an attitude “nurtures a willingness to tell”, which 
will involve risks on the part of the inquirer/ practitioner. This risk is acknowledged by 
taking seriously what is being expressed. This process is assisted by adopting “a stance 
toward participant experience that takes account of how they frame what they see, while 
not taking it for granted." (Argyris, Putnam, et al. 1985 p321-324) Three general 
requirements must also be met. The interventionalist;
1. Must be able to accurately and usefully comprehend the participants' experience, with 
some model in his head that will be useful to them.
2. Must have a position of his own that can sustain inquiry, one that can frame errors, 
difficulties and resistance without triggering protective responses.
3. Agree that not only are mistakes acceptable, they are the raw material of learning and 
without them the process of inquiry into the theories-in-use would grind to a halt.
(ibid)
[The extent to which this has become part of my practice was made clear to me recently. 
A seven year old boy underwent a tonsillectomy and suffered a disastrous and 
unexplained post-operative complication that almost resulted in his death. The child 
eventually made a complete recovery. As we were puzzled by the post-operative course, I 
suggested to the parents that all the doctors concerned with the case meet up with them to
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review what had happened. When this took place it became clear that all was not well 
because the anaesthetists involved became subjected to a series of questions that became 
gradually more ‘hostile’. In this charged atmosphere, I could see that the anaesthetists 
were resorting to an explanation of what had happened that was becoming increasingly 
more technical and sophisticated in biomedical terms and the parents were becoming 
equally frustrated in asking appropriate searching questions due to their lack of 
knowledge. I began to wonder if espoused theory was to find out what had happened but 
theory in use was to explore the possibility of a cover up for a clinical mistake. My 
response to this situation was to ask the parents if they were asking such questions 
because they were concerned that a cover up was taking place. The remainder of the 
discussion concerned itself with this possibility and I had a sense that we had entered a 
more honest level of inquiry into what had happened. At the end I asked the father if he 
still felt that we were trying to cover up a clinical mistake and his response was that he no 
longer felt that this was the case and he suggested that we were to ‘free the spirit and 
move on’. ]
There are a number of key questions to address in situations like this where the 
interventionalist reframes the situation and invites inquiry. The first is the routine one of 
validity concerning such observations; what are the rules to assist validity? The second is 
the assumption that eliciting theories in use, particularly if they challenge the espoused 
theories of the doctor or patient, is necessarily in the patient’s interest and if so, who 
decides? Furthermore, as a researcher, I ask myself how explicit should this process be to 
the patient? Should it be explicit as good clinical practice (and so much of it seems that 
way) or should it be explicit as research?
Argyris addresses the question of validity with a set of seven rules that are again 
summarised below.
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Rules to assist validity
Rule 1. "Combine advocacy with inquiry. ..this requires that individuals regard their 
views as subject to critique and test, it asks that they at once make them public and invite 
others to inquire into them."
Rule 2. "Illustrate your inferences with relatively directly observable data...when 
participants make a claim, they provide the data on which it is based."
Rule 3. "Make your reasoning explicit and publicly test for agreement at each inferential 
step....in the face of conflicting meanings, retrace steps... detect leaps of logic that they 
and others may make."
Rule 4. "Actively seek disconfirming data and alternative explanations....a common 
inferential error is to seek confirming data...this strategy may make participants 
defensive."
Rule 5. "Affirm the making of mistakes in the service of learning....illustrating views, 
making one's inferences explicit, and seeking disconfirming data all put participants at 
risk of discovering that they are wrong...it evokes our defences against failure...one way 
is to regard mistakes as the raw material... .doing this is largely contingent on reframing 
what it means to make mistakes and what it takes to learn."
Rule 6. "Actively inquire into your impact on the learning context...the action scientist
wishes to influence the inquiry at hand....this can make mistakes that hinder the task is
not to diminish the interventionist's influence but to inquire into whether the influence is 
intended, and whether it is the right influence to exert."
Rule 7. "Design ongoing experiments to test competing views."
(Argyris, Putnam, et al. 1985 p261)
What is noticeable here is the high level of inquiry in the rules that aim to shore up 
validity. This can be used to address in some measure the concerns one might have about 
researching practice in a way that involves others without their knowledge. For example, 
it is possible to inquire about inference in a way that suggests that inquiry into practice is 
taking place. “What you have said, makes me think that you believe in ‘x.’ I have become 
interested in researching the way I practice and I wonder if you would like to comment 
on my conclusion here.” Such inquiry embodies an element of framing in which I
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indicate, within the inquiry question, that one role I have here is that of researcher- 
researcher into my own practice, viz researcher into the medical process. This is not 
necessarily straightforward for once the frame has been set, subsequent behaviour may 
proceed in a way that attempt to fit the framing in an effort to make sense of the situation. 
It seems possible that the act of raising an additional role, that of researcher, may lead to 
a situation where all my actions may be perceived as those of a researcher into practice 
and the straightforward role of a doctor is overlooked.
This suggests that attention ought to be directed to ‘role’ framing. Am I, at any one 
moment in the clinic, a doctor, a participator, a researcher and how explicit should each 
of these roles be? The importance of this lies in the fact that this may produce unintended 
bias on my part that influences data collection. Is what I report (as data) from patients 
experiences in the medical context contaminated by my role as researcher?
This suggests that threats to the validity of action science may “come from the possibility
that participants misreport events that the reflection process itself may be sufficiently
threatening to provoke individual’s defensiveness which may thus increase the likelihood 
that they will cover up needed information.” (Watkins 1988)This means a heavy demand 
on the interpersonal skills of the researcher. This in turn raises concerns about the 
question of control. It is possible that many of the techniques described, “with an 
emphasis on predictable, replicable techniques may inadvertently encourage those who 
would use action science as a gimmick”. Such gimmicks may be used to control rather 
than empower, (ibid)
The Reflective Practitioner
My interest in Schon’s work The Reflective Practitioner was stimulated by the title and 
also by the claim that it offered a new way of understanding how professionals think in 
practice. It focuses on the professions that operate with uncertain knowledge and 
conflicting values. It starts by asking provocative questions. "Is professional knowledge 
adequate to fulfil the espoused purposes of the professions? Is it sufficient to meet the
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societal demands which the professions have helped to create?" It talks about a ‘crisis of 
confidence’ that has arisen from "questioning professionals rights and freedoms” which 
has led to deeper questioning of the professional's claim to extraordinary knowledge in 
matters of human importance. This has been developed by some to show how 
professionals “misappropriate knowledge in their own interests and the interest of a 
power elite intent on preserving its dominance.” (Schon 1983 p i3)
This situation has partly arisen because of the “complexity, uncertainty, instability, 
uniqueness, and value conflicts which are increasingly perceived as central to the world 
of professional practice. In such fields as medicine, professionals speak of a new 
awareness of complexity which resists the skills and techniques of traditional expertise. 
As physicians have turned their attention from traditional images of medical practice to 
the predicament of the larger healthcare system, they have come to see the larger system 
as a 'tangled web' that traditional medical knowledge and skill cannot untangle." (ibid) As 
a consequence the situations of practice are seen as unique events and an eminent 
physician has claimed that “85 percent of the problems a doctor sees in his office are not 
in the book'." (ibid) This new found awareness has led to the development, in some areas, 
of professional pluralism. In medicine, attempts are currently being made to resist such 
pluralism by the development of restrictions to practice seen in treatment algorithms and 
evidence based practice. An indirect consequence of this may be the rapid expansion of 
‘complimentary’ medical practices such as acupuncture and homeopathy as an alternative 
pathway to pluralism. Incidentally, the use of the word ‘complimentary’ in 
complimentary medicine is interesting because it suggests an alignment with 
conventional medicine but as conventional medicine strives to distance itself from such 
activities by it’s emphasis on evidence as a basis for treatment, this relationship may 
change.
The principal problem lies then in the mismatch in applying “traditional patterns of 
practice and knowledge to features of the practice situation, of whose importance they are 
becoming increasingly aware.” (Schon 1983 p i8) Nevertheless, Schon assumes that 
competencies do exist but what is missing is an epistemology of practice that begins to
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describe or explain such competencies. Such competencies can only be explored, 
according to Schon, by the specialist themselves “for who, other than another similarly 
qualified specialist, can challenge him?" (Schon 1983 p7) This simple assertion is, as I 
see it, the keystone upon which the whole approach depends and remains probably the 
most significant difference from the action science of Argyris, who portrayed the 
interventionalist as the facilitator to understanding.
What is particular about the epistemology of professional practice? The systematic 
knowledge base of a profession is thought to have four essential properties. It is 
“specialized, firmly bound, scientific, and standardized.” (ibid) Schon held the view that 
this last point was particularly important because professionals are led to believe that the 
paradigm in which the profession knowledge is developed, should also form the 
paradigm of practice. In practice, he believed, this is achieved by applying standardized 
knowledge, in the form of very general principles, to concrete situations. This concept of 
'application' leads to a view of “professional knowledge as a hierarchy in which 'general 
principles' occupy the highest level and 'concrete problem solving' the lowest.” (ibid) To 
assist this analysis, Schon draws upon the work of Edgar Schein who described three 
components to professional knowledge:
1. An underlying discipline or basic science.
2. An applied science or engineering component applied to day to day diagnostic 
procedures and problem solving.
3. A skills and attitudinal component that concerns the actual performance of services to 
the client.
(Schon 1983 p24)
This hierarchical separation of research and practice, he called ‘technical rationality’.
This model is reflected “in the institutionalized context of professional life, in the 
institutionalized relations of research and practice and in the normative curricula of 
professional education. Even when practitioners, educators, and researchers question the 
model of technical rationality, they are party to institutions that perpetuate it." (Schon
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1983 p26) This is seen particularly well in the manner in which the curriculum of a 
medical school is developed, where the order of the curriculum reflects the underlying 
components of medical practice, a relationship I have indicated in the opening sections of 
this thesis. The first few years are spent developing a basic science approach to medicine, 
emphasising the positivist’s aspects of medicine. Then on the wards as a student, an 
applied science is developed and finally, after qualification, the skills to be able to apply 
this knowledge in context are developed. It should be noted that the teachers in each of 
these aspects are different. The hierarchy of high level basic science to low level 
application is embedded in the training system.
The problem with a hierarchy of knowledge founded upon a positivist paradigm is that it 
can find no place for practice, for practical knowledge. The assumptions of positivism do 
spread seamlessly from basic science to practice. As previously mentioned “practice 
appears as a puzzling anomaly” until it is construed as “the relationship of means to ends. 
Given agreement about ends, the question, "How ought I to act?" could be reduced to a 
merely instrumental question about the means best suited to achieve one's ends.” With 
this emphasis on problem solving, the problem setting could be ignored as much or a 
little as one wished for “problem setting is a process in which, interactively, we name the 
things to which we will attend and frame the context in which we will attend to them." 
(Schon 1983 p21-75) In professional practice it is possible then to decide what 
components of the setting are to be regarded as important and this forms the frame of the 
problem to be solved. Perhaps the variation of possible problem settings can best be seen 
in the career choices that are possible in medicine.
"In such 'major' professions as medicine, there are zones where practitioners can function 
as technical experts. But there are also zones where the major professions resemble minor 
ones. There are those who chose the swampy lowlands. They deliberately involve 
themselves in messy but crucially important problems and, when asked to describe their 
methods of inquiry, they speak of experience, trial and error, intuition, and muddling 
through. Other professionals opt for the high ground. Hungry for technical rigor, devoted 
to an image of solid professional competence, they choose to confine themselves to a
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narrow technical practice." (Schon 1983 p42-43) This has been described as the choice 
between ‘rigor or relevance’. In an earlier part of the thesis, when I was 
phenomenonologically inquiring into career choices, I drew up a list of career 
possibilities that highlighted this choice. It could be seen that in some branches of 
medicine it may be possible to pursue a career with an emphasis on rigor, such as in 
biochemistry and in others an emphasis is placed on relevance, such as in general 
practice. Such an approach can be seen as selective inattention to data. What happens 
when, as a practitioner, one wishes to practice with rigor and relevance? In such a 
situation, technical rationality has limitations and it may not be possible to fill the gap 
between a positivist knowledge base and practice.
Schon tries to answer this by recognising that when the professional acts in a certain way, 
he or she might start to ask questions about this process. He proposed a methodology to 
undertake this in a systematic manner and the central pillar of this approach he called 
‘reflection in action.’ He starts by observing that; "every competent practitioner can 
recognize phenomena, for which he cannot give a reasonably accurate or complete 
description. Even when he makes conscious use of research based theories and 
techniques, he is dependent on tacit recognitions, judgements, and skilful performances. 
Professional people often think about what they are doing, sometimes even when they are 
doing it, they may ask themselves. 'What features do I notice when I recognize this thing? 
What are the criteria by which I make this judgement? What procedures am I enacting 
when I perform this skill? How am I framing the problem when I perform this skill? It is 
this entire process of reflection-in-action which is central to the art by which practitioners 
sometimes deal well with situations of uncertainty, instability, uniqueness and value 
conflict."( Schon 1983p49-50)
Reflection in action is linked to the concept o f ‘knowing in action.’ Using the argument 
o f ‘common sense’ Schon admits a category o f ‘know-how’ and that knowing in action is 
nothing more than ‘know how’ in the action. As a researcher I note that what he calls 
‘common sense’ is nothing of the sort. The manner in which he constructs his argument is 
a skilful application of practice. It is an academic ‘know how’ and is no different in
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essence from the phenomenon he is attempting to describe. He is thus using a 
methodology (reflection in action) to elucidate an epistemology (practice) to be applied to 
the same methodology (reflection in action). At one level it can be construed as a 
tautological, self referencing argument. However, he goes on to note a number of 
properties associated with this concept of practical know how.
1. There are actions, recognitions, and judgements which we know how to carry out 
spontaneously; we do not have to think about them prior to performance.
2. We are often unaware of having learned to do these things; we simply find ourselves 
doing them.
3. In some cases, we were once aware of the understandings that were subsequently 
internalized in our feeling for the stuff of action. In other cases, we were never aware of 
them. In both cases we were usually unable to describe the knowing which our action 
reveals.
(Schon 1983 p54)
He completes the argument by arguing that if we ‘know in action’ then we can observe 
ourselves knowing in action, and this is the phenomenon o f ‘reflection in action’. He 
takes as an example the ‘sense making’ that jazz musicians makes as they reflect on the 
music they are collectively making. (Schon 1983 p55-56) Much reflection in action 
hinges “on the element of surprise.” When experiences are encountered that are pleasing 
or otherwise, the practitioner may respond by reflecting in action.
The methodology is completed by attention to two key features; the process of framing 
and experimentation. In methodological terms, framing and experimentation, results in a 
sequence of events described by Schon as exploration, move testing, hypothesis testing 
and evaluation o f outcomes.
Exploration, or ‘exploratory experiment’, is a “probing playful activity by which we get a 
feel for things. It succeeds when it leads to the discovery of something else." (Schon 1983 
pi 45) It is a process of reframing a problem, which usually in itself suggests a direction
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for reshaping the situation. The second stage of move testing, is an action taken in order 
to produce intended change. The third stage of hypothesis testing “consist of moves that 
change the phenomena to make the hypothesis fit. The inquirers influence the unique 
situalion at hand, the domain of inquiry. They influence the totality of their object of 
study and seek to exert influence in such a way as to confirm, not refute, their 
hypothesis.” This is a process whereby the practitioner tries to make the situation fit the 
frame but in doing so must remain open to the possibility that this may not be possible. 
Attention must be focussed particularly on those aspects that are resistant to change. An 
analysis of consequences usually takes on the following form.
Consequences in relation 
to intention
Desirability of all perceived 




4. No surprise 
(Schon 1983pl 52-153)
Undesirable 
Desirable or neutral 
Desirable or neutral 
Undesirable"
This approach differs from that of Argyris in a number of ways. Schon places a much 
greater emphasis on the process of framing. In the process of asking the question Why is 
this so? Argyris would imply an action that suggests change for the better. Schon 
reframes a problem in such a way that suggests a direction for reshaping the situation but 
leaves open the possibility that it may not be ‘for the better’. Schon seems to adopt a 
more neutral view by arguing that the outcomes that emerge from this reframing, shed 
light on the understandings that shape the phenomenon. In professional practice, this 
process of reframing is particularly triggered by becoming ‘stuck’ in a problem and leads 
to what he calls a ‘frame experiment’. However, the repetitive nature of professional 
practice, is such that professionals encounter certain situation again and again. This 
“confers on him and his clients the benefits of specialisation” but also leads to a
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narrowness of vision as well as an increasingly automatic response to certain situations. 
(Schon 1983 p60-61)
The ‘narrowness of vision’ developed as a result of specialisation raise two points 
concerning becoming ‘stuck’ and the opportunity for surprise. Firstly, as one becomes 
more experienced, the opportunities to become stuck, which leads to reframing, are likely 
to be reduced. How does the practitioner keep up the element of surprise? Secondly, and 
perhaps more importantly, however, the perceived way of looking at events is continually 
reinforced as the correct way of doing do. Opportunities for reframing remain dependent 
upon continually taking seriously the “uniqueness of the present situation” and not 
becoming lulled in a sense of familiarity generated by repetition. My whole thesis rests 
upon the idea that I have reframed my practice despite my experience and I would be the 
first to admit that outside stimuli and input have been obligatory in generating such 
change. I could not have attempted this from within the confines of my own practice and 
with the aid o f ‘The Reflective Practitioner’-something else must have taken place. I 
believe this to have been the input of others, family, patients, colleagues, fellow students, 
supervisors and examiners. Whilst the methodology of reflective practice does not 
exclude an input from these parties, the onus remains upon the practitioner to generate 
new frame experiments to trigger new understandings.
With this in mind, how does Schon approach the question of validating such an 
approach? This is approached firstly by judging the reframing in terms of a set of 
questions.
Can I solve the problem I have set?
Do I like what I get when I solve this problem?
Have I made the situation coherent?
Have I made it congruent with my fundamental values and theories?
Have I kept inquiry moving?"
(Schon 1983 pl33)
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"The practitioner evaluates his problem-setting experiment by determining whether he 
likes these unintended changes, or likes what he can make of them. The practitioner 
(may) value the unintended changes he has made or discovered. The evaluation of the 
frame experiment is grounded in the practitioner's appreciative system, he judges a 
problem-setting by the quality and direction of the reflective conversation to which it 
leads. This judgement rests, at least in part, on his perception of potentials for coherence 
and congruence which he can realize through his further inquiry." (Schon 1983 pl35)
These questions and evaluations, used to judge quality, depend upon Schon’s opening 
assertion that only the professional is in a position to judge his or her practice because 
they remain the only person in a position to validate such practice. As a researcher, I ask 
myself what it is one is trying to do here? If the idea is to produce a methodology of 
practice for the professional, then self referencing evaluative criteria like these may be 
acceptable, because if nothing else they will encourage a process of critical evaluation of 
practice. As well as being attractive to a professional used to maintaining independence 
of action, this approach to quality may be better than none at all. As a foundation for a 
critical theory methodology, such self-reflective validation on its own may not be a 
sustainable position. This is seen at a later stage when Schon applies the ideas to a 
particular problem and offers the following values as a means of developing quality.
1. Give and get valid information
2. Seek out and provide others with directly observable data and correct reports, so that 
valid attributions can be made
3. Create the conditions for free and informed choice
4. Try to create, for oneself and for others, awareness of the values at stake in decision, 
awareness of the limits of one's capacities, and awareness of the zones of experience free 
of defence mechanisms beyond one's control
5. Increase the likelihood of internal commitment to decisions made
6. Try to create conditions, for oneself and for others, in which the individual is 
committed to an action because it is intrinsically satisfying, not because it is accompanied 
by external rewards and punishment.
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7. Make protection of self or other a joint operation, so that one does not withold negative 
information from the other without testing the attribution that underlies the decision to 
withold.
8. Speak in directly observable categories, provide the data from which one's inferences 
are drawn and thereby opening them to discomfirmation.
9. Surface private dilemmas, so as to encourage public testing of the assumptions on 
which such dilemmas depend.
(Schon 1983 p231-232)
These criteria, not in many ways different from the openness advocated by Argyris (and 
also by Torbert) represent an attempt to increase the degree of reflexivity which is not 
generally evident in reflection in action as far as agenda setting and move testing is 
concerned. Such a position has raised questions about the level of participation by various 
members. This research method has been viewed as essentially “phenomenological, in 
that it focuses on the subjective processes of interpretation that a reflective practitioner 
applies in working through a problem. “(deNeufville 1984)
As a researcher, I am left with the impression that whilst it offers a method that generates 
insights into practice, by itself it, would be insufficient as a methodology for research into 
clinical practice. What I feel is missing is an awareness of ontological position as a 
researcher, in order to ask questions about the significance of quantitative and qualitative 
data encountered in the clinical interaction. Hence, my model outlined at the beginning is 
based upon an appreciation of the shortcomings of solely adhering to this approach. This 
conceptual model is reproduced here for reference.
1. In my position as a doctor I operate at one level as a positivist (positivist theory 
generating data production).
2. At the same time I have tried to work as a reflective practitioner/ action inquirer 
(constructivist theory underlying nature of data and data production)
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3. And finally as a researcher I try to develop an awareness of the ontological position I 
am adopting. This may be described as theory behind theory in that it represents an 
awareness of the assumptions circumscribing a particular paradigmatic position.
Action Inquiry -Torbert
I was attracted to the idea of exploring the book The Power of Balance; transforming 
Self, Society and Scientific Inquiry (Torbert 1991) by the man himself. I first met 
William Torbert in September 1994 when he was a facilitator in a three day conference at 
Hawkwood, England. One reviewer suggested that the book contains “a great deal of 
male discourse and deliberation. His closest confidantes and co-conspirators over the 
years seem to be male. The most prominent female figures in the book seem to involve 
wives and lovers, who represent pain/ ecstasy in his life.” (Mitchell 1993) This book had 
fairly clearly portrayed his position in society (as a white middle class professional male) 
a position that is normally well defended and yet he had, through his openness, expressed 
a certain vulnerability. For these and possibly other reasons, he was robustly criticised on 
a number of occasions during the conference and on one occasion this was sufficiently 
hostile to apparently move him to tears. What impressed me was that even in the face of 
this hostility, he appeared to be still able to listen to the messages behind the rhetoric and 
maintain his openness. Here appeared to be someone who could practise what he wrote 
about in his book in a manner that I saw as convincing. "The intellectual power of
balance includes the intellectual capacity to think on one's feet in the midst of
crisis.... moral capacity to act with integrity and compassion in times of pressure... .the 
strategic capacity to weave all that one knows...into actions that reverberate positively an 
all time horizons, the visionary capacity to see what one does not see and to challenge the 
assumptions of one's current way of seeing and thinking, to see other perspectives and to 
see through transformations in one's own perspective."
(Torbert 1991 p5)
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The book claims “to present a new theory of power, a new practice of management, and a 
new approach to conducting social science” which as one review comments “is no mean 
achievement for any author”. (Cooper 1991) His vision of action ‘inquiry’, a term Torbert 
employs to distinguish it from action research and action science, is based around an 






“This attention is what sees, embraces, and corrects incongrueties among mission, 
strategy, operations, and outcomes.” This type of action inquiry goes beyond 
professional boundaries and is “a kind o f scientific inquiry that is conducted in everyday 
life. It is a kind o f social science that deals primarily with 'primary' data encountered 'on­
line' in the midst o f perception and action” and only secondarily with secondary, or 
instrumental data, “collected and analyzed 'off-line'.” Such “consciousness in the midst 
o f action...is both the ultimate aim and the primary research instrument in action 
in q u ir y (author’s italics) (Torbert 1991 p219)
Coupled with this awareness is the need for a transforming leadership, which is what 
particularly distinguishes Torbert’s version of action science from that of Argyris and 
Schon. This transforming leadership is a “blend of four types of power, unilateral power 
diplomatic power, logistical power and transforming power”. (Torbert 1991 p i3-32) The 
ability to exercise and appropriately blend these four different types of power he called 
‘the power of balance.’He develops a hierarchy of leadership qualities reflecting the 
various ways that such power can be exercised.
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Governing frames at successive developmental stages
Stage Name Governing Frame
1 Impulsive Impluses rule reflexes
2 Opportunist Needs, interests rule impulses
3 Diplomat Expectations rule interests
4 Technician Internal craft logic rules expectations
5 Achiever System success in environment rules craft logics
6 Strategist Principle rules system
7 Magician Process (interplay of principle/action) awareness rules
principle.
8 Ironist Intersystemic development awareness rules process
“Each succeeding construction 'dethrones' the assumptions of the previous construction 
and transforms them from their role of framing and governing reality to a new role as 
variables within a wider reality.” (Torbert 1991 p42-43) This power is most appropriately 
exercised through the use of ‘liberating structures’, which are “paradoxical structures that 
shape a subordinate’s efforts while at the same time also stimulate a leader’s self 
questioning and authentic action.” (Marshall 1992) This developmental management 
theory has been criticised on the grounds that one “can only appreciate those meanings at 
one’s own stage of development or below.” This can make it all too easy for those at a 
higher stage to devalue those at a lower stage. (Putnam 1993)
Action inquiry is individual inquiry with the aim of collaboration. If this is successfully 
managed it may lead to a ‘community of inquiry’. It is this feature particularly, that 
Torbert saw as the distinguishing feature that separated his work from that of Argyris. He 
maintained that action science, whilst claiming to “seek to enact communities of inquiry 
in communities of social practice” overlooked three important considerations. Firstly, 
“how far communities of practice in the everyday world diverge from the ideal of 
community of inquiry. Secondly, how far the community of scientists themselves diverge 
from the community of inquiry and finally how far the current scientific ideal of a 
community of inquiry diverges from an ideal that can resolve paradigm disputes and be 
realized in communities of practice.” (Torbert 1991 p23 9-240) He takes the view that 
Argyris and his colleagues appear to assume that “the distance in all cases is relatively 
small, one of degree not of kind.” (ibid) Argyris, he goes on to say “implies that science
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has something to offer practice but not vice versa”, a position, incidently, that Schon also 
attempts to correct. Furthermore, the assumption that “the apparently small distance 
between mainstream scientific values and action science values is in fact the case, an 
assumption not borne out by a) reflection and b) the “lack of conversation between 
empirical scientists and phenomenologists.” Finally, he argues, “Kuhnian analysis 
highlights how scientific communities as communities of social practice are unable to 
resolve paradigm disputes.” (ibid) By resolving these, he proposes a “new kind of social 
science, management, teaching and learning aiming at creating communities of inquiry 
(peer cultures) within communities of social practice.” In this respect he feels that 
Argyris has fallen short of creating a community of inquiry, (ibid)
If the methodology is different, then it may be useful to examine how is data generated 
using this model and how is it tested? First of all Torbert advocates that relevant data is 
generated not just in our professional lives, but also in our personal lives as well. “Good 
practice should not be reserved just for our professional lives.” (Torbert 1991 p222) This 
approach led one sympathetic viewer to comment that it “challenges perceptions about 
appropriate boundaries, and it reunites productivity and inquiry, reason and feelings, the 
professional and the personal. The detached view of scientists as observers, who often 
lead lives uninformed by their own theoretical insights, seems inappropriate as we move 
into the complexities of the post-modern age.” (Marshall 1992) This approach, where 
action inquiry is seen as a “a dialectical, experiential process that treats the four territories 
of experience as distinct-vision, strategy (reasoned or felt), action, and the outside world- 
and that seeks to enact congruent patterns across all four territories of experience" is very 
demanding upon the inquirer. Data is likely to emerge from every direction and this may 
be difficult to hold so that “even if we widen our awareness momentarily in response to 
some reminder, it narrows again very soon, and we do not feel its narrowness." (Torbert 
1991 p222) In everyday experience, knowledge may be perceived as adequate until one 
becomes aware, and this has to be an intentional process conducted in the present, of the 
four territories of experience. This reminds us of the “narrow cognitive interpretive net 
we apply to our perceptions. We are rarely aware of our own behaviour and others’ 
reactions as we act.” (ibid) (I found that this was personally illustrated to me when I saw
177
mysef on video for the first time) This action, in which we “verify for our selves the 
four territories of experience” then permits a widening of the scope “of alternative actions 
and strategies.” (Torbert 1991 p228) This suggests fairly intensive data analysis which 
would be generated for several years whilst undertaking a thesis.
Since talk forms that principle basis of action, communication and the way we conduct it 
is important. Communication “in daily, professional, and intimate conversations can be 
understood and practised as efforts to communicate in all four territories of experience.” 
(Torbert 1991 p233-234) This suggests a method that can be employed that pays attention 
to the four parts of speech.
1. Frame- the assumptions that bound conversation, the "name of the game", the purpose 
of speaking;
2. Advocacy- a particular goal to be achieved, an abstract assertion about perception or 
action;
3. Illustration-a. concrete example, a colourful story; and
4. inquiry- an invitation to respond, an effort to determine the effects of one's action 
(one's speaking) or others perspectives on the matter.(ibid)
The approach to framing was reflected in my research both as a reflective practitioner and 
as a researcher. As a reflective practitioner I would pay attention to the framing process 
of the clinical problem but do so with what I perceived as a greater level of clarity than 
before. For example, it appears to be a common occurrence for patients to perceive a 
specialist as knowledgeable about clinical problems outside their area of expertise. This 
phenomenon was illustrated by a patient, who came to the clinic with a nasal problem, 
but instead sought my opinion about treatment she had been given for her asthma. I was 
happy to discuss her nasal problem but did not feel equipped to discuss her asthma 
treatment. The framing process commenced by clearly delineating my area of expertise, 
and having done so, negotiated, through inquiry, agreement about the goals to be 
achieved by the consultation. This process was noticeable enough to elicit comment from 
another doctor sitting in the clinic with me. Framing the problem as a researcher means
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paying attention to the theory frame or paradigm in which the medical discourse is going 
to take place. Will it be appropriate to be positivist or constructivist here and how do I 
validate this position?
Torbert’s communication strategy also suggests a higher level of inquiry at each of the 
stages of framing, advocating, illustrating and inquiry. There is a level of inquiry implicit 
in the framing process because it is perceived as a set of assumptions in the first place. 
The illustrative phase of the process is seen as a further level of inquiry by offering an 
example to check out the clarity of the assertion to the other participant. Finally, the 
inquiry process at the end is to invite feedback before a process of reframing starts the 
cycle again. Torbert saw this as a “process to invite the exercise of mutual influence and 
transforming power, while increasing the validity of the data available about how 
participants are experiencing the situation." (Torbert 1991 p234)
However, much of his approach has been criticised as “too normative and too idealistic” 
to be as useful in practice as perhaps it should be.( Bird 1993) There is no reference to the 
everyday dynamics of race, gender and class, a particular concern because of the 
privileged position of the white, middle class professional male in western 
organisations.( Mitchell 1993) Nevertheless, Torbert’s vision of action inquiry more 
overtly acknowledges the existence of communities of inquiry, emphasises the 
importance of inquiry in both framing and advocating and develops a case for connecting 
leadership more fully with the process of inquiry. In many ways, this conveniently leads 
to the final version of action inquiry, participative action inquiry.
Co-operative Inquiry
Action research in the participatory paradigm is characterised by a form of research more 
usually called co-operative inquiry. The first formal account of co-operative inquiry, or as 
it was then called ‘experiential research’, was published in 1971 by John Heron. He drew 
attention to an inconsistency in conventional psychological research when an original 
researcher “assumes a free autonomous cause in their own behaviour....and at the same
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time denies its relevance to the behaviour of their subjects, for example explaining their 
subjects’ behaviour in terms of strict causal determinism?” And conceived the idea that 
the “researcher is necessarily also the inquiring agent, who is both experimenter and 
subject combined.” (Heron J. p3, 1996).
The main emphasis in co-operative inquiry is on research with people not research on 
them or about them. In this respect each member of a co-operative inquiry group is a co­
researcher, co-subject and participant. The very words ‘co-operative inquiry’ suggest a 
level of mutuality missing from many other forms of research both qualitative and 
otherwise. The defining features of this approach have recently been summarised:
1. All subjects are as fully involved as possible in all research decisions taken in the 
reflection phase
2. There is an intentional cycling between reflection and sense making with experience 
and action
3. Explicit attention is paid to validity procedures
4. A radical epistemology is developed that is both informative and transformative
5. There is a need for a range of special inquiry skills
6. Use of the full range of human sensibilities should be considered 
(Heron J. p36,1996)
The radical nature of the extended epistemology is seen particularly in the four main 
inquiry outcomes, “which correspond to the four forms of knowing: experiential, 
presentational, propositional and practical” (ibid). In this respect the full range of human 
expression is regarded as legitimate. These include transformations of person 
(experiential) and presentations of insight through “dance, drawing, drama and all other 
expressive modes, which provide imaginative symbols of the significant patterns in our 
realities.” (Heron J. p37,1996). Heron (ibid) perceived some of these inquiries as 
transformative, including for example transformation of the environment, social 
practices, self-directed learning, intimacy and others, others are perceived as informative.
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Transformative inquiries are seen as a result of developing particular practical skills, 
which are seen as exercising primacy over reports or presentational insights.
Whilst the intention might be to encourage full participation in all research decisions, 
which is one particular hallmark of co-operative inquiry, such a radical epistemology is 
not likely to give rise to a uniform style of inquiry. Indeed there are a number of different 
types of inquiry as outlined by Heron. (Heron 1996 p40-42) These may be ‘bootstrap’; 
internally or externally initiated; full or partial forms; same, reciprocal, counterpartal or 
mixed role. The bootstrap inquiry group chooses to be entirely self-initiating by either 
reading how to do it, or experimenting to find its own way to approach an inquiry. In 
internal inquiry groups, the initiating researchers are “personally engaged with the culture 
or practice which the research is about,” whereas in the external group, the initiating 
researchers are externally placed. In full form inquiry groups, every participant is fully 
involved as both co-researcher and co-subject, but in partial forms the initiators may only 
be involved as co-subjects. ‘Same’ ‘reciprocal’, ‘counterpartal’ or ‘mixed role’ are to do 
with “inquiries that focus on practice within a given social role. In ‘same’ inquiry models, 
all co-inquirers have the same role. ‘Reciprocal’ is the name given to inquiries in which 
co-inquirers have roles of equal status, for example a spouse, partner or colleague. 
Counterpartal role inquiries are ones in which co-inquirers include a sample of all the 
kinds of participants likely to be encountered in an inquiry into that phenomenon. For 
example a group interested in the practitioner client relationship might include doctors, 
nurses, patients, families. Finally, a mixed role includes different kinds of practitioner, 
for example different therapists such as general practitioners and complimentary 
therapists.
An inquiry may be started by an initiator’s call, in which an individual launches an 
inquiry by forming, with appropriate publicity, an inquiry group interested in exploring a 
specified topic. This is the usual manner in which a group will form. Data generation is 






• Reflection and planning for further action
The first reflection phase may decide on a number of alternatives; a more focused topic 
for research, a plan for the first action phase, consider a method of recording data during 
an action phase. The action phase, in which each participant is both co-researcher and co­
subject, will explore a particular experience related to the inquiry topic, apply an inquiry 
skill or make a record of experiential data gained. The full immersion phase may be 
characterised by a new awareness or breakthrough to a ‘new perception’. Finally the 
second reflection phase will usually attempt sense making with a view to redefining the 
inquiry topic, but may also review the method of data recording or modify the plan for 
the next cycle. (Heron 1996 p50).
Heron has identified two distinct styles of co-operative inquiry culture, which he has 
termed Apollonian and Dionysian. The Apollonian inquiry “takes a more rational, linear, 
systematic, controlling and explicit approach to the process of cycling between reflection 
and action.” The sequential steps are rational; “plan, act, observe and reflect, then re­
plan.” The Dionysian inquiry takes on “ a more imaginal, expressive, spiralling, diffuse, 
impromptu and tacit approach to the interplay between making sense and action.” In the 
reflection stage they “share improvisatory, imaginative” ways of making sense and the 
implications for this are not worked out by rational pre-planning. In their own way, both 
share an “intentional interplay between making sense and action.” (Heron 1996 p45-47)
Heron maintained that such a methodology called for special inquiry skills and validity 
procedures. Special inquiry skills regarded as useful for informative inquiries have been 
termed ‘being present’; ‘imaginal openness’; ‘bracketing’; ‘reframing’. These inquiry 
skills are to do with empathy (being present), being “receptive to the meaning inherent in 
the total process of shaping people” (imaginal openness), managing conceptual labels 
“embedded in the perceived world”, to be more open to “inherent, primary, imaginal
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meaning (bracketing), and being “open to reframing the assumptions of any conceptual 
context or perspective (reframing).” (Heron 1996 p58-59) I notice that all these special 
inquiry skills have one thing in common, the ability to return to data, to overlook the 
cultural inference we make about people, statements and talk and to disregard 
constructively the classifications we make about what we see. Such a return to data, to 
the basic experience, opens up the possibility of new associations or new relationships. 
The early part of this thesis indicated that I had come to recognise that the way I had been 
looking at the world was dependent upon adopting a set of assumptions that allowed me 
to make sense of data. This was proving to be problematic as I strove to add complexity 
and understanding to an analysis of the clinical situation. The attraction of co-operative 
inquiry methodologies, in their full participative mode, was that it encouraged a co­
inquirer to return to basic data in the form of basic experience and to re-evaluate the 
classifications that had formed part of one’s cognitive and practical makeup since birth. It 
encouraged one to reclassify what had been discarded or ignored to be useful, 
informative and such reffaming encouraged the researcher to make new sense.
Inquiry skills that relate to ‘radical’ practice have been termed ‘dynamic congruence’; 
‘emotional competence’; ‘non-attachment’; and ‘self-transcending intentionality’. These 
have been described in the following way; “practical knowing, or knowing how to act” 
(dynamic congruence); “the ability to identify and manage emotional states in various 
ways” (emotional competence); the “ability to wear lightly and without fixation the 
purpose, strategy, form of behaviour and motive which have been chosen as the form of 
action” (non-attachment); and the “skill of having in mind, while busy with one form of 
action, one or more alternative forms” (self-transcending intentionality). (Heron J. 1996 
p58-59)
Such a methodology calls for special validity procedures, whose purpose is to “free the 
various forms of knowing involved in the inquiry process from the distortion of uncritical 
subjectivity.” (ibid) This approach to validity is consistent with an epistemology that 
accepts almost any form of experience as legitimate for inquiry, and utilises special 
inquiry skills that challenge conventional emotional responses, conventional
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classifications of experience, typical responses and intellectual fixedness. In a sense the 
purpose of validity is to challenge any aspect of the research that has perceived structure 
or appears to be resistant to change. Given such a requirement, validity is therefore often 
seen as a balance between opposites, no one polarity gaining dominance over the other. A 
balance is therefore required between “divergence and convergence within the action 
phases of one or many research cycles” .(ibid) Several cycles of action and reflection 
reinforce the notion that the inquiry topic is not subject to organisation and fixedness-it is 
an indication that engagement is sufficient. A balance between reflection and action 
suggests a harmony between mind/body perception. Challenging uncritical subjectivity is 
an agreement that any inquirer can be authorised to act as ‘devils advocate’ in order to 
“question the group whether one or several forms of critical subjectivity is afoot.’’(ibid) A 
perceived “interdependence” between chaos and order suggest an “attitude that tolerates 
and undergoes, without premature closure, inquiry phases which are confused and 
disorientated, ambiguous and uncertain, conflicted and inharmonious, generally lost and 
groping.” (ibid) It is necessary to adopt some regular method of “managing unaware 
projections of some past or emotionally repressed traumas” (ibid) and finally looks for 
evidence of genuine, authentic collaboration.
So far I have discussed the various ontological positions to adopt as a researcher and 
considered what constitutes data within the positivist, post positivist, critical theory, 
constructivist and participatory paradigms. This has included a discussion on how data is 
generated in each of these paradigms, particularly with a view to generating data that was 
relevant to professional practice. I have also considered various research questions and 
underpinning all research questions is the need to ask relevant questions. This has been 
followed by a careful review of some of the methodologies available to a qualitative 
researcher. The resubmission has enabled me to indicate how I found some of these 
methodologies useful in generating data. I have concluded that an action research 
metho dology is appropriate because of the need to ask relevant questions in the moment.
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The third section of the methodology sections;
1. Ontological and epistemological issues in relation to a research question
2. Linking research questions, epistemology and methods
3. Ethics, morality and politics of the research process
4. Producing a practical research design
devotes itself to the ethical problems of undertaking clinical research of this kind before 
putting together what I perceived as a practical research design in the final section.
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Section 3
Ethics, morality and politics in research design
In relation to developing an ethical research practice I would like to address five 
particular problems. Firstly, there are problems in determining what is meant by 
‘research’ when it becomes inextricably linked with practice. Secondly, there are 
problems in separating out implicit from explicit permissions to undertake ‘research’. 
Thirdly, there are problems in adopting a particular ethical research stance. Fourthly there 
are problems in understanding at a moral philosophical level what is right and what is 
wrong and fifthly there are problems in trying to make sense of it all and adopt a position 
that aligns with common sense.
How do I determine what is research when it is linked to practice? In the clinical 
interaction there are a number of activities taking place, some or all of which may be 
regarded in one sense as ‘research’. Firstly, there is the investigation of the clinical 
problem. It is a kind of research or investigation into natural phenomena. Then there is 
the research into clinical practice, the attempt that I make as a doctor to try and become a 
better one. Finally there is the research, depicted in this thesis as ‘a researcher’, in which 
I ask myself questions about the theory behind the theory behind the data. This is the 
process through which I attempt to make sense of context, context of phenomenon, 
context of data, context of theory. At one level all of these different processes constitute 
research and each should have a particular ethical position but at another level they would 
appear to be the constituents of good practice. For which of these levels of research is it 
necessary to obtain permission to research?
This is what I mean by the problem of separating out implicit from explicit permissions 
to research. I have made the assumption that any patient who comes to the clinic has 
given implicit permission, to a certain level at least, that they wish me to investigate/ 
research the clinical problem. Furthermore, I have made the assumption that any patient 
who comes would wish me to adopt a ‘research’ stance on such clinical practice that is
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aimed at improving that clinical practice and that they are necessarily part of one’s 
process. It could be argued that these are unethical assumptions to make, that each 
clinical consultation should start with a explanation that research is about to take place 
and the ethical position of that research should be clarified. The impracticality of this 
approach means that it doesn’t happen most of the time, but on specific occasions it does. 
When patients are asked to become part of a clinical trial of treatment, then the clinical 
process as ‘research’ has to be transparent. There are also other moments when I, as a 
doctor, am aware that my treatment has an element that is essentially experiment. For 
example, neither the parent nor myself is usually very certain what effect a persistent 
hearing loss in a small child has had on behaviour. In suggesting a treatment that would 
restore hearing to normal, I am not certain of the outcome on behaviour. In this respect 
the surgery constitutes an ‘experiment’, and I try to make this position clear. In everyday 
terms, however, permission to investigate a clinical problem is accepted as implied and I 
take this to be reasonable. Is it safe to assume the same permission as ‘researcher’, in 
which I trying to look at myself and the patient, has been granted and which would 
appear to be beyond what a patient might expect as part of a clinical consultation?
Denzin and Lincoln have identified five ethical stances in research; the absolutist, the 
deception model, the relativist stance, the contextualized-consequentialist model and the 
feminist position. (Denzin & Lincoln 1994 p i9-22) The absolutist "argues that social 
scientists have no right to invade the privacy of others” and regard “disguised research as 
unethical.” Such a model dictates that my position as a researcher should be made clear. 
For some of the time this is straightforward and at other times it is not. When I have 
undertaken interviews about my practice, when I am interviewing patients about the 
problems of decision making, the early part of the interview is devoted to trying to obtain 
permission on this point. The very act of obtaining this permission may well allow an 
agenda of the other party to emerge, so that adopting an overt ethical stance as a 
researcher may well influence the data generation.
In my conversation with Valerie (appendix 3) the process of obtaining ethical permission 
to proceed as a researcher ran into problems. We had agreed to meet and talk about her
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difficulty in deciding whether to accept a heart/ lung transplant. This part of the 
conversation took place at the beginning of the interview.
R: You, you've asked me to have a little discussion at the beginning about what it is
that I ’m trying to do. That's why I'm going to start, start off by talking. I  think we were 
going to also learn from this about what it is that you would like to get out o f our chat 
because you, you have an interest in talking about this as well?
V: Mmm.
R: as well and, I, I  will also address the question o f confidentiality on video and if, if,
i f  it turns out that things are unacceptable 
V: Mmm.
R: you can always switch it o ff or
V: Yes.
R: either at the beginning, middle or end or at a later stage. I, as you know, work as
a doctor. I  work within a medical framework in which I  obtain medical information and 
try and advise in the most appropriate sense. What I'm, have been interested in looking 
at is what people do when doctors and patients with information that may be not medical 
in the strictest sense o f the word, but maybe important in terms o f determining what they 
do. And that involves trying to decide if, i f  that happens and i f  it happens what are the 
circumstances that bring this kind o f evidence into the discussion. Do doctors permit 
patients to bring this in? Do they restrict access in all kinds o f ways? Does the whole 
business o f being, being in a conventional western framework o f medicine make it very 
difficult fo r  patients to make decisions. That involves looking very much at myself and 
how I  handle this. What do I  do with this information? Do I  disregard it? Do I  pay 
attention to it? Do I  pay lip service to it? Do I, do I  pretend to pay attention to it? But 
all the time underneath it, ignoring it but in a more subtle way. That sort o f thing, but 
also asking patients how they construct images o f their own illnesses and how they apply 
medical information in the conventional medical sense in terms o f making the decision 
themselves. Is that clear? Is it?
V: Yes, that's fine.
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R: Good. So, we are going to begin this well actually perhaps the best thing to do
would be to
V: You're talking about it particularly within the realms o f decision making?
R: I  suppose so. That, that is the point at which a decision is made that, that forms
the, the focus for, fo r  thinking about these issues but o f course these issues enter into a 
clinical context at all times without necessarily a decision being made. And yourself, 
what would you like to get out o f this discussion?
V: I  don't know. I  am very interested in an area which I  think the National Health is
beginning to address and that is what the patient themselves is happy with in terms o f 
treatment even though that may not always be the best in terms o f whatever clinical 
measurement is available. That which might make the patient feel much happier and, in 
doing so, would allow them to relax and be more receptive to what ever treatment they do 
have and may end up perhaps producing a better result or perhaps in the patient having 
a better quality o f life in their own terms.
R: mmm,
V: that's part o f it.
R: OK.
V: And the other part o f it I  think is the, the awe in which the medical profession is
still held by people generally, most o f all by patients, prevents many people from feeling 
that they can address issues about their treatment with their doctors; indeed they rarely 
have the information to do so. The language o f the medical profession is very technical 
and specialised, whereas the concerns o f patients are usually voiced very much in terms 
o f their feelings, intuition andfear o f consequences. In addition fear o f the unknown 
plays a large part in a patient's comfort and it is rare for this to be dealt with in a 
supportive way by staff without underestimating a patient's ability to understand what is 
going on. Patient’s fears or enquiries are likely to be addressed to the staff, who are 
readily accessible to them, the less qualified grades o f nursing staff. Although these 
nurses are often most sympathetic to patients, they too have little or no access to doctors 
and in passing messages up the chain o f responsibilities they can get distorted and 
delayed. These worries are often not passed on to doctors in a way that will produce the 
required information. The ‘named nurses ’ system o f allocating specific nurses to patients
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throughout a stay in hospital depends greatly on the ability o f the nurse and can be 
frustrating fo r  patients since to some degree it blocks access to someone who may be 
more sympathetic; but most o f all in the several stays in three different hospitals I  have 
experienced recently this system is very unpopular with nurses, who simply don't operate 
it. Although much has been done to make hospitals more friendly places, including 
breaking down what seemedfearsome hierarchies o f anonymous staff, according to all 
the patients I  have spoken to, it doesn't help i f  they are left not knowing where they are. 
Not wearing uniforms and white coats and nurses being apparently more on one level 
and known by their Christian names, not having matron and so on does not help i f  they 
don't know where they are in relation to staff. They need to know who to speak to if  they 
want a real difference and who is accountable fo r  their daily welfare. They need to know 
that even more when they are really ill because they have no choice but to put themselves 
in the hands o f a system which they feel will be watching out fo r  them and have its own 
checks and balances. They need to know who can begin to make decision making, at 
least in part, accessible to them in a real sense.
It is most important for patient's wellbeing to fee l that they have ownership and some 
control over their illness and that they can do things or behave in ways which will help 
themselves. The degree to which this is possible may relate to their recovery.
R: Right, there is
V: Is it a bit muddled?




At the time this seemed straightforward. In a conversation I had with Valerie at a later 
date, she mentioned to me that whilst it was pleasant of me to discuss what I was trying 
to do in a collaborative way, she would have preferred if I had just told her what I trying 
to do. “I really wanted to know what you wanted out of it... .1 expected to be asked/ 
directed.” In this way it would have been easier for her to fulfil my requirements and
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hers!! (extract from letter from Valerie to me on reading the transcript). Clearly such an 
invitation for permission to research my practice is impractical at the beginning of every 
straightforward clinical consultation. In this case then, to some extent, deception is taking 
place. This constitutes the second ethical stance in research according to Denzin and 
Lincoln.
The deception model "endorses voyeurism in the name of science, truth and 
understanding.” (ibid) This position is regarded as justified on the basis that a social 
scientist has a duty to contribute “to society's self-understanding.” Any method that 
contributes to this is justified. Such a model attempts to justify itself on the basis that 
“people in power, like those out of power, will attempt to hide the truth from the 
researcher.” (ibid) Such a model assumes that the researcher is in a better position to 
determine what is in the interests of society and assumes that the loss of freedom to the 
individual, who is the subject of the research, is counterbalanced by the increased 
understanding such research would provide.
In the third ethical position, the so called relativist stance, the researcher will "study only 
those problems that directly flow from their own experiences.” Such an ethical position is 
more circumscribed than the absolutist and deception models because “agenda setting is 
by personal biography, not by some larger scientific community.” Such a position relies 
upon the researcher’s own set of standards to determine the ethical position of, for 
example, the degree of participation. The approach aims to “build open, sharing 
relationships with those investigated.” (ibid) This position acknowledges that the issue of 
what is right and what is wrong in the research is determined by the researcher and 
justifies this by claiming that just as the research is researcher orientated, then so is the 
ethical foundation. Much of my research into my own practice adopts a relativist stance 
since much interpretation is self-referencing but as I will argue shortly, such a position 
leaves unconsidered the question of what is right and what is wrong.
The final two ethical positions have much in common. The contextual ized- 
consequentialist model is “built on mutual respect, non coercion and non-manipulation,
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the support of democratic values and institutions, and the belief that every research act 
implies moral and ethical decisions that are contextual.” The feminist model springs from 
the contextualized-consequentialist model but particularly emphasises the “collaborative, 
trusting, non oppressive relationships between researchers and those studied." (ibid)Both 
these positions attempt to adopt a shared ethical stance in which the moral and ethical 
consequences of any decision or action is reasonably transparent. The concern is that 
such mutuality may be more apparent than real. The world in which the clinical 
interaction takes place, and the language used in the discourse, is much more under the 
influence of the doctor. "Social groups are prevented from achieving a correct 
understanding of their situation because they have passively accepted an illusory account 
of reality that prevents them from recognising and pursuing their common interests and 
goals." (Carr & Kemmis 1983 p i37)
This interpretation suggests that knowledge is shaped by human interests. In this respect 
knowledge is linked to power, and as such, requires an ethical stance. Habermas contends 
that different kinds of knowledge are developed “on the basis of interests that have 
developed out of the natural needs of the human species and have been shaped by 
historical and social conditions. Without the whole range of needs and desires 
incorporated in the human species, human beings would have no interest in acquiring 
knowledge and there would be no possibility of knowledge at all.” He goes on to 
construct three knowledge-constitutive interests which he labels the 'technical', the 
'practical' and the 'emancipatory'.
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He argues that language is so “distorted by prevailing social, cultural, or political
I condr.ions” that 'practical' interests can only be adequately pursued when “alienating
conditions have been recognised and eliminated.” (Carr & Kemmis 1983 pl32-134) As a
docto* I need to be aware of the extent to which the biomedical language that I employ in 
the consultation may distort the real interests of those whom it purports to serve. The 
contextualized-consequentialist and feminist ethical model attempt to at least be aware of 
this distortion and recognises the ethical position of failing to do this adequately. One 
might argue that two doctors both of whom are familiar with medical discourse might be 
in equivalent positions of power, even if they meet as doctor and patient, but this position 
is difficult to reach when a doctor meets a patient with little understanding of the medical
I discourse. At this point in the argument, knowledge, power and ethical considerations
meet and it is insufficient to simply adopt a single ethical stance. The ethical stance it 
seems to me is overtaken by a moral one in which the researcher becomes principally 
concerned with what is right and what is wrong.
The current scene is illuminated by four basic theories of what is right and what is wrong. 
These include the utilitarian, the Kantian, instuitionism or common-sensism and a virtue- 
ethicist approach. (Honderich 1995 p593-595) The utilitarian maintains that the right 
action must “ be understood in terms of human good or well-being” and more generally 
the right action is that action which is conceived as leading to or more likely to lead to “ 
the greatest balance of human pleasure or happiness over pain or unhappiness.” (ibid)
This position underpins the moral basis of the Lincoln and Denzin’s deception model but 
is controversial because of the potentially uneven distribution of such pain and pleasure. 
Medical research may have to confront the possibility of pioneering some treatments with 
patients who may not only not directly benefit but may indeed find their position made
I
worse by such research, even though society as a whole may ‘benefit’ in the long term. If 
my own research into practice complicates and disturbs the doctor patient relationship by 
unearthing unhappiness inappropriately, I may not be able to justify this by a claim that 
greater happiness to the whole may ensue.
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The Kantian position argues that a moral position must be “understood independently of 
all empirical and sensuous motives. Moral rightness in behaviour is a matter of acting 
consistently and rationally.” (ibid) My research position challenges the notion of acting 
consistently by arguing that such consistency is based upon a consistent set of 
assumptions that themselves need to be challenged. I am also arguing that a rational 
position in terms of analysis may present an incomplete picture of events because there 
are phenomena that form important contextual components of the problem that are 
beyond rationality. It would be ontologically incoherent to adopt an ethical position upon 
a rational stance when trying to undermine the fixed rational stance of conventional 
medical practice.
The third approach of intuitionism or common-sensism insists “that there can be no 
unifying account of our moral obligations; these, it claims, are irreducibly plural, and the 
only general moral principles it is willing to recognise are prima facie principles-it is 
wrong to harm another, it is wrong to break a promise.” (ibid) Such a position also fails 
to address the same problem of how to resolve the sacrifice of one person in medical 
research in the interests of the greatest good. Intuitively one can argue that any death is 
morally objectionable but common sense suggests that there may occasionally be a strong 
case for such course of action, for example in the case of Siamese twins where separation 
may allow one twin to survive. Nevertheless, contemporary medicine is founded upon the 
Hippocratic notion of “first do no harm” and the intuitive common-sense approach to 
morality is the one that at least feels familiar as a basis for a research position.
The virtue ethicists position is also founded upon the schools of ancient philosophy. A 
virtue ethicist believes “that right and wrong cannot be captured by independently or 
basically valid moral principles but is a matter of situational sensitivity (Aristotle) or of 
the expression or maintenance of fundamentally good or admirable inner motives or 
states (Plato).” (ibid) This position is felt to contain insufficient general principles to 
sufficiently constrain what “the moral agent does outside, in the world, to other 
people. ”(ibid)
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Given this apparently complex position, what sense can I make of all this? Bannister 
(Bannister et al 1994 p i42-159) has suggested asking four principal questions.
1. What is the purpose of the research? Why am I engaged in doing it?
2. Which parties, bodies, practices are affected by the research?
3. What are the implications for these bodies in framing the research questions and 
undertake the research in the way I have chosen?
4. Whose interests are served by this approach?
The espoused purpose of the research arose out of a practical difficulty in applying 
positivist based medicine in context. Such a project could have been tackled without the 
need for a more formal approach via a thesis and so one further purpose of the research 
was to obtain a higher degree. As the research progressed, and as my perspective as a 
constructivist developed, my involvement in the research began to include another 
dimension, a more political dimension. This arose out of an understanding of the way in 
which the medical world exercised its control on knowledge, through its use of medical 
discourse and through the institutional control of its organisations including hospitals and 
regulatory bodies. Part of the purpose of the research has become a desire to widen the 
notion of what constitutes medical knowledge beyond what is widely seen in the medical 
fraternity as proper knowledge. In this respect I see myself as part of a much wider 
debate between those who advocate an ‘evidence based’ and those who advocate a 
‘context based’ approach to the practice of medicine. This has implications for other 
parties and bodies in medicine. At one level, I sense that what I now advocate serves to 
undermine the position of the doctor as the sole arbiter of what constitutes knowledge, 
and what constitutes good practice. At the same time I belong to an organisation, a 
hospital, whose espoused aim is to serve the community at large and from this 
perspective my approach does not feel like one that undermines. I am at the same time 
aware that I am using my position as a doctor to challenge the position of doctors in a 
way that might be difficult for someone who is not medically qualified. Is this a position 
that betrays trust? I think not, as the espoused aim of medicine is to work towards the
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common good and if my position is wrong, I believe the institutions of medicine are 
sufficiently robust to rebuff any challenge from within the organisation.
Clearly, within this research frame, my interests are likely to be served but am I serving 
the interests of patients, other doctors and the medical institution as a whole? Can I adopt 
an ethical position that pays attention to interests other than my own? I do not know but 
the temptation is to claim to adopt a defined ethical position such as the relativist stance 
of Lincoln and Denzin. However, this single perspective would fail to acknowledge the 
complex position that I find myself in as a doctor/ researcher into the clinical problem; 
researcher into my own practice and researcher into theory. As a researcher I notice how 
inadequately such a stance describes what is taking place in the clinic but also as a 
researcher I notice how difficult it is to offer an alternative. The only position I can adopt 
is to claim awareness as a researcher of the two different paradigmatic positions of 
positivist and constructivist, and the different ethical stances each of these positions 
demands. This, I see as reflected in an attitude of inviting inquiry into inquiry method 
during interviews. For example, in my interview with Patrick we discussed the process of 
interviewing. We were halfway through the interview and found ourselves discussing our 
expectations from the interview.
R: I  wanted, I  wanted to ask you i f  this interview was what you expected?
P: Uhh I, I  rather hoped it would be like this. Uhh I  thought perhaps it would be uhh you 
ask the questions and me responding largely with yes's and no's and uhh I, I fe lt that I  
was not being able to get over to you all o f those subtleties which umm which are built 
into the interchange that happily we've had so far. Umm because otherwise umm you 
have to remain on umm gener', generalities. Whereas the truth is actually detailed and 
uhh and the subtleties o f uhh o f uhh understanding and how could I  possibly convince 
you uhh without going into those details such as the, the uhh uhh the antibiotic uhh 
situation that arose which was very meaningful to me and I, I  was surprised, as I've said, 
that umm that it wasn't to you uhh but then I  often found that with, with many points that I  
might raise in, in consultation with doctors that uhh where I  thought I  was saying 
something significant umm it proved not to be from the doctors point o f view uhh but,
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uhh, uhh and o f course I  hold it as being important and that's the difference. Uhh I  might 
be uhh I  might be uhh swayed by a doctor picking up a point that I  thought was quite 
important and would mean something to me as a result o f this reaction to it umm but I  
would still hold the umm the views that I  held about importance which my doctor might 
not have.
R: Can I  respond to that?
And later on in the interview:
R: I'm, I'm aware that I'm largely asking you questions 
P: Yes.
R: and uhh umm and I've very much enjoying it, the answers in this sort o f dilemma. Is 
there anything uhh you want to change that a bit, and ask me some questions?
P: (coughing) Well not at all Richard. I  think the, the story is with me rather than with 
you umm and what uhh has been said has uhh prompted from me uhh the sort o f umm 
criticism i f  you like that I  would uhh I  would wish to umm level uhh in these exceptional 
circumstances.
R: Right.
P: Uhh these things would never be said to you under normal circumstances. It is 
because we are sitting down being honest with each other and you are asking me to tell 
you my true feeling, my honest feelings about uhh my uhh recent history and because I  
think I  have something interesting to say to you and my motivation that I  think is that 
perhaps there is something to be, to be learnt from it. Uhh I, I  worry particularly about 
the many people who may be walking around today who, who have had radiotherapy for  
example
(Patrick, Appendix 2)
At this point in the methodology section, the paradigmatic positions to enter as a 
researcher have been considered, together with what constitutes data in the realm of 
research interest. Thought has been given to what are my specific and general research 
questions and various methodologies have been examined to see how they may generate
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data to develop understandings. Finally, the question of ethics and morality in research 
have been considered. The final section of the four main sections;
1. Ontological and epistemological issues in relation to a research question
2. Linking research questions, epistemology and methods
3. Ethics, morality and politics of the research process
4. Producing a practical research design
needs to consider how I put all this together to produce a practical research design.
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Section 4
Producing a practical research design
I encountered three stages in developing a practical research design; co-operative inquiry, 
supported action inquiry and action science/ inquiry. At the onset of the research, in 
1990,1 set up what I believed to be a co-operative inquiry group of doctors. I started this 
co-operative inquiry group with the aim of exploring the non-clinical processes 
surrounding decision making with a view to integrating medical, positivist, quantitative 
knowledge with qualitative understandings. At the end of the first year, I could not see 
sufficient progress in understanding the relationship between qualitative and quantitative 
phenomena and whilst continuing to be part of the ‘co-operative inquiry’ group of 
doctors, gradually turned my attention to an exploration of the problem focussed more on 
my activity in the clinic. In doing this, I was aware that my participation in both the 
hospital inquiry group and the Postgraduate research group at Bath University (part of my 
supervision process and discussed in more detail shortly) was continuing to be valuable 
in what I thought/ felt/ experimented/ experienced in the clinic. As a consequence my 
practical research design was reconfigured in terms of Heron’s ‘supported action inquiry’ 
model. (Heron 1996) In 1992, the hospital inquiry group disbanded but I continued to 
research my practice in the clinic but using action science/ inquiry as described by 
Argyris, Schon and Torbert. This progression of research design from co-operative 
inquiry, to supported action inquiry to action science/ inquiry can be seen to develop 
through this section.
The resubmission process has also encouraged me to reconstruct this final stage into a 
three level conceptual picture of positivist, reflective practitioner and researcher in a way 
the re-addresses my original puzzle of integrating positivist medicine with non-clinical 
processes. In other words, I have developed a model that allows me the flexibility to 
tailor treatment and paying attention to the process of doing this in a way that is not 
exclusive to quantitative or qualitative perspectives.
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At the beginning, in 1990,1 could see that it would be possible to research my practice in 
my own clinic using ethnography or action science together with supervision and 
participation in the Postgraduate research group at Bath University. I also saw the more 
exciting possibility of creating a co-operative inquiry group of departmental colleagues 
centred around the head and neck oncology clinic. This model would comprise a series of 
action (head and neck clinic) and reflection (hospital inquiry group) phases that seemed 
to conform to a co-operative inquiry methodology. I now propose to set the scene in more 
detail by explaining what took place in my own clinic and in the head and neck oncology 
clinic to show how they related to the hospital inquiry group as a co-operative inquiry 
methodology.
My personal clinical practice
Each week I would hold six three to four hour clinics. In each of these I would see 
anything from twelve to twenty patients. The problems would range from the apparently 
straightforward one of needing a hearing aid to complex and difficult decisions to be 
made by patients with unpleasant malignant disease. Most of the time I would be in the 
clinic alone with the patient but on other occasions medical students, trainee doctors, 
other colleagues or nurses would be present along with any number of relatives or friends 
of the patient. There would be one or two nurses in attendance.
The head and neck oncology clinic
This was specifically developed to plan treatments for patients with cancer of any part of 
the head and neck. I ceased to be a member of this clinic in 1993 as a result of a 
departmental reorganisation, so I include here a description of these clinics I made in 
1991 and quote from my research diary.
“These clinics are held once a month on the second Wednesday afternoon starting at 
2.00pm. Beforehand, fo r  about an hour and a half we meet over lunch held in the 
department. The lunch is principally a social event involving not only the medical staff
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but also the nursing, audiology and secretarial staff. We usually listen to a short ten- 
minute talk from a pharmaceutical representative in exchange fo r  lunch supplied by 
them. The rest o f the time is spent in free conversation, general chit-chat, gossip etc. 
Occasionally a topic o f general interest will emerge but much more often small groups 
talk amongst themselves. We are joined by the radiotherapist and oral surgeon at about 
2.00pm and the clinic begins.
I  can see that after an hour and a half o f socialising there is quite a 'party ’ atmosphere.
In fact these lunches were introduced in 1983 to try and instil a sense o f cohesion, esprit 
de corp within the department. In addition, this 'party' atmosphere has enabled us all to 
gel into a group which perhaps increases the sense o f ‘being outside it all ’ that I  suspect 
the patients experience when we saw them in the clinic later on that afternoon. The 
feeling I  suspect is like arriving late to a party.
The clinic is held in a very relaxed atmosphere, at least I  thought it was relaxed until I  
later learnt from the co-operative inquiry meetings that this was not the case. Everybody 
is standing, except the patient and possibly a relative, who are both given seats. Usually 
only one relative will be present because o f a lack o f space in the room. The medical staff 
are in small groups paying minimal attention to the patient unless they are directly 
involved as part o f the decision making process. The conversation in these small groups 
can be medical, hospital politics, hospital gossip or frankly social but they are all held in 
‘sotto voce ’. From time to time key members will come over to the patient to give an 
opinion and others are invited to observe, examine the patient etc. as part o f the decision 
making or educational function o f the clinic. This ‘choreography ’ was believed to take 
some o f the pressure o ff patients as they entered the room so that the process became 
more comfortable fo r  them.
Every patient seen during the clinic has a head and neck malignancy and for most o f 
them the problem is less than straightforward. Many o f them are contemplating their own 
mortality or at the very least the end o f life as they know it. They have cancers o f the 
tongue, throat, voice box, sinuses, salivary glands or facial skin. It is obvious to all
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concerned that the problem is serious and it is impossible in such cases to disguise this 
fa c t unlike a problem safely tucked away in the bladder or abdomen.
Before they enter the room, a medical history, a historical medical explanation o f the 
problem, is read out by a member o f staff to all the other doctors. One o f us then goes to 
collect the patient from a crowded waiting room nearby. Usually other patients are 
waiting their turn, and often the consequences o f treatment or disease are plainly there 
fo r all to see. It sometimes looks a little like a battlefield casualty room. No such ‘party 
atmosphere ’ exists here. Perhaps i f  the patients and their relatives had met beforehand, 
over lunch like we had, they would have been able to generate a collective will, a 
collective determination that the individual could draw upon and demonstrate a 
collective sense o f purpose in the same way as the medical staff.
Upon entering the room, the patient is introduced to key members o f the medical staff.
We used to introduce them to everybody but by common consent this was fe lt to be not 
only unnecessary but also agonising fo r  all concerned. We take turns to examine. At the 
end o f aboutfive minutes the consultant in charge will say something like this:
"we fin d  it difficult to talk honestly and straightforwardly about your problem when you 
are in the room. I  wonder i f  you wouldn't mind stepping outside fo r  a few  minutes and 
then we will come and give you our opinion "
Together we discuss the problem. There is usually a difference o f opinion as to what is 
the best thing to recommend. This difference may be due to many factors but seems to be 
dependant upon where your principal training in head and neck surgery has taken place. 
Some units have a reputation fo r  being more surgically aggressive and this is reflected in 
the graduate. There is often quite a lot o f laughter, but it doesn't fee l like disrespectful 
laughter to us, but i f  it could be heard outside it might not have seemed so. I  am often 
reminded o f GK Chesterton’s remark;
"We often laugh at what would otherwise be tragic".
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We usually manage to come to a collective decision, which often includes an option or 
two which can be put to the patient. For example a common option is:
"we believe that your chances o f survival will be reduced i f  we treat your cancer o f the 
voicebox with radiotherapy, and you will be able to speak in a normal manner i f  it is 
successful. On the other hand, i f  we remove the cancer with surgery your chance o f 
survival is improved but you will not be able to speak in a normal way. Do you have any 
feelings or thoughts on this particular point? "
The surgeon, radiotherapist and usually one junior doctor in training will then talk to the 
patient and relative(s) in a separate room, the room in which lunch was held. Meanwhile 
the next patient’s history is being presented to the rest o f the group. About ten to twelve 
patients are seen in an afternoon and the clinic finishes at about 5.00 to 5.30 with tea. 
Everyone is usually pretty exhausted. At the end nobody seems to enjoy the clinic much.
The conduct o f the clinic contained much ceremony, which we all instinctively 
understand and may be supportive to our purpose, whatever exactly that might be. These 
include meeting beforehand to develop a sense o f collective medical cohesion, the 
separation o f the patients from the main body o f the clinic in another room, the 
presentation o f  a medical history without the patient, the invitation to the patient to leave 
before any decision is discussed, the final discussion in a separate room all o f which are 
part o f a ceremony. Every doctor was aware o f the sequence and control that such 
ceremony gave to the flow o f information to the patient. The ceremonial aspects made it 
difficult to challenge the process and would unwittingly discourage any ‘troublesome ’ 
questions. A t the same time the ceremonial nature o f it gave the clinic considerable 
authority and on many occasions patients expressed pleasure in seeing so many doctors 
coming together as a team to tackle their problem. ” (Research diary RJC)
The head and neck clinic met on a monthly basis and the possibility became evident that 
this decision making arena might be a suitable place to investigate decision making. I
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therefore suggested setting up an inquiry group of the clinic participants with the general 
aim of examining decision making. This became known as the ‘hospital inquiry group’.
The hospital ‘co-operative’ inquiry group.
This group was formed as an espoused co-operative inquiry group in the early phases of 
the research project and met on a regular basis for two years. In setting up this group, I 
was aware of two needs that would be important. First of all, there was the need to set up 
a structure that permitted action/reflection cycles characteristic of co-operative inquiry. 
Secondly, there was the need to have a topic, a research question that would prove to be 
sufficiently attractive for a group of busy doctors to wish to attend such an inquiry group. 
With this in mind, it seemed to me that there were a number of practical points to 
consider. At the time I saw the following as important.
a. I would need to form a group with a common interest in the research question.
b. The topic itself should have some authority in the medical world. For example, a 
suggestion to research the organisational relationship between doctors and managers 
probably wouldn't attract more than a passing interest from most of my colleagues.
c. Those participants in the group should find the topic relevant within their working lives 
even if they were to move out of hospital life into general practice.
d. It had to be a topic that made it practical to generate data during my clinical activities. 
It should mean that several times a day we would research the topic or at least think about 
what we were trying to do.
The group was composed of my consultant colleagues, the senior and junior registrars 
both of whom were career ear, nose and throat surgeons and the senior house officers all 
of whom were pursuing careers in general practice. This group met once a month, 
alternating with the head and neck oncology clinic, to discuss clinical decision making.
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The co-operative inquiry model incorporated the head and neck oncology group and the 
hospital discussion group to form the action and reflection phases of a co-operative 
inquiry cycle. (Reason. 1988.p4-5)
Stage 1. The discussion group. A group of co-researchers would meet for about one hour 
to inquire about decision making in the head and neck malignancy clinic. At the end of 
this meeting, during which various problems within the clinic were discussed and the 
decision making processes were evaluated, we would agree to change some aspect of the 
clinic, some feature of the clinic. Thus we would hope to both improve the way the clinic 
was conducted and at the same time shed light on the way decisions were reached.
Stage 2. We would take the change or changes we had made to the clinic and agree to 
assess the impact on ourselves and others. Self observe, observe others and record these 
observations.
Stage 3. The head and neck clinic. We would experience these changes within the clinic 
and try to become "fully immersed" in our practice. We would note the effect of the 
change or changes we had agreed to make on the running of the clinic, paying attention to 
the patient, other colleagues and ourselves.
Stage 4. We would return to the discussion group and reflect on this experience and try 
to make some meaning of it. After this sense making stage we would return to Stage 1 
and commence another cycle of inquiry.
Stage 1 and 4 would essentially take place in the discussion group and Stage 3 would take 
place during the head and neck malignancy clinic. Stage 2 would partly take place during 
the discussion group and to some extent during the clinic. The first few minutes of each 
clinic were spent reminding each other what changes we had agreed to make and 
obtaining agreement from those who were unable to or did not have the time to or did not 
wish to attend the discussion group. These cycles of inquiry would each take a month to 
complete.
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Heron has identified two different approaches to setting up inquiry groups and proposes 
the terms Apollonian and Dionysian to describe the two approaches.
“I use the terms to refer to two different and complimentary co-operative inquiry cultures. 
The Apollonian inquiry takes a more rational, linear, systematic, controlling and explicit
approach to the process of cycling between reflection and action The Dionysian
inquiry takes a more imaginal, expressive, spiralling, diffuse, impromptu and tacit 
approach to the interplay between making sense and action.”
(Heron. 1996. p45)
My approach was to set up a co-operative inquiry group in a way that sought immediate 
engagement with the methodology as an exploratory device for two reasons. Firstly, as a 
way to develop a more reflexive approach to qualitative research by setting up a group 
that encouraged its members to challenge assumptions and interpretations by inviting 
appropriate feedback. The hospital discussion group seemed to offer a better opportunity 
than other occasions in hospital life to do this. In this respect it seemed to work well. For 
example, one meeting discussed the significance of calling one another by Christian 
names at work. Although we were inexperienced as qualitative researchers, I had never 
experienced a similar occasion in hospital when such a discussion involving consultants, 
trainees and medical students had taken place. It was also an exploratory device in the 
sense that actually trying a methodology was going to tell me more about co-operative 
inquiry than reading about it.
As a researcher, I notice how impulsive, how Dionysian according Heron’s description, 
such an approach appeared to be and how much of a contrast such an approach is to the 
rather controlled, rational and analytic behaviour of the positivist paradigm. There may 
have been a number of reasons for doing this. It may have been partly a deliberate 
rejection of the more rational, explicit, controlling analytic approach to research that had 
been my experience to date. The experience of being able to playfully offer interpretation 
was a distinct contrast to what I had been used to. Finally, instinctively it ‘felt’ 
appropriate and the very term ‘action research’ seemed to encourage the idea of having a
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go. The fact that I chose to follow a research strategy based on instinct (“it felt right”) 
already says something about a shift in paradigm.
This temptation to act in this way appeared to have two safeguards. Firstly, I was 
confident that I had an innate, albeit imperfect, understanding of what was happening in 
clinical practice and that this innate understanding would guard me against forming any 
conclusions that would seem spectacularly inappropriate. Secondly, participation in the 
postgraduate research group at the university provided a touchstone to what might happen 
in the hospital co-operative inquiry clinic.
The Postgraduate Research Group at Bath University
The Postgraduate research group was formed in September 1990. In the beginning there 
were eleven research students and two supervisors, Dr Peter Reason and Professor Judi 
Marshall. Two students left after the first year. The remaining nine students came from 
various walks of life. They comprised a psychologist, an art therapist, senior nurses, a 
nursing academic, an engineering lecturer, a senior policewoman, a business consultant, a 
management academic and myself, a surgeon.
For five years, we met for one day a month during the academic terms. For the first year 
we talked as a single group but thereafter we usually spent the day as two smaller sub­
groups. My group comprised a hospital clinical psychologist, a hospital art therapist, a 
senior nurse, an engineering lecturer and myself. Dr Peter Reason was our usual 
supervisor. As I took part in the conversation I would take notes. When I look at the 
topics we discussed in the early years they include such items as the nature of knowledge, 
particularly what was meant by knowing, gender, power, learning, territory, process, 
critical subjectivity. In the later years, words such as ‘elegance as a validity concept’, 
connected knowledge, ‘growing edge’ in thinking are hinted at throughout my notes. 
There would always be a session when we would review our own projects and about an 
hour was given to such a review. On four occasions I brought along a video of an
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outpatient consultation and the group watched this, made suggestions, comments, 
observations and critical analysis.
How did I work with and within the postgraduate group? The day would start with 
general introductions and then a search would be made for a theme to develop and 
explore for the day. We might select for example a theme based on ‘experiential 
knowledge and what it means for each of us.’ This would be a core topic around which 
the discussion and critical comment would revolve. At the end of the day we would 
attempt, not always possible, to summarise the key issues raised. From the early stages I 
learnt to adopt a duel role in these discussions. At one level I would be participating, 
contributing and carefully listening to what was being said. At the same time I would be 
constantly asking myself the question, “How does this relate to my own research 
project?” If I saw a relationship, or if this internal conversation generated an idea, a new 
approach, a question to ask myself, the hospital group or patients in the clinic, I would 
make a note of it. This group discussion, where alternative interpretations were discussed, 
where my inferences could be challenged, where the discrepancy between my espoused 
theory and theory in use could be brought to my attention was the principal means of 
developing two changes. Firstly, it resulted in a shift from positivism towards 
constructivism as I began to unpick the assumptions I had overlooked as a positivist. 
Secondly, these discussions, I believe, helped to develop a critical subjectivity.
During the first year it became clear that the relationship between the two main groups 
was complex. I began to notice the way I would participate in each of the two groups and 
the way they would relate to one another. The simple model I started to develop as a 
researcher can be depicted thus;
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Postgraduate Research Group Full Learning of qualitative methodology
Partial Research into decision making
Hospital Research Group Full Practice of qualitative methodology
Full Research into clinical decision making
This relationship seemed to make it possible to try out reflexive approaches gained as a 
member of the postgraduate group within the hospital group and in time both these 
groups became forums for the development of facilitation skills, processing awareness, 
identification of themes in discussions and so forth. By the end of 1991,1 began to see 
my activity in the clinic as part of a third “group”, the doctor/patient group and so this 
group became incorporated into the set of relationships.
Postgraduate Research Group Full Learning of qualitative methodologies
Partial Research into decision making
Hospital Research Group Full Practice of qualitative methodologies
Partial Research into clinical decision 
making
Doctor/ Patient Research Group Full practice of qualitative methodologies
Full research into clinical decision making
Although at the time I perceived the relationships as developing the methodology of co­
operative inquiry, in retrospect I see the process as one that contributed to the 
development of reflexivity by encouraging a relationship between reflection and practice 
and back again. However, this relationship between reflection and practice was enriched 
by transition through each of these different groups with the postgraduate research group.
Heron called this research relationship ‘supported action inquiry’ in which person A 
educates person B in the use of action inquiry and:
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“Once B has got the hang of it, B is the primary researcher of his or own behaviour and A 
is only partial co-researcher. A has a secondary, supportive role, participating with B in 
regular reflection phases, discussing and facilitating ways in which B can make sense 
of past action and prepare for future ones, and make more congruent the interaction of 
B’s goals, strategies, actions, outcomes and context.”
(Heron J, 1996. p24)
Supported Action Inquiry
Heron sees this form o f ‘supported action inquiry’ as having boundaries that are semi 
permeable between sets of relationships and which may offer different levels of 
participation for different actors. Using his approach I have constructed the relationships 
in a way that I saw as applicable to my situation in the following way:
Postgraduate Group
(reflection practice)
Nature of boundary between Self ?Open/partial
groups Group ?Closed/partial
Participation in decision­ Self Full
making research Group Partial
Participation in experience: Self
Group
Full in postgraduate group 
Full in hospital group 
Full in postgraduate group 
Nil in hospital group
(practice.....................reflection)
Hospital Group
It was also possible to construct a similar picture to describe the nature of the boundary 
and participation that existed between the clinic and the postgraduate group. Because the
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postgraduate group were able to view some videos of my clinical consultations, I see that 








Participation in decisions: Self Full
making research Group Partial (video)
Participation in experience: Self
Group
Full in clinic 
Full in group 




At one level, I am suspicious of the neatness suggested by such a model, but it did serve 
to encourage a separation of action and inquiry, together with a slowing down of any 
interpretations that might be suggested. This was seen particularly in the way that 
consultation videos were made in the clinic to be discussed in the postgraduate research 
group.
Action Science/ Inquiry
After a while (1990-1992) this attempt to set up a co-operative inquiry and then 
supported action inquiry ceased to be sustainable and the reasons for this will be 
discussed in the next section Reflections on Clinical Practice. From this point onwards 
my research methodology was centred on action science (after Argyris and Schon) and 
action inquiry (after Torbert). Research into my practice was supported in two ways. 
Firstly in my continued participation in the postgraduate research group at the University
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of Bath and in the use of more extensive interviews with patients, which I will now 
describe. On three occasions I undertook more detailed interviews with patients. The 
complete transcripts are presented in Appendices 1,2 &3. They are the stories of David, 
Patrick and Valerie. David and Patrick were both patients in whose care I had been 
involved. The interviews lasted forty minutes, one hundred and twenty minutes and 
ninety minutes respectively. Their clinical problems, the circumstances surrounding how 
I came to interview them and the process of recording, transcribing and correcting that 
took place will be described in more detail in the next section ‘Reflections in Clinical 
Practice’.
How do these three methodological approaches relate to one another?
This evolution as a qualitative researcher, which might justifiably be seen as jumping 
capriciously from ethnography, to co-operative inquiry to supported action inquiry to 
action science, has resulted in a complex story but it is one that makes sense to me in two 
ways. Firstly, it charts my development as a qualitative researcher and secondly it 
documents what I saw as the impracticality of sustaining the hospital inquiry group. My 
sense making of my development as a qualitative researcher has been possible by 
examining the whole process in terms of shifting paradigms in the forms of the model 
described earlier on in this section.
Level 1. In my role as a doctor I operate at one level as a positivist (positivist theory 
behind data production).
Level 2. At the same time I work as a reflective practitioner/ action inquirer (theory 
underlying nature of data and data production)
Level 3. As a researcher (theory behind theory production) I try to develop an awareness 
of the ontological position I am adopting.
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This means that the whole process is now seen as an attempt to develop a critical 
reflexivity developed around a need to work in more than one paradigm made necessary 
by paying attention to both evidence based medicine and qualitative issues.
How was this grounded in data?
As my ontological position was shifting towards critical theory and constructivism, then I 
needed to consider sources of data that helped me to decide whether findings are value 
mediated and/or created as the investigation proceeds. At the same time there was a need 
to develop an understanding of how I, as an investigator, influenced these values. In 
particular, I needed sources of data that allow me to see;
a) my perspective as a doctor more clearly
b) the perspective others, especially the patient, with more authenticity
At the onset of the research, my existing theory of medicine in context was either 
incomplete or inappropriate. Others have advocated that when “prior theories concerning 
contextual aspects of an expert's knowledge in any particular domain are absent, then 
under such circumstances the inquiry tends to take a more generative approach." 
(Henwood & Pidgeon 1993 p20) This suggests that data generation needs to be firmly 
grounded in everyday practice. There are practical as well as theoretical reasons for this 
approach. It would not only be practical to think about data generation and theory 
generation during the clinic but such data and theory building would take place in 
context. Since the original motive for research is the problem of applying positivist 
theory in everyday context, such an approach would represent at the very least an 
ontologically coherent approach. It would also permit, when appropriate, an opportunity 
for exploration of the value laden nature of data. For example, if I ask the question, ‘do I 
have an ethical position about participation in decision making?’, it is then possible to 
explore the question in context, with the patient. Ail this suggests a grounded theory 
frame to data generation.
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During the research, I became aware that I made many claims that could not be 
substantiated or which could only be weakly substantiated. For example, I was unable to 
say that I have raised my level of inquiry only that I believe that I have raised my level of 
inquiry. The basis for this is that I notice internally that I am asking more questions and 
this claim, even when made on a critical self-referential basis, represents at best only a 
weak form of justification. This can be viewed from two stances, that of a practitioner 
and that of a researcher. As a reflective practitioner, I notice that the world becomes more 
problematic because I have developed more of a self monitoring look that adds to the 
complexity of what it means to be a self reflecting practitioner. The importance of 
context, the theory and value driven nature of data, and an awareness of the assumptions 
of positivism mean a radical shift from the more straightforward position I had adopted as 
a conventional doctor. As a practitioner I have noticed that working like this appears to 
be more satisfactory but as a researcher I notice that it is difficult and contentious to 
demonstrate to others (which is of course data). As a practitioner, I notice how much 
more satisfactory my practice has become, but as a researcher I also notice how difficult 
it is to prove to other people that this is also the case (which is also data). This is largely 
because so much of the data is in my own behaviour in levels of comfort, surprise etc 
(which is also data). All this suggests the need for a critical self-referential frame to data 
generation as well.
Reconstructing the methodology as part of the resubmission has allowed me to formulate 
more clearly how, in my current practice, theory is developed from data framed in three 
different ways;
Positivist frame 
Grounded theory frame 
Self referential frame
This threefold approach has acted and acts now as a guide in trying to develop a capacity 
to understand in the following ways. The positivist frame allows me to develop the 
positivist basis of contemporary medicine. The grounded theory frame acts to remind me
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that data is theory and value driven and circumscribed by assumptions, which allows non 
positivist data a ‘voice’. The self referential frame allows me to make conjectures with 
reference to my own position and asks questions as a researcher with a view to becoming 
critically self-referential.
The methodologies employed to generate data in the positivist frame do not directly form 
part of this research and I do not propose to discuss them in detail other than to raise two 
points. Firstly, to acknowledge the incomplete picture obtained when considering a 
medical problem solely from within the positivist frame and this has been alluded to in 
previous sections. Secondly, to recognise that there are ethical concerns about the nature 
of positivist research when viewed from the qualitative perspective and these have 
already been discussed.
The methodology employed to generate data and theory in professional practice is 
employed in the clinic, during the consultation process. Such a methodology needs to be 
‘in the moment’ so that assertions can be challenged, questioned and reformulated as part 
of the decision making process. Inquiry can be raised to allow assumptions to surface 
about non-clinical processes such as power and gender which may be germane to the 
consultation. Action science is a methodology that claims to be epistemologically and 
methodologically coherent with doing this. Given the very short nature of some 
consultations, it would also appear to be practical but that in itself raises an issue. Does 
this process simply become nothing more than ethnography? Is the consultation too short, 
given that one is also trying to complete a medical task, to allow different viewpoints to 
emerge and different assumptions to be properly tested. Action science looks at the 
incongruity between the theory espoused and the theory in use and such a short 
consultation time might not be sufficient to test this incongruity sufficiently rigorously, 
certainly in the individual case.The difficulty in presenting a credible case that real 
inquiry took place is highlighted in presenting this work as a PhD thesis.
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Credibility in clinical practice
I have attempted to address the problem of credibility by trying to throw open my 
practice for others to see. The aim is to challenge my own sense making with alternative 
views from outside. I have tried to do this in four different ways. First of all by the use of 
more detailed interviews and the interview data (Appendix 1,2 &3) are given as examples 
of what I was doing. Although such interviews do provide more time and space to 
explore issues, they are not simply extensions of the consultation interview lasting one 
and a half hours rather than five or ten minutes. They are interviews about the nature of 
my engagement as a doctor rather than the original data of the consultation. I was asking 
for data on how I could have done this differently; what were the problems generated by 
my approach? Such an inquiry could be done in a way that was not possible in a busy 
clinic, that needed a little time and space to emerge. The following example is taken from 
an interview with David. He had been a patient of mine and I was asking him for some 
feedback on how he saw our relationship and the way the medical problem was managed. 
The numbers in brackets represent pauses (in seconds) in speech.
R: Mmm. (2). I'd very much welcome some feedback about the part I  
played. I  mean 
D: Mmm.
R: (2) umm (1) How did you view our relationship and the discussions we 
had? What was, what was the good thing, was was the bad thing, what, 
what, what
D: Well there, there, there was, there wasn't a bad side to it Richard, I  was 
absolutely delishted that you were frank with me. Uhhh. I  think you, you, you 
were very kind in the way that you put it. You, you didn't pull any punches 
but it wasn't brutal whereas the bloke at the, the Marsden Clinic, I  mean that 
was a (1) disgusting carry on. Uhhh 
R: Mmm
D: No, I, I, huhh, in all things I  like honesty and in coming to see you, I  
asked you what the prognosis was and you told me. You told me probably the
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kindest possible way that you could without pulling any punches and I  was 
very, very grateful fo r  that. Umm. Had you not told me in that way and had I  
not found out fo r  a fa ir length o f time, I  think I'd have been a bit annoyed 
actually.
R: Right.
D: Because at least it gives you a chance to well (3) I  don't know, put, put 
yourself in order, start to fight it, start to make your decisions but in, in my 
view it was exactly the right way to treat it and the right thing to do.
R: Right. And I, I  don't mind you, I  really don't mind you being critical in 
any way because I'm interested to learn but would there be anything that you 
would have done differently or uhh is there anything that Ifailed to 
understand.
D: No. No, not at all. I  think (3) there was just one, one, one element when 
I, I  started to tell you about going down to see this bloke George in Wales 
R: Yes, I  know, I  remember that.
D: "Don't Dave, don't tell me". (Laughter.)
R: DidI?
D: Yeah, yeah. ( Laughter). And I  thought well, come on Richard that's a bit 
closed minded. (Laughter).
R: Thank you. I  think the trouble is, umm, I, I, I, I  will try to be more open 
about these things. It's very difficult. What, what ends up umm is people 
start asking advise about whether or not they think 
D: Yeah.
R: they should go but the trouble is, I  have no experience at all 
D: No.
(Appendix 1. David p i2-14)
The reservations David had about my ‘open mindedness’ took some probing and some 
time to emerge. In a busy clinic it is hard to imagine there would be the time to genuinely 
explore such issues. As such it also permitted exploration of many other issues. Where 
had I made assumptions? How did he react to certain information I gave him? Were my
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; assumptions about what was happening justified? They are interviews about the 
consultation process and represent an inquiry in their own right but they also pay 
attention to the purpose of the consultation, that is trying to make someone better. I am 
also trying to make an assessment of the relative usefulness of such interviews at the 
time. As I hope to demonstrate in the following section, these interviews not only allowed 
me to explore my own espoused theories but challenged them. For example in the 
interview with Valerie, reaction to my position as a white middle class professional male 
doctor (discussed later in the section on power) and the assumptions that go with such a 
position, was a perspective that I had never been given. This may have been largely 
because in my position as a doctor, I am surrounded largely by white middle class male 
doctors. I believe that such interviews allowed me to examine this position more 
carefully. The interviews also highlighted and challenged a number of issues; agenda 
| setting in interviews, the role of alternative medicine, space and noise in hospitals as
expressions of power, the role of family and friends in decision making and many others.
Secondly, I have taken videos of my clinics to the postgraduate research group at the 
University of Bath and we have viewed them together. These were examples of everyday 
‘straightforward’ consultations. This was undertaken on four occasions and on each of 
these occasions the videos were seen and discussed by the group for a period of 
approximately two hours. This process generated insights that were in time translated into 
changes in practice. I gave an earlier example of how one member of the group (PR) 
noticed that I would lean forward and examine someone’s ear, adult or child, without 
asking permission. This gave rise to a discussion about the nature and importance of 
touch, implicit permissions and the assumptions that go with these, which eventually led 
to a change in practice and a topic for discussion when teaching clinical examination.|
Other examples of the way that observation from watching videos of consultation 
changed practice include; observations that during the consultation many people were 
coming and going in and out of the room; the way I would interrupt answers; questions 
were formulated by me in such a way that made short answers more likely; and that I am 
; fairly large as an individual and often hunch myself up.
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The third means of opening my practice to others was when I was accompanied by a 
colleague, trainee, medical student or nurse in the clinic. I would formally ask them to 
comment upon my consultation process. What did they notice about my consultation 
style? This invitation included a specific request to suggest changes that might help to 
improve it.
The final means of throwing my practice open to others was in the hospital discussion 
group. This group was initiated to explore questions of consultation style and decision 
making and provided another opportunity to examine the incongruity between espoused 
theory and theory in use.
Opening my practice in these ways was an attempt to get beyond a series of small 
anecdotes. It represented an attempt to reach a level of engagement where I was trying to 
notice my own behaviour at a micro-level on a systematic and regular basis and if such 
inquiries are to be regarded as self-referential, they represented an attempt to do so at a 
critical level. One could also argue that this criticism itself represents nothing more than 
an attempt to impose the idea that there is generalised ‘objective’ knowledge based on the 
positivist ideal of systematic, comparative, replicative observation that is “used as a point 
of reference against which all research is judged.” Some have argued that “such an 
approach to evaluation is based on a major fallacy and logical error in that rules for 
conducting research are mistakenly seen as rules of justification to be used in the 
evaluation of knowledge." (Morgan 1983 p396) It seems to me that Morgan is proposing 
an argument here for accepting the status of validity criteria that are essentially ‘self 
referenced’, but that the researcher would still need to look for internal validity criteria 
that satisfy him or her of the quality of what they have described. It seems mandatory to 
generate validity criteria that satisfy my own concerns about truth and which seem, at the 
same time, credible to others.
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Validity
Validity is concerned with the criteria forjudging the quality of an inquiry and is once 
again dependent upon the paradigmatic position of the researcher. The validity criteria of 
positivism and post-positivism are based around clarity and stability of findings. This 
means that research quality is based upon “isomorphism of findings with reality” to 
support internal validity and “generalizability, reliability (in the sense of stability) and 
objectivity ( distanced and neutral observer)” (Guba & Lincoln 1994 pi 14) to support 
external validity. The critical theorist assesses quality by the extent to which the “inquiry 
acts to erode ignorance and misapprehensions, and the extent to which it provides a 
stimulus to action, that is to the transformation of the existing structure." (ibid) This 
position takes into account the historical and cultural context of the inquiry. Two sets of 
validity criteria have been proposed for constructivism; trustworthiness and 
authenticity.(ibid) The trustworthiness criteria are “credibility (paralleling internal 
validity), transferability (paralleling external validity), dependability (paralleling 
reliability), and confirm ability (paralleling objectivity)”. Authenticity criteria will include 
concepts of “fairness, ontological authenticity (enlarges personal constructions), 
educative authenticity (leads to improved understandings of the construction of others) 
and catalytic authenticity (stimulates action).” (ibid) However in the constructivist 
paradigm the parameters of quality are not universally agreed and alternative views have 
been expressed that do not stick closely to equivalents from positivist paradigms.
To a constructivist, validity “has to do with the adequacy of the researcher to understand 
and represent people's meanings” (Banister, Burman, et al. 1994 pl43) and a number of 
criteria have been suggested to judge quality. These include the following. Keeping close 
to the data to produce a public product. Building theory that is rich, complex and dense, 
which pays attention to the complexity of the situation under study. Maintaining 
documentation on values and assumptions as the research progresses. Exploring cases 
that do not fit and maintaining sensitivity to alternative explanations offered by 
participants. Producing detailed descriptions of context to increase the possibility of 
similar studies arriving at similar conclusions and finally developing a reflexive approach
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that “acknowledges the ways in which research activity inevitably shapes and constitutes 
the object of the inquiry.” (Henwood & Pidgeon 1993 p24-27) Reflexivity "refers to the 
way in which all accounts of social settings-descriptions, analyses, criticisms etc-and the 
social setting occasioning them are mutually independent." (Cohen & Manion 1989 p33) 
This recognises that theory will affect the way data is generated and subsequently 
explanation. This problem is partly overcome by "an exploration of the ways in which the 
subjectivity of the researcher has structured the way it is defined in the first place” and in 
this way "subjectivity is a resource, not a problem." (Banister, Burman, et al. 1994 p i3)
In the participatory paradigms, with its emphasis on the importance of practical expertise, 
the challenge to develop action/ practitioner validity criteria is clearly thrown down;
“For a skill, knowing how to do something, can never be reduced to written descriptions 
of doing it. Being able to write such a description is no evidence of being able to perform 
the skill. The only evidence that you have the skill, and have it up to a certain standard of
competence, is your demonstration of it Thus the challenge to the academic research
establishment of the primacy of the practical is that published research reports become 
entirely secondary to the researcher’s demonstration of competence in action”
(Heron. 1996. p21)
The difficulty encountered in describing a skill is very important to me. Part of my 
frustration in writing a convincing account of a change in practice, is that I am aware that 
my skill as a writer may be used as the sole criteria by which my skill as a practitioner is 
judged.
Since my espoused position as a researcher is one of an awareness of paradigm, 
sometimes operating within the positivist framework and at other times adopting a 
constructivist position, then I have to ask how these different and conflicting criteria of 
validity relate to me. How have I shifted from positivism to constructivism with at the 
onset, only judgements of quality based upon the positivist perspective? What have been 
the problems associated with doing this? Is it an authentic position to take because a
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constructivist might argue that at the level of belief this multi-paradigmatic perspective 
simply represents an attempt to impose order on research by sidelining much 
interpretation into a compartment labelled “constructivism”. This is what some have 
described as an attempt to deal with the crisis in positivist research “by suppressing it" 
(Parker 1989)
As a researcher I am aware of a number of problems associated with this shift. The first 
one is the question of complexity. A hallmark of positivist research, and one criteria upon 
which quality is judged, is simplicity and clarity. As a researcher in the positivist 
paradigm, I am always looking to simplify situations, extract simple understandable and 
transferrable relationships from complex data. When these simple relationships suddenly 
emerge from complex data, for example when a treatment protocol clearly gives extended 
survival, there is a sense that a real discovery has been made. The simpler and more clear 
cut the relationship, the more transferrable such a finding would appear to be, so clarity is 
a meta criteria for validity. By contrast, complexity is a distinguishing feature of 
explanation in the qualitative field of complex phenomena and attempts are made to 
increase this complexity even to the point of chaos and confusion; “some confusion 
suggests deeper levels of meaning.” (Banister, Burman, et al. 1994 pl42-159) As a 
researcher from the positivist tradition, I have found it hard to overcome this tendency to 
avoid complexity and remain aware that I continually seek to impose order upon 
situations even to the point that I might overlook data that makes a situation complex.
At one level this approach makes the situation paradoxically even more complex. If I 
attempt to limit complexity by "tightening up the procedures so that the subject cannot 
possibly guess or interfere with the hypotheses", I am suppressing speech, suppressing 
data and suppressing meaning. Any understanding of what is happening now depends 
upon interpreting correctly the effect of this suppression. (Banister, Burman, et al. 1994 
p6) By contrast, suppressing meaning makes it appear to be less complex. As a 
practitioner this latter approach is understandable when one considers the fact that clinics 
are complex enough as it is. The process of greatly increasing complexity by ‘making 
data boundaries leaky’ sets up a tension between “ 'personal reactivity' (the attempt by the
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'subject' to understand and control the research) and 'procedural reactivity' ( the ways in 
which the demands of the situation limit their room for manoeuvre)." (Banister, Burman, 
et al. 1994 p i5) This may be reflected in consultation style as a practitioner (suddenly 
shutting the door on data offered by the patient when the waiting room is bursting at the 
seams). At the same time it leads one to ask questions about the process of researching 
(what is the theory behind research?). Is this control of data reflected in research theory 
by continually imposing order on explanation by marginalising discomforting data. As a 
researcher do I continue to shy away from complexity as a measure of explanation? Do I 
still at heart adhere to the notion of independent variables and is this reflected in my 
model of framing (positivist, grounded theory and critical self-referential) and researcher 
model (as positivist, constructivist and researcher)? Such questions give me a sense of the 
depth to which I still instinctively adhere to explanation offered by one paradigm, even 
when I sense that I have already made a real intellectual shift. My wish to impose order is 
firmly rooted.
In contrast to this I have noticed that a shift to a more complex constructivist viewpoint 
has allowed all kinds of data previously overlooked to enter, especially data from 
patients. I have begun to accept qualitative information that is non-medical from the 
patient (“I have a sense that I have something more serious going on”) and in my own 
mind accord it equal status with, for example, an important blood result. I have learnt to 
make this process explicit to the patient. What I have noticed, as a practitioner, is that this 
strategy appears to produce a more satisfactory consultation. I cannot easily prove this, 
just sense it. This leads me to ask myself, as a researcher, how have I internally validated 
such a change that ‘appears’ to work as a practitioner but whose basis for belief is at odds 
with my positivist criteria of quality. How have I addressed this incongruity between 
behaviour and, as it were, belief.
In order to do this, I found that I started to develop a series of qualitative criteria by 
which I could judge the quality of change. At the heart of all this is practice, professional 
practice, and in the early stages evaluating new knowledge was based on noticing change.
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These are essentially based upon the notion of bringing past experience to bear on a 
situation. Earlier in the methodology section I suspended the argument on ‘usefulness’ 
and promised to return to it when discussing validating change in practice and do so here. 
It seems to me that validated change in consultation style pays attention to ‘usefulness’ 
determined not just by the doctor but by the patient as well. To do this, I conceived the 
notion of authenticity; personal, medical and political authentic behaviour, to internally 
validate this change and they included the following outlined below.
1. Did working in a more authentic way prompt patients to move towards a world where 
the balance of power felt more evenly distributed? Could others access my medical 
expertise and use it more effectively for themselves?
2. Did a change in consultation style allow patients more time to make a decision as the 
complexity of what was being decided was more clearly made? Was I showing them how 
to implement this?
3. Did analysis of apparently ‘simple’ problems take me much longer as I would unearth 
many issues hitherto left uncovered?
4. Did a change in practice make the consultation more anxiety making, more stressful, 
more disturbing or more rewarding for the patient and for me? But at the end of this did 
we both feel that the process was worth exploring, i.e. constructive?
5. Did working in a more authentic way make me feel in some situations more connected 
with what was happening to the patient? Did I feel more involved, more understanding of 
the difficulties in deciding, more upset sometimes by the interaction?
6. Were any ideas I had, any changes that I had introduced into my practice, sustainable? 
Was I still adopting the same general approach a year or so later? This is closely related 
to the notion of consistency as a qualitative validity concept. (Banister, Burman, et al. 
1994 pl43)
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7. Did any ideas I had, any changes that I had introduced into my practice, lead to other 
ideas that were themselves sustainable?
8. What degree of "passion" did I feel about this?
9. Was the language employed consistent with an authentic process? Did my language 
change as I became more careful, more thorough in my approach, more aware of the 
relationship between power and language?
10. If I tested out some of these ideas on other doctors who also spent time in the clinic, 
did their comments and observations have meaning for me and them?
11. Did I find undertaking research in this way exciting and intellectually freedom 
making?
12. Did these changes generate an emotional response e.g. ‘embarrassment’ as I learnt 
how I had previously misinterpreted events?
In many respects, what I had previously judged to be early expressions of internal 
validity represent a new set of questions concerned with process that I had hitherto never 
asked myself. In this respect these criteria are evidence of raising the level of inquiry by 
raising the complexity of explanation but they still suffer from the criticism that they are 
self-referentially constructed and not accessible to others. Nevertheless, as a researcher I 
took the view that they provided evidence of an alternative means of validating findings 
to provide sufficient impetus to continue the shift towards a constructivist paradigm-an 
example, I would propose, o f ‘catalytic’ authenticity.
The last criteria o f ‘embarrassment’ was usually associated with discovering that an 
inference that I had made was incorrect. For example, understanding the importance of 
‘embarrassment’ arose from an occasion when I had made an error of interpretation by
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judging purpose solely on the basis of behaviour (strategy). The occasion was a 
qualitative research conference in 1994 during which I had met a participant again four 
years later. On the first occasion I had made the following judgement.
Hawkwood Sept 1990.
(unedited extracts o f research diary in italics)
The smaller group met on the first afternoon andfairly quickly, as part o f the 
introductions we made to one another, we all learnt what each one o f us had as jobs, 
interests etc. One o f our group, I  shall call her Greta, a psychotherapist aged about 65, 
after learning that I  was a surgeon made it clear that she regarded herself as the victim 
o f a number o f surgical errors ofjudgement over her lifetime. She recounted how she had 
been the victim o f a series o f inappropriate operations, which had been made worse by 
unexpected complications. I'd  ended the day by feeling that she was expecting me to bear
all the responsibility fo r  errors committed by other surgeons towards her  What I
really wanted to say to her but didn't was: "Ifyou weren't so fat, then maybe the surgeon 
would have had a chance. Besides you seem to be so opinionated I'm surprised that you 
were unable to take over and tell the surgeon just what you think should be done."
Four years later at another Qualitative Health Conference (Hawkwood 1994), I had 
spoken to Greta about our initial meeting and asked her what she thought had happened.
Research Diary, Hawkwood Sept 1994
"Found myself talking to Greta (sic) at supper this evening. It is four years since we first 
met in the small group run by Peter and the third conference we have attended together. I  
found my initial irritation o f her had gone and that I  liked her and found her easy to talk 
to. After we had been talking fo r  about five minutes about the events o f that day, I  
mentioned our first meeting. I  explained my annoyance at apparently having to accept the 
burden o f all the mistakes made by all the surgeons, with whom she had dealings.
She first o f all acknowledged that she had been aware o f going too fa r  in blaming me for  
her experience with doctors and apologised. I  had been correct on this point. What
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followed took me by surprise. She added that she liked me immediately and that I  was the 
first surgeon that she had met who she had liked. For the first time she fe lt able to say 
what she really meant about the medical profession to the medical profession. How 
embarrassing. My interpretation o f antagonism had been founded on my own reactions 
and prejudices whereas she had seen the opportunity to be honest with someone, based 
on the opposite sensation o f attraction.
When we met on the second occasion in 1994,1 learnt that my interpretation of what was 
happening between us in 1990 was incorrect. I had badly misunderstood the situation 
from her perspective and was embarrassed at being so completely wrong. This re- 
evaluation left me feeling inwardly embarrassed. The embarrassment I felt had in some 
way to be a reflection of the shift in position that I had made in the previous four years. 
Consider for a moment the processes I had gone through before reaching the feeling of 
embarrassment.
In order to avoid awkwardness in a situation in which I felt unfamiliar, I had avoided 
saying what I really wanted to and I had attempted to hide my true feelings. There was a 
discrepancy between my cognitive position, the way I presented it and what I was truly 
feeling. This situation gives rise to two potential sources of embarrassment. In the first 
place, if I had failed to disguise my true feelings and made clear from the start how I 
really felt about Greta, I would have broken a social convention about being so honest, so 
early on. “The discomfort of personal embarrassment can itself ensure that most people 
will do more or less the right (i.e. organisational) thing with clients, customers, 
colleagues and bosses.”(Fineman. 1993. p i7). That much is perhaps self-evident. There is 
a second source of embarrassment linked to loss of credibility. If I disguise what I was 
truly feeling from Greta and the other members of the group, but at a later stage my true 
feelings become apparent, such a change would leave the members of the group uncertain 
of my position from then onwards. My credibility would be compromised. If on the other 
hand, I managed to continue to maintain my true feelings covert and adopt a public 
position of civility, but at a later stage discover that I was incorrect, then such a shift 
would result in internalised, personal embarrassment. It seemed to me that the sensation
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of embarrassment provided information about the quality of a shift in my position, my 
understanding of events. In this particular case, I discovered that I had made judgements 
about someone based largely on appearance and behaviour whilst completely failing to 
check out the validity of such a judgement. It was beginning to seem to me that 
embarrassment, when experienced in this way, could be regarded as a validity criteria in 
the sense that it is indicative of a shift in position.
Summary of Methodology
The methodology section has addressed issues of paradigm, what constitutes data and the 
methodologies to generate further data and understandings. These have been linked with 
my basic and general research questions to produce a set of practical research designs. 
The reconstruction made possible by resubmission has meant that I understood this in 
terms of a shift from ‘co-operative inquiry’ to ‘supported action inquiry’ to ‘action/ 
science inquiry’ of the reflective practitioner type. The process of integrating quantitative 
(positivist) data with qualitative data is understood in terms of a three level conceptual 
model of positivist, reflective practitioner and researcher. I have also considered the 
problem of producing an account of researching practice that is seen as credible and valid 
and suggested some of the criteria I have found useful. If the complexity of the 
methodology described above appears overly complex, uncertain, and capricious, I would 
argue that "the law of'requisite variety' may be appropriate here; the complexity of the 
phenomenon is mirrored in its representation. Simpler formulations are entirely possible 
but they should alert one to the drawbacks that such formulations contain." (Clegg 1989 
p215)
The next section is an account of what took place in the clinic and the hospital inquiry 
group. I try to produce evidence of how my understandings changed my practice by using 
data from events in my clinic, the hospital inquiry group and interviews with patients to 





This section tells the story of my change in clinical practice from 1990 until 1998. In 
telling the story I draw on experiences from the hospital inquiry group, my day to day 
consultations in the clinic and the three in-depth interviews I have made with patients. 
Throughout most of this period (1990-1996), I was supported as a researcher by the 
postgraduate research group at Bath University but from 1996 onwards by my 
supervisors.
In choosing how my practice has changed, I have chosen to explore five themes;
□ Inquiry groups and groups in the clinic
□ Power and medical power
□ The nature of expert knowledge
□ Leadership
□ How do patients judge quality.
I have chosen ‘inquiry groups’ and ‘leadership’ because part of my change in practice 
was an increased awareness of the importance of individuals other than the patient in 
influencing decision-making and understanding the clinical consultation. These include 
friends and relatives of the patient, as well as the presence in the clinic of other doctors, 
nurses or students. By refraining the clinical situation in terms of a group inquiry, this 
meant that an understanding of leadership/ facilitation became important as well. No 
examination of leadership/ facilitation is complete without a discussion on ‘power’, and 
as power is so intimately connected with knowledge, the nature o f ‘expert knowledge’ 
was deemed important to consider as well. Finally, as a general validity issue, I was 
interested in how ‘patients judged quality’.
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Tlhe time frame of the story is not straightforward. If I had chosen to present this in strict 
chronological form, then my chosen topics of groups, power, leadership, expert 
knowledge and quality would be presented in this section of Reflective Clinical Practice 
concurrently with one another as my understandings developed. This would have meant 
jumping from one topic to another as the story unfolded over the last eight years. Instead 
I have chosen to take each of these themes and explore their significance as I came to 
understand them better. They each have a particular starting point. In the themes ‘inquiry 
groups and groups in the clinic’, ‘leadership’ and ‘how do patients judge quality’ I have 
used the entries I have made in the diary recorded whilst a member of the hospital inquiry 
group as a starting point for discussion. The topics of ‘power and medical power’ and 
‘the nature of expert knowledge’ draw on clinical experiences as a starting point. Each of 
these themes is then developed to the point where I currently understand them as part of 
my practice. Explaining the story in this way has meant that I have placed the entry ‘the 
end of the hospital inquiry group’ towards the end of this section when in fact it ceased to 
meet in 1992. The sequence of topics, together with their subheadings, looks like this;
Inquiry groups and groups in the clinic 
Patients and their relatives or friends 
Other doctors in the consulting room
Power and medical power
Some broad schools of thought on the subject of power
Some selected philosophers on power
My position as a white, middle class, professional male
The nature of expert knowledge
Doctors as experts in their own illness 
Patients as experts in their own illness 
Children as experts in their own illness
Leadership
How do patients judge quality 
End of the hospital inquiry group
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I wanted to convey the sense that a series of frameworks evolved during the research as I 
developed as a qualitative researcher reflected by my progression from positivism to 
constructivism. I call these ‘frameworks 1,2,3 and 4. To convey this sense of 
development, I have introduced them throughout the section. There is some sense in 
placing them where I do. Framework 1, at the beginning, is essentially a positivist 
approach, and seems to represent the starting point for this research. Framework 2 
appears in the section on power and is relevant in this position because my development 
of this framework began when I appreciated that any framework, even one that supposes 
to be more equally distributive of power, is wrapped up in power issues. Framework 3, 
placed after the section on expert knowledge, was developed after recognising that my 
expert knowledge was theory and value dependant and so this framework emphasises the 
importance of all kinds of knowledge, qualitative and quantitative, in the clinical picture. 
Finally, framework 4, a position of espoused mutuality, is positioned at the end because 
such a framework claims to blur or abolish the distinction between researcher and 
researched and participator. It is the conceptual position as a researcher (theory about 
theory about data) that sees this framework development, from 1 through to 4, as 
representing a series of paradigm shifts. The final overall scheme of this section now 
looks like this;
Framework Type 1
Inquiry groups and groups in the clinic 
Patients and their relatives or friends 
Other doctors in the consulting room
Power and medical power
Some broad schools of thought on the subject of power
Framework Type 2
Some selected philosophers on power
My position as a white, middle class, professional male
The nature of expert knowledge
Doctors as experts in their own illness 
Patients as experts in their own illness 




How do patients judge quality
End of the hospital inquiry group
Framework Type 4
In this section I have drawn on clinical anecdote, experiences in the clinic, experiences in 
the hospital inquiry' group, understandings obtained in the postgraduate inquiry group and 
the interviews with three patients to support my belief that change has taken place.
A litle more needs to be said about these interviews I have made with patients, 
particularly in the way that they were made and the format in which they are presented in 
this section. Each interview was filmed on video and then a complete transcript was 
made. These interviews took place in chronological order. Each of these patients found 
themselves in a position where they had to make some difficult choices. David and 
Patrick had both been patients under my care. I was never involved with looking after 
Valerie but she has become a personal friend. All have given permission to include these 
extracts. The complete transcripts can be found in the appendices but each of them is 
presented in a slightly different way.
In thj case of David, the text was cleaned up a little and many of the ‘urns’ and ‘ahs’ 
were removed. The bold numbers in brackets that appear throughout the text, represent 
pauses in seconds. The interview lasted forty minutes. The style of the interview is fairly 
structured and I ask questions that generally lead the conversation. David did not want to 
see tie video or the transcript but always made it clear that he was very happy to talk 
abou the issues that his difficult decision raised. Sadly, he died two years ago (1996).
For latrick’s interview a complete transcript was made, but on this occasion all the 
pauses (marked in seconds in brackets) were included, together with half words, repeats, 
‘urns and ‘ahs’. Patrick did not like the sense of incoherence this seemed to suggest and 
askec if he could clean up the text. He not only rewrote sections to make his position 
cleanr, but he also added various observations and thoughts that he felt were necessary.
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These have been clearly distinguished from the text. The pauses in the conversation have 
been left in place. The interview lasted two hours. It is much less structured than the 
interview with David.
In Valerie’s interview I decided, given the experience with Patrick, that the transcription 
woud mainly stick to the text and include repeats but not all the non-verbal utterances 
that occurred. Valerie’s voice was very soft and so there were a number of moments 
when it was not clear on the video what she was saying. Valerie took the transcript and 
with the aid of her computer, rewrote sections so that what she wanted to say was clearer. 
Again, she added in various comments and when this has happened, it has been made 
clear in the text. The interview lasted ninety minutes. This interview is relatively 
unstructured. Whilst we started out with the intention of talking about the decision 
Valerie had to consider, much of the interview became devoted to a discussion about 
experiences in hospital.
In order to place these interviews and extracts in context, what follows is a short 
summary of the difficult position in which they found themselves.
David 
Appendix 1
Davii, a businessman, was in his early forties when we first met. I subsequently saw him 
in oitpatients on many occasions and at my request he kindly consented to a discussion 
abou: the way we had been working together. Two years before we had met, he had 
devebped a cancer of the ethmoid sinuses, which are a group of sinuses located between 
the e/es and extending backwards to about the middle of the head. The initial treatment 
offend was fairly straightforward and took the form of a course of radiotherapy 
consbting of daily visits to the centre for a period of six weeks. The side effects were 
relatively mild and a CT scan (detailed X-ray analysis) of the sinuses revealed that, as far 
as coild be ascertained, the tumour had completely responded to the radiotherapy. All 
seeirad well for about 18 months when a recurrence of the original symptoms suggested
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that the tumour had returned. A biopsy of the suspected area confirmed that this was the 
case. This was the moment when we met for the first time.
The dilemma now facing David was a fairly classic one in head and neck malignancy. No 
further treatment with radiotherapy was possible so that, broadly speaking, there were 
only two alternatives. By declining further treatment, he could accept the inevitable 
outcome of death and survival was estimated to be a year or at the most. The plan would 
be to continue to ‘live in the fast lane’ (David’s words) until the return of uncontrolled 
symptoms made this impossible. Alternatively, he could undergo major surgery. This 
would be extensive and involve the removal of all the diseased area between the eyes, but 
would also include removal of the left eye. There would be a significant risk of operative 
mortality, perhaps 5%, and a considerable period of disability, discomfort and tiredness 
during the time in hospital and afterwards at home. This might last for as long as three or 
four months. The degree of disfigurement would depend a little on the final surgery but 
was likely to be modest. The chances of a cure would be no more than about 10% but if 
the tumour were successfully excised it was possible that he may experience a normal or 
near normal life expectancy of good quality. He chose to leave the tumour untreated and 
continue with a near normal life for as long as he could. I interviewed him about eighteen 
months after he had made this decision. The purpose of the interview was to discuss how 
he had come to make this difficult decision and to hear his views were about the way I 
had worked with him as a doctor.
Patrick 
Appendix 2
Patrick was in his early fifties when I first started to look after him. He had developed a 
tumour in his neck. Tumours in the neck usually present as a result of primary in another 
site but, as is sometimes the case, no other primary could be found. A few years 
previously he had had a testicle removed because of a malignancy but this was not 
thought to be the related to the current problem. The glands of the neck were removed 
and he underwent a course of radiotherapy to the neck and to the back of the nose, a site
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known to be one that can harbour a very small otherwise undetectable primary. All 
seemed well until two years later when he decided to have a small cyst, which had been 
present for twenty years, removed from the top of his scalp. Another surgeon undertook 
this procedure. To everyone’s surprise this was reported to contain a small primary 
tumour, which was thought to be probably the source of his original neck tumour. There 
were two choices here. It was possible to have further radiotherapy to the area on his 
scalp as a kind of belt and braces approach to be sure that all the tumour had been 
removed, or alternatively to wait and watch the site carefully for any kind of recurrence. 
Patrick’s faith in the infallibility of doctors had been shaken and so this was a decision he 
felt inclined to make for himself.
In this case there was an additional awkward issue for me. When we had first met and 
found the tumour in his neck, we had discussed the arguments for and against removing 
the cyst from his scalp. It had been decided to leave this alone but subsequent events had 
suggested that this was an error. The purpose of the interview, from my point of view, 
was to talk about how he had made the decision when he had lost considerable 
confidence in doctors and his reactions to the way I had been involved in his treatment. 




Valerie is in her early fifties. Unlike the cases of David and Patrick, I have not been 
involved in her care. She started to experience problems with her health from her late 
teens onwards. Throughout her adult life, she has experienced a progressive loss of lung 
function and the point has been reached where she has to make a decision between two 
choices. Either she could continue to make the most of her deteriorating lung function or 
opt for a heart lung transplant. Without such treatment her life expectancy was thought to 
be about ten years but the heart lung transplant carried with it short term risks of failure 
and longer term problems of organ rejection. Her position was complicated by the fact
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that she has a brain cyst and has experienced epileptic episodes. The remarkable thing 
about Valerie is that despite such difficulties, she leads an independent life and occupies 
a senior position in the arts world.
The purpose of the interview, from my point of view, was to discuss the difficult decision 
that Valerie was in the process of making. The rather open, unstructured style of the 
interview, meant that the interview turned to some of the experiences the Valerie had had 
in hospital, together with some of her thoughts about the nature of chronic illness.
Framework Type 1.
Framework 1 seems to me to represent the obvious starting point. This decision making 
framework is one I would regard as the ‘traditional’ one, in which the doctor observes the 
patient, examines them and offers treatment. For this reason I have given it the subtitle 
Observer/Healer. What is meant by this and how does it work in practice?
Observer/healer
Doctor Patient
Type 1 Observer/researcher Observer/participator
The doctor observes and researches the patient but the patient acts as 
observer/participator. In this situation, a doctor will take a history, observe and examine 
the patient and then, with little or no reference to the patient’s own perspectives, suggest 
a treatment. The frame in which such the medical problem is viewed, disregards context. 
The doctor assumes that he or she can select the most appropriate treatment for the 
lifestyle of the patient. It is technical and directive. Such behaviour is acting at the level 
of technical rationalist and represents treatment applied in the positivist paradigm. It is 
presented in simple diagrammatic form in Figure 4. Before commencing this research,
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Surgery ^  
Life ^  y
Doctor Patient
Figure 4. Type 1 The Observer/Healer
In this framework the doctor observes and researches the patient's medical
problem and then determines treatment.
Inquiry groups and groups in the clinic
The first diary extract comes from the first meeting of the Hospital Inquiry group, which 
began to meet in October 1990, the same month that the Postgraduate research group at 
the University of Bath started to meet. The Hospital group was set up with the idea of 
developing a co-operative inquiry group into clinical decision making.
The group was formed to research the Head and Neck Malignancy Clinic, with the 
espoused purpose of trying to improve the way it was run for both patients and doctors. 
During the course of these Hospital Inquiry meetings, many new and unexpected points 
of view emerged, which began to make me re-evaluate the perception of my own 
behaviour and my perception of the behaviour of others. In particular, these meetings 
began the process of alerting me to the level of inference in which I was operating. The 
group provided some opportunity to provide feedback that challenged the way I had 
progressed up the ladder of inference, from directly observable data, to cultural inference 
to theoretical meaning (theory in use) without first testing the validity of this position at 
each level. (Argyris, Putnam, et al. 1985 p345) This helped to initiate a process of self- 
examination that alerted me to inconsistencies in my own reasoning about any given 
situation. As the following extract will illustrate, this was in a way that confronted me, 
because my perception of the Head and Neck clinic was very different from the 
perception of some of the other members, an interpretation that I call “hostile”. 
Confrontation like this may have been useful. Argyris felt that sudden confrontation of 
this sort often helped to “unfreeze automatic behaviour”. (Argyris, Putnam, et al. 1985 
p349) Nevertheless, my initial reaction to what I call “hostility,” is partly open, because I 
do not attempt to suppress it, and partly defensive because I interpret it as my fault. My 
suspicion is that my reaction might have been considerably more defensive but for my 
participation in the University Postgraduate group.
These extracts have not been altered other than a little editing in the interests of clarity.
| For the first entry, a little more than is perhaps necessary for the discussion of the
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subsequent topic o f ‘groups’ has been included to convey a little of the flavour and 
variety of what was being discussed.
Diary from Hospital Inquiry Group. 7th Oct 1990 
1st meeting. Attendance: M, Female House Officer; C, H(Part Time), K, A, Female 
Senior House Officers; G, Female Registrar; K, Male Senior Registrar(SR); Self.
The most striking feeling I  was left with after the meeting; which lasted 50 minutes, was 
the hostility generated by talking about the clinic. Words such as ‘intimidating ’,
‘exhausting ’, ‘the worst clinic I  have ever attended ', ‘terrible fo r  the patient ’ were 
typical It seemed clear to me that a clinic in which literally life and death issues were 
discussed sensitises us all to the issues and generates much anger, resentment etc. at 
perhaps having to face the issue o f our own mortality. I  couldn’t help feeling that most o f 
the anger was directed at me. To some extent I  think that this was inevitable since I  feel 
sure that I  am perceived as ‘responsible ’ fo r  the clinic and have undoubtedly been the 
one who has attempted to draw them all in and involve them in the discussions that take 
place in the clinic. I f  they have been feeling uncomfortable being there in the clinic, such 
a practice is bound to create hostility. This attitude from them encouraged me to avoid 
leading the group discussion and I  think I  began to detect signs that this was starting to 
work. In the last 5 or 10 minutes individuals were starting to address each other rather 
than direct all their comments toward me.
The question o f group control and meaningful direction is crucial. I  can see that there is 
a delicate balance between three forces, which are to some extent opposites. Firstly a 
free and open discussion, secondly some kind o f direction and thirdly an element o f 
leadership without alienating the sense o f  collaboration. I  suspect that the idea o f some 
leadership will be an anathema to some collaborative inquirers, but at this early stage it 
seems that the risk o f drifting, particularly with a group o f doctors who are probably all 
| ‘goal orientated’ in approach is too great. The whole thing could easily founder.
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As the session progressed, a sense o f purpose started to spontaneously develop. We 
talked about the goals o f a head and neck malignancy clinic and it became clear that the 
next meeting, a month later in November, should devote itself to considering a small 
change in the way the clinic was run. We could then assess this change in the following 
clinic in December.
The question o f gender arose in particular in relation to women being more sensitive to 
the feelings ofpatients. This disappointed me somewhat as I  don’t like to be personally 
categorised and categorised into an insensitive group at that.
After the meeting, two o f  the group independently approached me asking i f  they could 
form a separate group but with patients, who have been through a clinic, to explore how 
they fe lt about the experience. It had occurred to them that this exercise was exploring 
their own anxieties and that this may bear no relationship to those o f the patients.
The emotional content of the meeting, what I called ‘hostility’, illustrates some of the 
demands of free and open inquiry. Argyris summarised these demands in the following 
way: "Participants must be able to retrieve largely tacit inferential processes.. .they must 
be able to deal openly with challenges and conflicting views.. .they must reveal 
information that might expose their own or other's vulnerabilities; they must be able to 
recognise and acknowledge when they are wrong... they must feel free to choose among 
competing views.” (Argyris, Putnam, et al. 1985 p238) Such requirements, he maintained 
would “foster learning” but ran the risk of generating “disagreements, conflict, 
embarrassment, and failure, evoking defences to minimise such risks.” (ibid) My own 
approach in feeling that “much of the hostility was directed at me” and my own 
reluctance to defend the idea that I thought the clinic worked well in a number of ways, 
suggested a somewhat defensive reaction to this point of view. In terms of inquiry, there 
are several ways to approach such feeling. Argyris would advocate a more introspective,
|
| process-orientated approach to encourage the participant to “focus on individuals' 
emotional reactions” so that “we can more fully grasp what individuals are up against, as 
well as how they manage such reactions.” This may be problematic because to “to
240
publlicly retrace and make public these processes involves risks that themselves evoke 
emotional and defensive reactions that hinder the retrieval of these processes and make it 
difficult to report them to others.” (Argyris, Putnam, et al. 1985 p246-247)
Torlbert might see such attitudes as representing commitment, on the part of the 
part icipants, to a principle. Torbert took the view that it is often appropriate to hold onto 
one’s own belief with conviction in the face of criticism, for a number of reasons. For 
him, it enabled ideas and convictions to be communicated that he was otherwise unable 
to, it eradicated nervousness and anxiety in expressing strong feelings in public and it 
created a group norm “that permitted open, strong disagreement”. In addition, “because 
the argument had been so surprising to everyone and so positive in its outcome, it created 
a norm of welcoming surprising new directions” (Torbert 1991 pl37-138) Such a strong 
feeling on the part of some of the participants might have enabled them to overcome 
“their nervousness”, and in doing so help create a norm of more open inquiry if that is 
what is perceived to have happened.
This early experience in the group were helpful in beginning to explore discontent, 
dissatisfaction, sadness or even hostility as a process issue in the clinics. Instead of 
adopting a posture in which these feelings were denied or glossed over, I would consider 
as a researcher, whether it was appropriate to inquire into their meaning. Earlier in this 
thesis I gave an example of how, when encountering difficulties discussing a 
tonsillectomy that had nearly ended with disastrous consequences, it had become 
liberating when we shifted emphasis to discuss the possibility that the medical staff might 
be covering up a mistake. Such an approach has been made possible by “focussing on 
individual’s emotional reactions.” Such an approach might be expected to make the 
consultation anxiety making and I found it stressful because it does not seem easy to ask 
such questions when it seems safer to stick to a medical discourse and talk about 
bleeding, blood gases and the like. If such interventions, stressful though they seem at the 
time, lead to a position that was perceived by myself and the patient (through inquiry) as 
worth exploring, then I took this as evidence that validated this approach.
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When I consider that the Hospital Inquiry Group was drawn from every hierarchical level 
of hospital medical life, from consultant, registrar, senior house officer, to newly 
qualified doctors of only two months experience, it did surprise me to see individuals 
apparently talking so freely. In my experience in hospital, both as a trainee and as a 
consultant, I had never encountered a group of trainees and consultants together who had 
had quite this kind of conversation. One reason may lie in the fact that a significant 
number had previous experience of this kind of discussion group because it forms part of 
the training for most general practitioners, but not for surgeons. Whatever the cause, it 
certainly seemed that those taking part were motivated to interact. What was the key to 
this interaction?
Randall and Southgate maintain that; “The key to any interaction, whether it’s between 
any two people or in a group or organisation is DESIRE. The first question to ask when 
looking at a group is-What do it’s members desire?” (Randall & Southgate 1980 p2) 
Questions like this certainly draw attention to some assumptions that I have made. My 
interpretation that they felt a freedom to discuss openly what was happening represents 
an assumption about behaviour, a process issue, and my observation about motivation 
represents an assumption about purpose. At the beginning, I had assumed that the 
members of the group would share my interest in decision-making, or at least would 
enjoy the opportunity to take part in such a discussion. This high level of assumption 
meant that I didn’t take the opportunity to ask other members of the group what it was 
they desired. Did this matter? Would the question itself have been meaningful?
This question cannot now be answered, but work has suggested that straightforward 
questions like this do not always lead to straightforward answers. Sometimes members of 
a group will respond to a question like this by offering the ‘official’ reason for being in 
such a group? “Most groups have an ‘official’ desire. This is usually given as the reason 
for the group’s existence. Sometimes it is more of a theory about what people in the 
group ought to want or desire.”
(Randall, R. Southgate J. 1980. p i6)
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Members in a group may have actual, official or private desires to be part of a group.
This complexity suggests that the ‘desire’ to participate in a group may be pluralistic. In 
the creative group actual, official and private desires are united but, more commonly, 
there is an intermediate position in which there may be conflict between these various 
desires but the group still continues to exist. If this is not considered or negotiated 
properly, it may make a considerable difference to the subsequent creativity of a group. 
“In the destructive group, the levels of desire are split. The actual, official, and private 
desires are swallowed up, or swamped by the desire to survive at all costs.” (Randall, R. 
Southgate J.1980. pl9) In the Hospital Inquiry group, the ‘official’ reason for existence 
of the group was to engage in an exploration of decision making because that was how I 
had set up the group. Was any attempt made at the time to explore the actual/ private 
desire of the group members? Sadly, the answer is ‘no’ and it is no longer possible to 
retrace this process, but the question can prompt me, as a researcher, to ask about my 
own ‘actual’/ ‘private’ desires for forming a group.
I believe I can see that one ‘private’ desire on my part was to find a group that would 
provide a forum for practising facilitation and developing inquiry skills. After watching 
facilitators in the Postgraduate group, I could practice these skills in the Hospital group. 
At the time my ‘espoused’ theory was to start a collaborative inquiry group, and this may 
have been partly true, but ‘my theory in use’ may have been to start a group to practice 
facilitation skills. This eventually became clear as my methodology developed and I 
began to pay attention to the purpose of each of the groups; a point I will address shortly.
The need to develop facilitation skills raises a number of questions that concern the 
nature of initiating an inquiry that go beyond research question, epistemology, 
methodology and ethical stance. There is the need to address practical issues. There is the 
need to energise it, the need to generate shared purpose, and the need to negotiate the 
relative roles of participator, researcher, leader or facilitator in this environment. Torbert 
asks, “What kind of leadership and organisational structure integrates the apparently 
incompatible qualities of shared purposiveness with self direction, of high productivity 
with confrontative inquiry, and of both pairs with one another?" (Torbert 1991 p7) Some
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more participative/ appreciative in a more mature group. (Neilson. EH. 1986. p85). This 
suggests a transition from a more ‘energising’ approach in the early stages to a more 
collaborative inquiring approach in a group that is more mature. For example, a more 
participative style of leadership might have acted upon the idea of forming a patient 
discussion group, suggested by the two members at the end of the first meeting. In the 
course of time, this involvement of patients from the beginning may have lead to a 
genuine co-operative inquiry group. On the other hand, clear direction may have been 
needed because otherwise it might have resulted in loss of intent, direction and form, 
particularly as this group was one whose members changed every six months when 
trainee staff rotated to other posts.
Torbert extends this notion of attention further by suggesting that leadership involves 





He put forward the idea of “a paradigm of just action” that saw “the need to cultivate an 
awareness that embraces the realms of the intuitive whole, the rational strategy, plan, or 
rules, congruent action, and outcomes that observes and corrects errors and 
incongruities from  one realm to another." This involves a simultaneous awareness of 
each of these four territories of experience. Attempts to achieve this are linked to a 
hierarchy of leadership development that progressed from ‘impulsive’ to ‘ironist’, whose 
“governing frames determined behaviour in terms of mission, strategy and behavioural 
operations” in the following manner. This has been referred to in an earlier section but 
the list is reproduced here for convenience.
245
Governing frames at successive developmental stages
Stage Name Governing Frame
1 Impulsive Impulses rule reflexes
2 Opportunist Needs, interests rule impulses
3 Diplomat Expectations rule interests
4 Technician Internal craft logic rules expectations
5 Achiever System success in environment rules craft logics
6 Strategist Principle rules system
7 Magician Process (interplay of principle/action) awareness rules
principle.
8 Ironist Intersystemic development awareness rules process
(Torbert 1991 p42-43)
Such a hierarchy, where “each succeeding construction 'dethrones' the assumptions of the 
previous construction” suggests a progression to a wider reality that is necessarily more 
appropriate as well as desirable. One is left asking, where would I place myself or be 
placed by others? Is there room for a level of leadership that can change depending upon 
context? What kind of leadership is appropriate for a surgeon in a group, in a clinic?
My recollections of what I was trying to do at the time were focussed around the business 
of trying to empower the trainees in the department to feel as though they could, as well 
as ought, to contribute to a debate about the merits or otherwise of the clinic. My 
comment that I feel that I have been the “one who has attempted to draw them all in and 
involve them in the discussions that take place in the clinic ”, would seem to indicate this. 
This wish to ‘empower’ them was to some extent reflected in the way that I started to act 
organisationally in the day to day running of the department. I suggested that they 
organise their own rota, start to construct their own educational programmes and organise 
their own working week to staff the clinics and wards. I perceived that the act of 
removing power from myself was equivalent to empowering them. In fact, as later diary 
extracts will testify, in some ways the department began to fall apart and there were 
occasions when things went distinctly awry. Torbert experienced much the same thing:
"In my own early attempts as an adult at leadership of socially innovative organizations, I 
exercised power as little as possible in order to empower others. Only upon reflection 
afterwards did I begin to realize that these situations had required a greater exercise of
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power (at times unilateral, at times logistical, at times transforming), and that what I had 
in fact enacted and thus modeled for others was not exercising power. My self­
empowerment had contradicted my espoused aim of empowering persons. To make 
matters worse, I discovered that a large proportion of my co-workers tended to assume 
that I was utterly naive or that I was mysteriously devious and manipulative, my self 
disempowerment had powerful and negative effects on others."
(Torbert 1991 p69)
Torbert does not supply any data to support this view, but I have on occasions sensed the 
same thing. In preparing this section, I asked a good colleague and friend for an honest 
account of how he perceived the way I exercised power in the department. His considered 
reply was that whether or not I was actually doing this, I gave the impression that I was 
always trying to think two or three steps ahead of what was happening and that this 
sometimes conveyed a sense o f ‘deviousness’, almost the same expression used by 
Torbert. .
Where does this put me in the leadership hierarchy of Torbert? I cannot begin to answer 
this but as a researcher, I am struck by the need I have to try and find an answer to this 
question. What is at stake here? Is this leadership hierarchy a means whereby I can 
measure achievement, how my understanding of the world exceeds that of others with 
whom I work? If I apply Torbert’s own four territories to this question and ask myself 
what is the intuitive mission here? What is the strategy in writing about it in this way? 
How is it going to alter my behaviour and what can be achieved by this discourse? The 
questions themselves seem to evaporate. I am left with the residue that the concept of 
leadership styles expressed in this way is useful but that it may not be useful to apply 
them too conscientiously to any given situation. As Marshall says; it may be useful to 
adopt a “more playful touch”. (Marshall 1992)
Randall and Southgate offer a different analysis to group development and leadership 
styles. It is much less dependent upon the actions of the single facilitator/ action inquirer 
than Torbert’s approach seems to imply. It looks at the different roles that may develop as
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a group matures. If sufficient attention is paid to doing these roles well, then the group 
will be productive and cohesive, but if this is not done, then the group may be 
destructive. This outcome is not necessarily regarded as failure, it just produces different 
kinds of data. The analysis itself is more attuned to the participatory paradigm. They 
define four phases in the development of a group; nurturing, energising, peak and 
relaxing. Three types of leadership quality were displayed in this early nurturing phase of 
group development; organising, production and emotional. (Randall & Southgate. 1980. 
p24). Organising leadership is interested in information gathering and alternative ways of 
looking at problems. Production leadership concentrates on preparation for the task and 
emotional leadership pays attention to emotional support needed by members of the 
group and maintaining a sense of group cohesion.
It is very tempting to look at clinical practice re-framed in this way. I would suggest that 
medical education equips a doctor reasonably well for the tasks of organising and 
production leadership. The interest for me lies in the requirements o f ‘emotional’ 
leadership in the clinical situation and how to pay attention to such issues satisfactorily in 
a brief encounter. If the idea that an outpatient consultation can be considered as a 
‘group’ is sustained for a moment, what are the emotional leadership qualities displayed 
as a group develops? According to the model put forward by Randall and Southgate, the 
task of the emotional leader is not static but changes as the cycles progress through the 
four phases of a creative group.
Group Phase Emotional Leadership Quality
Nurturing Emotional support, group cohesion
Energising Fire the group with energy
Peak Leadership not important
Relaxing Task winding down
In looking at this sequence, I ask myself what role, if any, do I play here in the clinic and 
is this theory relevant given that the ‘group’ meeting is so brief? In considering this 
question I began to notice that I spend a great deal of the time reassuring patients that 
there is nothing wrong, so much so that I am often struck by how much anxiety the
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medical profession is capable of generating. As a young trainee in general surgery I 
remember seeing endless terrified young women with breast lumps, all fearful that they 
had cancer. In reality very few of these lumps were found to be malignant and so the vast 
majority of patients were reassured that all was well. This meant that there was a 
sequence of generating tension with the history, examination and aspiration cytology, 
which was usually relieved by the good news that the results were normal. I began to 
notice how pleasurable it was to give such good news to many, who were expecting the 
worst, and so it was not uncommon for patients to spontaneously hug the doctor with 
relief All this tension and relief appeared to be medically managed.
I began to reflect on the manner in which anxiety was managed in the clinic and noticed a 
pattern of clinical practice. In a clinic a doctor has only a few choices he or she can make. 
They can discharge the patient, investigate the problem or, in the case of a surgeon, list 
for surgery. Justification for investigating a problem often rested on the suggestion that 
something more serious was possible. This action lent purpose to the visit for both the 
doctor and perhaps for the patient as well. Ruling out something serious felt like a 
worthwhile role for me to play. It reinforces the notion that I am there to investigate 
serious problems. Many authors have commented on this strategy of physicians to 
promulgate an image that “at any moment they are involved in lifesaving activities. This 
is reinforced, especially in hospital clinics, by an atmosphere of alarming noises 
emanating from loudspeakers and intercoms implying that somewhere a life is being 
saved.” (Taggliacozzi D. et al. 1972.) I cannot be sure but from the reactions of patients I 
suspect that the decision to investigate was perceived as justification for coming.
The following is a simple example of how all this might take place in practice. “At some 
point you must have wondered about a brain tumour. I really don’t think this is at all 
likely but we ought to be absolutely sure and rule it out, all the same. Just to be on the 
safe side, let’s do a brain scan. Don’t you agree?” A brain scan would be organised and 
the patient would then return for the results. In the vast majority of cases the test would 
be absolutely normal and the patient would be reassured so that this strategy is almost
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failsafe. At the end the patient would feel better, and I would experience professional 
satisfaction by such reassurance.
The very large number of normal laboratory and radiological results seen in clinical 
practice may be testimony to the frequency and self-sustaining nature of this approach. 
After routine examination for insurance or employment, three quarters of the patients 
were referred for exclusion of heart disease, suggesting that unjustified concern about ill 
health was often iatrogenic. (Fitzpatrick R. 1996. p311) McDonald and Mayou both 
reported that a third of patients still continued to be anxious after an investigation 
revealed a normal heart. A similar study of headaches and reassurance about serious 
disease revealed a similar picture. (McDonald. 1996. p329; Mayou R 1976 p55; 
Fitzpatrick R. 1981. pi 067). The process of reassurance generates further anxiety and a 
further appliaction of the same process.
As a researcher I find myself asking, whose interests are served by such an approach?
The patients? Mine? If ‘good clinical practice’ is perceived as the espoused theory, 
‘interest in generating anxiety and subsequently relieving it’ might well be the theory in 
use. In order to inquire into this I began to change my practice in such a way that 
explored the question ‘whose interests are served here?’ After taking a history from a 
patient, who was dizzy, conducting a careful examination and performing a simple test or 
two, I might then chose to explain the issues here in the following manner.
“I do not think that you have a serious problem. I have taken a detailed history and 
carefully examined you with this in mind. I am not infallible and there is a very small 
chance that there is something more significant going on but the only way we can be 
absolutely sure would be to do a brain scan. This involves not inconsiderable exposure to 
radiation and so it is a test that is not without hazard. I am perfectly happy to leave things 
as they are and not do these tests, but this is a decision in which we have to take some 
collective responsibility. Would you like to say what your feelings are on the matter?”
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Some would chose to be investigated but the majority of patients, when presented with 
information in this manner, chose to have no further investigations. Furthermore, they not 
infrequently indicated that they appreciated that this position was made clear in this way. 
This outcome suggests that my theory in use is concerned with protection and reward.
The protection lies in lessening the chance of missing something diagnostically and the 
reward springs from raising anxiety in the patient and relieving it with a series of normal 
investigative results. Torbert might regard this as an analysis based on switching attention 
from strategy to purpose and raising the level of inquiry around purpose.
Groups in the clinic.
As time went on, I began to notice the existence of various other groups in the clinic. I 
had previously perceived the clinic as a doctor and a patient interacting, with a variable 
number of others, both medical staff and patient’s friends and relatives, looking on as 
observers. Discussions in the Postgraduate Research group and the Hospital Inquiry 
group led to a re-evaluation of this position and I began to reconsider the clinic as a much 
more complex collection of different groups within groups. For example, it meant 
regarding the patient and his or her relatives or advocates as a distinct group. Other 
doctors and/or medical students, who may be in attendance for training purposes, form 
another group. Finally, coalitions between the patients and these other doctors in 
attendance form yet a third group. Is re-framing the clinic as a group encounter with these 
coalitions useful in the clinical context?
An outpatient consultation, involving only a doctor and a patient, represents, in number 
terms, the simplest of groups. On many occasions other people may be present as well. 
What is the effect of more than two individuals in the consultation? What if a small group 
forms in outpatients? How is it influencing the kind of issues that are raised? Is it 
permitting some issues to more easily emerge in the same way that I suspected had 
occurred in the inquiry group of doctors and others or does the inhibiting effect of being 
part of a group create more problems than it solves?
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There are many possibilities in terms of numbers of doctors, patients and their relatives 
that may be present in the clinic. For some of the time I will be the only doctor with a 
single patient but I sense that it is becoming more common for patients to come with an 
‘advocate’ such as a close relative or friend. Children will nearly always be accompanied 
by a parent, frequently both, and at times with one or two siblings as well. Adolescents 
often bring along a ‘friend’ just to sit in. I may not be the only doctor. It is usual at the 
Royal United Hospital, Bath to have one and sometimes two trainees in attendance, and 
from time to time a medical student. When I first showed some of the video of outpatient 
consultations to the Postgraduate Group one of the first comments to be made was 
surprise at the number of people in the room; other doctors, nurses, parents, relatives and 
friends. The influence of these other groupings has been shown to be very complex and 
frequently extends beyond the apparent main players, as one particular example shows. 
“Data showed that the discussion was likely to be initiated by a professional outside the 
patient's household, that the number of actual participants in the discussion was small, 
that social network—friends and relatives—were important during the communication and 
discussion processes, and that the decision to enter hospice care was likely to be made by
the caregiver as well as how social networks, particularly friends and relatives, who all
serve to communicate information about hospice.”
(GochmanD S. 1990. p i5)
Indeed ‘David’ had talked about the time when he had decided to have no 
further treatment and experienced the need to try out such a decision on his 
friends.
“D: Huhh. Ac', actually it was a fairly amusing time fo r  me (laughter), I  
know that sounds ridiculous but it was. When we left here, Linda was in 
tears and she was very, very upset, she didn't know where she was going to 
go and I  said come on, I'll buy you a drink and we went down to the pub, got, 
got her a stiff drink and I  had one, came out and got in the car and she said 
you 've not fastened your seat-belt up. I  said well I  don't do things like that 
anymore. She said what do you mean, you're breaking the Law. I  said, well
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(1) there are no laws really, i f  I'm going to shuffle off in a year I'm now going 
t(o bloody well please myself for a year and we went home and we had the 
firs t o f my 'Dave C's Dying Parties’. Rang round all the friends and said uhh 
(laughter), said that's it lads, i f  we're going to shuffle o ff you'd better all get 
round here and uhh literally within an hour o f having left you, I'd  got a house 
fu ll  o f people and we had an enormous piss-up that went on 'til about 2 
o'clock in the morning. Everybody had a fabulous time and uhh (1) I  think in 
a  way that was my way o f breaking everybody into the news and getting them 
laughing and looking at it in the right sort o f context in a light sort o f way 
rather than uhh being told in hushed tones that C ’s on his way out. (1) And I  
think again (.) the circle o f friends that I  have helped me enormously because 
they didn't sort o f walk round talking in hushed tones and they weren't you 
know sort o f  talking behind back hushed 'How is he today ? and all the rest o f  
it'. u
(Appendix 1, David)
During the course of the discussion I had with Valerie, she indicated that she undertook 
the same kind of process.
V: That's an interesting one because that's what I've got to do about the transplant in the 
end. I  have a friend whose daughter, who's one o f my very, very goodfriends and who's 
been great support to me fo r  some years her daughter is a councillor with London 
Underground. So when I  went up to London to be assessed for the transplant, I  actually, 
I  asked her i f  she'd come and see me and I  said ‘how do you decide between two things 
that seem as bad as each other? Because I  mean the time that Professor Z was giving me, 
not that I  realised this then, and the kind o f death he's described’ is not that significantly 
better than the transplant except that o f course i t ’s much less invasive. But basically I  
asked her ‘how do you decide between the two things, neither o f which is very
attractive? ’ And umm she came down in the end to something th a t....
R: She said?




My experience with groups meant that I started to re-examine what was happening in 
outpatients. Rather than ignore the existence of others in the room, I started to pay 
attention to their presence and reflect on what their presence might mean. In one sense, a 
visit to outpatients by a patient, accompanied by relatives or friends, in the presence of a 
doctor, with or without colleagues or medical students is rather like the first meeting of 
an inquiry group. If it is regarded as a one-on-one interaction between doctor and patient 
with an audience of relatives, friends and colleagues, then important information may be 
lost. Can an approach that considers the clinical consultation as a complex group shed 
any light on what might be happening?
My interest in re-framing the clinic in this way arises from an interest in how opinion 
from one party (the parent in the case of the child; the relative or friend in the case of 
another adult) can be seen to justifiably enter the decision making process. If the patient 
is considered as an independent entity, the part played by others in influencing outcome 
has no point of entry. Such a perspective also obliges me to consider the influence on 
other patients and myself in the clinical environment. Much of what follows springs from 
re-framing the clinic in this way. In doing this I have considered three cliques or 
coalitions as Neilsen calls them. These are the connections that patients make with other 
relatives or friends; the connections which doctors make with other doctors or medical 
students who may be present. Finally there are the connections that accompanying 
doctors make with the patient.
Patients and their relatives or friends.
About forty percent of my practice involves seeing children with Ear, Nose and Throat 
problems. When children attend a clinic they usually do so with a parent. Usually they 
will attend with their mother, sometimes with their father, sometimes with both parents 
and brothers and sisters attending. Occasionally they may be with childminders,
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grandparents or an older sibling. Do these different patterns of attendance mean 
anything?
The patient and their relative(s)/friend(s) would form a coalition between themselves so 
that I make the assumption that this is already mature. Neilsen has advocated that such 
dyads and cliques allow inclusion and influence and my experience in the Hospital 
Inquiry group had suggested that this can happen. I began to look for evidence of such 
coalitions and cliques in the clinic. For example I began to more carefully notice who 
came with the patient and wondered if such advocates acted as a chaperone, as an acolyte 
to balance perhaps the acolytes of nurses and receptionists surrounding the doctor. I 
proposed earlier that the ceremony surrounding outpatients of journeying, waiting, 
ushered here and there by ‘courtiers’ and undressing was partly a device to empower the 
doctor and disempower the patient. If the patient arrived with their own coterie of 
‘courtiers’ this might be seen as a device to rebalance this distribution of power and I 
couldn’t help but conjure up a picture of a medieval dignitary arriving at court with their 
own dignitaries. I began to observe that these ‘courtiers’ would hardly ever come in first 
unless it was a parent accompanying children. It would be usual for a husband or partner 
to hold any coats, bags etc. and somehow this seemed to immediately establish a role for 
themselves, a reason for being there, a legitimate reason for being there. I saw this as 
mirroring the nurses who held instruments, diaries, notes, all the trappings of my trade.
Most attendees would remain quiet, occasionally volunteering information. They might 
reinforce, with little sounds, shifting of position, repeating statements, certain key points 
as the patient made them. Patients might turn and look at them for emphasis, to gather 
support. It appeared to be a way of gently indicating the presence of a dyad or coalition 
and that was certainly the effect that it had upon me. Finally, they may take over in part 
or in whole the patient’s role in the consultation. This is very reminiscent of the 
behaviour described above when ‘C’ started to first voice her disapproval about certain 
aspects of the clinic.
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Such a description tends to suggest that any liaison between a patient and a relative or 
friend was always a collaborative one. On some occasions a patient might choose to 
decline the services of a friend or relative. A patient might firmly indicate to their 
relative, who might be making motions to enter the consultation room that they should 
remain outside. The empowering effect of this seemed tangible. The patient appeared to 
convey an impression of authority. This felt exactly like dismissing one’s own 
‘courtiers’; it seemed empowering to the patient. This was enhanced even more when, on 
the rare occasions that it happened, the patient chose to dismiss my courtiers and asked 
other doctors and nurses in attendance to leave, so that only the two of us remained in the 
room.
Such groups within the group could be regarded as having different degrees of maturity. 
A family group might be considered as a robust coalition at the level of stage 4 (see 
Table 1) and as a well established coalition claim the authority to have a marked 
influence on the process. This can be seen most obviously when parents conduct the 
whole interview without any opportunity for the child to contribute, indeed they may 
have to if the child is in infancy. This may even happen to children who are teenagers. It 
appeared to me that the child seemed perfectly content with this arrangement when I took 
the opportunity to ask if this was so. A less mature coalition of adolescent and friend 
would be more like a lower order dyad and the friend might expect only a modest degree 
of inclusion. My feeling was that they were there to empower the patient, their friend, in 
a way that made them comfortable. This is certainly the argument made by Neilsen, who 
advocated that these coalitions are believed to be helpful in resolution of the core 
dilemma, which is, in most cases, likely to be the level of anxiety felt by the patient.
I began to ask whether the accompanying persons were relatives, or parents, or friends. 
This led me to ask why a partner, wife or friend, had come with the patient. This was met 
with a number of different replies.
“because I  was/they were asked to come. ”
“I  was nervous and needed some support ”
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“I  never remember what is said and someone else can help me to remember”
“Someone to talk to afterwards i f  I  have a difficult decision to make ”
“Someone to talk to i f  la m  given bad news”
“M y friend was curious “(common amongst adolescents)
“I  hate hospitals. ”
The variety of answers meant that it was unsafe to make any assumptions about why 
relatives or friends had decided to come or why the patient wished to be accompanied in 
this way. It did mean seeing the group of doctor, patient and advocates and other 
attendees as a collection of coalitions each with their own reason for being there. If their 
attendance, and mine for that matter, was seen as strategy then it was important to 
consider the purpose behind it. Why was everybody there, what was their individual or 
collective desire in being there?
As Randall and Southgate have maintained, this is important to consider if one is 
interested in establishing a constructive, creative group, for in one way, this is exactly 
what my perception of an outpatient consultation began to be. This meant paying 
attention to ‘agenda setting’, particularly patient agenda setting. It meant creating an 
opportunity for patients to put forward a reason for being there, an espoused reason 
albeit. I saw this as an attempt to establish purpose and desire. About this time I began to 
explore more fully expectations and frame the consultation with questions such as “What 
are you hoping to get out of seeing me today?”, “What is your purpose in coming today?” 
This was sometimes developed to include a range of extreme choices indicating that any 
choice within these extremes was in order; for example “Do you want to go back through 
the door with an operation in the book or definitely avoid one?” Such an approach 
seemed to prompt patients towards a position where they could use me more effectively, 
because their reason for coming, wanting to leave etc were made clearer by an 
opportunity to declare their ‘interests’.
This approach resulted in surfacing some of my own experiences of illness in the family.
I began to recollect how it felt when purpose and interests and agendas as associated
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family members were ignored in favour of apparent purposes and interests and agendas 
o f medical agency. Certainly no apparent attempt was made to distinguish them from one 
another. In November 1977 my first child, a boy, was born. I was a newly qualified 
doctor of one year’s experience. It became clear in the space of twelve weeks that all was 
not well and that he was failing to put on weight. Over the course of investigations he 
was found to have cystic fibrosis. Left untreated with antibiotics, the vast majority of 
children with cystic fibrosis have died by their fifth or sixth birthday. But if regular 
physiotherapy to clear the chest (typically six episodes of fifteen minutes a day) coupled 
with regular antibiotics are administered the mean survival of this group can be raised to 
sixteen years. My wife and I started to meet other families in a similar predicament and 
what we saw was that raising the survival rate from six years to sixteen years was not 
necessarily in everyone’s interests. Most of the parents had become divorced. Many of 
the other children in the family appeared resentful of the attention and many of the 
children with cystic fibrosis themselves seemed angry at being brought to a level of 
consciousness where they were made aware of the fact that they were going to die at a 
young age.
We began to take the view that ‘treatment’ of this kind served no purpose. We tentatively 
explored the notion of allowing ‘nature to take its course’ but were quickly told that they 
as doctors they were the guardian's of the child’s ‘best interests’. They would, if 
necessary, resort to legal action to enforce treatment. We recognised their good intentions 
but their efforts were going to be devastating to both our child and ourselves. For all of us 
seemed to be facing pain and suffering without meaning and this course of action did not 
seem to be in anyone’s ‘best interests’. We both instinctively felt that a model of decision 
making that incorporated our own input was needed.
In 1977, the response we had received from the medical team was determined by a notion 
o f ‘best interests’. What is meant by the idea o f ‘best interests’. Does it mean best 
interests of the child, the parents or the whole family? “The state may be limited by the 
best interest criterion when dealing with children, but parents are not. The state's relation 
with the child is formal while the parental relation is intimate, having its own goals and
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purposes. While the liberal canons insist on the incompetent one's best interest, parents 
are permitted to compromise the child's interest for ends related to these familial goals 
and purposes.” (Schoeman, F. 1985. p45)
This absolute view suggests that there is an ethic imperative that some outside agency 
acts as the final arbiter of the child’s best interest. Insufficiently confident of our own 
feelings in this situation we let the matter rest. When he unexpectedly died six months 
later whilst undergoing treatment on the hospital ward, along with our feelings of sadness 
and unfulfilled expectations, there was quite a feeling of release for him and for 
ourselves.
The management of this problem had two parts to it; making the diagnosis and instigating 
treatment. The first diagnostic stage was undertaken without reference to us. The 
investigations that led to a diagnosis needed a directive style of leadership by the doctors 
where they took complete control. It felt very reassuring and appropriate that they did so 
because for both the doctors and ourselves, purpose was the same; to find out what was 
wrong. When the diagnosis had been made, treatment was begun and continued without 
any reference to us. The moment that the nature of the problem became clear, particularly 
the consequences on both the everyday lives of our child and ourselves, then both my 
wife and I felt that we should have had some kind of input. It was not even a question of 
persuading the attending paediatricians to discontinue treatment, it was more a need to 
have some kind of framework in which the non medical aspects of the disease, the impact 
on the family unit, should be considered in the overall management. The ‘expert’ 
knowledge we had about our family should have formed part of the decision making 
process. The directive style of leadership, which we perceived as appropriate for the 
diagnostic stage, continued without pause or reflection into the treatment phase, when the 
purpose of action had changed. The commanding, prescribing behaviour of a more 
directive style in the doctors felt to us at odds with the participative/ appreciative style 
expected of this group with it’s family coalition. We tried to discuss this and I sensed that 
the actions of the paediatricians arose out of three positions.
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1. They knew that the child would not survive long and it was their duty to treat as best 
they could.
2. They belonged to a specialty, which had, over the years, made incremental progress 
towards cures of various diseases. We would be part of the long-term experiment that 
lead to a cure. The fact that in the process our lives would suffer accordingly was part of 
the tradition of progress. Some degree o f ‘sacrifice’ (literally on the part of our child, and 
emotional on our part) was the price of progress.
3. They genuinely believed that he would be cured by the treatment.
Of course, today things might have been different. These events took place twenty years 
ago and a more contemporary view might respect shared decision-making so that “in the 
best interest of critically ill children, parents should be the primary decision makers in 
collaboration with health care professionals.” (Rushton. C. 1990. p206; Hardwig J. 1990. 
p5)
Other doctors in the consultation room.
If the clinical consultation is re-framed for a moment and seen as a group, what effect 
does this have when one considers another doctor or student in the room? How might this 
influence the situation? First of all, I found that simply raising an awareness of this 
‘medical coalition’ between doctors suggested that attention should be drawn to it. I 
began to change my practice to make sure that as each patient entered the consultation 
room, the doctors or students were introduced to them and that the role or purpose in 
being present is made clear to the patient. This meant emphasising that other doctors or 
medical students are there to learn but may well be able to offer additional advice. Very 
few patients seemed to object to this and usually responded by saying that they 
understood that it is necessary to learn. However, the balance between observing, 
learning, practising and participating is tricky and the presence of a ‘learner’ in clinic 
carries with it all kinds of implications. There is, it seems to me, a suggestion that 
patients are there to be practised upon both in outpatients and possibly by inference in the 
operating theatre. What is the evidence for this?
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The standard National Health Service consent form has a section advising the patient that 
signing the consent form does not guarantee that a particular surgeon will undertake the 
operation. It may mean that surgery can performed by a trainee with no guarantee to the 
patient of training status, competence or level of supervision. It suggests that the system 
allows procedures to take place in less than ideal circumstances, with less than perfect 
results, in the interests of training. Patients, if you like, may be ‘sacrificed’ so that a 
novice may learn their craft.
Valerie relates an experience when an inexperienced trainee operated on her with 
significant consequences. The experience raises a number of issues. It particularly 
suggests that the medical organisation can convince patients that the system is safe but at 
the same time makes it difficult for them to question this. However, the main purpose in 
including this extract is to show the relationship between consultant and trainee in terms 
of practising skills upon patients in a way that may not be in the patient’s interests.
Valerie describes how her brain cyst was aspirated by a trainee on the open ward. The 
entries in brackets are comments made by Valerie on reading the transcript.
“V: Because I  wasn't sure that I  was right and because I  believed that my consultant
who was supposed to be good would not let that man do it i f  he was not good enough.
R: So you had belief an intrinsic belief in the system?
V: Yes, it was a young consultant. As fa r  as I  knew I  was in the best neurology
hospital in the country - i f  not Europe. This man surely would not be in his position i f  he 
were not pretty special. My consultant had spent about ten to fifteen minutes chatting to 
me, leaning against the wall near the desk, before lunch. During this chat he told me that 
this procedure was not a problem unless o f course (he mimed) you pulled the flu id  off the 
brain too quickly. In which case you might cause a thrombosis - a stroke - or similar.
He departed with a friendly grin saying he would ‘get one o f his boys to do it. ’
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(I desperately hoped in advance that it would not be the one who came. (He had two 
registrars.) The man in question had personality problems that were openly discussed by 
the nurses, who said that he constantly told them he did not have enough confidence, this 
they did not believe since he behaved so arrogantly. He looked and dressed as though he 
might be a slick dealer in the 1980s stock exchange.
He had brought me the consent form for my operation on the night I arrived. He had not 
expected me to read it and was very impatient when I tried. It was impossible for me to 
read it with him fidgeting and I capitulated to the system since I knew there would be no 
alternative, but I asked him what would happen if the operation went wrong (neither my 
neurologist or surgeon had told me about the risks of brain surgery.) He simply grinned 
idiotically and said “We’ll make it better”. I gave up and he produced a fountain pen 
with red ink in it for me to sign - in the circumstances it looked like blood. He then tried 
to get an Indian - possibly Sikh - woman to sign and gave the same responses when she 
could not understand it. She was unhappy and refused until her husband came in later.
I have since decided that although my consultant was or is supposed to be very bright - 
the pathologist husband of the woman next to me had looked up his “form” - he was still 
in his thirties and he probably lacked experience both of casework and of leading his 
team. I know that registrars have to gain experience, but he was unaccompanied and I 
think in view of the state of my lungs the consultant should have taken particular care. 
Then I feel guilty for even thinking that.) (Comment added by Valerie on reading the 
text)
I've since formed the opinion that Ok, you know, he may be a brilliant technician and 
brilliant surgeon but he has not had enough experience of leading a team and he talked to 
me for twice as long in the morning, the consultant, as it took the guy to take the fluid out 
of my brain, he could have done it himself while he was talking to me. That sort of thing, 
you know, happens, you know. I suppose nobody's going to learn unless you're allowed 
to do things but....
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R: But what stopped you ? What, what actually stopped you ?
V: I  don't know, it was a complete nightmare because as soon as he 'd done it and I'd
realised he'd done it practically in a second or two and I  thought, am I  still sitting here 
because the consultant had told me in the morning that o f course you can't draw fluids 
out o f the brain quickly like that. ” (Appendix 3 Valerie)
Valerie points out that in the time it took the consultant to explain to her that someone 
else would come and aspirate the cyst in her brain, it would have been possible to have 
undertaken the procedure himself. Such a situation forces one to examine the way that the 
system allows room to be made for trainees to practise procedures.
Such practise can take a number of different forms. Animals are frequently ‘sacrificed’ in 
the interests of research, developing new surgical techniques and practising surgical 
skills. Surgeons practice upon deceased ‘patients’ in the post-mortem room and this takes 
place regularly in my own hospital. This idea of practising is ultimately extended to live 
patients. When a new technique is introduced, and this in recent years is most evident in 
heart surgery, there is a ‘learning phase’ during which the results may be poor until the 
surgeon has developed his or her skill. Such patients are seen as a sacrifice in the interests 
of advance and I have heard colleagues talk of a ‘surgeon with a touch of the Prussian 
General’ who has the stomach to make such sacrifices in the interests of advancing 
knowledge. So that to the medical establishment the idea that trainees practice on 
patients, and specialists make advances by practising on live patients, may not be so far 
removed from the notion of sacrificing animals in the pursuit of surgical education and 
improvement. Are there circumstances that test this notion of sacrifice so that it is then 
seen as inappropriate?
The moment another healthcare worker has to have surgery, particularly another doctor 
or a nurse, it is a widespread practice for the consultant to perform this surgery 
themselves and trainees are not involved at all. Certainly specialists don’t seem to 
advance their expertise by practising upon other doctors or healthcare workers. This can 
be extended to the families of doctors and surgeons depending upon the importance of the
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doctor concerned. A distant relative of a famous surgeon can expect the same treatment 
as a doctor and part of the game plan of such a patient in the outpatient consultation 
seems to let information about other medical members of the family become known. 
Sometimes the family practitioner will do this for them in the referral letter. There is an 
unspoken dialogue going on in which such patients are identified as not suitable for 
‘sacrifice’. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that trainees only ‘practice’ on National 
Health Service or public service patients and that they are not present in a private 
Independent Hospitals to ‘practice’ on private patients.
Of course I use the term ‘sacrifice’ here in a archetypal manner. What I am trying to 
convey by highlighting the different hierarchies of treatment and is that other purposes 
may be at play. It is suggesting that below a level of purpose that would accept that 
training is necessary is a level of purpose that includes reference to sacrifice. It is as 
though the ancient notions of more obvious sacrifice have become hidden by the surface 
of technical medicine.
Re-framing like this started to make me feel uncomfortable. This resulted in a shift of 
attention from the actions or strategy of everyday practice towards attention to purpose. 
This meant concentrating on the purpose underlying their presence and to try and make 
this as clear as possible. If patients were listed for surgery and it was likely to be 
undertaken by a trainee then this was pre-agreed with the patient. Otherwise I would note 
on the admission card that I alone would undertake the surgery (a manifestation of 
Torbert’s logistical power). An attempt was made to match the appropriateness of the 
surgical task to the skill of the trainee. In this way it was made clear to the patient that 
they were not being practised upon. During the course of this thesis, all surgical lists by 
unsupervised trainees ceased and only those with a higher surgical degree were permitted 
to undertake surgery. I cannot necessarily be sure that this change in the department is 
connected with such re-framing but as a key member of the department I can claim a part 
in this. How do I know that fundamental assumptions have been disturbed? I recall the 
awkwardness I felt in beginning to appreciate that practice and sacrifice may not be so 
distant from one another when I considered the role trainees played in the organisation. I
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take this sense of awkwardness, like embarrassment earlier, to be a simple validity claim 
that change had taken place.
As a researcher I notice how difficult it is to track the process from re-framing to actual 
change and furthermore, how difficult it is to convince others that this has taken place. 
Part of the reason might be that such change does not take place in isolation. These 
changes reflect a wider cultural and historical movement that includes challenge to the 
notion of professionalism to govern itself, to give a greater account of itself and to justify 
certain practices in public. As I write this, the hospital is introducing the concept of 
‘clinical governance’ a disciplinary structure that monitors and questions and prohibits 
such practices. The idea then that surgeons can practice on patients in a manner that is 
unaccountable is part of a wider cultural shift in attitude. In such circumstances it 
becomes difficult to be sure just how much is generated by such re-framing as above and 
how much is part of this wider shift in attitude.
It would be an oversight to conclude without examining for a moment the connections 
made between the patient and those doctors other than myself in attendance. I began to 
notice that for much of the time the patient would largely ignore any other doctor in the 
room except if a female doctor was observing/attending and a female patient came in 
when I sensed a connection between them. For example, replies to my questions would 
be made, not to me, but directly to the other female doctor or medical student. If this 
started to happen, sometimes the other doctor or student would start to ask the patient 
questions themselves. Such a relationship between male doctors observing male patients 
or male doctors observing female patients seemed to be much less common although 
occasionally a male patient would start to form such a relationship with a female doctor. 
Is there evidence to support a different clinical relationship based on gender?
There is no literature specifically on the subject of relationships of this kind but it has 
been shown that female doctors spend more time with their patients than male doctors. It 
is about three minutes per patient in general practice and one minute per patient in 
hospital practice (Cypress BK. 1980). Most of this difference is time spent when a female
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doctor sees a female patient. Male doctors it seems tend to spend equal time with both 
sexes. This may be so for many reasons. It may be that for some reason it takes longer for 
women to take or give a history than men. It may be that introductions take longer. Some 
work has suggested that there is a perceived preference on the part of women for a 
woman physician (Grant 1988. p i 15) There are many possibilities here. Consequently, I 
tried to inquire a little into the nature of the connection between a female doctor in 
attendance and a female patient. I noticed however that whenever I raised this as a 
process issue, and inquired what such interactions might mean, or why they had taken 
place, it usually resulted in a certain awkwardness or embarrassment. The other female 
doctor would apologise for “interfering” and remain conspicuously quiet for the rest of 
the time.
The place of gender as part of my medical discourse is seen in the following entries 
especially in the way I portray female voices in the diary entry following the meeting of 
the hospital inquiry group. My attention was drawn to this by the supervisory process, 
and it eventually led me to re-evaluate my position in the organisation as a white middle 
class professional male. This diary extract is taken from the first clinic following the first 
meeting of the Hospital Inquiry group. The inquiry group had finished by setting itself 




Head and Neck malignancy clinic. Attendance: SELF, ‘R’ AND ‘T% Consultants;
‘H’ Radiotherapy Consultant; ‘Rd’, Consultant in Palliative Care; ‘S’, Senior 
Registrar; ‘G \ Registrar; ‘P’, Registrar in Maxillofacial Surgery; ‘C% ‘H’ (Part 
Time), ‘K’ and ‘A’, Senior House Officers; ‘M’, House Officer; ‘D% Nurse from the 
ward.
This is the first clinic that has been held after our initial meeting. I  am conscious o f a 
number o f things. ‘H ’ our part time doctor with us only three days a week looks very
266
much as though she wants to opt out and is also clearly very uncomfortable. Actually she 
tells me some two to three weeks later when I  mention this that in fact she is not well.
She mentioned in the meeting that lack o f seats was a problem and significantly 
contributing to the level o f exhaustion we all experience. I  get her a seat. It doesn't really 
help. I  know that there are problems between her and the rest o f the junior medical staff 
over the rota and time off over Christmas and I  wonder i f  this is a factor. ‘K  ’, who is keen 
to please and anxious not to upset anyone, gets very involved in the discussion. This helps 
a lot. On one occasion she becomes a key member when one particularly frightened 
woman recognises her from a previous admission to the ward and immediately adopts 
her as an ally andfriend ‘K  ’ is very helpful in the discussion we have afterwards with 
the patient when discussing options and does an impressive job in comforting her. ‘C ’, 
who was, I fe lt the most vocally critical o f the clinic in the first meeting is away. I  don't 
perceive any real change in the others.
This clinic was followed three weeks later by the hospital inquiry group. This is a further 
extract from the reflective diary made after these meetings.
DIARY
28th November 1990
2nd meeting of multidisciplinary group. Attendance: ‘R’ (Leaves after 30 minutes, 
‘Rd’, SELF, Consultants; ‘S’, Senior Registrar; ‘G \ Registrar; ‘C% ‘IF (Part time), 
‘A’, Senior House Officers; ‘M’ House Officer.
I  start the meeting by showing the flip charts, which we produced at the last meeting. It's  
pretty negative stuff. ‘R ’, who wasn't there at the first meeting, is, I  think, a little hurt 
(perhaps that’s too strong a word) and immediately engages largely with ‘S ' in a 
conversation to bring out some o f the more positive and helpful sides to the clinic e.g. 
teaching. Pretty soon the meeting is lively and vocal but virtually all the conversation is 
between ‘R ’, ‘S ' and R d \ Much o f it is directed by eye contact at me as apparently the 
chairman. I  begin to fee l uncomfortable. Firstly I  don't fee l responsible fo r  the clinic, its 
construction and what goes on in it; in fact, rather the opposite. Part o f the reason fo r
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doing this research is to look at ways to change it in a constructive way. Secondly, I  am 
not doing my job at all well as a facilitator within the group if  my position as Chairman 
is being acknowledged by all implicitly. I  decide to say something direct and mention 
feeling uncomfortable and immediately there is a change.
‘S  ’ says that he thought I  was leading the discussion. I  realise that to a new member I  
had failed to make my position and interest clear. The lively discussion between the 
above three continues with much gusto. It goes on for about ten to fifteen minutes and the 
others (all girls except me) are merely observers with little or no eye contact between the 
three in discussion and the rest. It is exactly like the head and neck oncology clinic. The 
senior medical staff talking, deciding, sparring etc. and the rest observing. I  am in a 
dilemma. Do I  mention this obvious analogy and threaten to inhibit ‘R 7 1 think he has 
joined with some misgiving and perhaps out o f a sense offriendship or whatever but now 
seems to be enjoying the whole process. The same thought I  sense is true fo r  ‘S ' and ‘R d ’, 
who, as a consultant in palliative care is perhaps the most at home with this sort o f thing 
and is clearly happy to get involved straight away. I  watch the watchers. I  am puzzled 
because they don’t seem discomforted particularly by all this, except possibly ‘H \
The women in the group are being marginalised. By failing to contribute or more 
accurately engage in the group discussion, it is failing as a group. Secondly, I  don’t like 
seeing talented and capable women being dominated by men (who are also talented and 
capable I  should add) and finally I  am anxious to empower them to help them realise that 
they are not only capable o f but entitled to contribute. Later on I  learn from them that 
they are stuck on the idea that they are not really permitted to contribute to discussions 
about treatment because o f their insufficient knowledge and experience. I  decide to 
comment on the fact that the women are being left out o f the discussion. This certainly 
frees them up for a moment but after a minute or so the discussion between the men starts 
up again. It is not until R  ’ gets up to leave, clearly wishing to stay because he continues 
to talk even as he closes the door to leave, that the discussion really becomes more 
generalised.
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‘C ' makes a good observation. She accuses me o f only putting negative comments on the 
flip  chart and I  choose to ignore positive comments. This tells me two things. Firstly that 
I  am consciously looking fo r  problems within the clinic so that at a later stage I  can say 
to myself how I  have improved all these things and the other is that by writing on the flip  
chart I  can partly control, manoeuvre and manipulate the group. O f course she is 
absolutely right.
‘H ’ leaves at about 4.40. The effect o f people leaving on the group is interesting. 
Generally it is helpful. The group becomes smaller but a more subtle effect is that o f the 
level o f contribution made by those who anticipate that they will have to leave. ‘R ’ who 
knows that he will only be attending for half the session and is comfortable in the group 
occupies a lot o f airtime before he leaves. On the other hand ‘H \ I  postulate, knows she 
will be leaving halfway though and wonders i f  it is worthwhile really "getting into it". A 
non-contributor leaves. Non contributors cause the rest to fantasise why they are silent 
(disapproval, disagreement etc.) and can in turn block us.
A general discussion follows. ‘Rd  ’ suggests introducing a clinical psychologist to map 
interpersonal interactions within a clinic but nobody seems too keen on this idea; 
perhaps the group is too young. I  remind everyone that our stated aim fo r  this meeting 
was to suggest a small change to the clinic and the way it is run to try and improve it. We 
agree to change the seating arrangements. The bulk o f the seats will be placed around 
the edge o f the room with three seats left fo r  the main ‘actors ’ in the drama, the three 
consultants. I  personally express reservations because it seems to me that that it will only 
serve to increase the barrier between the consultants and the rest o f the staff by having a 
‘stage and audience ’. I  have images o f victim, firing squad and official observers. The 
others disagree. A t last we agree to try this. I  personally think that it will make things 
worse but le t’s try it.
When I read this now, I feel awkward and have to resist the temptation to alter it. To me, 
this embarrassment feels more like a validation of just how far my position and attitude 
has shifted since writing the diary five years ago. On a general level, the assumption I
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make about what others think and feel without any effort to confirm these inferences is 
evident. On a more particular level, I feel awkward in reading about my desire to offer 
protection and empowerment to the “girls” in the department. I would not use the word 
"girls" if I were to write a diary today. As a researcher I ask myself what does this tell me 
about my perceived position in society? My espoused theory is one of protection and 
empowerment of the younger female members of the department but what is my theory in 
use here?
Through the use of this gender frame, I first begin to notice the gender discourse that is 
evident in hospital life. The use of the word 'girls' when referring to female members of 
staff, doctors and nurses, seems to be widespread in hospitals and my casual use of the 
word would have been typical. Male members are more usually referred to as ‘men’ or 
‘doctors’. There is an implicit hierarchy between men and women within the use of such 
terms. At the very least there is one of age, young/old and possibly one of 
father/daughter, teacher/learner, protector/protected. It is a discourse of power as well as 
of gender. The wish to "empower them to help them realise that they are not only capable 
o f but entitled to contribute" is not so much a wish to empower but a power statement 
about my own position as a male in the organisation. It is what Benokraitis and Feagin 
referred to as “condescending chivalry.” (Benokraitis NV & Feagin JR. 1986)
The gender and power discourse evident in the use of language is reinforced by certain 
structural expressions of gender and power within the fabric of the organisation. Most 
surgeons are male, indeed the proportion of consultant surgeons who are women in the 
United Kingdom and the States is apparently less than it was thirty years ago, despite the 
increasing proportion of female medical graduates. (Lorber J. 1993. p66). Most of the 
senior medical staff are men and of 135 consultants at the Royal United Hospital, 14 are 
women. This disproportionately small number of women at senior level is made even 
more evident because at the junior level women outnumber the men. A doctor’s dining 
room conveys this sense of male superiority. All men on the ‘head’ table, all women on 
the juniors table. Indeed the term ‘mess’ is one borrowed from the military vocabulary.
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Furthermore, most nurses, physiotherapists, radiographers, blood technicians, 
receptionists, secretaries and others occupying similar supportive roles are women.
It seems fairly obvious that this imbalance in gender and power in organisations does not 
just apply to medicine but is an issue that is widespread. What is odd about this position 
in medicine is that men have somehow usurped the perceived ‘caring’, ‘nuturing’ role of 
women. Riska believes that the liberationist rationalism of the nineteenth century was in 
reality an opportunity for medicine to subvert other healthcare occupations, which by 
their nature were women dominated (Riska. 1993. p2). The official history of the Royal 
College of Surgeons of England portrays part of the story. There was indifference 
towards midwifery as a specialty suitable for recognition until women were admitted to 
the college in 1876. Some women wished to take just the midwifery exams but this was 
disallowed. (Cope Z 1959) This and other similar disputes resulted in a new division of 
healthcare labour that placed men firmly upon the top of the hierarchy. This domination 
of men over women, by doctors over nursing, is even more complex because of internal 
gender generated divisions between nurses themselves.(Carpenter M. 1993. p97)
This suggests that my experience of progressing through medical school, progressing 
through the training grades and working as a consultant in a hospital for ten years in an 
organisation that is male dominated and male structured is likely to generate a level of 
expectation as a male. What are my assumptions as a male? This whole question can be 
further extended to include race and class. What then are my assumptions as a white, 
middle class male? Such a question cannot be addressed without considering the nature 
and use of power.
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Power and Medical Power
I have been asked by the examiners to make a choice to develop one of the topics of 
‘groups’, ‘leadership’ or power. I have chosen ‘power’ because the problems of power 
are widespread within organisations and embedded within epistemology and 
methodology. The exercise of power is a multi-dimensional concept that involves the 
“control and manipulation of knowledge and knowledge structures” (Cutting 1994 p20) 
so that as organisations take structure there are those who “are experts on the form, those 
who are novices, and those who are, or will be, the victims of another persons stock of 
knowledge.” (Denzin 1983 p i39) Furthermore these structures themselves are 
constructed by those who are in control of such knowledge, who determine what is truth, 
what is not truth and what validates either position. Power is also an issue in any 
relationship between persons and within groups; it is a force in the “interpersonal 
dominance actualized in human relationships through the manipulation, control, and often 
destruction (both physical and mental) of one human by another human." (ibid) In a sense 
‘power’ would need to be discussed if I chose almost any other topic to develop for it is 
not only an important concept in the doctor/patient contract but universally.
I found it hard to know where to begin a discussion on power. My everyday experience 
suggests that power is applied to produce results; parents, teachers and managers do this. 
This stems from my experience as a child in a family, in schools and organisations such 
as hospitals and universities. I notice individuals accumulating power as a kind of 
organisational currency that determines worth or importance. People talk about ‘getting 
more power’, chairing more powerful committee meetings, occupying more powerful 
positions or being more powerful. I find myself caught up in this exercise and any change 
in the organisation includes an evaluation in these terms. Such an approach does not 
explain in adequate terms the relational nature of power; what happens when two 
powerful people disagree; what happens when groups become powerful, for in this 
situation power seems to reside within the relational structure of such groups rather 
within an individual. An example of this is the power of the medical establishment in 
society in general. Such power does not reside in one individual but as agency power in
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the office and structures of the organisation. This suggests that a pluralist approach may 
be needed to adequately convey the way power enters our lives in ways that is not at first 
obvious. "Power is best approached through a view of more or less complex organised 
agents engaged in more or less complex organised games." (Clegg 1989 p20)
So in tackling this I have chosen a framework that acknowledges a pluralist analysis of 
power and moves from the general to the particular in the following fashion.
Some broad schools of thought on the subject of power.
Some selected philosophers to study.
My position in life and the organisation as a white, middle class male.
In following this structure I have tried to pay particular attention to implications of power 
in the doctor/ patient encounter. This approach also recognises that this is not a thesis on 
power and so trying to understand power in the clinical context, an approach that is 
practical, would, I hope, be sufficient and appropriate.
Some broad approaches or structures to the study of power
I have chosen four broad approaches to the study of power. They are those offered by 
Clegg, Marshall, Vince and Torbert. They are all pluralist in concept but emphasise 
different aspects of power. For example Clegg adopts an historical position and reading 
his work I am left with the impression that power is perceived in terms of control, 
distribution of resources, manipulation as the dominant description. Marshall puts 
forward a more optimistic picture of power drawing particular attention, as I see it, to 
notions of co-operation and personal power. Vince highlights the assumptions that white 
middle class professional men hold in organisations. Torbert adopts a developmental 
approach both in terms of linking different types of power to different stages of childhood 
and adolescent development in suggesting that different types of power may be 
appropriate depending upon the time-scale of the project involved.
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Clegg’s approach
Clegg identified two historical approaches to the concept of power, those derived from 
Hobbes and those derived from Machiavelli. "Hobbes sets out the terms of a debate 
around a conception of sovereignty and community, Machiavelli initiated a concern with 
strategy and organisation." The approach of Hobbes concerns itself with “what power is” 
whereas, Machiavelli and his successors interpret power in terms of what it “does.” 
(Clegg 1989 p5) Historically, the view of Hobbes has, until recent times, attracted most 
attention with its emphasis on conflict and the theory surrounding it. Contemporary 
debates, particularly the work of Foucault, have revisited the approach of Machiavelli and 
questioned the assumption that power is necessarily an analysis of conflict. Power is 
somehow in the system or culture that we inhabit and controls us, principally through the 
use of language, in ways that may or may not be obviously in our interests.
Clegg identified a number of questions that any analysis of power needs to address. "Is 
power distributed plurally or held by an elite? Is power intentional or not intentional? Is 
power confined to decision making or is it evident in non-decision making? Is not making 
a decision an action or a non-action? Is power a capacity for action or the exercise of 
action?” (Clegg 1989 p37) These are important questions but the nature of them is all the 
same. They are questions that consider power in unitary terms, as a single phenomenon 
and approaching power in this way was, according to Clegg, part of the problem. 
Historically, questions like these have sustained an approach that persisted in thinking of 
“conceptions of power in unitary terms to which all issues of theorization must be 
resolved." (ibid)
Clegg offers an alternative construction of "three distinct but related conceptions of 
power" and configures them accordingly in terms not only of their internal relations but 
also their relations to each other. He goes on to suggest that "it is less important to 
adjudicate the debate by declaring in favour of this or that true concept of power, once 
and for all time.” Instead he suggests exploring the language games for theorising power, 
making a note of the political myths, identifying the rules of this and “pinpointing a few
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moves and strategies within them.” Perhaps, he suggests that it “is these moves, these 
strategies, these passages constructed through the ensnaring funnel-web that prototypes 
of power may be seen?” In this way power consists in the “networking of relations, in the 
way in which moves in the game implicate others as allies or adversaries in one's 
interpretation of what the game is.” The suggestion is that such networking or relations, 
such constructions, are themselves sources of power and that there is no escape from such 
an analysis. Perhaps, he argues, “we are as much condemned to interpretation as we are 
to strategies of power." (Clegg 1989 p38) This observation prompts me to ask what is the 
purpose behind my own attempt to interpret the nature of power. For example, is my 
attempt to analyse the networks and relationships of power that characterise my own life 
and organisation, an attempt as an overt conflict theorist to acquire power in a way that 
identifies allies and adversaries? Although I hope that this is not necessarily the case, I 
have developed sufficient circumspection to know that it is a question I cannot 
immediately answer.
How then does Clegg construct his vision of power? The three “distinct but related” 
concepts of power described in his framework for analysis are ‘agency’, ‘power and 
resistance’ and ‘episodic power.’
Agency
Agency, is not a generic term for ‘people.’ It refers to the collective forms of decision 
making of the kind that takes place in organisations. The concept of agency is seen in the 
“purposeful goal orientated action” that characterises organisations. The purpose of all 
forms of agency is the “achievement of control produced by discipline.” Consistency of 
action and thought, coherence of action and view and memory of self are all phenomenon 
that are “learned and accomplished”. When this is achieved organisationally, it results in 
the “stabilization of power relations across an organizational field of action, and thus 
between many subjectivities, rather than simply within one embodied locus of 
subjectivities." (Clegg 1989 p i88)
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The mechanisms of such organisational control manifest themselves through the 
disciplinary practices of surveillance. Such 'disciplinary practice' not only normalises 
individuals but also other collective organised bodies through comparative data. Such 
surveillance, which is more than simply a question of direct control, may be personal, 
bureaucratic, performance, legal, ethical, persuasive, enabling or morally endorsing and 
represent “the extension of direct, personal supervisory control into notions of individual 
space which previously were private.” (Clegg 1989 pl91)
From my perspective in hospital, this surveillance can be seen in at least two ways. 
Firstly, in the way that I am normalised by disciplinary practices and secondly by the way 
that it ‘entitles’ one as a doctor to undertake surveillance of patients. The first is an 
example of constraint that the organisation imposes on me, makes me ‘obedient’, in 
return perhaps for the second, the assumed power to impose constraint on others, to make 
them ‘obedient’. In the last few years there has been a considerable growth in the 
development of such surveillance centred on the acquisition of data. For example, every 
department is obliged to audit some aspect of the organisational process in a manner that 
adheres to a recognised audit methodology. This identifies actions of the organisation and 
individuals that departs from normal so that incorporated within the methodology is a 
mechanism that suggests action to restore normalcy. This includes audit of quantity and 
quality such as surgical throughput, surgical results and complaints. This is extended to 
include comparative data with departments in other hospitals with centralisation of such 
data by medical institutions such as the Royal College of Surgeons, institutional bastions 
of disciplinary power. Self surveillance may be important as well in maintaining a profile 
that is not made visible by the organisation’s own surveillance procedures.
Such restrictive agency power to make me ‘obedient’ is offset by conferring on me the 
power to make others ‘obedient’. As a doctor this is perceived as the medical surveillance 
of patients, which include not just medical but personal questions as well. This 
surveillance underpins the routine questions that form part of the routine clinical 
examination. I have a sense (which may be an assumed privilege I have as a white male 
doctor) that I am entitled to ask almost any question in the interests of supposedly
276
understanding the problem. The way I have been taught to ask such questions also 
suggests that I have access to a repository of normative data. For example, take the 
question that forms part of the routine history taken from a psychiatric patient; How often 
do you have sex each week? This question, which I was taught to ask every psychiatric 
patient regardless of the problem, can be seen as an invasion of privacy. We were taught 
to ask this and other awkward questions in a certain way; How often do you have sex 
each week, never or 20 times? The espoused purpose of asking a question in this way was 
to create the environment for an ‘honest’ answer. The theory in action may have been to 
suggest that as a doctor you possess a body of data encompassing the complete range of 
possibilities in the community and a clear conception of what constitutes the 'normal' 
number of times.
The existence of agency suggests a relationship where empowerment was dependent 
upon being ‘obedient’. Clegg argued that agency directed delegated routines with 
discretion in a way that could inhibit or empower. He drew attention to the relationship 
between power and discretion, to what he called the “central paradox of power”. If the 
power of an agency is increased in principle by that agency delegating authority, then the 
delegation of authority can only proceed by rules. These rules necessarily “entail 
discretion and discretion potentially empowers delegates.” From this process arises the 
“tacit and taken for granted basis of organizationally negotiated order” that resulted in 
what Foucault referred to as “interiorized normalizing gaze of professional self­
regulation”. (Clegg 1989 p200-201)
Such a model of agency with many other agencies such as a hospital needs to consider 
the relationship one agency might have with another agency; what Clegg called a 
“disciplining of the discretion of other agencies.” (ibid) I perceive hospital life as a 
myriad of mostly professional agencies. These include not only the medical agencies of 
the Royal Colleges, the General Medical Council and the Medical Defence Societies, the 
General Nursing Council but also the many organisations that represent operating 
department assistants, physiotherapists, pharmacists, audiologists and other medical 
personnel. Furthermore, there are those in essentially non-medical tasks such as cleaners
277
and porters, who can exert agency as well if they chose not to clean the ward or take 
patients to theatre. What are patients to make of the many different agencies they 
experience in hospital competing for their attention, from the nurses, to the various 
doctors, to the porters, to the cleaners? What is also noticeable is the lack of agency that 
represent the patient, only the Community Health Council as far as I can see, who have 
no visible representation in the hospital. This contrasts to the many that represent the 
interests of the professions that work within the hospital. Over all of this the hospital 
management is attempting to generate strategic agency through the “disciplined 
discretion of the agency of empowered authorities, to enable creativity which is embued 
with positivity yet still constrained by discipline." (ibid)
I sense that such professional agencies strive to gain ‘improved’ positions with respect to 
each other. Evidence for this may be found in the following observations. I have noticed 
in the last twenty years of medical practice how pharmacies have gained control of drug 
prescribing so that at the present moment I can only offer patients a limited choice of 
drugs from a formulary drawn up by pharmacy. This is in contrast to no restrictions at all 
when I first qualified. The opening paragraph of the introduction to Project 2000, the new 
vision for nursing in the next millennium contains the statement, “the nurse is not the 
hand maiden of the doctor” and that the nurse is the “advocate of the patient”. I notice 
that the sign at the top of the bed has the patient’s name at the top, the consultant’s on the 
bottom and the nurses in between. I am left wondering if there is any significance in this 
order.
Valerie touches a little on this when as she notices the complex agencies that pervade 
ward life. Although this extracts includes other observations, for example the way access 
to certain groups is restricted, the general tone of the passage is noticing the existence of 
various interested groups and the pecking orders that exist therein that may restrict 
access. From her observations patients find it easier to gain access to the cleaner than the 
doctor, which may not be surprising, but she detects barriers that help to maintain this.
She notices the uneasy relationship that exists between nurses and doctors.
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V: And the other part o f it I  think is the, the awe in which the medical profession is
still held by people generally, most o f all by patients, prevents many people from feeling 
that they can address issues about their treatment with their doctors; indeed they rarely 
have the information to do so. The language o f the medical profession is very technical 
and specialised, whereas the concerns o f patients are usually voiced very much in terms 
o f their feelings, intuition andfear o f consequences. In addition fear o f the unknown 
plays a large part in a patient's comfort and it is rare for this to be dealt with in a 
supportive way by staff without underestimating a patient's ability to understand what is 
going on.
Patient’s fears or enquiries are likely to be addressed to the staff, who are readily 
accessible to them, the less qualified grades o f nursing staff. Although these nurses are 
often most sympathetic to patients, they too have little or no access to doctors and in 
passing messages up the chain o f responsibilities they can get distorted and delayed. 
These worries are often not passed on to doctors in a way that will produce the required 
information. The ‘named nurses ’ system o f allocating specific nurses to patients 
throughout a stay in hospital depends greatly on the ability o f the nurse and can be 
frustrating fo r  patients since to some degree it blocks access to someone who may be 
more sympathetic; but most o f all in the several stays in three different hospitals I  have 
experienced recently this system is very unpopular with nurses, who simply don't operate 
it.
Although much has been done to make hospitals more friendly places, including breaking 
down what seemed fearsome hierarchies o f anonymous staff, according to all the patients 
I  have spoken to, it doesn't help i f  they are left not knowing where they are. Not wearing 
uniforms and white coats and nurses being apparently more on one level and known by 
their Christian names, not having matron and so on does not help i f  they don't know 
where they are in relation to staff. They need to know who to speak to i f  they want a real 
difference and who is accountable fo r  their daily welfare. They need to know that even 
more when they are really ill because they have no choice but to put themselves in the 
hands o f  a system which they fee l will be watching out fo r  them and have its own checks
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and balances. They need to know who can begin to make decision making, at least in 
part, accessible to them in a real sense.
(Appendix 3, Valerie)
Such considerations lead me to consider my position in the system, to what extent I am 
subject to medical agency, particularly in relation to this work. Part of the ethical position 
of this thesis is to contemplate a method of practice that attempts to make transparent to 
the patient aspects of the conventional agency of medicine. In this respect I am applying 
an element of discretion to my practice, that may or may not depart from the ‘normalising 
gaze of professional self-regulation’. This may be laudable but what is the disciplinary 
process monitoring my part in all of this? My first response is to suggest that it might be 
my role as a researcher but this in turn prompts the question What are the agencies 
disciplining my role as researcher? I cannot help but notice that I have adopted a research 
agency, a school of management, that is outside the conventional agency of medicine and 
that this has been both fruitful and problematic. It has forced me to adopt practices of 
validity, in particular the relationship between data and inference, which brings to my 
attention the many assumptions I have made as a doctor. Although this may appear to me 
to have generated insights, the difference between these two agencies and the approaches 
offered by them may not in reality be particularly great. What if a patient where to enter 
the system with an approach to agency that is radically different from my own. For 
example, their system of medical belief may be founded on an entirely different authority 
from the conventional medical one. For example, David explains how he derived great 
comfort from faith healing.
So I  went down to see this chap and uhh I, I  had what he terms as 'healing' 
off him (1) andfelt considerably better (2) umm. At that time the (2) tumour 
hadn ’t manifested itself again, it was after radiotherapy but before (1) umm I  
got it in the neck and the (1) just in front o f my ear there (2). But I  had got 
great problem with my left eye. The vision was down to (1) no more than 5%
I  reckon at that time. It was blood shot all the time and it was acutely 
painful, very, very dry, uhh, extremely light sensitive and after one visit to
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this bloke, it was all right again. Slightly blood shot but visions (1) I'd say 
95% again and I  thought, that's fairly odd, (laughter,)
R: Mmm
D: Very odd in fact. (2) From there, I  took a lot o f time o ff work, had 3 
months work out actually and I  started to read all the great Eastern religions 
again, brought books all over the place and I  started to have a look at 
spiritualism. Umm and it was fascinatingly similar to a lot o f the Eastern 
religions (4). From the reading o f the books, I  eventually (2) put a little bit o f 
credence in what was uhh being said and I  tried to see this faith healer that I  
had initially seen down in Wales again, it’s a long way, he's an exceptionally 
busy man, people come from  all over the world to see him and uhh it was 
getting more and more difficult to see the bloke so eventually I  went locally to 
the spiritualist church and umm they have been giving me healing down there 
on a (2) weekly basis fo r  about (1) 10 weeks now (1) during which time I  
have improved enormously. You, you can probably see the lump in the side 
o f my neck, I  don’t think that's huhh, since you last saw me I  don't think you’d  
see a great difference in that.
And later he suggests that I did not take this seriously enough
D: No. No, not at all. I  think (3) there was just one, one, one element when 
I, I  started to tell you about going down to see this bloke George in Wales 
R: Yes, I  know, I  remember that.
D: "Don't Dave, don’t tell me". (Laughter.)
R: DidI?
D: Yeah, yeah. ( Laughter). And I  thought well, come on Richard that’s a bit 
closed minded. (Laughter).
R: Thank you. I  think the trouble is, umm, I, I, I, I  will try to be more open 
about these things. It's very difficult. What, what ends up umm is people 
start asking advise about whether or not they think 
D: Yeah.
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R: they should go but the trouble is, I  have no experience at all 
D: No.
R: I  don't, I  don't know anything worthwhile about the set up 
D: Mmm
R: and I  (1)1 am careful to only claim any kind o f experience or knowledge 
or expertise in rather a narrow area but I  am aware that there are, there's 
much more 
D: Mmm.
R: to the whole business o f  disease, medicine and life with the narrow 
perspectives that, the Western tradition probably gives us 
D: Mmm
R: but I  have to be very careful about claiming to be an expert.
(Appendix 1. David)
In a sense my claim to be radical, to view the practice of medicine from a truly radical 
perspective is a sham. I would more seriously challenge medical agency if I had adopted 
a perspective centred on a different system such as the traditional African system. I have 
not which suggests that I remain ‘obedient’ at heart to conventional medical agency. 
However, I might argue that part of my position is to mount a certain resistance to an 
established position and such resistance, I would argue, may generate understandings.
Power and resistance
The second of Cleggs ‘circuits of power’ is the concept of power and resistance. In this 
respect he emphasises the relational quality of power and suggests that people “ 'possess' 
power only in so far as they are relationally constituted as doing so.” Power will rarely, 
if ever, occur without resistance from some quarter. This may either “consolidate itself as 
a new power ('organisational outflanking') and thus constitute a new fixity in the 
representation of power, or it may be resistance to the exercise of power which leaves 
unquestioned the fixity of the terms in which that power is exercised.” (Clegg 1989 p207- 
211) This implies that there is always a dialectic to power, that any individuals position to
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marshall influence will be, to a greater or lesser extent, diminished by another agency’s 
power. According to this approach, as doctors adopt positions of power, they are likely to 
observe that patients will resist any expression of power to a greater or lesser extent.
In the medical context, attempts by patients to do this may be hampered by the fact that 
the language used to mount arguments by both patients and doctors may be different. The 
former may use everyday descriptions and the latter biomedical descriptions. One way 
for each to resist the power of the other is to fail to play the game and “try to resist the 
meaning in which one is being implicated in the other's moves." (ibid) An alternative 
approach is to learn the language of biomedical descriptions well and engage with 
doctors using their own jargon. I noticed, as Valerie gave her story of her illness from 
childhood to adulthood, just how rich in biomedical terms her language was, which 
suggests a strategy to overcome the problem.
R: Thank's Val There are lots o f questions I  want to ask you but the one o f the
things that I  noticed, was when you described it all that you use a lot o f very conventional 
medical terms and a lot o f the medical language. I  mean it's a very sophisticated 
description and I  would think from a medical point o f view, you're extremely well 
informed. Is that how you view it all? Is that how you construct it in your mind?
V: It's the way the doctors tell me.
R: Does that, does thatfit in how you'd like to see it or have you just found? ...
V: Yes in a sense that I  want to understand the doctor’s language so that there is less
o f a divide between us...............I  don't think one can underestimate the umm knowledge
that anybody with a chronic illness gets o f  their illness and they certainly have a very, 




She went on to tell of an occasion when this knowledge had allowed her to argue in 
favour of one treatment against the advice being given to her. This appears to have 
empowered her to successfully resist the advice being offered to her.
Patients who arrive with a special understanding of their problem gained from medical 
textbooks or the internet, seem to generate more questions and consequently take much 
more time in the clinic. This would not really be very surprising, but as a researcher I 
started to pay attention to the way in which this happens. Familiarisation with biomedical 
language seems to enable patients to mount more effective resistance to my propositions, 
which in turn obliges me to shore up any arguments I have made with more information. 
In other words, resistance generates knowledge, an idea put forward by Foucault and 
which I discuss in more detail later. I also noticed that if I departed completely from 
biomedical language and use everyday descriptions instead, this would also generate 
more questions in the same way. My evidence for this was that in both these situations 
the clinic consultation time will be lengthened, a validity issue alluded to earlier in the 
thesis. What both these points suggests is that language may be used to limit 
opportunities for questions or to mount resistance to action. Consequently one of the 
difficulties associated with a strategy that is designed to empower patients by addressing 
the problem of language as a barrier to communication, is a clinic that over-runs. In my 
discussion with Patrick, we considered for a moment the problem of time and explanation 
in the clinic.
P: The, the second one is, is that uh uh the uhh consultation time that uhh the patient has, 
the opportunity to, to explore with doctor his fu ll (1) medical condition.
R: Mmm.
P: Uhh that’s umm that’s very limited and I  went away often I  accepted it 
R: Mmm.
P: and oth’, other patients accept it because you, you as a doctor uhh in a, a year for  
example will see what, a hundred and fifty different patient? Perhaps even more and 
maybe less that’s very uhh conservative but you have to share your time with 
R: You may be surprised i f  I  tell you it’s more like three or four thousand.
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P: Well you have to share your, your three hundred and sixty five days amongst those 
three or four thousand patients 
R: Mmm.
P: uhh many o f uhh o f whom will have very serious illnesses because o f  the nature o f 
your the work you're in. Uhh you also have a home life uhh therefore the umm the 
thinking time that you can give to your patients uhh and the interchange that you can 
have with your patients is extremely limited. The patient however, has all the time in the 
world. Not only that, he is traumatised to the point where he excludes all other thought 
and his thoughts centre on his problem and they roll around the brain endlessly. I  know, 
Fve been through it.
R: Right, well I  mean, sorry, sorry to interrupt but what I  was suggesting to you was that 
perhaps that is, that is the way the organisation is set up to prevent too great an 
interchange in discussion with quite difficult emotional issues which might include (1) 
y cancer
P: Yes, that’s right.
R: I  mean that's certainly emotionally it's not intellectually the xxx thing to do but if  your 
whole day is, is uh like that it can become exhausting and I, I  just wondered i f  you had a 
sense that the way things are set up is to prevent too deep the discussion.
P: No, no, I, I  think I, I, I  have to say that o f all o f my doctors that they, they applied 
their time and their thoughts in the best way possible to help me.
R: Right.
P: I  always felt simply that the number o f patients you see, which is fa r  more than I'd  
realised actually, is so great that your time o f necessity has to be shared.
R: But Ijust, I  didn't want to give you a sense o f not being umm o f being less important 
because you're part o f the greater number 
P: No, no.
R: But just the reality o f it is
P Oh yes I  understand that, no, I, I  have no, no gripes about this. I  think, we have how 
many doctors to the population? One in, I  have no idea but one in a thousand is it? I ’m 
not sure.) Appendix 2, Patrick)
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What Patrick appears to be suggesting is that underpinning this notion of resistance and 
knowledge is an unwritten agreement about how much time can be spent with a doctor. 
For on the one hand his mind was full of thoughts and questions he did not ask but he 
went away broadly satisfied with the system. The doctor is prepared to give a patient all 
the time he or she needs. The patient is prepared not to ask for it. Such a position suggests 
that something is present in the process that discourages too many questions; resists 
desire for further knowledge. The maintenance of this contract may depend on subtle 
agreements that underpin this game. What happens when the rules are disregarded? In the 
gossip that exists between doctors, I notice widespread irritation with any patient who 
arrives with numerous articles on a particular medical problem and who proceeds to ask 
large numbers of questions.
There are two particular situations when the rules of the game may be disregarded. These 
are when the patient is contemplating a serious illness and when confidence in the doctor 
has been lost. In both these situations, it seems to me, the patient is not surprisingly 
inclined to take much more control, to take power, and overcome the resistance that 
discourages too many questions, or independent action on the part of the patient.
David, faced with a life threatening illness, was offered a second opinion and went to 
arguably the most prestigious head and neck cancer unit in the country. He was seen in 
the clinic by a well-known surgeon who strongly and uncompromisingly recommended 
radical surgical treatment. I asked David how he would have coped if that had been his 
only experience of treatment.
R: What, how do you think you'd have coped i f  you'd met a surgeon who 
hadn't discussed with you the option o f doing nothing? (1) Perhaps 'nothing' 
is the wrong word, o f treating it conservatively or with alternative, none 
traditional (1) medical methods?
D: (Intake o f breath.) Hooh crickey. That is a difficult one.
R: Could you have been sucked into the system do you think and , and not 
allowed your own choices or do you think you would have, you'd have, you'd
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have blocked that?
jD: Yes I  would, without a doubt. I  think uhh (2) if, if, i f  you, you look at 
structured Western civilisation there are all sorts o f organisations who would 
dearly love to run your life fo r  your and (Laughter)
R: Right.
I>: and try to on regular basis and, and I'm cognoscente o f the fac t that you, 
you could be aware o f it all the time, uhh, so no I, I  wouldn't be forced down 
any particular route I  don't think.
(Appendix 1, David)
Given the circumstances of his problem, getting the ‘right’ answer was 
important. He seemed to indicate that he would be able to resist this medical 
agency with considerable certainty. Patrick recounts an occasion when he lost 
confidence in his doctor and took a decision to have more control on his 
treatment.
P. Huh, now you can understand, I  think, that umm at this moment i f  we freeze this 
moment in time uh there was I  worrying about a cyst, being reassured by all o f my 
doctors that I  had no umm cause to be alarmed about it in any way and suddenly ()  uhh 
it is cancerous and I'm right. Umm, the uh, the confidence in my doctors at that point in 
time dropped quite uhh considerably. And that's not to say that I  wasn't respectful o f my 
doctors and what they'd done fo r  me uhh but I  didfeel at that moment. I  remember saying 
to myself “ be careful here; you're going to have to protect yourself in this situation and 
be very much involved in the decision making. ” I  think that's a natural reaction fo r  any 
patient to make.
(Being "right” boosted my sense o f willingness to take an independent stance on decision 
making. That is to say, it gave me a private inner confidence as distinct from a 
“confrontational ” confidence. Note added by P when reading text)
R: You mean in terms offurther treatment and what you've decided to do.
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His sense that the system was error free was shaken and as a result he took more control. 
The manner in which he portrayed this is interesting. Rather than overtly resisting any 
recommendations made to him he talked about a “private inner confidence” suggesting 
that disguised beneath an espoused theory of diplomacy, there might be a theory in use of 
resistance.
I do not see such action by David and Patrick as just exercising resistance to an episode 
of power but of exhibiting behaviour that the organisation would consider disobedient.
Episodic power
Clegg’s third ‘circuit of power’ was episodic power. Episodic power “may be conceived 
as occurring within a reasonably well delimited framework in which there are systematic 
relationships between agencies and events.” In other words something has to be seen to 
have been done in order for episodic power to have been exercised. This contrasts with 
the “dispositional” concept of power, that ‘structures’ agency and which is linked to the 
notion of a capacity to exercise power whether or not this is exercised. Clegg maintained 
that episodic power is “grounded in resource control”; there are some resources that can 
be activated in any struggle for power. Such resources are “deployed not promiscuously 
but with some target in view.” The exercise of episodic power is a balance between 
achieving target and restricting the access of others to resources. (Clegg 1989 p212-217) 
Such a sovereign conception of power, linked as it were to action, feels more familiar as a 
conception of power in a surgical discipline linked also to action.
What are the resources to be deployed? Obviously, these include resources controlled by 
the doctor. These include not only access to treatment, but access to information or 
expertise. General practitioners act as the “gatekeeper” to specialist opinions, and 
specialists act as gatekeepers to specialist knowledge and expertise such as surgery. It is 
also necessary to consider resources at the disposal of patients, which include paying for 
treatment. Resources are not always financial and I am conscious of the satisfaction to be 
had when treatments are successful and this is acknowledged by patients.
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Clegg concludes his complex picture of power by indicating that power is represented in 
a  number of different ways. It is “present as each specified modality of episodic, 
dispositional and facilitative power.” It is also present in the “overall flow of action 
through the circuits of power and the relational articulation which will constitute the 
calibration of this flow.” (Clegg 1989 p213) His metaphor o f ‘circuits’ conjures up an 
Image of electricity flowing from place to place, giving of fields of force depending upon 
its configuration at various points like magnetic coils and causing action at others like a 
light bulb glowing. Even the notion of resistance has its parallel in ohms’s law. In this 
respect it is an explanation conceptualised in any everyday phenomenon but as a 
positivist such an idea makes me feel comfortable and suspicious.
Marshall’s approach
Marshall draws attention to four assumptions that underpin many current models of 
power. They are that “power is competitive, a matter of individual ownership, motivated 
towards control and expressed through doing.” She unpicks these assumptions to put 
forward an alternative vision which is “co-operative, based on joint ownership, directed 
towards influence and expressed in individuals' quality of being." (Marshall 1984 ) 
Marshall’s four dimensional map describes power in terms of “over others”, “structural 
factors”, “through and with others” and “personal power”.
Over others (1)
Coercion; reward; ability to access organisational rewards (and punishment) for others; 
formal/positional/legitimate; expert; referent/charismatic.
Structural factors (2)
Centrality to organisational tasks; handling uncertainty and risk; relative number; 
visibility; power through difference/new perspective.
Through/with others (3)




Competence; wholeness; self-esteem; autonomy; definitional sensitivity and capability; 
stamina/resilience; change and regeneration.
I see this description as a dialectical analysis of power. Although all of these are 
conceived as different kinds of power, the first two seem to highlight the ‘conflict5 nature 
o f power and the second two highlight the ‘nuturing’ quality of power. This competition/ 
nurturing dialectic seems to me to ask questions about purpose underlying power that 
simultaneously encouraging diversity (through competition) and stability (through 
nurturing) as potentially key elements of a productive social reality. It suggests that the 
balance between all these elements is important in maintaining a system that is apparently 
functional. I can only resolve this in my mind by drawing parallels with the elements that 
ensure successful biological evolution; diversity in the midst of stability to ensure 
survival. I would like to hold this metaphor for a moment whilst at the same time 
describing this model in more detail.
The first dimension of the model, power over others, “relies heavily on traditional notions 
of power as a personal resource deployed to control the environment” but draws attention 
to the power whereby an individual can gain “access to organizational rewards (or 
punishments) for others.” (Marshall 1984 pi 08-109) Such a view of power sees power as 
a resource to “control the environment” and is essentially developed from French and 
Raven’s model. (French and Raven 1959). This first dimensional model is essentially 
episodic in nature and overlooks the “relational nature of the processes involved” and in 
doing so “encourages spurious notions of personal independence.” (Marshall 1984 pi 09) 
This model is particularly well reflected in the merit award system that recognises 
personal achievement of consultants within the medical system. Each year I am asked to 
submit a record of personal achievement, which is evaluated by a selected group of 
doctors from within the hospital. Two or three consultants are given merit awards. I 
cannot help but see this in biological terms as equivalent to ‘survival of the fittest’.
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The second dimension, ‘structural factors, acknowledges the “need and room for risk- 
taking as well as for risk-reduction” in any organisation. Innovation and difference allow 
an individual to become visible and if handled adroitly results in the “accumulation of 
personal credit.” (ibid) Such an approach is seen to be very context dependent. It is a 
recognition that within the structure of the organisation that the generation of difference 
is a necessity for ‘progress’ for without difference, selection of suitable strategy would be 
impossible. Again such a model has echoes of evolution in that change and hence 
adaptation is not possible without diversity.
The third dimension develops a theme of co-operation by “creating power through 
relationships”. These include “membership of informal networks, forming liasons to 
influence particular organizational issues, coaching relationships, social support, 
empathetic relationships.” (ibid) This idea of power, shared by Srivastra, is dependant 
upon appreciating the validity o f others' experiences and perceptions, to offer a greater 
capacity for power. (Srivastra & Barrett 1986 p321) Such relationships originate in a 
“wider attunement to the interests of the pair, group or community.” Such power may be 
“fragile and unstable” so that “in crisis it is likely to revert to competition." (Marshall 
1984 p i09-110) This third dimension power is at least partly if not wholly dependent 
upon collectively agreed goals so that the resilience of this may be dependent, one might 
presume, upon the manner upon which these collectively goals have been agreed. This is 
likely to have been expressed through language. It has its biological equivalent in mutual 
nuturing, the collective desire to ensure survival of your gene pool, your particular 
interests as long as they are allied to the interests of the group. Srivastra suggested this 
when he talked about an organisation that is “an open ended evolving system” which a 
fundamental belief in “the open, evolutionary process of organizing, a sense that the 
organization is not a closed determined structure but is in a perpetual state of becoming.” 
(Srivastra & Barrett 1986 p319)
Personal power is seen as “the sense of personal self-worth, an individual valuing and 
having access to all their characteristics through an aware, but not necessarily easily 
pleased self-tolerance.” (Marshall 1984 pi 10) It is a sophisticated concept of self-esteem
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“grounded in self-validation rather than ease in public relationships” the more usual 
definition of confidence. Such personal power is the means by which productive co­
operative networks are developed and maintained because of the attention paid to the way 
“situations and characteristics are being defined and valued by others.” An important 
element of personal power is seen in identifying characteristics that “threaten our 
integrity”, (ibid)
Such an analysis suggests that the relational characteristics are important. How does the 
individual whose power principally resides in informal networking, coaching and 
attention to wider issues respond in the midst of an organisation emphasising the value 
of competition and visibility. The biological metaphor makes sense to me because it 
suggests that all types of power are needed to generate a system that is healthy provided 
these competing forms of power are balanced. At the same time I am aware that such a 
position might serve to justify the continuation of competitive, opportunistic ‘leader of 
the pack’ behaviour. Such behaviour is considered characteristic of many white middle 
class males and whether this is seen as a positive quality might depend upon perspective.
Vince
Viice identified three related perspectives on power that “constitute a general picture of 
power in organisations: discursive power, disciplinary power and episodes of power." 
Diicourse in this sense is created “in the interaction between various phenomena, the 
social and cultural factors that determine the construction of meaning, the factors that 
coistitute institutional knowledge, and the various systems within which behaviour is 
deined." (Vince 1996 pi 34) Language and knowledge of all kinds are viewed as 
inaruments of power that impose form and order for the purpose of control.( Morgan 
1913 p389) By drawing upon the work of Fraser he constructs a picture of the way that 
discursive power operates in day to day life. These comprise;
1. The officially recognised idioms (i.e. ways of talking about needs, rights and interests)
2. The vocabularies available (e.g. feminist, therapeutic, religious etc)
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3. The paradigms of articulation that are accepted as authoritative
4. The narrative conventions available for constructing the individual and collective 
stories that constitute people's identities.
5. The modes of subjectification: or the ways in which various discourses position the 
people to whom they are addressed as for example, 'normal' or 'deviant'.
(Vince 1996pl34-135)
These elements of discursive power are seen as an expression of the “relationship 
between language (in a very broad sense) and power." (ibid) Habermas drew attention to 
four naively accepted assumptions about the nature of speech but which are made the 
subject of argument in discourse analysis. These are, first, “that what is stated is true; 
secondly, that the utterance is comprehensible; thirdly, that the speaker is sincere; and 
finally, that it is right for the speaker to be performing the speech act.” Discourse 
analysis claims to explore these assumptions by examining and testing such claims 
through rational assessment. Habermas argued that “inherent in all speech is an 'ideal 
speech act' from which the sort of'ideal speech situation' required for a rational true 
consensus can be derived”. In a truly democratic form of discussion ideas flow 
“uncoerced” and participants are free from any form of domination, manipulation or 
control.” He agrees that whilst this may never be achievable in practice, the very act of 
participating in discourse “carries with it the supposition that a genuine agreement is 
possible.” Without this supposition the “very meaning of speech would be called into 
question.” (Carr & Kemmis 1983 p i32-140)
The circumstances that would generate truly democratic discussion are dependent upon 
“equality of chances to assume speech roles. If this were to happen, all participants would 
have the same chance to initiate or to perpetuate the discourse, to put forward, to call into 
question, and to give reasons for and against statements, explanations, interpretations, 
justifications and the same chance to express attitudes, feelings, intentions and the like.” 
Truth , therefore, cannot be analyzed independently of'freedom' and 'justice', (ibid)
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Speech and text then brings to life the networks of relationships and power that inhabit 
our world in terms of parental, developmental, medical etc agencies that determine our 
choiices and behaviour. Inherent in this analysis can be found the “rules for reproving 
thos»e who fail to adhere to it." (Banister, Burman, et al. 1994 p i00) In this way power in 
all its forms and language are inextricably bound together. Vince links this idea to 
episodic and disciplinary power to ask pertinent questions about the assumptions that 
white middle class men make about their destiny and offers a pluralist view drawing 
attention to such assumptions.
"one of the things that white, middle class men are taught is to believe that we are
right....led to believe that the world will fall apart unless we hold ourselves together we
have not learnt that we do not have to be right...we have the right to control...defined 
authority in our own individual terms... ignoring a wider set of values.... education 
encourages us to recreate the world in our own image... see life as the exercise of power, 
not as learning how to exercise power."
(Vince 1996 p i40)
Clegg makes the same observation when he notices that “contingency reigns, albeit with 
a hegemonic personal cast” for past sociological observations have noticed that “certain 
male identities which are constituted in socially and economically privileged contexts 
will be routinely more strategically contingent for organizational decision-making, access 
and success in hierarchically arranged careers.” (Clegg 1989 p i98) This hegemony 
encourages us to “be competitive, rational and emotionless” to increase the probability of 
being able to get what we want from the world. Because these “value systems underlie 
organisation” such actions are given greater legitimacy, which means in turn greater 
opportunity. Such power gives “greater potential to act in a world defined by us” but also 
leaves us with the capacity to “be defensive about what we know” and chose not to act 
about it if we wish. This can be seen as a form of oppression as well as power, 
underpinned by an understanding of whose interest are served by any particular action or 
inaction. The value system that justifies action is that of white middle class values, in 
which others may participate if they accept such values. (Vince 1996 p l4 1-143)
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Can it be construed as an exercise of power if this is unintentional? Wrong would argue 
that such an unintentional exercise of power is not an example of power (Wrong 1979) 
but others, women and disenfranchised races perhaps would regard this as a naive 
approach. The issue here is the context, the structural power that determines context and 
such context is a fundamental social reality as far as these groups are concerned. (Clegg 
1989 pi 47) One could also argue that not only failing to recognise the presence of power 
based on the existence of a white middle class structure as an instance of power but also a 
denial of power’s presence is also an instance of power. So what does Vince suggests? 
Like Marshall, his analysis suggests that a shift towards accepting responsibility with 
others and “finding ways of integrating the rational, emotional and political aspects of 
ourselves” would allow us to challenge such assumptions in a way that might serve to 
unshackle middle class white men as well as others. (Vince 1996 p i44-145)
Valerie comments on the cultural, racial and gender differences that structure power 
relations in a hospital. This extract draws attention to the way certain doctors move and 
behave within an organisation, which suggests some ownership of the environment. The 
way a doctor can move noisily through the ward at night, which suggests that keeping a 
patient awake in this way does not matter. This contrasts with the attitude and demeanour 
of an Indian SHO, and the South American doctor/patient who seem to be offering a 
different approach. Whilst this account only represents one individual’s experience with 
only four other doctors, I recognise my own unconscious actions in the attitude of the 
white middle class doctor in a way that generates some embarrassment, a test of validity I 
have alluded to previously. The extract is rather long, but I perceive this as necessary.
The extracts in brackets are comments that Valerie made on reading the transcript.
V: I  said this to Dr X. He had a really, really lovely Indian SHO who you probably
know, who used to come into the ward very softly. I  noticed by the way that all the staff 
always called him by his Christian name not his surname which they didn’t do with most 
doctors but he would sit on you know, sit on the bed, he would smile at you. I f  he came 
into the ward and caught your eye, he’d  smile and say ‘hello, good morning ’ or
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something. All the other doctors, especially the young ones, they're terrified. They've got 
steel on the heels o f their shoes or at least they've mostly got hard shoes. They come 
across a ward, clack, clack, clack, all the way over. They ignore everybody's eyes. They 
never meet an eye and they go to the bench and thing, whatever and write it down and 
then they go and see their patient and it’s a kind o f totalfunnel tunnel. I t’s impersonal 
and all the rest and you can't, I  mean, it, it's been like thatfor donkeys years and I'm sure 
i t ’s it’s partly in the beginning fo r  doctors a kind o f mixture o f fear and apprehension 
and all quite human things as well but it’s also to do with esteem and arrogance and the 
different position in the hierarchy between the nurses and doctors. I  don't think it should 
be perpetuated you know when they come in. I  think it should be dealt with and I  think 
all doctors should wear shoes that do not make a terrific noise when they walk across the 
wards, especially at night.
R: What, what does that tell you about the hierarchy fo r  the position ofpatients in
the ward then?
V: Oh well patients are there to be seen when the doctor’s ready and only then.
R: You said ‘doctors' Are doctors on top and then nurses? Where do the patients f i t
into all o f this? Underneath, in the middle, on top?
V: Well I  mean, none o f them would be there i f  it weren't fo r  patients but I  don't think
they remember that (Laughter.) I  don't know where they fit. They're there. I  suppose 
they are. I  mean they have to be underneath, but it's not a, it’s not the same logical thing, 
as nurses and doctors are all employed for patients.
R: I  interrupted your train o f thought on this. You were talking about doctors going
through the ward making noise. That's what prompted me to ask a question. What is 
walking through a ward noisily at night saying about the environment.
V: I  don't think, I  don't think they think that consciously. I  don't think uhh, I  think
there probably is a lot o f apprehension in young doctors first going onto the wards. It 
must be pretty scary and I  also know that quite a lot o f you know, the way I  mean, i f  you, 
you are experiencing seeing terrific pain and suffering or whatever, they would need to 
protect themselves and build up their own way o f coping with it.
R: Yes
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V: and I'm not talking about myself at the moment, and they see it repeatedly all the
time and they have to develop a way o f  dealing with it. They have, I  mean, you can't 
react to that as maybe I  would or a patient would every time so they develop different 
ways o f dealing with it I  think 
R: Mmm.
V: according to their own personalities. For some it is easier fo r  patients to meet
than others.
R: But I  am suggesting that the organisation may allow a doctor to behave in certain
kinds o f way because, although you say it's a thinking process fo r  a doctor to walk across 
the wards noisily at night, the organisation somehow permits that as an acceptable act. 
Yes, there may be reasons fo r  that as you say.
V: Well they're allowed to wear whatever shoes they like. I  suppose lace ups or
whatever.
R: Well I, I, I  mean... I  meant that there may be reasons why the organisation
permits an unfeeling attitude to develop 
V: Mmm.
R: as a protective mechanism but that, that was your suggestion because it would be
exhausting to cope with suffering all the time.
V: Well I, I  was taking that into account.
R: Yes, well it's uhh
V: Well I, I  mean considering the number o f years I've been going in and out o f
hospitals, I've only really realised since that dreadful experience in the National how 
much doctors do vary, not only in their ways o f dealing with people but, you know, 
adequacy in their techniques in every way - and nurses. They vary as much as any group 
of people outside do. Maybe not quite as much but there ought to be a way, I  know, I  
hate to say this but that Registrar who came to take the second lot offluid out o f my brain 
at the National. I  saw him walking across the ward, not doing as I  thought he should be 
doing on a crowded ward, to take the flu id  out o f my brain with no curtains drawn. I  
should have said something. I  wanted to say something but even I, with all my experience 
and what you say, you know, I  couldn't.
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(At the National, when I  saw the registrar who was coming to take the second lot o f fluid 
out o f my brain, walking across the ward towards me, not doing as I  thought he should 
be, I  was terrified andfrozen. I  had the strongest gut feeling that I  should not submit to 
this - this man should not be a doctor and he didn Y know what he was doing. Numerous 
contradictory rationalisations crowded through my mind as to why I  should not stop him 
- on top o f which was a fear it would be more dangerous to try. The status quo, the 
institution - the best hospital - would prevail. This self conscious, arrogant young man 
was coming towards across a ward crowded with visitors, with a piece o f gauze already 
soaked in dark brown flu id  - drying rapidly - in one hand and a kidney bowl with syringe 
already set up with needle in the other. It was about 5.15pm, there were five visitors at 
the bed next to mine, three opposite and others elsewhere. He made no attempt to close 
the curtains round my bed and told me come and sit on the end o f the bed next to him. I  
was aghast. I  should have said something but I  couldn ’t)
R: Why?
V: Because I  wasn't sure that I  was right and because I  believed that my consultant
who was supposed to be good would not let that man do it i f  he was not good enough.
R: So you had belief, an intrinsic belief in the system?
V: Yes, it was a young consultant. As fa r  as I  knew I  was in the best neurology
hospital in the country - i f  not Europe. This man surely would not be in his position i f  he 
were not pretty special. My consultant had spent about ten to fifteen minutes chatting to 
me, leaning against the wall near the desk, before lunch. During this chat he told me that 
this procedure was not a problem unless o f course (he mimed) you pulled the flu id  o ff the 
brain too quickly. In which case you might cause a thrombosis - a stroke - or similar.
He departed with a friendly grin saying he would ‘get one o f his boys to do it. ’
(I desperately hoped in advance that it would not be the one who came. He had two 
registrars.) The man in question had personality problems that were openly discussed by 
the nurses, who said that he constantly told them he did not have enough confidence, this 
they did not believe since he behaved so arrogantly. He looked and dressed as though he 
might be a slick dealer in the 1980s stock exchange.
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He had brought me the consent form  for my operation on the night I  arrived. He had not 
expected me to read it and was very impatient when I  tried. It was impossible fo r  me to 
read it with him fidgeting and I  capitulated to the system since I  knew there would be no 
alternative, but I  asked him what would happen i f  the operation went wrong (neither my 
neurologist or surgeon had told me about the risks o f brain surgery.) He simply grinned 
idiotically and said “We 7/ make it better ”. I  gave up and he produced a fountain pen 
with red ink in it fo r  me to sign - in the circumstances it looked like blood He then tried 
to get an Indian - possibly Sikh - woman to sign and gave the same responses when she 
could not understand it. She was unhappy and refused until her husband came in later.
I  have since decided that although my consultant was or is supposed to be very bright - 
the pathologist husband o f the woman next to me had looked up his “form ” - he was still 
in his thirties and he probably lacked experience both o f casework and o f leading his 
team. I  know that registrars have to gain experience, but he was unaccompanied and I  
think in view o f the state o f my lungs the consultant should have taken particular care. 
Then I fe e l guilty fo r  even thinking that.
I've since form ed the opinion that Ok, you know, he may be a brilliant technician and 
brilliant surgeon but he has not had enough experience o f leading a team and he talked 
to me fo r  twice as long in the morning, the consultant, as it took the guy to take the fluid  
out o f my brain, he could have done it himself while he was talking to me. That sort o f  
thing, you know, happens, you know. I  suppose nobody's going to learn unless you're 
allowed to do things but...)
R: But what stopped you? What, what actually stopped you?
V: I  don'.t know, it was a complete nightmare because as soon as he'd done it and I'd
realised he'd done it practically in a second or two and I  thought, am I  still sitting here 
because the consultant had told me in the morning that o f course you can't draw fluids 
out o f the brain quickly like that.
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(I think I  thought his personality was too unstable and I  consciously spoke to him very 
calmly and quickly drew the curtains myself to shut out his audience, while he was telling 
me not to bother it would be over in a couple o f minutes. I  sat down on the edge o f the 
bed dreading it. He took ages to fin d  the right place along my scar, when he did he 
dabbed it cursorily, once, with the said piece o f gauze without resoaking it and set about 
getting the needle in. When he was satisfied he pulled the flu id  out very quickly - as 
quickly as I  would think you could get flu id  through a needle - and pulled it out and 
showed me it triumphantly. I  was sitting in shock actually thinking “Am I  still here?. ” It 
was bright (arterial) redfluid andfrothed to fill the entire syringe. He said “there you 
are - lOmls. ” And I  thought it was considerably more. I  said, still calmly “I  thought 
brain flu id  was a sort o f grey colour and he agreed it was but said there was a lot o f 
blood in this. I  wanted someone else to see it but I  couldn’t move.)
R: Yes.
V: The consultant said, you know, do it slowly. I  had a long conversation with him
and then suddenly this man comes in and does that.
R: Why did you allow it to happen?
V: Are you saying it's my fault now?
R: No, no, no, not at all. Can I  clarify that? I  don't think it's your fault.
V: No, it's a joke. I  know what you're trying to say but I  can only say that most
patients, without my, my experience would have been even less likely than I  would to 
have objected.
(Reasons: There was my belief in the system, considerably reinforced by the fact that I  
was in the specialist hospital in the fie ld  Also my choices about the management o f my 
illness over the last twenty years has meant that I  have not been in hospital much in that 
time, most o f my experience o f hospitals until then was earlier in more rigorous times. I  
personally think that procedure should not have been done outside a treatment room with 
a nurse present, but knew nothing about neurology and it all seemed outside what I  knew 
about.
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It seemed to me that the problems associated with the cyst in my brain were in all senses 
completely outside my control It is important to me to feel that I  have some control over 
my illness so that I  can act in ways that will not make it worse, and i f  not healing will at 
least make me fe e l better or more comfortable. With the brain there was nothing I  could 
do. I  had tried to exercise my weak legs to make them stronger, but all it did was totally 
exhaust me. The messages from the brain were not getting through. I  think this long and 
steadily worsening experience had already created a sense o f powerlessness.
All this was reinforced by the way the ward in the National was run. It took only 
immediate pre-op and very ill post-op patients who were mostly too ill to talk to each 
other. The nurses when not performing necessary tasks were always at their station,
talking to each other or the younger doctors. There is the story o f the paralysed, blind 
woman opposite me who I  found out did not know why she was there because no-one had 
told her. She, with all her limbs strapped down, wearing dark glasses and stuck two feet 
in front o f the television all day, with a perfectly active mind and voice ignored, 
epitomised to me the unpredictability and sense o f being wholly out o f control o f oneself 
experienced by neurological patients.
When I  had the major seizure about 3 hours after the withdrawal o f  that flu id  there was 
even in those split seconds as it happened a dreadful inevitability about it. The pain was 
o f an order which I  had not thought possible - it was inhuman. Electrical current not 
related to ones shape or previous sensations enough to fe ll a huge old tree. The next day 
it was all played down and my anger was too deep and confused to be expressed.)
R: Well what I'm suggesting....
V: But how could I  have got round it? You tell me. Apart from just objecting then
and making a fuss. You see, every patient thinks i f  they make a fuss then all the staff are 
going to lay into them from then on because they don't like people who make a fuss.
R: Yes.
V: The nurses don't like it, the doctors don't like it. In actual fact it's possibly the
reverse. I f  somebody does come in and demands to be treated properly in hospital
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nowadays, they usually make sure they are because they know this person’s going to 
make a fuss i f  they don’t, but that’s very rare. Nobody knows that and I, I  didn't even feel,
I  mean, knowing it andfeeling it is two quite different things. I  didn't even think that until 
later. I ’ve been over that moment so many times and I'm not over it now -  after nearly 
two years it is still a emotional drain on me and although I  have wanted to write and 
complain I  have been unable to do so. I  also think that the surgeon should not have 
allowed him to do it in my case. I  think, why should I  think that arrogantly but I  think 
that with lungs as bad as mine, that they should have taken extra care. Umm I  wasn't 
even told beforehand that you know, there was a possibility o f strokes or epilepsy with 
brain operations anyway.
R: So Val, you seem to suggest that not only was there the hospital, but behind that
there was, there was a kind o f surgical institution that’s giving authority fo r  them to do 
things to you.
(sorry did not really answer you here but there is another point)
(I don’t know whether I  can take that any further but I  would say yes, and the thing that 
made it worse was the degree o f blinkered specialisation that was going on, not only did 
they not take regard o f my situation with very bad lungs, but they could not even write up 
my respiratory drugs properly the whole time I  was there, in spite o f several times asking 
for them to be corrected. This in itself caused me some degree o f discomfort, before 
starting on my brain.)
V: Oh yes, that’s the trouble, the arrogance but on the other hand you see, I  don't
believe that in breaking down a, a hierarchy in a visual sense, say by uniforms
R: Yes.
V: or some other basic way is going to help. I  think it has, you have to maintain a
structure where there is a clear line o f authority and there's a clear means o f working.
R: Right.
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V: and I, I  think you have to absolutely have that. I f  you haven't got that the patients
will feel more insecure and I  think terribly so. I  don't like not even knowing who the staff 
nurse is, I  don't like not knowing who the sister is on the ward. Basically i f  you're a 
patient, you'll probably never do it, you'll probably never talk to them but the feeling that 
somebody there is actually, you know, responsible 
R: Yes.
V: fo r  what's going on helps you, it's a helpful feeling.
R: Yes.
V: It's still quite frequent that you'll get a sister who never talks to the patients at all
now.
R: So the structures are, you're saying are both, both helpful and inhibitory in some
ways so
V: No they're not inhibitory on the patients sides. I  mean, the structure itself and the
line of, line o f authority is good What, what's built up behind them is a kind o f an 
assumed position within institutions 
R: Right.
V: Which I  don't think is necessarily that conscious anymore in people but it, it, it's
habits, die-hard and the habits can be ways o f thinking not just doing things.
R: Mmm.
V: and umm Iju st think that if, I  know that there's a cut off point where doctors, as
I've saidjust now, need to protect themselves from breaking down in, you know, 
emotionally fo r  what they see all the time but they still have in some respects to look at 
every patient as a person 
(Appendix 3, Valerie)
Although this is one person’s experience, her complex analysis suggests that such 
assumptive hierarchical attitudes may be alarming if exercised unthinkingly but have the 
potential to be reassuring when exercised as part of a co-ordinated structure that is seen to 
work together. This suggests that patients may pick up conflicts between agencies (nurses 
v doctors) rather easily and when it happens it obviously undermines confidence.
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Torbert
Torbert’s distinctive contribution is to “conceptualise power in terms of a theory of 
developmental transformation and to integrate it into a discipline for action." (Putnam 
1993) He proposes four types of power; unilateral power; diplomatic power; logistical 
power and a blend of these three he calls transforming power. The ability to exercise and 
appropriately blend these four different types of power he calls “the power of balance."
This thinking is constructed around a theory of human development, seen in a description 
of child rearing after Rawls. At first the child will learn the 'morality of authority'. At this 
stage “parents unilaterally enunciate and enforce rules of conduct”, which represent an 
application of unilateral power. Such power will only become authoritative (legitimate) 
with “the power to generate moral development towards principled conduct if parents:
1 make just rules;
2 give reasons for them in an understandable fashion;
3 enact the rules they enjoin when the rules apply to them as well.
(Torbert 1991 p25-26)
In adult terms unilateral power is seen as "the ability to unilaterally and uni-directionally 
cause the outcomes one wishes", (ibid) although it should be noted in passing that this 
definition of power is not exclusive to unilateral power. Furthermore, such a concept of 
power is not exclusive to Torbert; Lukes’ first dimensional power is similar to unilateral 
power. However, one of Torbert’s contributions is to attempt to make a link between 
power and justice and in doing this he concludes that unilateral power raises particular 
ethical issues. For example, even in a ‘benign’ dictatorship exercising ‘benign’ decisions, 
what will determine the right or just decision? A utilitarian approach would argue that 
“the right or just decision is that which generates the greatest good for the greatest 
number. The good is that which increases pleasure and reduces pain for each.” (Torbert 
1991 p i7-18) Maximising pleasure and to minimising pain is to maximise utility. A 
utilitarian theory treats “desires as ends and reason as a subordinate and these
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perspectives implicitly require a kind of rationality that weighs, compares, and organises 
desires, rather than merely calculating how best to achieve them ” (ibid) Therefore, it still 
leaves unanswered the question, how is this to be done; how is the power to be exercised.
After unilateral power, the next stage of upbringing sees the development of diplomatic 
power, or peer consent. It occurs when the teenager “learns the 'morality of association', 
through participation on sports teams and other organizations with peers.” Conduct is 
based more on pleasing equals than on obeying superiors and is exercised, not arbitrarily, 
but in the context of “organisational goals and norms that are consistent with justice.” 
Positive experiences are associated with the principles of justice, which become explicit 
as the youth becomes more adult. Eventually the rules of justice gain allegiance in their 
own right so that “the adult becomes committed to a 'morality of principle'.” (Torbert 
1991 p21)
In adult terms diplomatic power is “generated not by the power wielder but by the power 
yielder-by the consent of the governed.” (ibid) This is most clearly seen, Torbert 
maintains, in the realm of entertainment and the media. The media and entertainment 
personalities, who have the mysterious talent to draw mass attention, become the source 
of far-flung enterprises. Their power is based on others' willingness to give them 
attention. In this formulation, true talent represents legitimate authority because it 
commands the power (and revenues) associated with the willingness of the populations at 
large to attend to it.
Logistical power is invested in those who in office have the means to redirect benefit or 
otherwise to others. If unilateral, diplomatic and logistical power are the means whereby 
we achieve change what are the principles of justice that we adhere to in modem society? 
Rawl (summarised in Torbert 1991 p25-26) suggests that they are that;
1. "each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic 
liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all."
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2. "social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: to the 
greatest benefit of the least advantaged and attached to offices and positions open to all 
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity."
Torbert argues that this second principle generates utilitarian results. “Inequalities of 
position and wealth (to which those with less would not consent, all else being equal) are 
to be tolerated only as these benefit those with less. In other words a person may consent 
to receive less income than another, if the additional income motivates the other to 
become a doctor and cure the less wealthy person. If persons with less income gain 
greater utility from being healthy than they would from the additional income, they 
would rationally prefer and choose this condition over that of having equal income but 
less health." This approach is based on the principle that we act as we would wish others 
to act towards us and “only in ways that treat ourselves and other persons as ends (never 
merely as means)". (Torbert 1991 p27)
By asking how each of these types of power relate to a particular conception of ethics and 
justice, he identified three problems that separate theory from practice. Firstly, even if a 
just society is created, how can one be sure that it’s citizens maintain a commitment to 
“to just outcomes and to maintaining the necessary institutions?” (ibid) Secondly, 
contemporary society cannot be considered just because in the process of child rearing 
“few parents meet Rawls's criterion of enunciating, explicating, and enacting principled 
rules in child-rearing.” (ibid) This is reflected in the fact that there is research to show 
that only a very small minority of adults in our society achieve a ‘morality of principle’. 
Finally, he asserts that Rawls's theory does not provide a vision and method for 
transforming the relatively unjust and corrupt society into one that is more just and 
displays greater integrity?
He then argues that to transform such a relatively unjust society requires a kind of power 
that goes beyond the unilateral, diplomatic and logistical kinds of power. He suggests that 
to do this requires a blend of the three types of power, which he calls ‘transforming’ 
power. The particular character of transforming power is adherence to the concept of
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‘mutuality’. A person exercising “transformingpower invites mutuality- a mutual 
exercise of power guided by a living awareness of what is currently at stake for the 
particular systems participating in the transformation”. This involves co-operation from 
“the inside and the outside” and its operation “requires a continual, humble ejfort-not just 
to be rational, but to be aware o f  the present moment in all its fullness. This awareness 
effort includes and transcends one's own material interests, emotional preferences, and 
intellectual theory about the situation, as well as those of others and the institutions 
involved. It also transcends the narrowness of the present and experiences how the past is 
growing into this moment and the future is growing out of it." (Torbert 1991 p29)
Torbert finishes his arguments by relating each of these stages of development to 
different leadership and management styles. Opportunists, Diplomats and Technicians 
construe power as unilateral, diplomatic and logistical respectively. Those who reach the 
stage of ‘achiever’ are able to integrate these three forms of power but to be able to 
‘exercise’ transforming power requires development beyond the achiever to Strategist, 
Magician and Ironist styles.
Torbert’s other contribution was to link these developmental stages, types of power and 
the exercising of them to different time frames. Immediate opportunities and emergencies 
often call for the use of unilateral power, equivalent to the opportunist stage of 
development. When tasks and role related procedures are routine, institutions give 
predetermined consent to undertake and fulfil these. Such is the role of the Diplomat and 
Technician. The time frame of these tasks undertaken by Diplomats or Technicians are a 
year or less with “primary excitement from carrying out three to nine month logistical 
projects.” (Torbert 1991 p73-75) Achievers and Strategists seek real underlying meaning 
and consider time frames of three to five years. Magicians and Ironists will be “pre­
eminently attuned to creating contexts for inquiry into the real call of organizational 
mission and into full experience of organizing across territories of purpose, strategy, 
operations ,and environmental impact” and not uncommonly consider time frames of 
seven to twenty one years, (ibid)
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Putnam and others drew attention to two dilemmas inherent in this construction. (Putnam 
1993) Firstly, “one can only appreciate those meanings that are at one’s own stage or 
below. It is difficult to research higher stages, both because they are rare and they may 
exceed the researcher’s capacity to understand.” The second dilemma concerns one of 
practice. It becomes easy for those who have achieved higher stages to devalue others 
who are at a lower stage. It may, for example, be hard to maintain a degree of mutuality 
in the face of an entrenched opportunist. At one level these appear to be major criticisms 
but I find myself wondering if the answer to them cannot be found in the time-scales in 
which such stages operate. The time-scales themselves reflect the time it takes 
developmentally to understand different sorts of power. Unilateral power employed by 
the opportunist is immediate. This is what the small child understands. Magicians and 
Ironists exercise ‘transforming’ power and utilise time frames of seven to twenty years. 
Without necessarily having recourse to any specific practice of my own, I can see how 
individuals, teachers and parents, have transformed my thinking and experiencing in a 
way that has created my current interest in inquiry. This transformation was undertaken 
with a purpose, strategy, operation and environmental impact, all components of 
transforming power. This thesis is largely about understanding transformations that I 
have undergone, transformations that have both enhanced and limited my view of the 
world. This insight, made over a period of time, make me gain glimpses of what is meant 
by the concept of transforming power.
How does Torbert’s concept of power reflect itself in clinical practice. As indicated at the 
beginning of this section, his concept of power may be reflected in the various 
frameworks of practice I have begun to find useful. These frameworks are summarised 
below. Although a more precise explanation of these various models and how they came 
to be developed will be presented later in this section, it can be seen that the pattern is 




Type 1 Observer/researcher Observer/participator
Type 2 Observer Observer/researcher/participator
Type 3 Observer/researcher Observer/researcher/participator
Type 4 Observer/researcher/participator Observer/researcher/participator
I can see in general terms a relationship between Torbert’s concept of power and the 
models of clinical practice I espouse. In the same way that Torberts construction of 
power developmentally progresses from unilaterality to mutuality, these frameworks have 
developmentally broadly tried to do the same. In type 1, when the doctor acts as observer/ 
researcher and the patent acts as an observer/ participator, the doctor could be said to 
exercise unilateral power. This is the kind of mode of practice I was encouraged to 
undertake as a young newly qualified doctor. Such a model ignores the role of disease 
context, emphasises the importance and significance of disease pathology so that the 
pathway from history to examination to diagnosis and treatment is one that is largely 
controlled by the doctor. At the other end, a type four framework would suggest an 
approach to mutuality, the espoused position of the strategist and beyond. In the same 
way that Torbert noticed that strategists employed unilateral, diplomatic and logistic 
power in a blend he called transforming power, I notice that in type 4 frameworks it 
becomes possible as a doctor to once more exercise unilateral power once more. This is 
an argument I propose to develop later. Similarly type 2 models, which I called the 
‘consumerisf model where the doctor invites the patient to make a selection from a 
number of choices, bears a resemblance to Torberts diplomatic management style.
Some selected philosophers on power
It is clear that in each of these four broad approaches of Clegg, Marshall, Vince and 
Torbert, the authors have drawn on the work of a number of theorists on power. These 
include particularly those of French and Raven, Lukes and Foucault. I propose examining 
these in a little more detail.
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French and Raven
French and Raven relatively straightforward classification of power identified five types.
• reward (the ability to reward to different ways)
• coercive (the ability to punish in different ways)
• legitimate (the perception of power as a right)
• referent (the perception as being liked, charismatic) and
• expert, (the perception as being knowledgeable).
(French & Raven 1959. p i55-165)
These different descriptions of power are based upon the assumption that there exists in 
organisations many different individuals and groups seeking to influence others in an 
effort to achieve certain goals. Clegg’s model might regard reward, coercive and possibly 
expert power as examples of episodic power exercised by agency in pursuit of agency 
objectives. Vince drew attention to a special kind of legitimate power white middle class 
men assume upon themselves and noticed the discursive power of experts in the way that 
they might use language. Marshall explicitly recognises the contribution of French and 
Raven in developing her first dimension power usually seen in organisational reward 
systems, but extended the idea to consider the power of access to these reward systems as 
well. Finally, Torbert might see reward and coercive power as examples of unilateral 
power, referent as overlapping somewhat with diplomatic power and legitimate power 
invested in those offices able to exercise logistic power.
Doctors, by virtue of their position, can exercise expert power. However, French and 
Raven observed that when the expert is not a member of the same group, doctors and 
] patients are members of different groups, then ‘expert power’ is more accurately 
) described as ‘informational power’. This distinction may be important because the
K
exercise of power in this context is based upon change of one party by another. 
‘Informational power’ alone will not be sufficient to generate change unless it is believed
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by the receiver to be credible. Credibility may be linked to a doctor’s legitimate power 
and, in this way, informational power may be enhanced considerably. Credibility will 
also be based upon “characteristics of the stimulus such as logic of the argument or the 
‘self-evident facts’”(French & Raven 1959. p i64) and in this respect is dependent upon 
the nature of the discourse between the parties. Furthermore, the regard society pays 
towards doctors, reflected in the ‘ceremonies’ that characterise outpatients, wards and the 
operating theatre, may enhance credibility even further. Expert power is therefore 
informational power that is credible. However, as well as being credible in its own right, 
the information, which forms part of the stimulus, must be seen to be within the boundary 
o f the expert’s experience. So that it must be concluded that expert power is credible, 
informational power within a boundary delineated by the field of the expert’s knowledge.
If  the expert attempts to influence another beyond the boundary of the expert’s 
knowledge and this is not regarded as credible by the second party, this may result in 
some undermining of the expert’s power because the notion of trust is challenged. The 
trust arises out of an implicit understanding that expert knowledge is offered firmly 
within the boundary of the expert’s knowledge. The second party may not accurately 
perceive when the boundary has been reached and so if the expert is considered to have 
crossed it, it may then call into question the reliability of the core expert knowledge itself. 
From that point onwards, the second party may chose to question all information that is 
imparted. As such, the boundary circumscribing expert knowledge is thought to be more 
clearly defined than say the boundaries of referential or coercive power.
This suggests that as an ear, nose and throat surgeon, my expert’s knowledge would 
become less credible if I were to extend beyond the accepted boundary of this specialist 
knowledge. It might be challenged if, for example, I offer an opinion in the field of 
respiratory medicine and certainly if I extend beyond the boundary of medicine altogether 
and offer an opinion upon the life and lifestyle of the patient. When experts manage to 
offer and have accepted opinions outside their area of expertise, French and Raven called 
this the ‘halo effect’. What are the implications of this in the clinical situation when 
doctors cross the boundary, which delineates their ‘informational power’? How does the
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‘informational power’ interact with knowledge that the patient may have about their own 
lifestyle and wish to bring into the decision making equation?
I was taught as a medical student that a characteristic of a ‘good’ doctor was to take into 
consideration the occupation and lifestyle of the patient when considering treatments. In 
principle this represents an attempt to place treatment in context. As such it can be no 
more than an attempt to develop an imperfect understanding of the lifestyle of the patient. 
A positivist might see such lifestyle context as not especially important (it is usually 
marginalised as bias). A constructivist would argue that such context is very important 
and :he principle expert in the understanding of such context must be the patient. As an 
espoused constructivist, I would adopt the latter view, but it still leaves the problem of 
how expert, informational power of medicine interacts with expert, informational power 
of the patient and their lifestyle. Another framework for decision making is needed.
A constructivist perspective allows me to argue that when the relevance of the disease 
and xeatment needs to be judged within the life of the patient then the patient must take 
overas ‘expert’, expert in their own lives. The basis of this is that it is generally easier for 
the patient to cross the boundary into the specialists ‘information’ domain and obtain 
infoimation to influence treatment decisions than the other way round. A doctor would 
provde a biomedical analysis of the clinical problem and offer treatment in a series of 
options, each with their pros and cons, and invite the patient to make a selection. This 
appnach forms the basis of the second decision making model, the ‘consumerist’ model.
Franework 2
Doctor Patient
T ypil Observer/researcher Observer/participator
Typi2 Observer Observer/researcher/participator
For (xample, there is a condition called otosclerosis, which results in a slowly 
progessive hearing loss. The cause is increasing fixation of the stapes, one of the ossicles
312
i that connects the eardrum with the cochlear. A type two approach would include a 
j description of the problem and a list of possible options, which might in this case include 
no treatment, the use of a hearing aid or replacement of the fixed ossicle with a prosthetic 
ossicle. The last surgical option carries with it a risk of 3% chance of a total hearing loss 
in the operated ear. The patient would be expected to ‘research’ their attitude to this risk 
analysis problem by determining what day to day problems occurred as a consequence of 
the hearing loss, and how well these were managed with the use of a hearing aid. Armed 
with this information a patient might over a period be able to decide on surgery or not. 
Such an approach is represented diagramatically in Figure 5.
Expert power is based upon information, the ability to provide information or 
‘informational power’ and the above would suggest that the expert would demonstrate 
such expertise by giving such information. Evidence suggests that “the professional is 
jealous of his prerogative to diagnose and forecast illness, holding it tightly to himself. 
But while he does not want anyone else to give information to the patient, neither is he 
himself inclined to do so” (Friedson. 1970. pl43) A number of suggestions have been 
made as to why this should be so. Lack of time, inability on the part of the patient to 
understand, failure on the part of the patient to remember what was said, objections 
concerning the ethics of conveying bad news and finally the difficulty about doing so 
have all been suggested. (Tuckett 1985. p i99) An further view is to consider expert 
information as a logistical resource, which is redistributed with care. The claim to a 
monopoly of expertise and knowledge has been one of the foundations of the 
professional’s claim to a privileged social and economic status and not one, it is argued, 
that will be given up lightly. Moreover, “a degree of mystification and admiration in the 
client, along with a devaluation of lay knowledge, is sometimes thought to bolster 
professional power” (Tuckett 1985. p5) This suggests that there might be good reasons 
why doctors control scarce knowledge in order to act omnipotently.’’(Tuckett 1985. p213) 
This attempt to maintain ‘mystification’ might perhaps be thought of as a remnant of the 






Figure 5. Type 2 The Educator/Consumer
It might be easier for the patient to take medical information and judge its 
relevance to their lifestyle than the other way round
I cannot leave an analysis of the nature o f ‘expert power’ without reference to the 
‘sleeper effect’ but it’s understanding involves an appreciation of the nature o f ‘referent 
power’. Referent power is based upon the identification of one person with another, in 
this case it might be the charisma felt for a particular doctor. If an individual doctor has 
positive expert power but negative referent power then the change expected from the 
application of expert power might not be forthcoming. French and Raven expounded the 
belief that “over the passage of time the subjects tend to forget the identity of the negative 
communicator faster than they forgot the contents of his communication... .there was a 
weakening of the negative referent influence and a consequent delayed positive change in 
the subject’s beliefs in the direction of the influence attempt (“sleeper effect”)”. (French 
& Ravenl959 p i64). They put forward experimental evidence to support the idea that if 
the negative communicator was reintroduced, it reinstated the negative effect on change 
in belief once more.
One would suppose that a doctor with negative referent power would find that they would 
change another’s behaviour over a period of time as their poor communication skills were 
forgotten, provided that the patient did not come into contact with them again. The stories 
of David, Patrick and Valerie would not necessarily support this view. Each recounted 
experiences of contact with doctors that was unsatisfactory at the personal level and who 
might have been considered to have negative referent power, and my analysis was that 
this rather made them question the nature of the expert or informational power given to 
them. Some of their stories took place over a time-span of several years and didn’t seem 
to display any weakening of the negative referent effect.
Doctors might also be expected to possess ‘legitimate’ power. “An influencer O may be 
seen as legitimate in prescribing behaviour for P because he has been granted such power 
by a legitimizing agent whom P accepts.” (French and Raven. 1959. p i60) Legitimate 
power in medicine is based upon the publicly owned regulations of the General Medical 
Council and the various Royal Colleges. These agencies invest their representatives with 
legitimate power, which probably explains why it is common practice for certificates to 
be publicly displayed in offices. It might also explain why they are so large. My
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i fellowship certificate of the Royal College of Surgeons measures 60 by 45 centimetres.
!
Legitimate power is said to be more robust, stable and consistent than referent power but 
is still dependent upon the correct application within a ‘specific set of regions’. Where do 
these boundaries begin and end? The agencies attempt to influence public policy of 
smoking, eating and exercise in the political domain and their representatives echo this by 
commenting upon smoking habits, eating habits, weight control, exercise in the clinic. 
This ‘disciplinary’ network suggests that legitimate power is invested in practitioners in 
return for adherence to the party line on policy. A type 2 model might challenge such a 
practice because this suggests a patient is entitled to argue that it is in his or her interests 
to continue smoking, not exercising and eating high fat foods.
Lukes
Lukes saw certain individuals and groups as occupying a disadvantaged position in 
society by virtue of class, gender and race. He put forward a three dimensional 
description of power.
• First Dimension. In which one individual or group forces another to do something.
• Two Dimension. In which one individual or group controls what comes into the 
agenda.
• Three Dimension. In which one group or individual controls the world view of others. 
(Lukes S. 1974).
Lukes’ concept of power is an all embracing “restrictive agency model” that arose out of 
a critique of Dahl’s formal model of power, the ingredients of which were found in 
classical mechanics. The emphasis is on a prohibitive ‘power over’ concept of power. 
Some have suggested an alternative ‘power to’ capacity or dispositional concept of 
power. This alternative conception is centred on a view of power that was capable of 
implementing certain enabling and disabling strategies vis a vis protagonists, should the 
I occasion arise. (Clegg 1989 p86) This distinction itself suggests that power cannot be
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regarded as a unitary concept and challenges the single model of power put forward by 
Lukes.
Each of the pluralist conceptions of power outlined earlier acknowledge the importance 
of Lukes’ model. Clegg’s framework of power explicitly draws upon the work of Lukes 
but takes the model to task for failing to address the notion of ‘best interests’ adequately 
enough. Marshall refers to one sort of power as ‘power over’ others. Torbert tries to link 
power to justice. He puts forward a model that tries to pay attention to purpose (justice) 
and strategy (the exercise of power) in a way that draws attention to the notion o f ‘best 
interests’.
My first reaction on encountering Lukes’ model was that it was particularly relevent 
when considering an understanding of power in a clinical situation. First dimensional 
‘positivist' power might be exercised in emergency situations, when a doctor attempts to 
coerce patients into adopting a course of action or when patients refuse to follow a course 
of action suggested by the doctor. When David went to London to seek a second opinion, 
the surgeon offered an opinion of what should have been done and David was told he 
“was mad” not to accept this advice. The doctor is attempting, unsuccessfully in this 
instance, to exercise first dimensional power. Similarly, Patrick was advised by a surgeon 
that he ought to have radiotherapy after the tumour on the head had been removed but he 
declined to accept such advice. In a vivid example, when on this occasion first 
dimensional power was successfully implemented, Valerie was sitting on the ward when 
a doctor took fluid from her brain.
When I  saw the registrar who was coming to take the second lot offluid out o f my brain, 
walking across the ward towards me, not doing as I  thought he should be, I  was terrified 
andfrozen: I  had the strongest gut feeling that I  should not submit to this - this man 
should not be a doctor and he didn’t know what he was doing. Numerous contradictory 
rationalisations crowded through my mind as to why I  should not stop him - on top o f 
which was a fear it would be more dangerous to try. The status quo, the institution - the 
best hospital - would prevail. This self conscious, arrogant young man was coming
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towards across a ward crowded with visitors, with a piece o f gauze already soaked in 
dark brown flu id  - drying rapidly - in one hand and a kidney bowl with syringe already 
set up with needle in the other. It was about 5.15pm, there were five visitors at the bed 
next to mine, three opposite and others elsewhere. He made no attempt to close the 
curtains round my bed and told me come and sit on the end o f the bed next to him. I  was 
aghast. I  should have said something but I  couldn’t)
(Appendix 2, Valerie)
It could be argued that third dimensional power is evident here as well. There are all sorts 
of factors that exert three dimensional power to silence Valerie in this situation. These 
include organisational such as staff uniforms, professional routines, the public nature of 
the encounter, surgical smells on the ward, and the implied withdrawal of resources, 
including expertise, if the patient fails to be ‘obedient’.
In first dimensional power, conflict is overt and the situation is analysed in terms of 
behaviour, concrete decision making and resolution of real issues; in other words 
something has to be done by A in the face of B ’s conflicting wishes. Lukes saw A’s as 
having power over B largely through A’s control over superior bargaining of resources 
and this suggests that failure to submit to A’s wishes may lead to withdrawal of A’s 
resources. (Clegg 1989 p90) This might explain why it is common for patients to express 
concern over what might happen if they chose to disregard advice given to them by 
doctors. Many are worried that doctors will react unfavourably and they, as patients, may 
be denied access to medical resources at some future point in time. For example, patients 
are often concerned at what would happen if they cannot accept a specific date for 
surgery. They ask if will be taken off the waiting list entirely for refusing to accept.
Second dimensional power is said to take place when the agenda is controlled by one 
party in order to influence non-decision making. In such a situation conflict is avoided, 
becomes covert and conflict issues remain only potential issues; they never fully manifest 
themselves. Non-decisions (overlooking for a moment the unmeasurability of non- 
decision making) are said to be made which are only understood in terms of interpreting
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an intentional action. Given such a situation, it is not possible to be certain that non­
decision making has ever taken place with patients in the clinical situation. This position 
can only be inferred from data and this inference cannot, by its very nature, be validated 
by inquiry on my part. To do so exposes the non-decision making strategy, which 
reformulates the situation into a first dimensional power situation. However, I am aware 
as a doctor that I may be trying to control agendas in order to influence non-decision 
making. So that in the description of a surgical procedure, I am aware of being able to 
make selections of what should and should not be included in such a description in order 
perhaps to influence the emergence of potential issues. For example, in the independent 
sector in medicine, financial renumeration is considerably higher for surgical procedures 
than it is for consultations. The payment for undertaking a tonsillectomy is £240 for thirty 
minutes work and there no expenses incurred by the surgeon in the procedure. The same 
payment for a consultation is £70 for which there may be expenses of £20 or £30 for 
secretarial and room hire. It is evident that if a patient elects to have surgery, the financial 
renumeration is much more attractive to the surgeon than if they chose not to have 
surgery. Understandably, this could be an issue that colours the way that the advantages 
and disadvantages surrounding surgery are portrayed and yet this influence is usually 
successfully kept from surfacing. No patient has ever asked me the legitimate question; 
Does the fact that you will be paid very well to perform this surgery on me, influence the 
way you present the case for surgery?
As a practitioner, I can see that I might use two dimensional power to control the agenda, 
limit the exchange of information and anticipate key issues before they emerge and try, if 
felt appropriate, to divert or block them. Others have also suggested that the doctor 
withholds information to ease the workload and shorten the consultation and patients use 
it to attain an end such as a desired prescription (Lorber 1975. p213). Tuckett observed 
“that both doctors and patients may limit what they say more in the interests of achieving 
their aim than in helping the other to understand their point of view.” (Tuckett 1985. p6)
Are there any procedures that make control of agendas easier? I am not sure but I have a 
sense that the use o f ‘structures’ in clinical consultation might help. By structures I mean
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the way that a consultation proceeds with a recognised order of history taking, 
examination, investigations, diagnosis and discussion of treatments. I notice that I am 
more inclined to interrupt a patient when they depart from this structure. I may not be 
alone in this feeling for studies of clinical consultations have shown that doctors 
interrupted their patients opening statement in 77% of occasions ( Beckman & 
Frankell984.p692-696). A structured way of conducting a consultation is taught to 
medical students at an early stage, almost from the first day they arrive on the wards. 
Great emphasis is placed on sticking to this order so much so that when a medical student 
is examined for finals, evidence o f ‘structure’ in the presentation of any knowledge is at 
least as important as the medical content of the answers themselves. Perhaps they are 
empowering structures, What Gordon called “control through rationality.” (Gordon D. 
1988. p i9). How do I know that structures are empowering? Because sometimes they 
disappear and unstructured interviews make me more unsure of my role. If  the patient 
starts to cry, or gets angry, and the interview departs from a structured format, it seems to 
leave everyone unsure what to do next and certainly I am conscious of suddenly feeling 
disempowered.
Finally, since second dimension power is about controlling agendas, which also includes 
control of time, mention should be made of the many ways that one can have to indicate 
that the consultation has come to an end. These techniques may oblige the patient to 
finish before they have obtained all the information they might wish to receive. This may 
include loss of eye contact, a shift to a non-medical topic suggesting that the business is 
over, interruption by the clinic nurse or offering a handshake. Is there a situation when 
these games cannot be played so easily? When the patient is a doctor as well, it might be 
argued that the patient is able to more easily recognise techniques used to control 
information, techniques that could conceivably enhance non-decision making. So that 
when a doctor sees another doctor as a patient, any limit on the time taken to fully 
discussed the problem is eased and such a consultation I sense from my own practice 
takes much longer. There may be other reasons, discussed earlier, why this should be so.
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Three dimensional power is when A controls the worldview of B and strives to keep 
conflict latent so that B appears to move autonomously. A supposedly determines the 
‘real interests’ of B. Understandings are achieved in this situation by analysing political 
agendas and information structures. For example, a doctor strives to determine what 
happens to a patient by constructing a whole worldview of information in such a way that 
suggests to the patient that only one choice of action makes sense. Similarly, the doctor is 
under the same process because medical establishments set up principles of good 
practice that serve to determine how these medical world-views are constructed. The 
doctor might believe that he or she is practising autonomously but in fact practice is 
shaped by education, hospital working environment and the rules of conduct of the 
General Medical Council.
How do doctors construct medical world-views for patients? It seems to me to revolve 
around re-constructing for the patient a socially sanctioned dominant view of the clinical 
problem in biomedical terms. The problem is translated from a problem described in 
terms of everyday words and similes to a biomedical description of pathophysiology.
This shift to medical discourse constructs a world-view for the patient, which I would 
maintain is then better understood and shaped by the doctor. “The physician wants a 
biomedical definition, in terms of a disease with known physical manifestations, which 
implies medical ownership, while the patient wants the definition to be in his or her own 
terms of the illness experience” (Mischler 1984). This intellectual property then 
‘belongs’ to the attending physician. This has, I would suggest, been developed to such a 
degree in contemporary society that a hegemony exists that provides the principal 
medical outlook for the whole of society. Can I credibly support this assertion with a 
typical example?
Consider what happens when a small child comes to the clinic with a hearing loss. This 
‘everyday’ problem would, after one visit, be turned into a ‘medical’ problem o f ‘middle 
ear fluid’ or, even more pathophysiologically, ‘serous otitis media’. Hearing loss is 
described in terms of decibel loss at different frequencies. Pathological changes in the 
eardrum are described as Tos stage 1,2,3 or 4. Speech problems are described as
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problems of central processing. Once this transformation has been made, then 
management decisions are based on research that has only measured these parameters. 
Patients do not have easy access to this language and this research and in this way control 
is exercised.
When attempts are made to translate the problem or the management decision from 
biomedical language back to everyday language, the metaphors used ‘to explain the 
problem’ may sometimes be seen as generating worry, and possibly dependence, by 
emphasising the importance and severity of the problem. For example, hearing loss in 
small children may be due to the presence of middle ear fluid. Such fluid is often referred 
to as ‘glue ear’. The use of this metaphor prompted me to start asking patients what such 
a description meant to them. It quickly became clear that its use conveyed the idea that 
the highly delicate middle ear mechanism was ‘glued up’; ‘araldited up’ as one mother 
said. This is an inappropriate mental image because the middle ear space is really part of 
the back of the nose and the fluid is more akin to saliva and not at all like glue. 
Deconstructed like this the problem sounds almost trivial so one is left asking whether the 
development of more worrying terms like ‘glue ear’ may be part of a subtle use of 
language to encourage certain courses of action rather than others. Wrong asserted that 
"the professional has gained a status which protects him more than other experts from 
outside scrutiny and criticism and which grants him extraordinary autonomy in 
controlling both the definition of the problems he works on and the way he performs his 
work." (Wrong 1979 p337)
Patrick voiced his suspicions that doctors construct arguments to encourage patients to 
adopt treatments that may not be in the patient’s interests but protects the doctor from 
future litigation.
P: Excuse me Richard. I  think that's a different issue because you were at that time, and 
I  can understand, believing that this was not the source o f the cancer and I  can 
understand the medical argument 
R: Arguments fo r  it.
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P: Yes, were in fa c t against that being the case, supported by the fac t that three other 
doctors said exactly the same thing with the same conviction so I  understand that Uhh 
the problem arises when the, when it's removed and it's found to be cancerous then in 
fact we have to decide uhh why it's cancerous. Is it 
R: Yes.
P: associated with the previous cancer? It's always been cancerous and it caused the 
previous tumour? Or it is another, it is a spurious event which has created a new cancer. 
So these, these are different analyses as fa r  as treatment is concerned.
R: So what you're saying is that people have decided to go ahead with radiotherapy to 
cover themselves as it were and therefore they construct an argument 
P: That's a terrible thingfor me to say.
R: xxxx 
P: But yes.
R: They construct on argument based around the idea that, that this must have 
undergone malignant change in the last two or three years
P: It was another factor, another factor which created the envelope o f  confidence. (2) 
This might have been the case 
R: Right.
P: and i f  it, i f  it had been the case then my argument uhh relating to the truth o f the 
history o f that uhh cancer, would carry and there would be no need fo r  radiotherapy.
R: Right so you, you in other words you were able, am I  right in saying; you were able 
to, to see through the the uhh the constructed world o f medical knowledge to see why, 
why that had been done because you were, you were given a series o f  arguments that 
created a good medical reason fo r  going ahead with radiotherapy but you were able to 
see that that was a constructed world because doctors were then able to do what they 
really wanted?
P: Yes.
R: without entertaining other possibilities 
P: Yes.
R: because you fe lt were the genuine ones.
P: Well I  thinks that's another arm to this actually which is that radiotherapy, sorry i f
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yom had a tumour, Remove it-radiotherapy!
(Appendix 2, Patrick)
It would seem, according to Lukes, that some social groups are generally prevented from 
achieving a correct understanding of their situation because they have passively accepted 
an illusory account of reality that prevents them from recognising and pursuing their 
common interests and goals. If that is the case, then who or what determines real interests 
and how is the possibility of our knowledge about such real interests realised? Lukes 
maintains that “men’s wants may themselves be a product of a system which works 
against their interests, and in such cases, relates the latter to what they would want and 
prefer, were they able to make a choice." (Lukes 174: p34). He is suggesting that it is 
possible for power to be exercised over an agent against its preferences but in its real 
interests or against their latent interests. This assertion strikes at the centre of one of the 
major assumptions that I have held as a doctor for many years. If, some years ago, I had 
been asked the question, how do I know whether I am working in the real interests of the 
patient, I am quite sure that I would have failed to understand the significance of the 
question. “O f course”, I might have replied, “isn’t that what a doctor is supposed to be 
doing. Why do you ask such a question?” The complexity and difficulty of answering 
such a question is made transparent by Clegg’s critique of Lukes in a number of ways.
Lukes takes the view that it is essentially responsible individuals, who are the agency 
exercising choice at the heart of the structures of power. “Agency, conceptualized in 
terms of moral responsibility, is the locus of individuals who chose their actions under 
conditions of more or less relative autonomy. Their responsibility is to choose whether to 
act in terms of their own selfish interests or some conception of the real interests of broad 
segments of society as a whole." (Clegg 1989 p98) Such choice, however, entails 
responsibility and this responsibility is not defined other than in terms of a responsible 
agent serving broad social interests. Clegg has critiqued this position in three main 
ways.(ibid) Firstly, he suggested that interests “are self ascribed preferences” whose 
existence can only be revealed under “conditions of relative autonomy and democratic 
participation.” In other words it is insufficient to claim to be acting as a benign agent; a
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structure of liberal political participation is also a requirement to assist in demonstrating 
that this is so. Secondly, there is no ethical framework on which to base any position. 
Finally, real interests may only be understood in moments of “extraordinary action” and 
are not usually understood during the more usual situation of subordination. This last 
point is especially pertinent because it seems to me that the power underlying the stories 
and experiences of all three patients described, David, Patrick and Valerie, is rooted in 
the “extraordinary action” that each find themselves. They are all confronting an end to 
their existence and this may have triggered, in these cases at least, a determination to 
exercise their real interests. David, when asked how he would have responded to a 
surgeon who might have insisted on treatment he regarded as not in his real interests 
replies:
D: Yes I  would (have blocked that), without a doubt. I  think uhh (2) if, if, i f  
you, you look at structured Western civilisation there are all sorts o f 
organisations who would dearly love to run your life fo r  your and (Laughter)
R: Right.
D: and try to on regular basis and, and I'm cognoscente o f the fact that you, 
you could be aware o f it all the time, uhh, so no I, I  wouldn't be forced down 
any particular route I  don't think.
(Appendix 1, David)
Patrick resorts to a careful study of risk in order to block the idea of follow up 
radiotherapy, which he feels inappropriate. Although this is not fully portrayed in the 
interview, Valerie has since explained that she is proposing to decline the suggested heart 
and lung transplant in the belief that she will live longer without such surgery.
These situations are in my experience relatively rare and in the vast majority of clinical 
situations I encounter the opposite seems to be prevalent. A sense of powerlessness to 
question the medical hegemony of the day seems to be present. As Clegg has commented 
Whitt (1979), Katznelson (1973) Pateman (1970) Freire 1972 and Garson (1973) have all 
identified this sense of powerlessness. (Clegg 1989 pi 09) In suggesting causes for it,
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they point out that powerlessness may act as an indirect mechanism of third dimensional 
power and Valerie’s experience recounted earlier seems to support this. Those who lose 
a lot may give up trying to win after a while and apathy or fatalism becomes the norm 
along with acceptance or resignation. Some may decide it is better to participate than 
resist and finally resisting all the time results in chronic disorganisation.
What is my practical reaction to this position? I began to become aware of two distinct 
changes in practice. Firstly, right at the beginning of a consultation I will make an 
attempt to ascertain what the patient regards as their real interest in coming to the clinic. 
Questions like, ‘What are you hoping to gain by seeing me today?’ act to focus for a 
moment on what are perceived as real interests and this stance has been alluded to earlier 
in a discussion on framing. Secondly, an attempt is made to undermine the hegemonic 
view of medicine. This is done by suggesting that whilst I may be an expert in a certain 
area of the body, I would regard the patient as an expert outside this clearly 
circumscribed domain. They are invited to express and to hold onto any opinion they 
might have about what is a right and proper course of action for them to follow. This pays 
attention to the circumscribed nature of expert power of French and Raven, and is at the 
very least a shift towards mutuality by suggesting that a meeting of experts is taking 
place. "A person exercising transforming power invites mutuality- a. mutual exercise of 
power guided by a living awareness of what is currently at stake for the particular 
systems participating in the transformation. Transforming power cannot be insolently and 
urilaterally wielded.”( Torbert 1991 p57)
So far I have only addressed the extent to which I, as a doctor, have become aware of the 
way in which I can exercise third dimensional power. I am inevitably prompted to 
examine to what extent are my thoughts and actions are the subject of third dimensional 
pcwer themselves, the third dimensional power of the medical establishment? Whitt has 
proposed three models of group power.
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Pluralistic model interest groups
Elite model institutional elites
Class dialectical model social classes
Whitt quoted in (Clegg 1989 p i04)
Whitt also proposed a series of criteria when examining political issues to justify 
inclusion in one or other of these models. The tests for the elite model suggests that 
medicine falls into this category.
a. a high degree of elite involvement
b. general convergence of interests among elites
c. elite study and dominance on the issue
d. stability of the political allegiances
e. outcomes that tend to favour elite interests 
(ibid)
If the elite group is successful enough, then hegemony occurs so that the “intellectual, 
moral and philosophical leadership provided by the class or alliance of class and class 
fractions which is ruling, successfully achieves its objective of providing the fundamental 
outlook for the whole society." (Clegg 1989 pi 05) In this situation members of the elites 
themselves may be captives of the elite interests. Is this how I now see myself?
I am not sure, but the recent changes in the National Health Service has provided an 
interesting period in which there has been an attempt to destabilise the medical elite 
group by threatening the interests of a subgroup, hospital consultants, within the broader 
medical establishment. The reason for this is that the whole emphasis o f ‘Working for 
Patients’ (HMSO 1991), a strategic change document for the National Health Service, 
was on the importance of a primary led healthcare system. This meant that a particular 
hierarchical group within the elite was challenged by these changes. The ideas expressed 
in Working for Patients challenged an elite by espousing the notion of competition 
between hospitals and what is noticeable is how this has manifestly failed to happen in
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the last few years. This suggests that in this case elite cohesion is fairly robust. How has 
this change been resisted?
Whitt thought that elite models were dependent for their stability on a number of factors. 
The principal factors here were non-competitive business interests and elite cohesiveness. 
Despite the many changes that took place those engaged in national health service and 
private practice continued by and large to confine their practice to patient populations of 
well circumscribed areas. In other words competition was avoided. Secondly, informal 
networks such as the Royal Colleges and Royal Society of Medicine provided forums in 
which professional elite interests were discussed. What I felt I was observing was the 
power and effectiveness of an elite group maintaining the status quo. I also noticed how 
caught up I became in the process. I constantly paid attention to best interests at a number 
of levels; those of myself as a doctor, those of myself as a patient, doctors in general, my 
own hospital, etc. Despite giving much thought to the problem, I could not find consistent 
ground on which to make a solid stance as to what constituted a justified position.
These are all obviously assertions I make as a professional practitioner but finding data to 
ground this suggestion and convince others (an assertion I make as a researcher) I notice 
is difficult. As Clegg has observed, “individuals cannot recognize whatever their real 
interests are as long as they are subject to distorting dominant ideologies. Such dominant 
ideologies ..mask true needs with false wants...the problematic of'hegemony' and the 
'dominant ideology thesis' develop from this perspective.” (Clegg 1989 p i27)
Foucault
My interest in a perspective of power based on the work of Foucault arises from his 
analysis of power in three ways. Firstly, in his concept of disciplinary structures. His 
work ‘The Birth of the Clinic’, together with ‘Discipline and Punish; The Birth of the 
Prison’, charts how these organisations established disciplinary structures that permeated
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throughout these organisations and served to influence and control individuals who adopt 
marginalised positions. He took the view that there may be dangers in such control and 
that it may be appropriate to offer certain forms of resistance. Secondly in the 
relationship he draws between power and knowledge. In doing this Foucault argued that 
certain discursive practices arose that were structured in such a way as to determine 
“which statements were intelligible; which of those statements should be counted as 
serious; who was empowered to speak seriously and what questions and procedures were 
relevant to assess the credibility of those statements that were taken seriously." (Rouse 
1994 pi 03) Thirdly, his observation of the relationship between space and power has 
relevance to my practice in the world of medicine because of the way that hospitals are 
physically constructed as expressions of power, both in the clinic and the ward. The way 
in which hospitals have been laid out according to medical disciplines, in vast wards 
lacking in privacy, and even in the way that individuals move within them, are all subject 
to an analysis of power.
The concept of power discussed to date of French and Raven, and Lukes are essentially 
familiar ones of the A influencing B type. Foucault presents a different concept of power 
“as somehow present in its absence from the social terrain, in the normal routines of 
everyday organizational life generally.” This initially bizarre idea contrasts with the more 
usual conception of sovereign episodic power where power “means that something has to 
be seen to have been done in order for it to be said to be exercised." (Clegg 1989 p i49) 
His interest was aroused by observing the difference between massive but infrequent 
exercises of destructive force (public executions, military occupations, the violent 
suppression of insurrections) and the constraints imposed in practices of discipline and 
training. Foucault’s contribution was to describe the transformation that took place both 
in scale and continuity in the exercise of power. He documented this shift in political 
practice from the display of power as spectacle to the exercise of power through making 
its target more visible and audible. There was a gradual development of techniques of 
surveillance. (Rouse 1994 p95) In his own words; "It was a question not of treating the 
body en masse, 'wholesale', as if it were an indissoluble unity, but of working it 'retail', 
individually: of exercising upon it a subtle coercion, of obtaining holds upon it at the
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level of mechanism itself-movements, gestures, attitudes, rapidity: and infmitessimal 
exercise of power over the active body." (Foucault 1977 pi 36-137)
Foucault then conceives "power as a technique which achieves its strategic effects 
through its disciplinary character." (Clegg 1989 p i49) Methods of surveillance and 
assessment first developed in state institutions such as prisons, became widely 
disseminated through schools, the army, the asylum, and the capitalist factory. They 
become strategic to the extent that they are effective constitutions of powers “because 
they are knowledge constituted, not just in texts but in definite institutional and 
organizational practices, they are 'discursive practices': knowledge reproduced through 
practices made possible by the framing assumptions of that knowledge.” (ibid) Moreover 
this knowledge is very much based on practice; it influences the body, mind and 
emotions “in such a way that the ranking, hierarchy and stratification, which ensues, is 
not just the blind reproduction of a transcendent traditional order, as in feudalism. It 
produces a new basis for order in the productive worth of individuals, as they are defined 
by these new disciplinary practices of power." (ibid)
Foucault’s conception of power attempts to break decisively with the 'mechanistic' and 
'sovereign' view. He envisages a new form of social power which he describes as a 
'capillary form' of power which 'reaches into the very grain of individuals'; a 'synaptic 
regime of power, a regime of its exercise within the social body, rather than from above 
it.' This is expressed in the idea of shifting, unstable networks and alliances whose focus 
is closer to “hegemony as a 'war of manoeuvre', in which points of resistance and fissure 
are at the forefront.” (Clegg 1989 pi 54-155) Such a network of alliances, resistance and 
surveillance is dependent upon discourse, by talking, by writing, by faxing, by e-mailing, 
by radio, by television, by observing by the myriad of ways in which we communicate.
Foucault concentrated upon one aspect of this he chose to call bio-power, which he 
regarded as power orientated towards “the subjugation of bodies and control of 
populations in general." He saw bio-power as emerging from the new discourses of 
medicine and administration, which provided a framework for “the carrying capacity of
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new forms of disciplinary power to spread like a contagion from their initial institutional 
sites.” The carriers of “institutional isomorphism in this respect” were primarily the state 
and the professions. It is these knowledges and practices that they licence which produce 
the natural discipline of the workplace and the wage system, (ibid)
One example of the way in which this developed was the outpouring of talk, concern and 
writing focusing health but especially on sex. "We have become a singular confessing 
society...the confession plays a part injustice, medicine, education, family relationships, 
and love relations, in the most ordinary affairs of everyday life, and in the most solemn 
rites: one confesses one's crimes, one's sins, one's thoughts and desires, one's illnesses 
and troubles; one goes about telling, with the greatest precision, whatever is most 
difficult to tell...one confesses or is forced to confess." (Foucault 1978 p59) The result is 
the “development of a whole new realm of discourse attending to the definition of what is 
and what is not 'normal' and what is and what is not available for individuals to do, say, 
and be.” (Clegg 1989 p i56-157) These professional discourses increasingly “limit, define 
and normalize the 'vocabulary of motive which are available in specific sites for making 
sensible and accountable that which people should do, can do and thus do.” In this way 
bio-power normalizes society through the discursive formations of psychiatry, medicine, 
social work and so on. The terms of these ways of constituting the normal are 
“institutionalised and incorporated into everyday life. Our own reflexive gaze takes over 
the disciplining role as we take on the accounts and vocabularies of meaning and motive 
which are available to us, while certain other forms of account are marginalized or simply 
eased out of currency.” (ibid)
The process then feeds on itself because what is seen and heard is then documented as a 
resource for further examination and constraint (? like this thesis). So that the practices of 
surveillance, elicitation, and documentation constrain behaviour by making it even more 
thoroughly knowable or known. This new kind of knowledge presupposes new kinds of 
constraint, which makes actions visible and constrains people from speaking. It is in this 
sense primarily that Foucault spoke of "power/knowledge". "Finer grained 
knowledge..offers further possibilities for more intrusive inquiry and disclosure" a
330
position that potentially asks awkward questions of a thesis such as this. (Rouse 1994 
p96)
This process, according to Foucault, underwent yet further development. For example, 
"biographical unities" like family history of heart disease, cholesterol level or T-cell 
counts etc produced new kinds o f ‘human subjects’, producing new kinds of knowledge 
along with new objects to know, and eventually new modalities of power." (Rouse 1994 
p97) This is reflected in the clinical obsession with normal and normality. If an individual 
is outside the range of normal (arbitrarily defined) then they are abnormal, or 
pathological and may need to be normalised. For example, because snoring in fit healthy 
young men is relatively uncommon, snoring is considered abnormal and operations are 
available to ‘cure it’. Anyone who chooses to adopt a lifestyle that leads to a reduced life 
expectancy e.g. smoking is regarded as abnormal and attempts are made to normalise 
them by discouraging smoking. High blood pressure, raised cholesterol levels, mobility, 
hearing level in children and many other parameters are all subjected to a normalizing 
process. In this way control is exercised by obtaining a normalising distribution in order 
to locate an individuals discursive practice within such a field. This then is the practice of 
"normalizing judgement" that connects political regulation and the “construction of 
norms as a field of possible knowledge.” (Cutting 1994 p4-7)
As a doctor, I recognise that not only am I an instrument of medical discourse that 
exercises ‘disciplinary surveillance’ on the population, I am subjected to the same 
process myself by the institutions of medicine, and society itself. For example, hospitals 
have for some years been required to introduce ‘quality’ practices to regulate practice. 
Morbidity and mortality data is collated and made available to the public domain. From 
time to time disciplinary hearings are held in the General Medical Council and these 
often achieve widespread publicity. As I write this a consultant heart surgeon is charged 
with failing to appreciate that his operative mortality was higher than that of his 
colleagues.
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I inhabit an organisation where epistemic sovereignty (what is perceived as the medical 
truth) determines what is truth among competing truth claims. Knowledge is constituted 
as “the unified (or consistently verifiable) network of truths that can be extracted from the 
network of conflicting statements” (Rouse 1994 p i03) allowing truth to stand forth by 
suppressing error and irrationality. Irrationality in this context are those statements that 
are not acceptable to the regime that the statement inhabits. One is left asking: Is there a 
standpoint from which to mount resistance to this ‘truth’? It is perhaps this point 
particularly that separates Lukes’ third dimension of power and Foucault’s concepts. 
Lukes’ third dimensional description of power represents "the conception of power along 
sovereign lines.” It “embraces the fiction of that supreme power which can enable one to 
'get another or others to have the desires you want them to have-that is to secure their 
compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires'.” According to Clegg, Lukes 
implies an acceptance of the Marxian problematic of'hegemony' or 'dominant ideology’ 
without accepting the theoretical absolutism which would make this a coherent choice. It 
is not coherent because of the moral relativism he embraces by accepting a degree of 
hegemony but maintaining his 'liberal decencies'” (Clegg 1989 pl66) Foucault rejects 
the idea that there is any ground from which to mount a legitimate resistance for the 
connection, he proposed, between power and knowledge is not just a particular 
institutional use of knowledge as a means to domination. It might be that what counts as a 
serious and important claim to the truth at one time will not ( perhaps cannot) even be 
entertained as a candidate for truth at another. Truths, according to Foucault, are bound 
by their historical context and that “what were important shifts in what counted as serious 
discussion of madness, disease, wealth, language or life, were only evident in historical 
archives." (Rouse 1994 p93-94) There can be no such thing as a truth independent of its 
regime, unless it be that of another. It could be argued that liberation in the name of truth 
could only be the substitution of one power regime for another one. Since one couldn’t 
claim that a succeeding system was going to be any better than the previous one, there is 
no justification for attempting to change it. (ibid)
This has implications for my methodological approach. What justification can I have that 
an attempt to develop an approach that claims greater mutuality is more benign? Indeed, I
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could easily argue that an attempt to include personal perspectives of the patient as part 
o f the medical decision making process is resulting in ‘greater visibility’, greater 
opportunities for surveillance and discipline and thus incarcerates the patient even more. 
This certainly raises the question as to whether the shift towards a more co-operative 
medical approach is nothing more nor less than an extension of surveillance. Foucault 
approached this problem by suggesting that the approach to adopt is one of mounting 
resistance. This is not resistance for it’s own sake but resistance that is constructive and 
generative. He argued that a statement, a skill, or a machine by itself cannot count as 
knowledge but only in the way it connects with “other elements over time does it become 
(and remain) epistemically significant.” (Rouse 1994 p l l  l)These interactions encounter 
snags which generate conflict with other emerging epitemic practices. Such conflict spurs 
further investigations, articulations, and technical refinements. Conflict thus becomes the 
locus for the continuing development and reorganisation of knowledge. Where 
knowledge does not encounter resistance, “it is likely to lead to little or no further 
articulation, and to risk becoming isolated and inconsequential.’’(ibid) Foucault uses the 
term 'strategies' for the multiple ways in which these elements align or conflict with one 
another to constitute power relations. Once we recognise the complex and contested 
dynamics of knowledge production, we might say of knowledge as well as of power that 
"it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular 
society". (Rouse 1994; Jupp & Norris 1993)
How does all of this translate into clinical practice? It suggests that there may be a place 
for developing resistance to practice. This not only means encouraging patients to ask 
questions but actually to challenge medical discourse itself. So I began to find myself 
searching for suitable framing at the beginning of a consultation; “Please feel free to 
challenge or question any opinions I may express etc” This seemed to be insufficient and 
I began to pay attention to raising the level of inquiry during the consultation. At the 
heart of this is the ladder of inference described by Argyris. (Argyris, Putnam, et al. 1985 
p58) In making the transition from data to cultural inference to inference imposed by the 
hearer, inquiry is sought. “What is your reaction to this point?” “Do you agree with me or 
object to this analysis of the problem?” The practical problem that arose from this
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approach when I used it, was that unsuprisingly the consultation time was significantly 
prolonged. I began to find myself tom between feeling that a problem had been 
insufficiently explored and stress that came from clinics that overran. After all, in trying 
to address a power problem from the perspective of knowledge and resistance, I had 
generated another one by keeping people waiting.
In the interview with Patrick, we partly explore this problem. He suggests that a 
shorthand way of possibly overcoming this problem from his perspective is to somatise 
the arguments, the concerns, the resistance, the unexplained pieces of information to a 
‘gut feeling’, what he called ‘a sense of confidence’. Many other patients have expressed 
the same idea. Also in this short section of interview dialogue, I would like the reader to 
notice that we have reached a stage where he is prepared to mount a challenge to me as a 
doctor and remind me of an occasion that I “dismissed” a piece of information he had 
given me. The fact that he was able to do this suggests to me that the dynamics of the 
interview were such that there was a degree of mutuality in exploring these issues. It 
suggests that we had at least partly escaped from stereotyped doctor patient behaviour.
P: That's one factor. This factor is that the doctor is unable to provide this time and 
thought, due to his work load. It is more likely the patient feels, and I  do as a patient, that 
he has a greater privilege o f information than the doctor has 
R: Mmmmmm.
P: because o f  the fact that I  have lived with my condition, I  have after all been within the 
body, the diseased body over the protracted period 
R: Right.
P: and all those details are at my finger tips, they go round my head so often they are at 
my finger tips. I  can remember everything. My doctor can't. That means that uhh the 
patient has an advantage, it, a minor advantage, but he has an advantage, which he 
should use uhh uhh to uhh his best interest. Now uhh 
R: Can, can I  ask you, you, you say that's medical information that is 
P: No, no.
R: sometimes ignored? It's not in the conventional sense.
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P: No, I'm referring to the fact that the doctor gets it with the rounded edges not the 
sharp edges.
R: Ok.
P: And the sharp edges being the detail, the subtlety, the little things, which often get
missed
R: Right.
( I  think this is very important. When a patient raises a point or asks a question, it ’s 
asking will contain many motivating elements.
(a) He may be asking a logical question strictly within the framework o f the current 
dialogue.
(b) He may be asking a logical question outside o f the current dialogue, relating to 
matters unknown to his doctor-thought to be too loosely connected perhaps to be worthy 
o f raising with his doctor, or too lengthy to describe, or too complicated to describe
(c) He may be demonstrating an understanding, or lack o f understanding, o f what may 
have been previously said.
The point being made here is, in my opinion, there are, in responsive behaviour, clues, 
which i f  identified can be more revealing and diagnostically helpful- added by P  on 
reading the text)
P: or not even raised by the patient but are there i f  you, you had time to probe by asking 
questions.
R: Do doctors miss those?
P: They miss them but the patient doesn't and i f  the patient is an aware patient 
R: Yes.
P: they're meaningful. I f  the patient is an unaware patient, they, they’re not.
R: The, the reason why I  asked the question I  have done is that I, umm, very much 
developed a sense that (.) when patients tell you something umm like they instinctively 
fee l like you did that the, the uhh cyst as you called it on your head was a tumour, that 
whilst that is nothing more or less than a, i f  you like, a piece o f information from, from a 
patient that is medically unsophisticated
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P : Yes.
R: I  think it’s, I ’m beginning to realise that it’s important to regard that as a piece o f 
medical information as important as a blood count or, umm an appearance under a 
microscope. That is actually telling you something because patients have sensors inside 
giving information about how they work.
P: Well I  think that's part o f it.
R: Is that really that
P: I  think there is that uhh, that umm instinct because that's what we’re talking about 
really.
R: Yes.
P: It's, it’s an instinctive feeling umm but often i f  you look at instinct, it is related to 
subliminal thought which is not easy to, to analyse. Umm uhh I  remember the other day I  
was thinking about why was I  so convinced about umm it not being necessary fo r  
radiotherapy (coughing) and I  couldn’t recall why I  was so convinced but really it was 
based upon uhh real facts or real uhh supposition o f events I  think such as the uhh the 
umm bad luck factors.
R: The statistical construction.
P: Yes and, and then eventually and this is umm this is how the mind works as I  see it uh 
all the thought processes were in trauma. They rolled these facts around so many times 
that eventually you don’t have to think about them any more. You carry a sense o f  
conviction but really the conviction is related to the fact that you have uhh uhh analysed 
all o f those, all o f that information, all o f the subtleties and probabilities i f  you like uhh 
and they produce uh uh uh a figure which is your confidence figure and you don’t have to 
relate to it any more 
R: Mmm.
P: because I, Ifound that that's what I  did. Initially I  rolled all o f the facts around in my 
head, I  thought very deeply about them. I  went over these, these probability figures, 
same, same word again uhh 
R: I  know what you mean.
P: but event', but eventually I  didn't have to do it anymore because I, I fe lt a conviction 
that was founded upon those earlier thoughts.
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Rz So you turned, you turned an intellectual, a series o f intellectual processes 
P: Yes.
R: into a feeling.
P: Well into a, yes, into a sense o f  confidence 
R: Right.
P: which had a value to it which was very positive.
R: Right.
P: Uhh, I, I  think you know uhh that you could, you could have a range o f (1) senses o f 
confidence ranging from  nil to ten 
R: Yes.
P: and I  was around the nine and a half.
R: Right. (2) Do you look upon it (1) umm I, I  think I  know what you mean and I, I  
have umm begun to think that this happens both in myself and in others fo r  quite some 
time. I  look upon it as uhh a dialogue between your umm your sort o f intellectual 
reasoning 
P: Yes.
R: and your gut feeling and, and eventually umm
P: I  was going to say uhh the gut feeling to me is intellectual reasoning.
R: OK.
P: Uhh but 
R: xxx(unintelligible)
P: Well I  think it’s pragmatism. In my case I  felt that it was always based upon some 
sound reasoning, but I  am prepared to accept that there are fringes 
R: Right.
P: to, to this whereby the unconscious thought plays a part in making contributions uhh 
and they may be related to subtleties uhh umm some o f them almost long forgotten. 
Richard I ’m going to tell you another thing which you umm you will have long forgotten 
but I  haven't and this one o f those subtleties, one o f the pointers which you knew about at 
the time, it was a pointer, it was sitting in my mind somewhere, it was positive and helped 
this umm sense o f confidence at the end o f the day and it goes back to the uhh, the illness 
I  had with the uhh diseased uhh uhh testicle. At that time, as part o f the uhh uhh
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medication, I  was given an antibiotic. Uhh I'll just challenge you to remember that.
R: No I  don't.
P: You don't. I  wouldn't expect you to.
R: Well I  wasn't, I  wasn't looking after you in that process.
P: Umm but you were. I  had mentioned it to you.
R: DidI?





R: You'd been, you'd been given an antibiotic as uhh part o f the treatment.
P: I'm going to explain it first o f all 
R: Yes.
P: and then you'll understand the meaning for this, fo r me saying this.
R: OK.
(Appendix 2, Patrick)
I might also argue that recognising the consequences of the execution of sovereign power 
as Foucault suggests result in a position where more rectitude and less absolutism exists 
in the determination of what others ‘real interests’ might be. I feel much less obliged to 
interrogate the truths as perceived by patients until they are forced to align with a 
conventional medical position. The notion o f ‘real interests’ is no longer subject solely to 
the arguments of medical discourse. Can I demonstrate this? Not easily, but I have 
noticed in myself a change of attitude and approach in being comfortable in accepting 
unconventional solutions which fit within the framework of a patient’s beliefs but not 
necessarily mine. I hope that this is to some extent demonstrable in the transcripts of 
David and Patrick and is part of the reason to include the complete transcript.
One might argue that disciplinary structure and surveillance only becomes effective when 
enough communicative ‘synaptic’ connections are made throughout an organisation so
338
that sufficient detail and knowledge of what is happening becomes visible. The 
organisation develops a kind of consciousness. Foucault himself was well aware of the 
biological parallels with his ideas so I find myself looking for evidence that notions of 
‘consciousness’, the sense that the organisation ‘understands’ what is appropriate 
behaviour, appropriate discourse, actually exists. All I can say is that as a doctor 
practising in a hospital, I do have a sense that the organisation expects me to act in certain 
ways. This is difficult to demonstrate but as I write this I have just returned from the 
intensive care unit. I had been contacted at home by phone because of an emergency. 
When this happens, I am expected to drop whatever I am doing and fully occupy myself 
with the medical problem. The caller asked if I was on call (which I wasn’t) and didn’t 
apologise for breaking into my ‘home space’ or disturbing my weekend. Once again I 
then ask myself whether or not I have a standpoint from which to judge the 
appropriateness of this medical discourse that invades my home? I do not think that such 
a standpoint exists so I do not know if the ‘conscious’ wish of the organisation when it 
pursues and encourages me to pursue a medical discourse is engaged in justified action. 
We are bound then by the terms of our metaphor to leave certain question unanswerable.
When the phone call from the intensive care unit broke into my ‘home space’, it was an 
example of Foucault’s third interesting point about space and power.
“Disciplinary space tends to be divided into many sections as there are bodies or elements 
to be distributed...Its aim was to establish presences and absences, to know where and 
how to locate individuals, to set up useful communications, to interrupt others, to be able 
at each moment to supervise the conduct of each individual, to assess it, to judge it, to 
calculate its qualities or merits. It was a procedure, therefore, aimed at knowing, 
mastering, and using." (Foucault 1977 p i36-137)
Surveillance was often built into the physical structures of institutions that were 
organised to enhance visibility within them. “Here especially there was a new 
architecture of power."
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(Rouse 1994 p96) Of course this can be seen in the way that departments occupy space in 
hospitals according to size and influence, in the size of consulting rooms (large for one 
doctor), waiting rooms (small for large numbers waiting), desk size, chair size, chair 
height etc. But beyond this is a sense the hospitals are medical spaces, which are 
influenced and managed by the institutions and the members of that institution. For 
example, surgeons manage theatre space (I am at liberty to move any device, any 
instrument and position it in theatre wherever I wish, and occupy the centre of the 
theatre) and nurses manage ward space. There are still many open wards which lack 
privacy (the wards on which I work are currently mixed and open), except the ‘private’ 
beds which are single. Toilet and washing facilities are semi-public and bedpans are often 
used on the wards. The nurses station occupies a strategic position of surveillance, 
surrounded by phone, notes and computers. Valerie comments on this at length.
V:.... the others( nurses), you know, got her undressed, got her strapped up and stuck her 
in front o f the television that close and I  said ‘that well she really couldn't see ’ and all 
those nurses all day, all were behind the desk observing the acute patients just back from  
the operating you know ward, operating theatre section o f the ward. They were behind 
the desk and they were chatting among themselves and the doctors. They never chatted 
to anyone else. That's the extreme end o f it.
The ward may be visited from time to time by the matron as she ‘patrolled’ her space.
V: When I  first went into hospital, my bed was made 5 times a day. Matron came
round to see i f  you're Ok. There are no matrons and although everybody went weak to 
their stomachs with some matrons you know, Matron actually checking up was not a bad 
thing.
But most interesting o f all was the connection she made between space and noise; as 
though one increased ones personal space and personal power, by the use of noise.
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V, All the other doctors, especially the young ones, they're terrified. They’ve got steel on 
the heels o f their shoes or at least they've mostly got hard shoes. They come across a 
ward, clack, clack, clack, all the way over. They ignore everybody's eyes. They never 
meet an eye and they go to the bench and thing, whatever and write it down and then they 
go and see their patient and it's a kind o f totalfunnel tunnel. It's impersonal and all the 
rest and you can't, I  mean, it, it’s been like that for donkeys years and I'm sure it's it's 
partly in the beginning fo r  doctors a kind o f mixture o f fear and apprehension and all 
quite human things as well but it's also to do with esteem and arrogance and the different 
position in the hierarchy between the nurses and doctors. I  don't think it should be 
perpetuated you know when they come in. I  think it should be dealt with and I  think all 
doctors should wear shoes that do not make a terrific noise when they walk across the 
wards, especially at night.
R: What, what does that tell you about the hierarchy fo r  the position ofpatients in
the ward then?
V: Oh well patients are there to be seen when the doctor's ready and only then.
R: You said ‘doctors ’ Are doctors on top and then nurses? Where do the patients f i t
into all o f this? Underneath, in the middle, on top?
V: Well I  mean, none o f them would be there i f  it weren't fo r  patients but I  don't think
they remember that 
R: Laughter.
V: I  don't know where they fit. They're there. I  suppose they are. I  mean they have
to be underneath, but it's not a, it's not the same logical thing, as nurses and doctors are 
all employed for patients.
R: I  interrupted your train o f thought on this. You were talking about doctors going
through the ward making noise. That's what prompted me to ask a question. What is 
walking through a ward noisily at night saying about the environment.
V: I  don't think, I  don't think they think that consciously. I  don't think uhh, I  think
there probably is a lot o f apprehension in young doctors first going onto the wards. It 
must be pretty scary and I  also know that quite a lot o f you know, the way I  mean, i f  you, 
you are experiencing seeing terrific pain and suffering or whatever, they would need to 
protect themselves and build up their own way o f coping with it.
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R: Yes
V: and I ’m not talking about myself at the moment, and they see it repeatedly all the
time and they have to develop a way o f dealing with it. They have, I  mean, you can't 
react to that as maybe I  would or a patient would every time so they develop different 
ways o f dealing with it I  think 
R: Mmm.
V: according to their own personalities. For some it is easier fo r  patients to meet
than others.
R: But I  am suggesting that the organisation may allow a doctor to behave in certain
kinds o f way because, although you say it's a thinking process fo r  a doctor to walk across 
the wards noisily at night, the organisation somehow permits that as an acceptable act. 
Yes, there may be reasons fo r  that as you say.
V: Well they’re allowed to wear whatever shoes they like. I  suppose lace ups or
whatever.
R: Well I, I, I  mean... I  meant that there may be reasons why the organisation
permits an unfeeling attitude to develop 
V: Mmm.
R: as a protective mechanism but that, that was your suggestion because it would be
exhausting to cope with suffering all the time.
V: Well I, I  was taking that into account.
R: Yes, well it's uhh
(Appendix 3, Valerie)
What is embarrassing about the above description is that I can immediately recognise 
myself as a young doctor, as that ‘terrified’ young middle, class, white professional male 
starting out on the ward.
White Male Power
Vince, writing as a white middle class male, drew attention to the assumptions that 
underpin behaviour in those who occupy such a privileged position in organisations. He
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develops his argument by teasing out the assumptions underpinning critical phenomenon 
that pervade such organisations. "We are powerful because we are white.” (Vince 1996 
pl43) What appears to be a meritocratic organisation has a structure that permits itself to 
be constantly recreated. Only those that accept this structure and the values that permeate 
it can participate. The advantaged position of the white male is reflected in the 
organisation in that this position gives one the power to develop policies that are 
“enabling, supportive, defensive, dismissive or blocking.” This position may mean that 
we “refuse to see difference between people” and “define the needs of others through our 
own needs”, (ibid) To realise our will and increase the probability of being able to get 
what we want from the world, we are also encouraged to be competitive, rational and 
emotionless; the organisation legitimises this posture. All the time “we maintain that we 
are powerless to affect change”, espousing a sympathy for change but “having a greater 
investment in non-change”. In shoring up this position “we want to be told how to 
change” adopting a reactive posture and eschewing responsibility. "One of the things that 
white, middle class men are taught is to believe that we are right and see life as the 
exercise of power, not as learning how to exercise power, (ibid)
Vince continues by pointing out that this position is ‘shackling’ as well as enabling. Such 
socialisation is oppressive in that "what we do is limited by a framework of interests. 
Managers acquiesce to such demands only because they believe that it is in their interests 
to do so." No real shift from this position can be entertained until “power issues are 
perceived, acknowledged and worked on as an integral part of change." In commences by 
developing a “political sense of ourselves in organisations,” more than just a sense of 
how to manipulate organisational politics. It means integrating “what we are with what 
we do and acknowledging the emotional nature of work.” It means to “unlearn being 
responsible fo r  others instead consider how to act responsibly with others.” (Vince 1996 
p!41)
Recall the experience of Valerie, as she sat on the ward awaiting investigations for her 
problem. The entries in brackets were added by Valerie on reading the text.
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V: Yes, it was a young consultant This man surely would not be in his position i f
he were not pretty special My consultant had spent about ten to fifteen minutes chatting 
to me, leaning against the wall near the desk, before lunch. During this chat he told me 
that this procedure was not a problem unless o f course (he mimed) you pulled the fluid  
o ff the brain too quickly. In which case you might cause a thrombosis - a stroke - or 
similar. He departed with a friendly grin saying he would ‘get one o f his boys to do it. ’
(I desperately hoped in advance that it would not be the one who came he behaved
so arrogantly. He looked and dressed as though he might be a slick dealer in the 1980s 
stock exchange.
He had brought me the consent form for my operation on the night I  arrived. He had not 
expected me to read it and was very impatient when I  tried. It was impossible fo r  me to 
read it with him fidgeting and I  capitulated to the system since I  knew there would be no 
alternative, but I  asked him what would happen i f  the operation went wrong (neither my 
neurologist or surgeon had told me about the risks o f brain surgery.) He simply grinned 
idiotically and said “We 7/ make it better I  gave up and he produced a fountain pen
with red ink in it fo r  me to sign - in the circumstances it looked like blood He then tried 
to get an Indian - possibly Sikh - woman to sign and gave the same responses when she 
could not understand it. She was unhappy and refused until her husband came in later.)
R: Yes.
V: The consultant said, you know, do it slowly. I  had a long conversation with him
and then suddenly this man comes in and does that.
R: Why did you allow it to happen?
V: Are you saying it's my fault now?
R: No, no, no, not at all. Can I  clarify that? I  don't think it's your fault.
V: No, it's a joke. I  know what you're trying to say but I  can only say that most
patients, without my, my experience would have been even less likely than I  would to 
have objected.
R: Well what I'm suggesting....
344
V: But how could I  have got round it? You tell me. Apart from just objecting then
and making a fuss. You see, every patient thinks if  they make a fuss then all the staff are 
going to lay into them from then on because they don't like people who make a fuss.
R: Yes.
(Appendix 3, Valerie)
Notice how this approach contrasts with the behaviour of another doctor, who was not 
white, observed by Valerie.
V. ....I said this to Dr X. He had a really, really lovely Indian SHO who you probably 
know, who used to come into the ward very softly. I  noticed by the way that all the staff 
always called him by his Christian name not his surname which they didn't do with most 
doctors but he would sit on you know, sit on the bed, he would smile at you. I f  he came 
into the ward and caught your eye, he'd smile and say 'hello, good morning’ or 
something.
(Appendix 3, Valerie)
Of course these two excerpts have no claim to be typical, indeed I hope they are not, and 
there are many possible reasons why two individuals engage in contrasting behaviour that 
may not be dependent upon being white, middle class and male. Nevertheless, Valerie 
felt her position to be disempowered in the face of someone who appeared to assume a 
right to operate in a certain way. So that Vince’s approach serves to draw attention to yet 
another hegemony, the hegemony of personal and racial casting, that empirically 
supports the perceived truth that white, middle class males occupy privileged positions, 
behave in a privileged manner and expect to do well in organisations. They will find 
themselves, or make themselves, strategically placed to participate in critical 
organisational decision-making and reward systems. Marshall also recognises such a 
form of power. In support of this, attention has recently been drawn to the relatively 
small number of women and racial minority groups represented in the merit award 
system, a system of financial reward on the basis of excellence. This hegemony also 
suggests that female identity should, collectively if not individually, be routinely
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regarded as a strategic handicap. “This is not to say that class or gender will function in 
this way: simply that past sociological observations suggest that it probably will." (Clegg 
1989 p i98) Certainly, as I look around a hospital, I seem to find evidence everywhere 
that this is the case. Male doctors working in outpatients are supported by female nurses 
and secretaries; male surgeons in theatre are surrounded by female nurses and only a few 
other male support staff.
Feminist scholarship would seem to recognise the hegemony of the privileged position of 
the white male. What particularly makes feminist research 'feminist' is a “challenge to the 
scientism that refuses to address the relations between knowledge(and knowledge- 
generating practices) and power”. Feminist research is characterised by a “commitment to 
a specific, feminist epistemology; that is, a theoretical and political analysis that critiques 
dominant conceptions of knowledge, and poses questions about the gendered orientation 
of, and criteria for, knowledge." (Banister, Burman, et al. 1994 pl23-124) Given my 
position as a white middle class male, I find myself asking; Can men do feminist 
research?
To do this means to be able to genuinely adopt a standpoint that would be totally different 
from the accumulated experiences of a lifetime as a man and position oneself as a 
woman. Even the suggestion that this standpoint be considered is in itself a position that 
may arise from a patriarchal power structure to which one can only state that it may be 
best to suggest that the question is unanswerable. Alternatively, there may be an 
argument that men can position themselves “as either willing to learn from, or as 
participating in, debates in feminist research and may play a part in developing clarity in 
theorizing the politics of research.” (ibid)
Bannister et al suggested three kinds of critique that might help in relation to research 
topic and process. Firstly, in the identification of distortions and biases in research. "The 
claim is that models that ignore or devalue women's perspectives or experiences (as most 
do) are inadequate within their own terms. This is reflected in courses, programmes and 
documents that add women in to the title e.g.'women and work'. Secondly, to regard
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“women’s experience as primary in its own terms rather than as a resource to amend 
existing models.” The position of a unitary female experience has been challenged by 
black and lesbian feminists and that such models do no more than reproduce structures of 
cultural imperialism and heterosexism within feminist theory, "(ibid) The third strategy 
has been called “feminist relativism, feminist postmodernism, feminist deconstructionism 
or feminist post-structuralism and all reflect the debate on the inadequacy of all unitary 
grand theories.” All these paradigms challenge the dominant models that have attempted 
to represent and research women’s experiences, (ibid) What unites these three kinds of 
critique is the idea that gender difference is treated as a strategic intervention to 
illuminate the field. Such a position frames the way that research interventions are 
considered. This is because the framing process keeps in mind the possibility of change 
for such strategic intervention must challenge the status quo; “If you want to know a 
thing, you must change it.” (Mies 1993 p70) In this respect it is significant that it was the 
interview with Valerie that provided evidence for the position of the white male.
This analysis suggests that it becomes necessary to recognise the implicit assumptions 
underlying one’s position as a white, middle class male. This position cannot and should 
not be regarded as typical, as central to the perceived truth, around which every other 
perspective of gender, race and class, must position itself. In previously failing to 
appreciate this, I overlooked and failed to challenge the fact that the situation has been 
framed from this one perspective.
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The Nature o f Expert Knowledge
Doctors as experts in their own illness
What I have been suggesting in my analysis of the clinical encounter is that it may be 
preferable to adopt a situation that tends towards mutuality, a position in which both 
parties of doctor and patient would appear to exercise equal influence on the outcome. Is 
this necessarily desirable? Can I find evidence to challenge this view by exploring a 
situation where mutuality might presumed to be present.
Since doctors become ill like everyone else, what happens when they become patients? 
There is evidence in the literature to support the view that an experienced doctor might be 
aware that the arguments in favour of certain treatments rather than others are not wholly 
based upon rational argument. (Hamm 1988) Furthermore, the medical discourse through 
which the power relations of the consultation are conducted, is a discourse that one would 
expect to be fully understood by the doctor in the position of a patient. Did doctors as 
patients expect or wish to be ‘consumers’ in the process and be offered a series of choices 
and be invited to make a choice? Alternatively did they prefer to accept the recommended 
treatment option and follow professional advice?
I found myself thinking about this situation when a friend and surgeon, about my own 
age, unexpectedly found that he had developed a tumour. I followed his progress with 
concern and interest and whilst talking to my friend’s wife on the phone one evening, she 
mentioned that:
"It was absolutely wonderful fo r  my husband to be looked after by a surgeon who took 
over. He told us what to do and there was no messing about with this. "
I knew the patient to be a well informed, highly competent, academic surgeon and had 
made the assumption that he and his wife would have liked to have been intimately
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involved in deciding treatment. In his particular clinical case I knew that when it came to 
treatment, there were choices to be made. And yet, here I was listening to his wife 
describing how wonderful it was to have someone ‘take charge’. When I subsequently 
asked him if he felt the same way he confirmed that he did; he was very pleased to be 
‘told what to do’. This attitude appeared to contradict to what I was expecting to be the 
case. Surely, I asked myself, given his academic background, his response would be to 
make himself familiar with the arguments and decide the appropriate course of action for 
himself? Whilst this episode didn’t constitute evidence about what was happening, it was 
enough to prompt a line of inquiry into the position of ‘doctors as patients’. So when 
shortly afterwards I met a doctor in a similar situation, I took the opportunity to explore 
the situation a little more.
I was doing my usual clinic but sitting in with me that day was another junior hospital 
doctor of about five years experience. One of the patients that day was a young university 
student, in whom the diagnosis of lymphoma, cancer of the lymph glands in the neck, had 
just been made. He had come back to the clinic to hear the results of tests that had been 
done. I explained to him what was wrong, what would happen when treatment was 
started and what were the chances of a cure. It was obviously a difficult moment and as 
well as feeling sorry for him, I was conscious of the presence of another experienced 
doctor in the room watching what was happening. After the patient had left the junior 
doctor said to me: "That was quite difficultfor me to watch. You see, it is a big issue fo r  
me. " Unbeknown to me this doctor had a lymphoma diagnosed when she was 17 years 
old. She was currently awaiting the results of tests to see if the lymphoma had recurred 
ten years after her first treatment. The results were expected in about two weeks time and 
there was a chance that they were going to be positive. I asked her if she would be 
prepared to tell me how she had decided what treatment to have and where to have it? At 
the end of the clinic she started to tell me her own story.
At the age of seventeen, in her final A level year, she was found to have a lymphoma. 
Treatment at her nearest hospital had been very successful and the medical school had 
agreed to accept her, despite this illness, and she successfully completed her training.
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Nine years later she had a series of minor chest infections, and to rule out the possibility 
o f recurrence of the disease, a chest x-ray was performed. This x-ray had been seen in the 
clinic and was apparently clear of any significant disease but a subsequent full report by 
the radiologist recorded the possibility that a recurrence had occurred. Unfortunately, the 
report was not returned to the department for action to be taken and lay unnoticed in the 
x-ray packet. A year later she continued to have further problems and a repeat x-ray was 
taken and it became clear that a recurrence had occurred. When the doctor took out the 
x-ray taken one year previously for comparison, the original report by the radiologist was 
noticed for the first time. She realised she had lost a year of possible treatment and this 
may have compromised her chances of a cure, she decided to transfer her care to another 
consultant.
Treatment of recurrent disease in lymphoma is complex and there are quite a few choices 
to be made. Because of this I was interested to know how these decisions had been made 
and whether or not she had chosen to become involved in making these choices.
A "I would leave it entirely up to him. I  would undergo any treatment that he would 
recommend. I  didn’t question anything."
Q?“ Wouldn’t you go to a library, review the literature andfind out all about the various 
treatments and quiz him on the various options? ”
A "No, I  didn’t do that, I  trusted him. I  completely trusted him. ”
Q? “But hadn’t you done this with the first doctor only to be let down? ”
A ”I  decided to go back to a doctor that I  had known as a medical student at St 
Bartholomews. I  had admired him as a medical student and as a doctor while working 
there as a House Officer. Everyone knew him to be very good. I  trusted that. ”
I linked this up with the previous story of my friend and surgeon with cancer. In deciding 
what to do, they both appeared to have used their organisational knowledge to locate 
someone whose reputation suggested that they were especially competent. Having found 
such an individual, they appeared to want to disengage from the clinical decision making 
process and become entirely dependent upon the advice of this doctor. Other more formal
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studies support the idea that physicians as patients express only a slightly higher 
preference in deciding their own treatment when compared non-medically qualified 
patients. (Ende J et al, 1989.p23-30; Ende J et al, 1990.p 506-9) However, these studies 
do not appear to have investigated other strategies that doctors adopt in order to gain 
appropriate expertise. My limited evidence suggested that doctors might be doing more 
than simply submitting to the advice of their clinician and using additional strategies to 
secure the best treatment.
It seems fair to me to assert that knowledge of the competence of individual doctors 
circulates around hospitals. After all, treatment in the clinic, in theatre and in the 
intensive care unit is a public process and takes place under the gaze of other healthcare 
workers. I notice which anaesthetists are meticulous and systematic and who refuse to 
leave theatre under any circumstances to take phones calls etc. This might explain why it 
is that some anaesthetists who although might be safe in practice, are avoided by staff 
when it came to anaesthetics for themselves or a member of their family. Anaesthetists in 
turn watch me in theatre teaching, handling difficulties, making decisions etc. Similarly, 
nurses watch me in the clinic taking histories, examining ears etc and although I cannot 
prove this, no doubt make judgements about competence and thoroughness that enters 
into the organisation in some way. As a consequence of this, I believe, certain surgeons 
and physicians become popular choices with hospital staff when they chose someone to 
undertake their treatment or surgery. This suggests a level of organisational knowledge 
that determines where advice is sought. Such knowledge appears to exist at the level of 
professional gossip and is formed and shaped by other professional. Patients would not 
by and large have access to this professional gossip that is accessible by healthcare staff 
although from time to time friends ask me who I would recommend. By contrast patients 
have access to the public face of medicine and are persuaded, if they are persuaded at all, 
by the ‘legitimate power’ of the organisation, whose activities are monitored by the 
‘disciplinary gaze’ of the General medical Council and the Royal Colleges. It could be 
that healthcare staff might feel that that this sense of trust is insufficient possibly because 
not everyone has the same level of clinical skill and competence.
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Although a well argued case has not been made that such events happen in hospital, it 
seems to me that, at the level of common sense, it would be surprising if it did not. But 
this process might be suggesting something more interesting. Is it possible that healthcare 
workers, and doctors in particular, instinctively realise that an experienced clinician 
makes judgements based on experiential knowledge and if obliged to present this in 
propositional terms, so that consumer choices can be made, becomes handicapped by the 
process? Is it tacit acknowledgement of the importance of working experientially when 
functioning as an expert? I do not have sufficient data on the particular experiences of 
doctors as patients to pursue this further but this argument begins to raise questions about 
the nature of expertise in two ways.
Firstly, when I say that an expert might utilise experiential knowledge in his or her 
conduct as a professional, I now see this as circumscribed expert knowledge framed by 
an assumption that all relevant medical knowledge can be reduced to a positivist 
biomedical explanation. What is the status of expert knowledge that is not framed in this 
way? When a patient says, “I feel ill”, should this be regarded as ‘expert’ knowledge 
despite the fact that it is not presented in anatomical, physiological or biochemical 
language?
Secondly, it prompts general questions as to whether expertise from one arena can be 
appropriately applied to another. More specifically, is the manner in which a 
businessperson, or an engineer, or a production worker makes decisions in business, or 
engineering or factory matters transferable to medical problems? Are the patterns that 
are observed or the recourse to ‘gut feel’ equivalent? What are the components, if 
anything, that are common to the decision making process in each of the various 
disciplines of philology, biology, economics, engineering, everyday living? Foucault 
argued that philosophical concepts such as resemblance, representation and man pervade 
all the disciplines of a given period “ a view that leads him to the notion of an episteme as 
the system of concepts that defines knowledge for a given intellectual period.” (Cutting 
1994 p8) If that is the case, patients may also share certain ways of deciding what to do 
that constitutes being defined as expert. This suggests two further questions. Firstly,
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patients may access non bio-medical data that ought to be regarded as ‘expert’ 
knowledge. Secondly, do they have access to a decision making process that ought to be 
regarded as ‘expert’ since we both share a common way, at the ‘archaeological’ level of 
Foucault. I cannot answer this but such standpoints began to make me careful to re­
evaluate data from patients that is not presented in biomedical formats and prompted me 
to evaluate the nature of relevant medical data.
Patients as expert in their own illness
There is a group of patients who have experienced an illness for many years and whom it 
might be argued have truly become expert in at least one way. They understand through 
experience what it means to have chronic lung disease or chronic liver disease and how 
such treatment really influence what happens in a way that reading through textbooks 
cannot give someone. Valerie’s (Appendix 3) experience would suggest that in someone 
with a chronic illness, they can reach a point where they would regard themselves as 
‘experts’ in their own illness and see a need sometimes to impose their will on the 
situation.
V: I've got a very nice GP who works with me patiently, explains everything and
discusses issues o f treatment with me. He gives me a fair amount o f responsibility in 
managing my illness and when I  need it he will take surgery time to talk. Usually I  talk to 
him on the telephone and as a result I  take very little o f his time considering how ill I  am 
and I  call him out possibly once a year........................
Twice, at about ages 14 and 26 ,1 made decisions against my doctors' advice: the first 
completely instinctive and the second on the basis o f my observations o f  other patients 
and my own quality o f life. These and the decision I  yet have to make about transplants I  
will deal with separately in order not to make this background too long............................
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I  don't think one can underestimate the umm knowledge that anybody with a chronic 
illness gets o f their illness and they certainly have a very, very strong idea o f what is 
going to be goodfor me and what isn't and it, it quite often is right. It usually, it's, well 
it's always based on experience obviously because I  wouldn't, but it's all usually based on 
experience also o f at least one doctor that I'm in contact with either at the hospital, or my 
GP who is fairly experienced at the same time. And I  sometimes get sent to different 
doctors or am in a strange hospital i f  I'm somewhere else and umm and they have a 
completely different way o f dealing with me which actually is, is very distressing 
R: Mmm
V: And it’s very distressing i f  a doctor won't listen to you at all about what you know
is goodfor you fo r  instance and there are doctors in all, all hospitals and all surgeries 
like this and they are usually slaves o f either the latest medical text book or the one 
where they trained. Most doctors keep up to date and they've got a hell o f a lot to keep 
up to date with but I  just, I  mean there are contradictions now between the 
Brompton.....I  had a short time in hospital in the RUH last year..........................
I've never had such clean lungs and it's cleared them out. It clears out at the ends o f the, 
you know, the ends o f the alveoli, the sacs that are there, but I  don't know what's still 
down there but it clears it out a lot. And also before this, Frusemide has had an 
enormous effect on my lungs and, and that's the second story. About six years ago in the 
winter I  had what appeared to be heart failure which my GP put me on Frusemide for, 
with immediate relief o f all symptoms. After two or three months he took me off 
Frusemide and as soon as I  was off, I fe lt awful again and my lungs were very wet and, 
and my breathing was worse and I  said, \you know, can I  go back on it? ’ and he said \yes 
OK. ’ But he sent me also to be checked out by the heart consultant at Bristol Royal 
Infirmary. They couldn't fin d  anything wrong with my heart, there was no evidence o f 
heart failure afterwards but I  had all the classic symptoms when I  was initially put on 
Frusemide.
I  went up to the Brompton fo r  my next appointment and this doctor just wouldn't listen to 
me saying that I  had been much better and had had fewer infections since being on
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Frusemide. He wanted me to go on steroids again and I  had really bad side effects from  
steroids and quite frankly, i f  I'm on steroids for very long I'd  go and throw myself off a 
bridge. I've been on three times before with the doctors at Brompton. They've all 
agreedfor me to come o ff and he wants to try it again in larger doses. Umm and I  say, 
‘well I'm actually a lot better on Frusemide. I  want to stay on Frusemide through the 
winter and just see how much my infections are reduced because they certainly seem to 
be reduced over the summer. ’ And he said ‘well you can stay on this i f  you like, but 
you're going on steroids as well. ’ So umm 1 said, I  said to the consultant, ‘i f  you put me 
on steroids and I  stay on Frusemide and I  have a better winter, you're going to say it's 
because o f the steroids and I'm going to say it's because o f the Frusemide and you won't 
know which, which is which, what’s had the effect. ’ Anyway he wasn't going to change 
his mind so I  went back home fairly stressed by this interview. I  went to my GP and said 
7  wasn't happy with it, ’ and he concurred and let me stay on Frusemide without the 
steroids and I  did have a much better winter. Went back, asked to see Professor Z, my 
usual consultant the following spring and said, ‘look, I've been better. I've had a better 
winter, I've only been on Frusemide *, and this had been going on by the way over a 
period o f a couple o f years by then, which I  had been saying I  was better on Frusemide. I  
told him everybody said that it was not doing me any harm, so I  could stay on it, but there 
was no reason at all why it should be doing me any good. Anyway, I  saw Professor Z  
and I  told him this story and said that I  had been significantly better and had fewer 
infections and I  said ‘the other doctor wanted me on steroids ’ and he knew, he's known 
fo r  a year, I  didn't want to be on steroids. Anyway, halfway through this story he started 
to grin and he said, ‘I  think there's someone down the corridor who'd like to meet you ’ 
and he took me down to one o f the Registrars who was doing research into the salts in the 
lining o f the lungs 
R: Mmm mm.
V: because the balance o f salts in the lungs affects the efficacy o f the, the, working
and moving phlegm from the lungs in a continuous way. And, I  mean, one o f the things I  
found that the Frusemide also did, it's much easier to cough up sputum. I  could clear my 
lungs much more easily and there was much less o f it. I  went to see him and he was most 
interesting straight away and said, ‘yes you're right, you know, it affects the lining o f the
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lungs ’ and o f course Professor Z being bright, realised immediately that Frusemide 
would affect the salt balance in the body, not just in the kidneys or wherever, you know. 
He made the connection but only after 3 years, you know, the relative arguing, they 
suddenly decided I  was right. Umm and that was from what I fe lt  and, I  mean, what I'd  
observed. But I  have to say that the, the registrar doing; who was doing the research is 
still at the Brompton, did say that it was unusual for patients to observe themselves umm 
in an objective way accurately. I  don't know whether that's right or not. He said most 
trials, most studies with patients had not reflected what their accurate clinical state was 
and that's when my other interest comes in, in a sense that maybe doesn't matter i f  they 
fe e l better.
(Appendix 3, Valerie)
Valerie clearly suggests that she is assessing treatment outcomes on the basis of what it 
felt like as she breathed and coughed. “I  could clear my lungs much more easily and
there was much less o f it and that was from what I  fe lt and, I  mean, what I'd
observed. ” The idea that patients are in the best position to assess themselves, how well 
their lungs or livers etc work, is hardly groundbreaking, but it is interesting that Valerie 
remembers that it took three years for her to establish this point. This interview relies 
upon an accurate recollection of what took place but what is interesting is that the 
registrar appears to have acknowledged this fact with a caveat that most patients could 
not be relied upon to assess their clinical state with accuracy. It suggests an unwillingness 
to surrender the physician’s position to know what is best and it may be that patients with 
chronic illnesses are best positioned to notice this.
Even as I was engaged in trying to take more seriously data provided by patients, I 
became aware myself of how difficult it is as a doctor to surrender the position that I 
know best. During an outpatient consultation one day I had a discussion with a well 
informed journalist, who needed an ear operation. This was complicated by the fact that 
he had hepatitis C and this carries with it certain risks to both the patient and the doctor. 
All had seemed to be satisfactory but in retrospect I had seriously misjudged the situation 
because two weeks after the consultation a letter arrived, part of which I reproduce:
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Decar Complaints Co-ordinator: July 15th 1995
On Wednesday July 12 my wife and I  attended an out-patients appointment with the ENT 
consultant M r R  Canter to discuss the possibility o f treating deafness and a discharge in 
my deft ear.....in the course o f the consultation, Mr Canter remarked upon the fact that I  
am ta carrier o f the hepatitis C virus and attempted to explain some o f the problems this 
might cause in the event o f his attempting surgery on my ear (though he did agree, in
priraciple, to operate) unfortunately, hardly a single word he uttered on the subject has
any' basis in fact. And where there was fact, there was an astonishing lack o f tact.... after 
initially being stunned into silence, I  did consider challenging Mr Canter's eccentric 
views on hepatitis C but as my wife was obviously becoming distressed and we were also 
in a  hurry to attend a parents' evening, I  decided the matter was best dealt with by letter 
at a  later stage... ”
There then followed a detailed and well-informed criticism of the points I had raised and 
why they were inappropriately managed by me. This episode raises a number of points. 
The description that my views on hepatitis are "eccentric” is obviously one that I would 
contest, but it suggests that his view as a patient, based on his experience and reading of 
the subject, did not fit with the conventional medical viewpoint that I would have 
presented to him. We had talked about risk of transmission of hepatitis to other patients 
via the anaesthetic circuit and to theatre staff via aerosol transmission when bone was 
drilled away as part of his operation. These points would affect the timing and the length 
of time under anaesthetic because extra precautions would have to be taken; I felt obliged 
to let him know about this. Because he had seemed particularly well informed, I had 
made the assumption that we could talk with one another in a language based on a 
positivist or post positivist paradigm. The language of the consultation was very medical 
but in retrospect this may not have been appropriate. This raises questions about how data 
does or does not make sense when viewed from different paradigms and his paradigmatic 
position may not have been the positivist one I had assumed it to be. My conceptual 
model includes a level at which I ask, as a researcher, what paradigmatic position am I 
holding and in what paradigmatic position I am choosing to communicate. In the 
consultation I recollect having the kind of conversation about hepatitis with the patient
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that I might have with a medical colleague and as a consequence chose a positivist 
explanatory stance. In retrospect this may not have been correctly framed.
Alternatively, I may have been behaving like the registrar in Valerie’s story and 
experiencing difficulty in surrendering the notion that ‘doctor knows best’. There may 
well have been a dynamic that upon meeting a well informed patient that I was trying to 
demonstrate to the patient that I was even better informed about his disease; that ‘I knew 
best’. This judgement about his knowledge was made purely on the basis of a biomedical 
model of the disease. At one level, the theoretical, the biomedical level, I probably was 
better informed than he was but at another, in the experiential sense, I was not. I could 
have no real concept whatsoever of what it means to actually have hepatitis C, to undergo 
a liver transplant and to live with the knowledge that I could transmit this virus to others. 
Underlying all the talk we had had, was a strategy on my part not to acknowledge his role 
in any way as ‘expert in his own illness’ by confining discussion to operative issues and 
the language of discussion to biomedical language, both discursive practices in which I 
had greater experience. There were issues for him in which he could have not only made 
a contribution but played a part as expert. For example, there are decisions to be made 
about anaesthesia and its potentially detrimental effect on the liver in someone with 
hepatitis.
[There are a number of alternative inferences that can be made about this event, but no 
attempt was made to inquire into these at the time. Such complaints are embarrassing and 
there may have been reasons for not pursuing the matter much further given the way that 
the consultation was initially so badly misread. But in the context of a thesis, this also 
represents a moment where inference is badly disconnected from data and the opportunity 
to explore theory in use as opposed to espoused theory has been missed. Even now I am 
not sure how I would have handled events differently given that the context was one of 
complaint as opposed to an episode that provided data to heighten reflexive awareness.]
Earlier on in the thesis, I have reported a study, which found that when surgeons were 
asked to predict outcome on the basis o f ‘gut feeling’, they could do so with greater
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accuracy than a battery of tests. This suggests that, for doctors at least, experiential non­
positivist indicators, which may not be accessible to external review, are important in 
predicting outcome. An argument was made that these should form a legitimate part of 
the decision making process. Do similar experiential knowledge, ‘gut feelings’ on the 
part of the patient predict outcome in this way? I suspect that all doctors have a sense that 
patients who are positive in their approach to disease, believe in the treatment, do better 
than those who do not. The whole theory underlying the placebo effect is probably 
dependent upon this. Little work has been done on the ability of patients to predict 
outcome but one study attempted to do this. 23,000 people were asked a simple 
evaluation of health; “At the present time how would you rate your health ? ” and asked 
to categorise it into good, indifferent or bad. The answers given were a stronger predictor 
of death three years later than the objective indicators of physical examination and a 
battery of tests including blood pressure, blood counts, etc. (Idler EL, Kasl SV. 1991. 
p55-65). Others are beginning to make the same assertion; “It takes two to tango, and 
“empowering” patients means recognising their and their children’s special expertise on 
their own bodies, lives, and environments, as well as getting professionals to relinquish 
‘their monopoly on expert knowledge.’” (Roberts H. 1996, p934)
If the notion that alternative non-biomedical data put forward by the patient has the status 
of expert knowledge, then I need to consider how to relate this to the biomedical model I 
hold. If this ‘expert’ knowledge was explored by further inquiry, then I began to find that 
this generated data that began to make the decision making process immensely more 
complex. I began to see this increased complexity as evidence of two things. Firstly, as 
evidence that reality was being more accurately described, on the basis that no 
description in life is really that simple. Secondly, much that was subsequently revealed 
and which became important in deciding what to do appeared to be data that did not fit in 
well with a positivist definition of what was relevant. I took this as evidence that data 
from different paradigmatic perspectives was being exposed. This in turn suggested that 
discursive medical power, which might have been expected to limit opportunities for 
such data to enter the analysis, was being altered in some way. The assumptive bonds of
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positivism were being loosened. This is illustrated by the following story, taken from 
notes made at the time.
25th May 1992
I  recently saw a young teacher o f 23, who was troubled with tonsillitis to the point where 
it was leading to significant time off work. Even between clear cut episodes o f illness, she 
was acting below her best. The arguments for considering tonsillectomy were clearly 
overwhelming but she was failing to take up this option. She was unable to commit 
herself to going ahead with the operation despite the fact that she was fully aware o f the 
reasoned arguments in favour and appreciated the very small degree o f risk that the 
procedure would involve. The "voice o f reason" was in conflict with her "inner voice" (N 
Goldberger et al, 1987). I  suggested that she put aside for a moment the ‘head’ 
arguments to do with having the operation and concentratedfor a moment on what her 
‘instinct ’ was telling her. What happened was surprising.
The first thought/ emotion that came to her was that o f her mother who five years 
previously had died in most distressing circumstances o f cancer o f the breast. It became 
clear that she had, as a young girl o f fifteen or so, spent a considerable time looking after 
her. The difficulty she was experiencing in accepting surgery fo r  herself arose from the 
experience o f ‘ seeing my mother mutilated by surgery ’ and that the ‘thought o f having 
part o f my own body removed ’ was deeply distressing. This distress was impossible to 
articulate more clearly than this and whilst she recognised the illogical nature o f  these 
thoughts andfeelings, they were nevertheless real for her.
There remains the problem about what to do with this information and on this occasion I 
suggested that what had been revealed was important and so;
I  suggested that we meet the following week and i f  she could try and write down some o f 
her ideas around the subject. She did keep the appointment the following week but had 
not written anything (too much like homework!) and our discussion really didn't get any 
further. Later that day I  received a callfrom her family doctor and we talkedfor about
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thirty minutes about this patient the problems that the death o f her mother had caused 
her and her family. I  had entered this complex world ofproblems as part o f a simple 
consultation about some seemingly unconnected issue by attention to the dissonance 
between analytical and intuitive processes, and inviting further inquiry.
It might have possible to have coerced such a patient into proceeding with surgery 
‘against her better instincts’. As it turned out, when she was given a date for surgery 
some nine months later, she declined the offer. I believe that she did so because her data 
(reservations based upon previous experience) had been accorded the status of important 
medical information pertinent to the outcome and she had been given the opportunity to 
express this. I had not tried to use Lukes’ second dimension power to avoid any 
discussion of the dissonance between rational and intuitive judgement in case it disturbed 
the perceived correct clinical decision to proceed to surgery. My suspicion, and it can be 
no more than suspicion, is that those patients who proceed to surgery ‘against this better 
judgement’ and who subsequently experience problems are much more likely to take 
legal action against their surgeon than those patients whose ‘inner voices’ have been 
acknowledged.
On this occasion, and many others I was to find, the ‘head arguments’ had conflicted with 
the ‘gut feeling’. It is clearly a difficult area, but virtually no work has been undertaken in 
the medical context that has looked at decision making by the patient when there is a 
discrepancy between intuitive and rational judgement. As might be expected, it has been 
suggested that the manner in which information is presented can exercise an important 
influence on the way that intuitive judgements were retained in the face of evidence that 
this was entirely inappropriate. (Denes R V 1994.p819) However, such studies might say 
more about an attitude towards risk, and risk of surgery and the discourse used to explain 
this, than the problems associated with the interplay between rational and intuitive 
knowledge.
Whilst thinking about this, I began to look for any discrepancy between rational and 
intuitive judgement in my practice and ask the patients about it. I found that data
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generated in this way often led to interesting areas that had impact upon the decision 
making process. It seemed to be a powerful way of introducing non-biomedical data into 
the equation because the purpose behind the question can be construed as an invitation 
that the consultation process was prepared to enter a paradigm shift. It was also an 
invitation that data generated in this way would be taken seriously. David, Patrick and 
Valerie all respond to an invitation to explore this area of knowledge in a way that 
suggests to them that the phenomenon is real, and I found such reactions typical of those 
I experienced with other patients in the clinic.
David
D: I  think in making any sort o f decision, especially a momentous decision that might 
affect your life or your death, you draw on all the years o f experience that you've had in 
many, many fields and the decision that you make isn’t based upon what you have been 
told, it’s a lifetime's experience.....................
D: Huhhh, I, I, I  think perhaps I  don’t understand some o f it myself. I  think 
there’s, we've all got a bit o f an inner voice, women call it female intuition, 
men scoff at it, huhh, but it's there and there was something within me that 
said "no that's not the route to go, you go. ."
R: Did you, did you talk to that inner voice at all? Did you fin d  yourself 
having a, a dialogue with it?
D: No.
R: You just listened to it.
D: I  just listened.
R: And what do you see, what do you see, where do you see that inner voice 
coming from?
D: And uhh, it, it, it didn't take me very fa r  but um yeah, I, I, huhhh, I  think 
it's true to say that even when Ifirst got the news I'd got cancer and I  was 
having radiotherapy, umm I  began to look inwardly a lot more than I  had for 
many many years umm. And cert', certainly within business actually, I, now 
and again I  used to listen to the inner voice, I  didn't want to do something
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and say go on, no that's the right way and all
R: Right, I  see. V, would you listen to the inner voice i f  it gave you umm 
advice that was irrational or contrary to what you might expect to do i f  you 
sat and tried to work it out?
D: I f  it was strong enough, yeah.
R: Yes. What would you do i f  there was a conflict? Which would you listen 
to?
D: Mmm, crickey that is difficult. I  think I'd go for the inner voice.
R: Right.
D: I  think I've huh gone o ff the gut fo r  a great percentage o f my life you 
know, you, you, you look at something and you think is it right, is it wrong, oh 
crickey, can't make a decision. The first thought is yes it was right, let's go 
for it. And it, i t , it ,it works the majority o f the time I  think.
(Appendix 1, David)
Patrick
P: Many discussions on the subject ofprobability o f recurrence arose or relating to it. 
There was the assumption that it was indeed an independent separate umm cancer but I  
won't go into that at this stage.
R: May, may I  explore that with you?
P: Yes by all means.
R: I, I  know your background is mathematical and so if  we had quite a discussion about 
probability and I  like the way you've handled it umm I  mean I  can see what you've done 
but at the same time you use the word 'feel right" quite a lot 
P: Yes.
R: so it seemed to me that you used, and I  don't want to put words into your mouth but I  
get a sense that you are using the, these intellectual statistical mathematical arguments 
to, and, and you have trouble getting data but you've used this until you've got a solution 
that fe lt right.
P: Yes.
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R: Is that right?
P : That's right.
R: Until you were happy?
P: Well I, yes I  was, I, I  was uncomfortable uhh I  couldn't live with the idea o f opposing 
my doctors (.) who were adamant about it being uhh an independence uhh generation o f 
new, a new cancer uhh and in confronting that with umm uh a rather umm broad vague 
fee l factor............
(Always in my mind were the dire consequences o f being wrong, in spite o f my firm  
conviction that this was not a new cancer and, further, my immune system was capable, 
as it had been for some six years, o f preventing further secondary tumours forming.
As I  stated earlier my confidence was private and within me rather than confrontational. 
Before becoming confrontational it was necessary for me to have the opportunity to 
explain the fu ll case history and present with it my own logical conclusions.
Regretable, Dr B was not prepared to spend his time listening and as a result I  continued 
to carry my conviction and my worries within myself - note added by P  on reading the 
text)
R: You are saying so many interesting things I  have trouble keeping them all in my mind, 
a lot o f things I  want to ask you but umm and this doesn't directly follow from what 
you’ve just said, it just goes back a couple o f minutes to a moment when you said you fe lt 
powerless umm, in fact, umm to, to do what you felt to be the right thing and (1) I  get a 
sense that what you needed to do was translate the medical knowledge, the information 
you're getting from the radiotherapy and the general surgeon whom you saw into, into a 
kind o f language that you understood, seemed to be able to make an intuitive decision 
P: Yes.




P: Yes, well that's,
R: A method o f empowering yourself
P: Well yes indeed and I  regret very much not asking more questions but umm this is 




R: Where, where, where is the source o f your certainty about what's goodfor you?
Where does that come from ? You said experience?
V: Well it comes down to gut in the end. It's gut reaction based on experience and
umm weighing up the odds umm and the choice to have at the time. Further -  it is gut 
reaction based on a lot o f experiences, o f feeling really ill from medication.
R: Ok that's interesting. When you take, take that, how do you, how do you get it
into the equation?
V: That's an interesting one because that's what I've got to do about the transplant in
the end. I  have a friend whose daughter, who's one o f my very, very goodfriends and 
who's been great support to me fo r  some years her daughter is a councillor with London 
Underground. So when I  went up to London to be assessed fo r  the transplant, I  actually, 
I  asked her i f  she'd come and see me and I  said ‘how do you decide between two things 
that seem as bad as each other? Because I  mean the time that Professor Z was giving me, 
not that I  realised this then, and the kind o f death he's described, is not that significantly 
better than the transplant except that o f course i t ’s much less invasive. But basically I  
asked her ‘how do you decide between the two things, neither o f  which is very
attractive? ’ And umm she came down in the end to something th a t....
R: She said?
V: to obtain all the information you can about both, you know, both treatments.
R: Yes.
V: and the consequences of, consequences o f the treatment and think them over fo r  a
time and my gut reaction would come up. That always happens with me. Somehow, you, 
you begin to know exactly what you want to do and you then start thinking o f the reasons
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why. I  mean there’s a, I  mean it’s very instinctive thing or intuitive thing I  mean I'm quite 
intuitive about most decisions I  make about things anyway. Anyone who thinks like that 
makes decisions fairly quickly usually and then has to substantiate the reasons why.
R : But you ...so once you, once you collect the information, you allow an intuitive
decision to develop? Once you've developed that intuitive gut feeling decision, you then 
construct an explanation based on the evidence you have collected?
V: That's not quite right, you, no, I'm not closed at that point. It usually
turns out to be the right decision. You then say, "well Ok, well why, why have 
I  made that decision? Why does that seem to be the one I  want? ’ and you 
look at it again and that time the logic falls into place but also at that point I  
will still at any time listen to further arguments from doctors because my 
construction might not be right. Or something may have happened to change 
things.
(Appendix 3, Valerie)
Furthermore, when rational and intuitive judgements were in harmony with one another, I 
obtained the sense that this represented a weak measure of validity. These experiences 
gradually led to the idea of the third decision making model.
This third framework model reintroduces the idea that the doctor is also a researcher into 
the most appropriate decision. Highlighting any discrepancy between intuitive and 
rational judgement becomes a point whereby it becomes possible to explore the 
relationship between the judgements suggested by the positivist solution and the 
judgements suggested by the intuitive perspective of the patient. Allowing these 









researcher (theory behind the theory behind the data) I have retained an awareness of the 
paradigm position that I have chosen to adopt at that moment.
How was this translated into actual clinical practice? I began to systematically pay 
attention to the notion that opinions based on inner ‘gut feelings’ were a legitimate input 
into the medical decision making process. This was made explicit by clearly stating, at 
some point in the consultation, that this was the case. Furthermore it was not necessary to 
make a decision about what to do straight away. It may be helpful to ruminate over what 
had been said, to carefully weigh up the arguments, before coming to a any decision. This 
process may take some time and might involve a number of consultations. At one level, 
this invitation is paying due regard to a principal of participative action inquiry models 
with a number of cycles of action and reflection on the part of the doctor and patient. 
Others may also be participants but the degree to which other members of the group, 
other doctors, relatives and friends of the patient, truly engaged in inquiry depended upon 
how close they were to the patient, how interested they were in the problem, how much 
time they could spend talking about the problem and a whole host of other factors. Such a 
model is diagrammatically depicted in Figure 6.
Whatever the problems discussed in generating a consultation style that approaches 
mutuality, it has been assumed to date that the patient is an adult. About forty percent of 
the patients I see are children and developing a participative approach in which they feel 
free to ‘research’ their own health, disease and treatment options might present special 
problems. Naturally I wondered whether it would be appropriate to try and adopt the 
same approach with children in my clinical practice. Could some of these ideas, some of 
these frameworks of decision making, be successfully employed with younger patients?
Children as experts in their own illness
When children come to the clinic, most of the time seems to be spent talking to the 




Figure 6. Type 3 The Patient as Researcher
This model suggests that intuitive as well as rational judgement play and important part in the 
decision making process. Sometimes it is necessary to 'research' any discrepancy between the two.
listening and therefore choose my language carefully in the hope that the children 
understand what is happening. Part of the time is then spent examining them and in older 
children some time might be spent in explaining to them what happens when they come 
to hospital. Prior to starting this research, I would not generally have considered 
involving children in any other way, certainly not below the age of twelve or so, in any of 
the decision making process.
Because I was married to a solicitor, I was made aware that the law with respect to 
children rights was changing. The Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted by 
the General assembly of the United Nations on the 20th Novemberl989. Article 12 (i) 
states that parties "shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own 
views to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the 
child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child." In 
1991 the Children’s Act came into force in the UK and in the Autumn of 1991 the 
Government ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. (HMSO, 
1991). These Acts recognised in law that children and young people can make informed 
decisions but more importantly it implied that if they were not as fully involved as 
possible in the decision making process, it might be unlawful.
I started cautiously by changing my approach towards young adolescents aged twelve to 
sixteen. This is a difficult age group because they are perfectly capable of understanding 
all the issues involved but until the age of sixteen are ‘technically’ not responsible for 
treatment decisions as the law stands in England. This is reflected in the consent form 
which until the child is sixteen is signed by the parent or guardian. I had never felt really 
comfortable with this and would always ask such children whether or not they understood 
what was being discussed and if agreed with the decision before the consent form was 
actually signed. I began to appreciate that this approach might make it difficult for 
anyone, let alone a child, to really change what was taking place. All the discussion had 
already taken place between the parents and myself, time was getting short, and there 
would be other patients waiting to be seen. In considering this, I began to change my 
practice and started the consultation by saying to the patient something like:
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"You have come today to discuss whether or not it would be appropriate to remove your 
tonsils. Can I  say right at the beginning that the decision to do this operation is one in my 
opinion can only be made by you? Iam  not going to make it fo r  you, neither is your mum 
or dad, or your school teacher, although they may help you. It is a decision only you can 
make fo r  yourself. Also you don't have to decide today, but i f  you do you can change your 
mind at a later date. "
At this stage in the research, I was explicitly in my own mind using the simple 
exploratory tool described by Schon of exploration, move testing, hypothesis testing, and 
evaluation of outcomes. Outcomes were classified in terms of desirable or undesirable 
outcomes, each of which were regarded as surprising or unsurprising. (Schon. 1983, 
p i53) Given this methodology, what was to be my move test to test the hypothesis that 
they were capable to a useful extent of handling the issues involved?
I saw the change in framing the consultation as my move test. The perceived outcome was 
that they seemed to visibly relax and responded well to the idea that they could have an 
apparent input into the decision making process. At the end of the consultation, I would 
attempt to validate the inference that they were more comfortable by asking them if they 
minded being involved in this way. The response was usually, but not always, that this 
change in approach was found to be helpful. This outcome was perceived as a desirable 
consequences that came as no surprise. I gradually started to adopt the same style with 
younger children, ten, nine, eight and then seven years old. This approach has some 
support from a study on the ability of children to handle and analyse information in 
determining their own treatment.
“Overall, 14-year-olds did not differ from adults. 9-year-olds appeared less competent 
than adults with respect to their ability to reason about and understand the treatment 
information provided in the dilemmas. However, they did not differ from older subjects 
in their expression of reasonable preferences regarding treatment. It is concluded that the 
findings do not support the denial of the right of self-determination to adolescents in 
health-care situations on the basis of a presumption of incapacity. Further, children as
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young as 9 appear able to participate meaningfully in personal health-care decision 
making.”
(WeithomL. 1982. pl589)
I began to notice that if the ages of children fell below age seven or eight, then this 
approach sometimes produced undesirable consequences and they appeared to become 
overwhelmed by the attention. In children, who were eight years or so and older some 
desirable and surprising consequences arose. It should be remembered that a discussion 
about surgery has to include a discussion on complications and risks and these would 
ordinarily have been discussed, usually in coded euphemistic language, with the parent. If 
I was going to truly involve children in decisions about treatment then these risks, 
including death, needed to be addressed with them as well. I developed methods of doing 
this in a way that I saw as sensitive and appropriate. Discussing the possibility of dying 
during surgery with an eight year old may come as a surprise to the reader of this work 
but in doing so two features became clear. Firstly, the fear of dying during an operation is 
a common worry among children. This natural feeling could have been enhanced by 
parental attitudes or even the language of anaesthesia, which with euphemisms like 
‘going to sleep’ are identical to terms used to describe the death of grandma or the dog. 
Secondly, not a single child, with whom I addressed these issues, seemed to become 
alarmed at the opportunity to talk about risks and complications of surgery. Sometimes 
parents might express surprise as the conversation started to move towards such topics 
but they appeared to be reassured as they saw how well their children coped. Does this 
kind of involvement represent genuine empowerment? How could my sense that these 
children were genuinely involved in their decision making be validated? How real, how 
genuine was this involvement by young children in their decision making? How could I 
find evidence to counter the claim that this did not represent genuine empowerment?
One day I had the opportunity to find out when I met ‘Hannah’. She was eleven years old 
and had with some reluctance decided that she would like to go ahead with an operation 
on her ears. I could see that she was very frightened at the idea of surgery but because the 
problem was potentially serious I was making it fairly plain (choosing what I saw as an
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appropriate positivist stance) that there were strong arguments in favour of having 
surgery. She had agreed to go ahead. She came into hospital a few weeks later and all 
seemed well until she came into the anaesthetic room. As she was being wheeled in on 
the trolley, she appeared to lose her nerve and started crying. She then said that she had 
changed her mind and didn't want an operation. This situation not uncommon and the 
standard reaction is to proceed with the operation and anaesthetise the child against their 
will. Everyone seems to become a participant in this. The medical staff might see it as a 
waste of resources if the operation doesn't take place, the anaesthetist might see it as a 
test of skill putting to sleep a recalcitrant child, the mother or father, having ‘got so far’ 
may wish to finish the process. Hannah saw me, decided that I was not to be trusted, and 
turning to her mother cried out; "Mummy, don't let them do this to me !"
There is a much about an anaesthetic that feels like an execution (or sacrifice). As she 
looked at me, I suddenly saw the situation in terms of the power both she had and I could 
exercise in this situation. According to Lukes there were three alternatives. Would I 
exercise first dimension power and force her to have the operation? Could she exercise 
second dimension power and prevent the process from proceeding by shouting and 
screaming and so prevent any real discussion? Could she be persuaded by the exercise of 
third dimension power to proceed with the operation after becoming convinced that it 
was in her interests to proceed? Was I going to be true to my description and belief she 
was genuinely participating in the decision and could exercise discretion? Would the 
whole ceremony of surgery, once started, now proceed in an unstoppable way? Would 
the situation be similar to Valerie’s as she sat on the ward having a brain cyst aspirated 
against her better judgement?
Up to now my practice in a situation like this would probably have been to go ahead with 
surgery but on this occasion such an event challenged my espoused theory that she was 
able to exercise true participation in what was happening. If my theory in action was to 
retain control then I would continue the operation despite her opposition. If my theory in 
action was aligned with my espoused theory, then surgery should be abandoned for the 
moment. In this respect action had served as a means whereby theory in action could be
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explored. Given this analysis my reaction was to say; "that's OK Hannah. We won’t do 
your operation, but will you come and see me in the clinic next week and we can talk 
about it again?"
Hannah was understandably relieved. The person most annoyed by this was her mother, 
who didn't say anything but I got a strong sense that she was embarrassed by her 
daughter's reaction and annoyed that the operation had been cancelled at the last minute. 
Perhaps, I had not appreciated the emotional turmoil she had been through to get her 
child to the operating theatre. I explained that from my point of view that, having gained 
her daughter’s confidence, I couldn't let her down in this way. She had a problem that 
might well require more surgery in the future and I thought that I would be creating 
problems for myself if I started off our relationship like this.
We met next week. Hannah was embarrassed, apologised for her behaviour and after we 
had carefully gone through with her once more the reasons for surgery said that she 
would like to go ahead. Such a position could represent a description of third dimensional 
power in which I create the illusion of choice but still define ‘best interests’. To challenge 
this, I finished by saying that if she changed her mind at the last minute again, then that 
was still acceptable. Needless to say the surgery went ahead well, there was no repetition 
of the anaesthetic room incident and Hannah has had a number of operations since, 
without apparent difficulty. This was an unsurprising and desirable consequence in 
relation to intention. There are issues here of trust as well as power. It could be argued 
that my strategy was one to maintain trust so that greater power over Hannah could be 
exercised in the future. It is a difficult argument to counter, after all what would I have 
done if she had subsequently refused surgery, which I had perceived as important and in 
her best interests. Nevertheless, I would argue that Hannah had retained control over 
medical process by exercising her veto over surgery, a position I has encouraged her to 
adopt, and this represents the first stage in empowerment.
I frequently tell the story of Hannah to other children as an example of how it is possible 
for them to influence what happens to them. Surprisingly, this particular incident has only
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happened once in this age group, so perhaps by telling the story of Hannah to illustrate 
that empowerment of a sort is possible, my position is seen as authentic. As for Hannah, I 
suspect that I have set a pattern for the kind of interaction she will have with other 
doctors for the rest of her life. I have no evidence for this other than the fact that patients 
often describe similar experiences to this as important in setting up attitudes towards 
treatments, surgery and doctors that remain entrenched for life. Valerie describes an 
experience as a young girl, about Hannah’s age, and how resisting treatment, albeit in a 
different context, on this occasion was important in terms of feeling empowered.
V: We moved when I  was 10 years old and my mother was investigated very quickly and 
it turned out she'd got fa ta l stomach cancer which had gone on fo r  too fa r  too long to do 
anything about. And when she died I  was put in hospital and by then I ’d  got 
bronchiectasis as I  said, but from then on I  did get regular hospital treatment and when 
I  was 14,1 was, I  was still taking Franol, which was a white tablet. And one day on a visit 
to the clinic I  was given another white tablet to take, a small one, and was told that I'd  
got to take it regularly. It was most important I  should take it at the same time each day 
and nothing more than that, they told me nothing about it and there was no reason or 
precedent that would make me refuse it. And I  was, you know, frozen. I  would not take 
that tablet and I  didn't know why. I  went back home and my father had not been unable 
make me. My aunt also visited but I  didn't take that tablet. I  don't know why. I  went 
back to the clinic, he questioned me very kindly, over some period o f  time. I  don't know 
why I  wouldn't take that tablet but I  wouldn't. It was Prednisolone, which I  realised much 
later that had I  gone on it permanently then, I  would have been dead long ago.
(Appendix 3, Valerie)
I am aware that such an action on my part may be seen as an arbitrary ‘frame experiment’ 
that fails to take into account the complex relationship that parents might have with their 
children in determining treatment. This area has been the subject of very little research 
but one study of children undergoing orthopaedic surgery seemed to find that children 
themselves were more dependant upon their parents in the decision making process than
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a control group of normal schoolchildren would expect (Alderson P. 1992. p81-95). 
However, this simple child/ parent relationship appears to be complicated by a response 
determined by age and the presence of a third party. “It was found that when the adult 
directed the children as to which choice alternative to choose, all children (both grades 
and both sexes) preferred that alternative advocated by the adult. When however, the 
adult's influence attempt was followed by another adult's stating that the child should 
choose whatever he/she wanted, first graders displayed oppositional behaviour 
(preferring the alternative not urged by the first adult), while fifth graders continued to 
comply with the first adult's influence. These results suggested that oppositional 
behaviour in first grade children may occur as a function of conflict between adults 
regarding adult control over the child.” (Brehm S. 1977. p31)
There has also some evidence suggesting a relationship between authority on the part of 
the parent and ability of children, especially daughters in making a decision. “Results 
suggest that parental authority characterized by stem inflexibility and overcontrol has the 
greatest influence on daughters who develop chronic indecision tendencies.” (Ferrari, J R. 
1993. p963) This may have reflected modelling on the part of the girl because “there was 
a relationship between mothers' decision-making competence and the competence of 
young female adolescents.”
(Brown J. 1991. p363)
An alternative approach has been considered by exploring the idea of ‘best interests’ as 
determined by the patient, parents and gatekeepers, which would include general 
practitioners and specialists. Instead of one person (myself) determining ‘best interests’, 
this activity is seen as a collective decision of interested parties. “Ethically responsible 
team behaviour includes: weighing risks and benefits of proposed interventions; 
promoting discussion with families and patients to identify "best interests; ‘ monitoring 
outcomes.’” (Mouradian W. 1995. p510) This approach assumes that coherence can be 
reached in terms of defining ‘best interests’ by all parties. What would be the approach 
when difference existed between the best course of action perceived by the parent and the 
child? Instead of overriding the wishes of the child, this difference was highlighted and to
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explore the reasons why this should be so. For example, a child with a long history of 
tonsillitis might well have reached a point where they were so used to the tonsillitis that 
for them this was ‘normal’. There was no perceived need for surgery. Parents might see it 
differently. Each attack of tonsillitis was a disruption to the whole family; parents might 
have to take time off work, would be up at night looking after them etc. The parent and 
the child would have a completely different perspective as to what need to be done. The 
‘best interests’ of the child and the ‘best interest’ of the family would be in conflict 
(Schoeman, F. 1985. p45). Put like this, the perceived difference in ‘best interests’ could 
be seen as a difference based upon different perspectives.
I became aware that a more complex situation might sometimes arise when one parent 
was keen to proceed with surgery and the other was not. A common example would be 
when the child has recurrent tonsillitis or a significant hearing loss leading to difficulties 
in language development. In such a situation it often seems that both parents will have 
taken trouble to appear with their children in outpatients. At the risk of generalising too 
much, it seems to me that it is generally the mother is keen on some kind of surgery and 
the father not. What might be happening here?
First of all I get a sense that it has much to do with different perspectives on the problem 
and here I enter the realm of conjecture for a moment. It is still commonly the mother 
who will have to face the daily consequences of the clinical problem. They will be 
looking after an ill child during the day, be up at night more often, and generally coping 
with the disruption generated by the problem. The father might be more distant from the 
problem and will be less aware of any difficulties other than indirectly through his 
partner. When such a difference between the parents does exist and I draw attention to 
this, it is common for the mother to say: "You're never really there to see what happens!" 
Secondly, I also get a sense that the father particularly wants to see the surgeon, see the 
hospital, see the set-up, before giving his permission to proceed with surgery. He wants 
to judge the organisational competence and the professional competence. It might even 
go further than this. Sometimes I get a sense that the problem with fathers is much deeper 
than this. It is a feeling that their children have become a ‘ritualistic’ part of the greater
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healthcare organisation. Healthcare organisations need patients to make them work, to 
justify their existence, to justify the existence of those who work in them, to be the 
research subjects to satisfy the curiosity of the ‘scientists’ who work in them, to make the 
money go round. I believe this has become much more of an issue since the latest 
internal market reorganisation in which money ‘follows’ patients. Articulating these ideas 
is not easy for either the surgeon or the parent. Any parent with such thoughts might have 
difficulty making these views known without appearing offensive. As a consequence it is 
hard to test such conjecture with further inquiry in a busy clinic and it may be necessary 
to resort to alternative methodologies by others rather than action inquiry on the part of 
the surgeon involved.
With experiences like this, I changed my practice and began to develop a reluctance to 
proceed until I could see that there was congruence between these two views; the position 
of the child and the position of the parents. Resolution of these differing points of view 
was usually going to take time and I saw it as important not to be seen to take a decision 
quickly in contravention of the child's view or one parents view. Of course I have no 
knowledge of what takes place at home, whether the child or one parent was simply 
coerced and pressurised into proceeding with surgery, but I hoped that a number of 
actions on my part would help.
• Refraining from making a decision in outpatients when it was clear the child or one 
parent was not happy to proceed with surgery.
• Making this point in the presence of everyone.
• Inviting the child to write to me directly if they should have questions or difficulties.
• Offering a further appointment for discussion if necessary.
• Advising children that their best source of advice and help was their parents, who had
their best interests at heart.
From these and other conversations, I began slowly to develop a sense that data and 
inference from the patient, which was previously seen as not part of the biomedical 
model, ought to be acknowledged as ‘expert’. This approach, moving as it does towards a
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position of mutuality, still leaves unaddressed the problem of validating this. How 
reliable is such data and inference from patients, from parents, from children? After all, if 
I am listening to a history from a parent the original data of the disease process itself is 
transformed by inference as the child explains it to the parent and by inference as the 
parent relates it to me. Is it possible to connect such second order inference with data 
more robustly?
A possible approach is to turn around the principals of action science and to regard such 
data and such inference as a ‘self report’ on the part of the patient. The patient is now 
seen as an action scientist producing a ‘self report’ Two points of view have been put 
forward to consider the reliability of such reports. One approach is to conclude that "self 
reports are decidedly unreliable...individuals tell more than they know, unknowingly 
distort cues...human beings are unaware of their reasoning processes and are unaware that 
they are unaware." (Argyris, Putnam, et al. 1985 p242-243) An alternative approach is to 
take the view that "self reports are reliable commentaries...individuals are the best 
authority regarding their thought processes, they have access to these processes.. .they are 
aware that they are aware...may make mistakes.. .but if their views can be reconciled with 
those of the observer's.. .the reasons can be ascertained." (ibid) Action science takes the 
view that "both views are accurate but only in certain domains and there is a need to 
distinguish between espoused theories and theories in use.” (ibid) Such self reports 
should be subject to consistent rules to assist validity. These include asking patients to 
illustrate inferences with relatively directly observable data so that when they make a 
claim, they provide the data on which it is based. This means making their reasoning 
explicit and testing for agreement at each inferential step coupled with an attempt to seek 
disconfirming data and alternative explanations. To affirm the making of mistakes and to 
design ongoing experiments to test competing views, if the biomedical explanation offers 
an alternative course of action. (Argyris, Putnam, et al. 1985 p257-261) Although, there 
are components of this approach that I accept in type 3 framework for decision making, 
in which the patient acts as ‘researcher’ into their own condition, such an approach seems 
cumbersome. Furthermore, as a researcher, I would take the view that such an approach 
is guilty of imposing a set of validity criteria, which are circumscribed by a particular set
377
o f paradigmatic assumptions, on the situation. In other words, if patients provide 
arguments that robustly fulfil my set of validity criteria as a critical theorist, then I will 
chose to believe them
What is being asked here is to understand the rationale behind certain inferences made by 
patients and find them credible. Such rationale may be founded upon experience that may 
not be easily accessible to the doctor. Some work has shown that patients usually have a 
rationale for thinking in certain ways that may seem to the medical practitioner 
“haphazard, perverse or just plain cussed.” It was found that this was often based upon 
previous experiences of health services and health professionals and identified three 
groups. These were “those who had experienced past frights, those with current concerns 
about illness and those with a lack of confidence in healthcare professionals.” (Hopton J, 
Hogg R, McKee I. 1996) At the very least, it seems good practice to acknowledge the 
existence of these rationales even if one does not immediately accept the concept of 
‘expert’ non-biomedical knowledge. Better still, it would seem better to suspend 
judgement, hold such data and inference made by the patient lightly, respecting them but 
at the same time inquiring into them to explore the experiences and assumptions that give 
rise to this interpretation.
Framework 3
These gradual shifts, from only considering positivist data to one that saw data framed by 
theory reconfigured the consultation process from one where a doctor was seen as the 
main protagonist to one where each protagonist was expert in different arenas. Such a 
view represents a further shift towards a position of mutuality. This led to the 
development of the final two frameworks for decision making discussed later, but which 
in broad terms can now begin to be seen in the following manner.
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Type 3 and 4 decision making frameworks make an outpatient consultation more like co­
operative inquiry where doctor and patient are accorded more equal status as researcher 
and participator. It can also be recognised that such a pattern seen in progression from 
type 1 to type 4, reflects a shift in paradigmatic approach. Type 1, in which there is clear 
separation of researcher and researched, where the researcher determines what is relevant 
knowledge and the patient is experimented upon is closely allied to positivist principles. 
Alternatively, a type 4 model, which claims to seek a position of mutuality, is much 
closer to a participative inquiry paradigm. This obviously raises the possibility that theory 
(multi-paradigmatic perspectives as a researcher) has generated data (multi-model 
decision making models) that is theory dependant. This possibility forms the basis for 
claiming that, as a researcher, I claim awareness of paradigmatic position even whilst 
working as a constructivist and is evidence that the three level conceptual model is one 
that I claim to utilise.
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Leadership
The previous sections have indicated the complex relationships between power and 
knowledge. This meant that I was beginning to see myself in the clinic as a facilitator of 
(different forms of data, with methodologies I perceived as relevant to different situations 
(frameworks). If I claim to facilitate the process, which I sometimes see as a group 
process, it suggests that an analysis of leadership would be appropriate. My interest in 
decision making began by examining the head and neck malignancy clinic and in 
association with this, the hospital Inquiry Group was established. These two groups 
presented an opportunity to examine leadership in both these environments.
Early on it became clear that there were issues that were related to leadership, or control, 
and as part of the process of understanding this, I propose to revisit these diary entries 
once more. At the previous meeting of the hospital Inquiry Group, a decision had been 
made to change the physical arrangement of the room by altering the arrangement of the 
chairs. What follows is the diary entry I made after this clinic and the meeting of the 
hospital inquiry group that followed.
DIARY
12th December 1990
Head and Neck malignancy clinic. Attendance: SELF, ‘R’ AND ‘T’, Consultants; 
‘H’ Radiotherapy Consultant; ‘R d \ Consultant in Palliative Care; ‘S’, Senior 
Registrar; ‘G’, Registrar; ‘C’, ‘H’ (PART TIME), Senior House Officers; ‘M’, 
House Officer; ‘J’, Medical Student.
We had the usual pre clinic lunch, which I  have to admit was a bit more subdued than 
usual I  put this down to a number o f reasons. The principal one was that lunch was 
being hosted by a pharmaceutical representative who was very new to the job and 
somewhat nervous but we were also joined that day by two sixteen year old schoolgirls
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who were considering a medical career. Much of the usual hospital gossip, which livens 
up these meetings, was absent.
We rearrange the chairs as we had planned. Immediately two issues emerged. Firstly,
‘H ’ who had not been a party to any o f the discussions in the meetings because he hadn't 
been able to attend them, wonders what is going on. He also mentioned that he had not 
been asked. He questioned why the change offormat in the clinic? At this point I  found  
myself questioning, who owned the clinic and immediately realised that I  had always 
considered Hugh as our guest in our clinic. When I  had explained about the meetings 
and the decision that had been reached after the second meeting he, being the good- 
natured and flexible individual that he is, was happy to co-operate.
As we sat down, R  ’ also immediately questioned the decision and how we had come to 
make this. This raised the question as to how groups actually come to make a decision 
that we allfeel able to put into practice. A little good humoured banter followed. By now 
we were all in our seats and it was immediately clear that as the patients entered the 
room they were to be met by a wall o f about 12 to 13 faces sitting in three rows all in 
white coats except R  ’, who was dressed in a suit. The nurse attending the clinic said she 
thought that it was very intimidating andfor some reason found it hysterically funny. 
After that we all started laughing and there were humorous comments about \power 
seats ’, R  ’ dressing differently, in a suit as opposed to white coats, like ‘God sitting in the 
clouds ’ etc. A straw pole at that time found about one third in favour o f the old system 
and two thirds in favour o f the new seating arrangement.
The clinic began. There were only six patients, o f whom only one had a really unpleasant 
and difficult problem. We, at least I, hand this problem over to R  ’. R  ’ is very vocal in 
the clinic and spends part o f his time constructing diagrams depicting who is giving and 
receiving attention. Much o f the areas we are exploring in terms o f patient comfort are 
areas where I  think he feels that he has special expertise and Ifo r  one enjoy what he has 
to say. When I  give him the care o f this difficult patient, who is destined to die a most
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unpleasant way, I  feel very guilty at handing over to ‘R ’ such a difficult management 
problem.
The seating arrangement is judged a success by some, especially by those who I  had 
perceived as being most in favour o f the change at the last monthly meeting. I  think they 
fe lt responsible that it should work and were unanimous in saying that it had helped them 
to concentrate. Interestingly enough we all found ourselves asking the patients, especially 
those who had attended before with the old arrangement when we all stood up, what they 
thought. The answers weren’t consistent. At one time three o f us, including myself, sat in 
the patients seat andfelt what it was like. For me it fe lt very good because I  was looking 
at a group o f people that I  like very much. We all noticed that you tended not to notice 
those o ff centre. Pretty quickly the idea emerged that next time we should position the 
seats so that when the patient entered the room the first thing he should see was his own 
empty seat against the wall opposite. The main group should be seated to the side o f this 
chair, therefore partly out o f view. The presence o f a few  empty chairs in the watching 
gallery should reduce the feeling ‘o f a sell out show’ and o f 'observers watching an 
electric chair I  lookforward to next week’s discussion with interest.
DIARY
28th December 1990
3rd meeting of multidisciplinary group. Attendance: ‘R’, ‘Rd’, SELF, Consultants; 
‘S’, Senior Registrar; ‘G’, Registrar; ‘C’, ‘A’, Senior House Officers; ‘K’ House 
Officer, ‘K’, Medical Student.
We resumed the discussion by talking about the seating arrangement and how much the 
effect o f sitting down had altered our perception andfeelings. ‘Too small a room ’, ‘too 
many chairs ’ were common observations and typical o f how many felt. It soon became 
clear to me that the discussion was dividing people into two groups; those who preferred 
sitting down and those who preferred to be standing. Those who preferred to be standing 
were on the whole the ‘decision makers ’ and those seated were ‘onlookers ’. It occurred 
to me that both o f these groups had a common purpose in wishing to disengage from each
382
other. The ‘decision makers ’ fe lt conscious o f the presence o f the ‘onlookers ’ in the 
management o f such a sensitive situation and could distance their impact by getting them 
to sit and talk amongst themselves. The ‘onlookers * could distance themselves from the 
‘decision makers ’ by being in a seat which says T am an onlooker, I  am part o f the 
audience that is here to observe ’. I  mentioned this point but it was largely ignored so 
perhaps I  have either missed the point or that no-one was prepared to acknowledge the 
disengagement, in case they may be made to engage more actively.
The discussion centred fo r  a while around seating arrangements; its a little aimless and 
slightly hard going. Gradually we evolve the idea that it would be better i f  less people 
were there and that the SHOs could take turns to attend the clinic. One SHO would be in 
the clinic, one on the ward and another would be doing an extra clinic in another part o f 
the hospital as there would otherwise be nothing fo r  them to do. ‘R ’ and R d * leave and I  
am now the only senior member o f the department left. I  suddenly see my research 
running into difficulties. Because staff change every six months, it would take three 
months before all new members o f the department had attended a head and neck clinic 
and these discussion meetings would get o ff to a slow start. I  also mention that they are 
going to be making a decision on behalf o f  their successors and they hadn't been 
consulted. Things then started to rapidly liven up.
Initially my comment was dismissed as silly and it was pointed out to me that many 
decisions were made on their behalf by their predecessors without their input. This was 
the system. I  then commented that I  thought that they as a group found it difficult to 
organise themselves when they were left to their own devices. There had been numerous 
examples recently o f  things going wrong because o f this disorganisation, to the point 
where some o f the senior members were getting a bit fe d  up with them. Perhaps, because 
they prefer to be organised, they had assumed that their successors would fee l the same.
My reasons fo r  embarking on this discussion are perhaps a little complex. The most 
pertinent was that I  was disappointed that after I  had stuck my neck out somewhat and 
given them carte blanche to organise their rotas, working days, holidays etc. with the
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result that my colleagues had felt that I  was not organising them enough. There was no 
doubt that the experiment hadn't worked out well I  was certainly learning that it is not 
good enough to simply indicate to people what the goal is and let them get on with it. 
Sometimes it may be necessary to indicate how these goals might be achieved. Some 
fairly animated discussion followed and the only two comments I  really remember were:
"How can you ask us to make decisions and object when we do?" and 
"Richard, you are too much o f an idealist".
‘K ’, the medical student, points out that these comments were only made after my other 
senior colleagues had left. ‘S ’ collared me half an hour later and said that he had 
expressed anger with them as a group yesterday because he had spent the afternoon 
sorting out their work because they had failed to provide sufficient ward cover. He was 
therefore unable to go to the library to do some research. I  reply to him that it seems to 
me that they have failed to keep their part o f the bargain in providing cover and he is 
quite right in pointing this out. Afterwards I  fe lt a little hurt that to be an idealist was 
regarded as unacceptable but pleased that they could say it.
As I reread these notes, I notice the control I am exercising. I act as choreographer, 
moving people here and there, conducting ‘straw polls’, ‘handing’ over patients to 
colleagues as though they belong to me. At the same time I am participating in the clinic, 
greeting patients, examining them, teaching the trainee staff and finally trying to notice 
what is happening in the clinic and remember what I should put in my diary. It seems 
unappealingly egocentric and yet how could my colleagues be so tolerant of this, 
assuming that they were?
When I reflect on this, I am reminded once more of Randall and Southgate. I cannot 
consider this group to be wholly creative and might better be considered as an 
‘intermediate’ group, a group composed of creative and destructive forces. These 
intermediate groups, they claim, tend to demonstrate most clearly the three levels of 
organising, production and emotional leadership. “A group may have creative leadership
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on one level, lack leadership on one level and tend towards destructive leadership on a 
tthird ” (Randall and Southgate. 1980, p28)
In order to try to identify what was happening they propose asking five questions.
1. On which levels does the group have creative leadership?
2. On which levels does the group have destructive leadership?
3. On which level does the group lack leadership?
4. How can you provide the leadership that the group is lacking?
5. How can you change the destructive leadership towards something more creative? 
(Randall and Southgate. 1980. p28)
Although these are useful questions to ask, many of them are impossible to answer from 
my single perspective with unsubstantiated inference made some time after the event. 
However, some simple observations can be made. At one level this group was a Head and 
Neck Clinic engaged in a fairly routine task. It takes about twenty minutes to see each 
patient and there is a sense, in which each patient examined represents a mini creative 
cycle described by Randall and Southgate of energising, nurturing, peak and relaxing.
The energising and nurturing occur when the history is read out and the treatment options 
identified. The ‘peak’ is reached as the patient joins the group to discuss the position and 
we work to identify the most suitable treatment and the relaxing phase occurs in between 
each patient. This often includes a moment to wind down, to prepare for the next patient 
and this point it is common for a little light joking taking place. This particular clinic has 
been operating in this way for many years, so that at one level this cycle, this ceremony 
happens almost automatically.
One could argue that consultants provide the production and organising leadership. The 
patient, as it were, ‘belongs’ to this consultant because the history usually begins with the 
opening; “This is Mr So and So’s patient “, at which point the consultant will step 
forward and seem to take control. Also as production and organising leaders, they offer 
information, prepare for the task, synthesise, draw conclusions and tidy up. Other
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members of the group, largely trainees, do not appear to have a recognised task as they 
watch the consultants in the clinic. Occasionally they might become involved in 
administrative tasks. Randall and Southgate called this arrangement ‘the bureaucrats and 
the bored.’ “Here you find a small leadership group, who do all the work, and a passive 
membership who do very little... The leadership becomes a group within a group, 
playing to a passive audience who alternate between boredom, angry explosions and 
being coerced into doing some work.” (Randall and Southgate. 1980, p 29)
However, this clinic has set itself another task. It has the set itself the additional task of 
being a research group. This is not necessarily a task that would appeal to every member 
of the group, hence the comments that H made in asking who had decided upon the 
changes in the seating arrangement. I now begin to see much of the slightly frenetic 
activity on my part as part of a process of energising this group to become more 
interested in the research task. If this group is seen as a group with two tasks, that of 
conducting a clinic and that of engaging in research into clinic process, I seem to have 
assumed a number of roles. Firstly, as the initiator of the research, I have assumed the 
role of production, organising and emotional leader of the research group, and secondly 
leadership roles of one sort or another in the main clinical task of the clinic.
Torbert, in work with students that is in many ways very similar, tried to overcome the 
problem of multiple tasks by working much more in a role of facilitator. He allocating 
tasks to various members of the group. In his course “Forcing students to be free” he 
“asked them to chose a task leader, a process leader and a historian.” And “then offered 
them a model that distinguishes among various ways to make decisions (e.g. unilateral 
decree, two-person 'handshake', majority vote, explicit consensus).” (Torbert 1991 p i52) 
At the end of each session he asked them to review the decisions they had just made 
about leadership in the light of these categories. Such an approach separated out the 
various roles in the group in a way that permitted interpretation to be made from several 
different viewpoints and triangulation by group decision making in a way that was 
transparent. In the beginning I had formed the hospital inquiry group with no clear way of 
distinguishing task, from process, from research and attempted to analyse all three within
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1the same inquiry group. As the research developed and, with the benefit of hindsight and 
supervision, stumbled towards a strategy where I attempted to separate out these tasks as 
predominant activities in each of the various inquiry groups. The University Research 
Group paid attention to research process. The Hospital Research Group paid attention to 
the reflective practitioner aspect of the research by creating an environment to explore 
reflexivity. Finally the Patient/ Doctor group paid attention to positivist task, reflective 
practitioner and research task. This partial separation of tasks is reflected in the 
methodology but the model also allowed me to practice some aspects of my practice in 
each of these different domains and then try and bring it all back again into the clinical 
arena.
What is also clear in retrospect is the recurring problem of disconnecting data from 
inference. The feedback obtained from the hospital inquiry group on the clinic was 
initially perceived as feedback to support hypotheses about the manner in which the 
clinic was conducted and what might be changed to improve it. In fact, such feedback 
constituted data on the clinic, my role within it, their role within it as well as data about 
the hospital inquiry group. Failure to distinguish between data from these different arenas 
clearly enough meant that inferences were never properly validated. Were the reactions 
o f some members of the group based upon their perspective on the clinic and its problems 
or generated by participation in an inquiry group about which they may have had 
misgivings? Because of this failure to properly connect inference with data, the 
opportunity has been lost to explore leadership with the group, particularly with reference 
to Torbert’s ideas on different leadership styles. In what respect could my style by 
considered opportunist, diplomatic, achieving or even strategic? I am not sure just how 
useful trying to classify oneself is but the ideas inherent within the leadership styles are 
certainly useful to consider. For example, at a “ 'strategist' stage a person ceases to take 
the existing overall structure of social systems for granted as appropriate (or at least as 
inevitable) and therefore becomes interested in what a normative (a best, a just) structure 
would be.” (Torbert 1991 p51-52 ) Such a purpose would seem worthwhile, so what are 
the characteristics that manage such transformations to a more just system? 
Transformation, according to Torbert, is dependent upon perceiving a sufficiently
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complex reality in order to “develop an explicit, unique, theoretical synthesis...that 
provides greater guidance for action. Alternatively, the gradual recognition that systems 
effectiveness and justice can require not just a change of actions, but a change of goals, 
structures and values, leads some to develop a synthetic theory that accounts for and 
helps to generate transformations of frame in self, organization, or society." (ibid)
My espoused claim is that I am engaged in trying to change a structure to a more just one 
where power is not unilaterally exercised by consultants. This mutuality includes 
mutuality with patients and mutuality with trainee medical staff and possibly others. 
Evidence for this would include setting up a discussion group in which trainees can have 
the kind of conversations with consultants that I would not have been able to have had as 
a trainee myself. I believe some diary records would support the nature of this. The body 
of the thesis would lend some support to the notion that I was trying to do this with 
patients. In Torbert’s view such transforming power “invites mutuality- a mutual exercise 
of power guided by a living awareness of what is currently at stake for the particular 
systems participating in the transformation.” So from my perspective I appear to have 
gone some way towards substantiating a claim that some transformation has taken place 
but, as Torbert also warns, “the temptation and danger of the strategist....is that he or she 
may very well come to rely on a plausible and powerful theory, rather than on continuing
efforts of awareness to avoid such outcomes (real change in organisational structure)”.
(Torbert 1991 p57) It is certainly a possibility that this whole exercise represented by 
this thesis is nothing more than an exercise in creating a plausible and attractive theory to 
maintain the status quo. Indeed this very statement may be part of that so that it is 
impossible to break out of this loop of without reference to others unless I choose to be 
“actively seeking, challenge and contradiction.” (ibid)
Evidence that all was not well in this stage of the research is to be found in the way that I 
had initially tried to empower the trainee staff by disempowering myself. Instead of me 
organising their rotas and work schedule, they had been encouraged to do these tasks 
themselves.
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“I  was disappointed that after I  had stuck my neck out somewhat and given them carte 
blanche to organise their rotas, working days, holidays etc. with the result that my 
colleagues had fe lt that I  was not organising them enough. There was no doubt that the 
experiment hadn't worked out well. .........
"How can you ask us to make decisions and object when we do? " and 
"Richard, you are too much o f an idealist".
This was a problem experienced by Torbert as well. "In my own early attempts as an 
adult at leadership of socially innovative organizations, I exercised power as little as 
possible in order to empower others. Only upon reflection afterwards did I begin to 
realize that these situations had required a greater exercise of power (at times unilateral, 
at times logistical, at times transforming), and that what I had in fact enacted and thus 
modelled for others was not exercising power.... a large proportion of my co-workers 
tended to assume that I was utterly naive or that I was mysteriously devious and 
manipulative...my self disempowerment had powerful and negative effects on others." 
(Torbert 1991 p69) Torbert does not provide data for this assertion but it certainly was 
one I had sensed myself.
This last point made by ‘K ’ in the diary section is interesting and illustrates a problem I 
came to recognise in the clinic and in the workplace. “ ‘K \ the medical student, points 
out that these comments were only made after my other senior colleagues had left. ” He 
was indicating that if you make yourself approachable and create an environment where 
people, patients and colleagues, can say what they want, some unexpected things happen 
Was this in any way reflected in what was happening in the clinic?
I gradually became aware of a change over the following years and it had much to do 
with the exchange of information and feelings. I have suggested earlier that an ordinary 
clinic should really be regarded as a group, subject to many of the same processes that 
take place in groups. In the same way that members of well run groups will pay closer 
attention to what other members are expressing, listen more carefully, inquire more into 
the meaning of what was being said, the same was beginning to happen to me in the
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clinic. I believed that I was encouraging patients to say more clearly, more freely when 
they really wanted to say something. Evidence for this seem to come from the way that 
patients were more freely expressing anxieties and feelings around surgery, especially 
risks. As a consequence, my clinics were taking much longer. This suggests challenging 
traditional patterns of working where patients see themselves as “traditionally passive, 
afraid of doing wrong, afraid of being labelled a troublemaker.” (Roter DL. Hall JA.
1992. pl7).
Of course much of this should be part of a good clinical consultation, but I was 
experiencing a sense that the formal nature of the boundary, which determined what was 
exchanged in the way of information, was changing. I had a sense that the structure of the 
consultation had changed and the medical discourse was starting to include data that was 
not necessarily bio medical in the positivist sense. For example, I saw a patient recently 
who firmly believed that air through the right nostril provided oxygen for the right half of 
the brain and the left nostril did the same for the left part of the brain. This is the teaching 
of one eastern religion that formed an important part of his particular belief system. This 
idea makes no sense to me but in a participative clinical style this idea would need to be 
given recognition. This openness, this less judgmental approach, seems to challenge the 
traditional role of the doctor and appeared to be welcomed by patients. A line of 
argument suggesting that if you are ‘nicer’ then people will talk more easily to you, is 
hardly ground breaking. What surprised me, was that this perceived open approach 
resulted in unexpected hostility. Why should this be?
Head and Neck Clinic.
12th Aug. 1992
One moment from the clinic really stands out. I  made the comment that i f  you make 
yourself ‘approachable ’ as a doctor you had to accept that from time to time patients 
were inclined to ‘heap abuse on you \ They fe lt free to say what they fe lt about their 
predicament. This seemed to ring a cord especially with Hugh who must be one o f the
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most approachable doctors I  know. It may be a price to pay for being approachable but it 
doesn't make it any easier to accept.
Part of the reason may be insufficient framing of clinical style. If patients were expecting 
a certain approach, a certain clinical style, and didn’t find this, it might leave them 
uncertain and like the trainees, feel uncertain of what is expected of them. Alternatively I 
may be misjudging openness as ‘hostility’. I had experienced a little of this with Greta at 
the Hawkwood conference when she had explained that she was able to tell me about her 
unpleasant experiences in medicine because I appeared to be approachable. I had 
misinterpreted as hostility. Being able to express one’s true feelings as a patient, even if 
they are hostile, may be evidence of a truly open mutual engagement and as such may be 
regarded by patients as a hallmark of quality.
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How do patients judge quality?
The hospital co-operative inquiry group continued to meet on a regular basis, two to three 
times a term. The next diary entry was made after a head and neck clinic in February 
1992 and provided the impetus for a discussion on quality,.
12th February 1992
Head and Neck malignancy clinic. Attendance: SELF, ‘R \ ‘T’, Consultants; ‘H’ 
Radiotherapy Consultant; ‘Rd’, Palliative care Consultant; ‘M’, Maxillofacial 
Consultant; ‘C% ‘H’, ‘D’ Senior House Officers; ‘S’, House Officer; ‘F’, Dental 
Nurse.
This was the first clinic fo r  the new group o f SHOs who had started at the beginning o f 
February. A word about them. They all seem rather experienced and have been qualified 
fo r  a number o f years. One o f them, ‘C ’ has worked in the department some years ago, 
before my appointment, as a House Officer. Two o f them have just spent a few  months 
returning via the fa r  east after working in Australia.
There are only four patients to see. ‘R ’ is ill and ‘T ’ is away, along with the registrar ‘P ’. 
The senior registrar is in theatre sorting out a problem and does not participate at all the 
whole afternoon. It is a bright sunny day outside and contrasts with the problems we are 
facing in the clinic. We all sit down on the chairs. Even with the reduced numbers we 
have today, the row o f faces seem formidable. H ’ the radiotherapist is late to arrive and 
so we have twenty minutes to chat. The small clinic and the small number o f people seem 
like an ideal way to start with the SHOs.
R d  ’ starts talking about what he calls (i f  only ’. What he means by this is the expression 
used by patients when their doctors has been responsible fo r  a mistake that has 
threatened their chances o f a cure. We admit to experiencing very few  patients who say 
this or use a similar expression. R d ’ says that in his experience it is fairly common and
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often directed at hospital doctors rather than their general practitioners. I  suspect that 
one o f  the reasons is that any patient in a predicament with their disease is going to he 
anxious about confronting their potential saviour (?) with anger and will choose to 
displace it.
The freshness with which ‘R d ’ speaks makes me think that he has just had an experience 
with a patient like this earlier on today and I  ask him i f  that is the case. He explains that 
this is indeed so and I  am reminded o f the impression I  have that people walk into a room 
carrying their ‘baggage ’ with them. Then one o f those odd coincidences happens today.
Our second patient is a lady o f about 35 years who unexpectedly found that she had a 
cancer o f the thyroid gland diagnosed and treated about 10 months ago. The relevance to 
the above lies in the discovery that she had been trying to tell her general practitioner for  
quite some time previously that there was something wrong; only to have these fears 
dismissed. Finally when she eventually gets to hospital the surgeon aspirates some fluid  
from this lump and throws it away without sending it fo r analysis despite being asked by 
the patient to do so. He also ignores the fact the lump is still there. Eventually she refers 
herself back some three months later to be told somewhat brusquely after it was removed, 
that the lump was malignant. A classic ‘i f  only ’ story, which we hardly ever hear. She is 
new to the area and has been referred by her family doctor fo r  continuing care. I t is clear 
to us that there is considerable anger on her part towards doctors, loss o f confidence in 
the system as it has served her. Furthermore we all feel that she has been inadequately 
treated.
I  encourage her to talk about her feelings towards the surgeon and she talks with very 
little prompting fo r  aboutfifteen minutes gradually becoming more animated and as ‘R ’ 
observed afterwards with increasing eye contact with me. At the end she thanks us for  
being the first group o f doctors who have listened to her and she takes her leave with a 
promise from us that we will do our best to restore her confidence in the system. This has 
obviously been emotionally draining and I  think that we do need a moment to talk about 
the experience. This doesn't seem to happen and we move on to the next patient.
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What makes one patient trust, relate, have clinical confidence in a particular doctor rather 
than another? These questions must in some way be related to what is the perceived 
quality of a consultation. Therefore, such a question may be reformulated to ask how do 
patients judge the quality of a clinical consultation?
The question of quality of a clinical encounter covers many areas. One review looked at 
107 published studies examining both organisational factors as well as others in relation 











(Hall JA 1988. p935-9)
Some of these factors are bureaucratic, measurable and have political weighting. Access, 
waiting times, facilities and cost would fall into this category. They reflect measurable 
factors that are related to Foucault’s disciplinary structures of organisations that 
concentrate on producing normalising data. Such data is in the positivist paradigm and 
are concerned with throughput and unit cost. The remaining ones are really non- 
measurable, medical and assessed non cognitively by the patient. These measures belong 
to the qualitative paradigms and it is interesting that they are perceived as by and large 
more important. Also these variables are not independent of one another and indeed 
improving performance in one factor might contrive to diminish performance in another. 
The ‘humane and competent’ doctor in a practice might, over a period of time, become
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swamped by requests to be seen by patients so that access and waiting times become 
poor. He or she in the USA might control this by cost but in medical practice in the 
United Kingdom this is not possible. Bureaucratic and political attempts to improve 
access, waiting times, costs and crude measurements of outcomes may be made at the 
cost of humaneness and information on the part of the doctor simply because conforming 
to appointment times introduces severe time constraints on the length of the clinic 
appointment. For these reasons, it may be quite impossible to achieve high satisfaction 
scores on all these issues. Patients can recognise the organisational bureaucratic elements 
of a clinic and judge quality in those but doesn’t seem to rank them as important as the 
non-cognitive elements of quality.
Is courtesy by the doctor perceived as competence by the patient? Apparently not. Simply 
being a courteous doctor is not enough. Patients perceive a competent doctor as courteous 
but do not perceive a courteous doctor as competent unless actual competence is 
portrayed in some way or other. (Willson P. 1982. p i699). One study showed that 
patients were capable of assessing professional competence despite the absence of any 
specialist medical knowledge. When independent medical researchers scored a medical 
record for appropriateness of medical action in the accident and emergency treatment of 
burns and compared these with patient assessments of competence, they found a good 
correlation (Linn BS. 1982. p255). Nobody knows how patients make such judgements of 
technical competence because they would not be expected to make them on the basis of 
medical knowledge and information but make them they do. Another non cognitive factor 
that appeared to be especially important was the need for an ‘empathetic’ approach. 
“Provision of information needed for decision-making appears to be valued largely 
within the context of a caring physician-patient relationship. Specific surgeons' behaviors 
believed to facilitate patient adjustment include expressing empathy, allowing sufficient 
time for patients to absorb the cancer diagnosis, providing information, and engaging the 
patient in treatment decision-making.” (Roberts C S et al. 1994. p336)
This study reported these findings from a particular set of patients (all women) and a 
special problem o f breast cancer. Whilst everyone would regard an empathetic view as
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important, this may not be a generalisable finding for all other medical problems in both 
sexes. Studies that consider ‘empathy’ as a parameter outside of these special clinical 
cases do not seem to have been undertaken. However, common sense tells me that 
everyone would wish to have a sympathetic physician provided that they were seen as 
professionally competent. The problem for the doctor is portraying empathy and 
continuing to do so from one consultation to the next every single day for a working life 
of forty years. On a practical point this is greatly helped if the doctor actually likes the 
patient! (Roter DL, Hall JA. 1992. pl38) The consultation then is a trade off between 
good feelings and obligation.
Examination of a number of variables that characterise a good doctor interview reveal a 
number of interesting points. Younger doctors were perceived to be better than older 
because they behaved more competently, both technically and interpersonally, because 
they “engaged in more non medical talk and to conduct longer visits.” (Roter DL et al 
1988. p99). This would be in keeping with an audit we conducted ourselves on patient 
satisfaction within the department, which showed that patients were at least as, and in fact 
slightly more, satisfied with an opinion from a trainee than from a consultant. Healthier 
patients were more satisfied patients (Pascoe GC. 1983.pl85) although an explanation for 
this may be that dissatisfied patients are simply dissatisfied people. Patients were 
considerably more satisfied when continuity was greater (Roter DL et al 1992. p i7). If 
doctors were perceived by their patients to have a “warm personality, used a biomedical 
model that related to the patients model, had a patient centred interviewing style and were 
involved in a “true exchange” of information then the consultation was perceived as more 
satisfactory.” (Rosenthal R et al 1975.p679; Stewart M. 1984.pl67).
What is the attitude o f ‘insiders’ in the organisation towards quality? For example, does 
the attitude of patients and doctors when they are patients differ in this respect? From a 
personal perspective, I would pay little interest in the organisational aspects of quality 
such as waiting times or cost if I was seeking a medical opinion. This appears to be a 
widely accepted viewpoint among other doctors when considering treatment for patients 
and for themselves. “Factors related to the kind and quality of medical care the patient
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would receive appear to be most important in the decisions, with a high level of 
agreement between and among general/family practitioners and general surgeons as to 
the relative importance of the factors.” (Ludke R. 1982. p782) Doctors judge this quality 
o f care by consideration of the five traditional skills of medical care such as “diagnosis 
and treatment, effective communication with patients, problem solving, lifelong learning, 
and counselling on medical ethics.” and “the doctors value above all the patients' rights 
and the scientific approach.” (Finocchio L J et al. 1995. p i023; Grundstein Amado, R. 
1992. p i29)
This is an interesting position because it suggests a different paradigmatic perspective on 
task and process in exercising judgements. It suggests that the paradigm (qualitative) 
used by patients to judge process quality is at odds with the paradigm used to undertake 
the task (quantitative according to the perceived medical view). One reason for this may 
be, on the part of the patient, a lack of familiarity with the indices of quality in the 
quantitative paradigm and so it becomes difficult to make judgements of quality in this 
way. An alternative view is that competence in non-cognitive factors such as 
communication is perceived as evidence of competence in other arenas. This would be in 
keeping with our everyday experience in that politicians are judged by their effectiveness 
as communicators although this view may not be sound. Finally, it is possible to argue 
that such a discrepancy represents tacit acknowledgement that there are important 
components of the interaction that are not identifiable by quantitative analysis but lend 
themselves to qualitative judgement.
The end of the hospital inquiry group.
The Hospital Co-operative Inquiry group met from October 1990 until May 1992. In the 
last six months the meetings met somewhat irregularly and then eventually stopped 
meeting altogether. There would appear to be at least three reasons for this. Firstly, the 
inquiry group appeared to me to be making no progress in my understanding of decision 
making. This was partly due to a naive expectation on my part, a belief that the inquiry 
group would continually focus on decision making until a formula o f ‘rules’ of
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engagement would emerge and be refined. It was a failure to appreciate that participation 
in an inquiry group achieves greater understandings and in this way formulates better 
explanations for social processes. The sense that ‘progress’ was not being made was 
reinforced by the fact that the constitution of the group was forever changing. Every six 
months the trainee staff would change as they moved off to other positions. Secondly, the 
cessation of the inquiry group represented a stage in my development as a qualitative 
researcher. I mentioned at the beginning of this section on Reflective Clinical Practice 
that I identified three stages of development as a qualitative researcher determined by 
perceived methodological usefulness. These were from co-operative inquiry to supported 
action inquiry to action science/ inquiry in the clinic. Thirdly, I was beginning to develop 
a sense that my interest in such an inquiry group was perceived by others in the 
department as faintly ridiculous. I learnt several years later (1995) that in the latter stages 
of the inquiry group, certain members had decided to ‘set me up’ by advancing certain 
positions to ‘see how I would react’. There may be many reasons why this happened and 
I suggested earlier that one reason was a failure to understand the various issues of 
process and task that take place as a group develops.
Rather than concentrate on the apparent ‘failure’ of the group to continue, it seems more 
meaningful to ask the question; would I attempt a co-operative inquiry approach if I were 
to explore decision making today? When I look at my research as it is presented in this 
thesis, I believe that the theoretical explanations have some merit but other explanations 
are weak. In this respect I see the disconnection of inference from data in the pursuit of 
explanation to be too great to allow any kind of generalisable statement to be made. I also 
appreciate that a co-operative inquiry methodology may more rigorously validate 
propositions by attention to the process of connection data with interpretation. I admit 
there would be many organisational difficulties in setting up and participating in such a 
co-operative inquiry. This would be more complicated by the need for involvement of 
other actors such as nurses and patients, but such a methodology would create 
opportunities to overcome some of the deficiencies I see in this thesis. I have also 
developed as a qualitative researcher to the point where I may be able to do justice to the 
complexity such an inquiry might generate. My reasons for believing in this statement lie
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in the similarities I see between co-operative inquiry and the position of mutuality I see in 
the decision making model represented in framework 4.
Framework 4
The three decision-making frameworks identified so far have a pattern that suggests 
increasing involvement in terms of participation and research from both the doctor and 
the patient.
Doctor Patient
Type 1 Observer/researcher Observer/participator
Type 2 Observer Observer/researcher/participator
Type 3 Observer/researcher Observer/researcher/participator
I have so far held back from the idea that the doctor ‘participates’ within the clinical 
encounter in the same way as the patient. I recognise that it is hard to shake off the idea 
of watching, of observing and researching that characterises the role of a doctor in a more 
technical branch of medicine, such as surgery. The methodology of co-operative inquiry 
left me wondering if this sense of detachment could be disturbed and the pattern present 
of increasing involvement of both parties in the above three frameworks suggests the 
development of a further framework that included such participation.
Doctor Patient
Type 1 Ob server/researcher Observer/participator
Type 2 Observer Observer/researcher/participator
Type 3 Observer/researcher Ob server/researcher/participator
Type 4 Ob server/researcher/participator Ob server/researcher/participator
Framework 4 is represented diagrammatically in Figure 7.
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Doctor Patient
Figure 7 Type 4 The Patient and the Doctor 
as Participators and Researchers
This framework represents a position where the clinical interaction is seeking mutuality. Both the 
doctor and the patient are perceived as experts, researching explanations as full participants
I am conscious as I write this that what I am about to suggest is tentative and uncertain. I 
am also conscious that it represents a view of participatory research that espouses 
complete mutuality but may in reality be nothing of the sort. I can only respond by 
making the argument that it suggests an area for exploration. Reason has argued that “we 
can only truly do research with persons if we engage with them as persons, as co-subjects 
and thus as co-researchers: hence co-operative inquiry, participatory research, research 
partnerships and so on.” If this viewpoint is to be genuinely upheld then “complete 
personal engagement, passion and profound risk-taking are central to inquiry, and science 
and life are not separate.” (Reason P. p 9-10. 1994).
Certainly I have the feeling as a doctor that I do not engage in this manner and that the 
science of medicine is separate from everyday life. No matter what the problem faced by 
the patient, I remain detached from this problem. I may engage in a professional sense, 
trying to utilise all the medical knowledge that I possess, but for the moment that is as far 
as it goes. To date it would seem appropriate to describe my position as observing and 
researching but not participating. The co-operative inquiry forms of action science force 
one to ask the question whether or not it is possible to attempt “complete personal 
engagement, passion and profound risk-taking ”, and if so what would the level of 
participation be? If  it is possible to adhere to the idea that “science and life are not 
separate ” then how is that gap bridged?
It seems to me that at one level the doctor and the patient will always be separate. This is 
at the level of the disease itself. If I do not have a tumour, then I can never really 
experience what having a tumour really means to the patient. Some bizarre attempts have 
been made to overcome this in the past notably by John Hunter (1728-1793), who in an 
attempt to demonstrate that gonorrhoea and syphilis are manifestations of a single 
disease, inoculated himself and contracted syphilis. I am obviously not suggesting 
participation in this manner but more a loosening of the sense of detachment that I 
experience as a doctor so that such participation changes me not just in terms of 
professional practice but in terms of, for example, how I view life. I am suggesting a
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degree of involvement, some degree of participation in the problem that would close this 
“gap between science and everyday life” a little.
I f  this was attempted, I had a sense that two interesting things began to happen. Firstly, 
the disease, the medical problem, becomes a vehicle around which other everyday 
meanings of life may be evaluated. This is not just a romantic view and may have been 
what Decartes meant by the phrase “by our illness, we know ourselves.” The difference 
here is that it may be possible for a doctor, or any other carer, to be included in the 
process of acquiring knowledge. Secondly, it once again may become possible as a 
doctor to exercise unilateral informational power once more because if mutuality is a 
reality, the patient should feel empowered to accept as much or as little from me as they 
wish.
It is hard to know if such changes happen at all but I do notice that each week the British 
Medical Journal has a weekly section that invites contributions entitled “A patient that 
changed my life.” Usually these contributions emphasise a change in professional 
practice, a different way of treating patients but from time to time they receive 
contributions that illustrate how a patient changed the life and attitude of the doctor. I do 
not know whether I have genuinely experienced such mutuality but I certainly 
experienced a glimpse of this when I was involved with David. The story has been 
outlined already but I will briefly summarise the situation.
He was forty years old and presented with cancer of the ethmoid sinuses, which are a 
group of sinuses located between the eyes and extending backwards to about the middle 
of the head. A cancer here presents a serious problem for treatment. The initial treatment 
offered (the doctor as healer) was fairly straightforward. This was a course of 
radiotherapy, which consisted of daily visits to the centre, each one lasting only a few 
minutes. The side effect were relatively mild and a CT scan (detailed X-ray analysis) of 
the sinuses revealed that as far as could be ascertained the tumour had completely 
responded to the radiotherapy. All seemed well for about 18 months when a recurrence of
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the original symptoms suggested that the tumour had returned. This was confirmed by 
subsequent X-ray examinations and a biopsy of the suspected area.
The dilemma now facing David is a fairly classic one in head and neck malignancy. 
Broadly speaking, there are two alternatives. By declining further treatment, he could 
accept the inevitable outcome of death. Survival would be for a year or at the most. The 
plan would be to continue to ‘live in the fast lane’ until the return of uncontrolled 
symptoms made this impossible. Alternatively, he could undergo major surgery. If the 
tumour were successfully excised it is possible that the patient may experience a normal 
or near normal life expectancy of good quality for another forty years. It is a risk analysis 
problem.
When I first met David I tried to think what would I do in this situation and asked my 
colleagues and friends the same question. Nobody could give me an answer and yet 
David had to make up his mind quite quickly over a period of about four or five weeks. It 
became clear as we sat and talked about this together in the clinic that any kind of 
immediate decision was impossible. Whilst I could carefully explain the treatment 
options using the consumer model, framework 2, but it quickly became clear that there 
was a difference between sitting and talking about it in a rather abstract way and living 
with this ‘solution’. Deciding what to do in the clinic was a ‘rational’ decision but living 
and experiencing such a option might be very different. So he made a tentative decision 
to accept no further conventional treatment, to continue to ‘live in the fast lane’, and see 
what it fe lt like. We had together moved into a type 3 decision model, patient as 
researcher model, in which he would live life a little, live with this decision not to accept 
any further treatment and see if it was sustainable. We arranged to meet up together after 
two or three weeks to re-evaluate this option.
The interview I had with David occurred some time after the event and we were 
discussing what had been going on at the time when he was making these difficult 
decisions. I notice as I re-read these transcripts how directive I am in my questioning and 
for much of the time suggest what was happening and David acknowledges it.
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Nevertheless, as a participant I ‘felt’ we were having a conversation where each of us was 
able to say what we really wanted to say-a sense of mutuality appeared to exist. I notice 
how difficult it is to prove this to others. At the end of the second section I notice that 
David chooses to offer an alternative explanation on what he might have done given the 
situation I was outlining. This and other occasions where he resists my interpretations 
suggest weak evidence that a degree of mutuality existed.
D: I, I  think I  had almost made up my mind immediately I  was, as I  said 
earlier, not frightened o f dying; I  was a bit concerned about how painful it 
would be 
R: Right.
D: Umm, very concerned fo r  Linda and she, she, she is a very strong woman, 
she has been a marvelous support to me and she really has, she's liv' lived 
every day with it and she, she has been terrific. She's not cracked up at all.
And later in the interview
R: The other more complicated an issue that I  have been experimenting with 
is the idea that you have, there's not only a lot o f head knowledge about the 
treatment and your own life but you have a lot o f what we call experiential 
knowledge.
D: Mmm.
R: I  think you call that your inner voice.
D: Mmm.
R: And that, that we dialogue with one another 
D: Mmm.
R: on the basis o f head knowledge 
D: Mmm.
R: but it is necessary fo r  you consult your experiential knowledge 
D: Mmm.
R: and listen to that
403
D: Mmm.
R: in order to make sense and to come to some kind o f decision about what 
to do. It's no good being entirely rational about all this. That you had to, 
you had to experience, no, you have to kind o f consult the experiential side o f  
you to see i f  that, i f  it makes sense in terms o f day to day living.
D: That's right.
R: I  think the thing I  really want ask you is, because I  suddenly realised and 
I  have asked you this question already and but I, will ask you again that when 
we had a discussion about what the right thing was to do, it seemed to me you 
did fairly quickly come to the conclusion that the most appropriate way 
forward was fo r  you to, to carry on as it were without any surgical treatment, 
that it was one thing sitting in a clinic and deciding that that was the right 
thing to do 
D: Mmm.
R: but it was necessary fo r  you to go away and see what it fe lt like on a day 
to day basis with the knowledge that this thing still existed in your head 
D: Mmm.
R: How would, how are you going to cope with it? How was your family 
going to cope?
D: That’s right.
R: In other words you had to go away and experience this decision 
D: That's right.
R: before finally deciding that it was the right thing to do. I  don’t want to 
put words into your mouth but I  did sense that we talked and we quite quickly 
decided the right thing to do but there was still a lot o f uncertainty in the air 
and then I  saw you about 4 or 5 weeks later 
D: Mmm.
R: and you came in, I  remember thinking there's a strong feeling now that 
this is the right thing to do 
D: That's right.
R: and that, that it had taken a few weeks o f living with the decision before
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you, you fe lt certain you were right. Is that fair?
D: Huhh. Ac', actually it was a fairly amusing time for me (laughter), I  
know that sounds ridiculous hut it was. When we left here, Linda was in 
tears and she was very, very upset, she didn't know where she was going to 
go and I  said come on, I'll buy you a drink and we went down to the pub, got, 
got her a stiff drink and I  had one, came out and got in the car and she said 
you've not fastened your seat-belt up. I  said well I  don't do things like that 
anymore. She said what do you mean, you're breaking the Law. I  said, well) 
there are no laws really, i f  I'm going to shuffle off in a year I'm now going to 
bloody well please myselffor a year and we went home and we had the first 
o f  my 'Dave C's Dying Parties'. Rang round all the friends and said uhh 
(laughter), said that's it lads, i f  we're going to shuffle off you'd better all get 
round here and uhh literally within an hour o f having left you, I'd  got a house 
fu ll o f people and we had an enormous piss-up that went on 'til about 2 
o ’clock in the morning. Everybody had a fabulous time and uhh I  think in a 
way that was my way o f  breaking everybody into the news and getting them 
laughing and looking at it in the right sort o f context in a light sort o f way 
rather than uhh being told in hushed tones that C 's on his way out. And I  
think again (.) the circle o f friends that I  have helped me enormously because 
they didn't sort o f walk round talking in hushed tones and they weren't you 
know sort o f talking behind back hushed 'How is he today ? and all the rest o f 
it'. They 
R: Mmm.
D: They were up front about it because I  was up front about it, they sort o f 
said well
R: Your openness made them open.
D: Yeah.
R: Yes.
D: What the bloody hell do you fee l about this then Dave? How can you 
feel? I, I've talked about it a heck o f a lot over the last year to all sorts o f 
people because I fin d  most people are very, very frightened by it and it, it, it
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helps people i f  you can talk to them and relate your experiences to them. 
Because I  think in, yeah, in that sort o f 4 or 5 weeks between saying no, no 
I'm  not going to have the operation and seeing you again) umm 
R: You suddenly fe lt comfortable with the idea 
D: Yeah.
R: and, in a, in a way that you hadn't It struck me as, as it's all very well 
talking about these things 
D: That's right
R: but then the moment you leave the room or you find  yourself alone, you 
think, am I, am I  doing the right thing?
D: That's right.
R: But that sense o f uncertainty seemed to go.
D: Yes it did I  uhh, huhh, I  talked it through with Linda obviously 
R: Right
D: Uhh and it wasn't something that really she could make an input on. 
Decisions like that are very personal, you can only make them yourself. But I  
think she was not happy to see me go either route but uhh on a spiritual 
level, I  think she was quite relievedfor me not to have the operation because 
she having known me fo r  all the years, she knows what that would have done 
to me mentally uhhh. And I  think in fairness, she's got lots offaith in me, she's 
got none in spiritualism at all or that, or all that sort o f thing but uhh, I've 
been a reasonably strong minded individual most o f my life and 
R: I f  you’dfound though that we made a decision in the 
D: Mmm
R: clinic or at least you'd made a decision to do nothing 
D: Mmm
R: as the right thing and you'd gone home and you'd suddenly found that it 
was forever there, forever destroying your ability to enjoy yourself 
D: Yeah.
R: and it was wrecking your family and that the idea o f doing nothing was in 
living terms unacceptable, do you think you might have revisited the idea o f
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surgery and said well OK go for it kind o f thing.
D: (Long intake o f breath.) I  think I  would have, huhh, i f  it, I  mean no’, 
nobody likes pain. I f  it had become extremely painful 
R: That would have been different, yes,
D: I  think
R: moving the goal-posts.
D: Yeah, 1 , 1 , 1  don't know whether I  would have reconsidered it or not. I ’d  
like to think that I  wouldn't because huhhh, in coming to the decision what I  
was actually saying is that I  prefer life as I've always known it 
R: Yes.
D: and I'm not prepared to carry on with uhh a much depreciated life form, 
not being able to communicate and all the rest o f it so I  think had, had I  
considered it through pain, I  would have thought it was a fairly cowardly 
thing to do and had I, had I  actually had that operation and woken up with 
the bits o f tissue missing that they said would be missing, even i f  I  had been 




When we had met again, four weeks later, he returned and almost before he started to 
speak I could see that things were different. Gone was any uncertainty he had about what 
to do. He felt completely happy with the choice he had made and any lingering doubts he 
might have had about entertaining the idea of major surgery was gone. Up to this point 
the process of shifting from type 2, consumer model, to type 3 patient researcher model 
was no different from many other similar clinical interactions. But the relationship I was 
having with David was different from other patients and I asked him if he would do 
something for me and he kindly agreed.
My increasing reflexive awareness had made me concerned that I might have been a 
party to creating a world where he appeared to be acting in complete freedom. Was I
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operating using Lukes third dimensional power by creating a world for him of apparent 
freedom of choice and looking after his ‘best interests’ in this way? Were they in reality 
my ‘best interests’? Torbert suggested action inquiry interested in transformation should
“actively seek(s), challenge and contradiction in every way possible-by taking on
dilemmas of increasing complexity or social scope...or by discovering new ways of 
conducting inquiry that better show the consequences of his or her perspective and 
action.... must be self mortifying. It would rather not influence than inappropriately 
influence."( Torbert 1991 p57) In this particular case it was important to me that this was 
at least tested in some way. So, I suggested to him that he obtain a second opinion and 
that we deliberately chose a department with a reputation for an aggressive attitude 
towards surgical treatments. He travelled to the Royal Marsden Hospital in London, saw 
a distinguished surgeon who fairly forcefully offered him treatment. I note that seeking a 
second opinion can still be construed as a third dimensional manoeuvre in that I was 
creating a more complex world of second opinion, in which he believed he was 
exercising judgement autonomously but was not. As it happens he did not change his 
decision and declined this offer of surgery. That is not the point I wish to highlight but 
instead I realised that for me things were now different. It is very unusual for a surgeon to 
ask a patient to seek a second opinion, so why had I done this?
Something had changed; I felt much more involved in a way that transcended the clinical 
problem. I was a researcher and participator in this enterprise and became aware of 
learning not just about medicine but about life in this situation. This dilemma, involving a 
man my own age, was forcing me to re-evaluate my own perspectives about death. I 
wanted to know as much as he did whether or not this was the right decision. I was also 
researching the nature of the relationship I was having with him as a doctor. I felt 
involved in an unusual way and our positions appeared to be equivalent in terms of power 
relations for at one moment David says;
“The prime responsibility fo r  life, whether it be any facet o f it, rests with the individual I  
don’t think you can go along and ask a doctor or surgeon to be responsible fo r  your
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health. You have to do it yourself. Whoever does go along to a doctor and says, ‘Take me, 
do what you want ’, is making a big mistake. ”
(Appendix 1, David)
Paradoxically, such involvement is liberating in the sense that I feel I can return to 
practising at the level o f ‘technical rationalist’. I can once again say exactly what I think 
and feel about a clinical situation but both David and I accepted that I was not the only 
one with relevant and important information. My opinions become only one a perspective 
on a complex landscape and not a perspective that exercises dominance over all others. 
David appeared to exercise control over the situation and “join(ed) with the professional 
in making sense of the case and in doing so gain(ed) a sense of increased involvement 
and action.” (SchonD. 1983. p302).
As one might expect this kind of interaction does not happen very often and I am still not 
sure that it really represents more than an exceptional extension of good feelings. 
However, I get the sense that even though this is not a common experience to feel like 
this, it is an ideal, a justified position, by which other clinical interactions are judged. So 
that, as I begin to get to know the patient and the problem in more detail, I begin to 
develop a sense that the clinical interaction is moving in this direction and use that as a 
weak judgement of progress.
Finally, this thesis itself might be evidence that a position of mutuality is possible in the 
clinical process. Virtually every thought has arisen in connection with the clinical 
consultation, or thinking or reading about the clinical consultation. As a consequence of 
this my whole understanding of what is meant by data, its relationship to theory, its 
relationship to values, its relationship to power has changed. I cannot claim to be a 
detached researcher of the clinical experience, free of bias and its effects, when the act of 
engaging with research results in such a shift of ontology. It suggests that my 




I began this thesis by identifying the problem generated by apparently irreconcilable 
differences between quantitative and qualitative perspectives on the clinical landscape. 
My initial observations of hospital life suggested that adherence to a positivist 
epistemology to provide explanations was likely to be inadequate. In the methodology 
section I explored the theoretical foundations for different kinds of knowledge in five 
main paradigms and looked at different ways of generating data to enhance 
understandings. I conceived a three level conceptual model of working as a positivist, 
working as a constructivist and working as a researcher and linked these to the theoretical 
foundations developed in the methodology by suggesting that paradigm awareness was 
important. I have tried to show how this can work in the clinical situation to integrate 
quantitative and qualitative perspectives so that tailor making treatments becomes a 
credible possibility.
In the final section, Conclusions, I propose to evaluate what I have done (or not done) 
and how I see these findings in the wider perspective of my professional situation.
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CONCLUSIONS
What did I set out to do?
At the beginning I asked myself why it was problematic to apply in clinical practice the 
medical findings I had been taught. Good quality clinical medical findings were obtained 
by studies that sought to exclude ‘context’, for context in this respect was to be regarded 
as bias. Difficulties arose when the moment came to restore such findings into context, 
because from time to time this context, this bias, would appear to exercise an important 
influence in determining what should be done. This could be seen in apparently ‘simple’ 
examples involving treatment decisions for tonsillitis to ‘complex’ problems in advanced 
head and neck cancer. To begin with, I appeared to have two alternatives. I could ignore 
the effect of context and follow current medical treatment guidelines outlined in books 
and articles or I could choose to ignore these guidelines and follow what ‘seemed’ to be 
the correct treatment, dictated principally by the context. My practice, until I began this 
thesis, had hovered between these two options; sometimes adopting the more 
conventional medical approach and ignore context and sometimes abandoning it in 
favour of issues raised by the context. I could detect no consistency, no pattern in 
determining which of these two broad approaches should be adopted.
What have I learnt from the exercise?
In the end my personal search did not result in a ‘set of rules’ that determined what 
should be done in every circumstance. Instead my hold was loosened on positivist 
medical knowledge as the only source of knowledge that deserved consideration by 
appreciating that positivist knowledge was dependant upon a methodology circumscribed 
by a particular set of assumptions. In developing as a qualitative researcher, I began to 
see the puzzle, not simply conceived in terms of problem in context, but reconfigured in 
terms of developing understandings of a host of non-clinical processes such as power, 
gender, group interaction. This meant recognition of different forms o f data, particularly
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a lighter touch on what constituted relevant ‘knowledge’, all of which illuminated the 
clinical landscape.
The thesis is essentially in two main sections and both these sections have been attempts 
at refraining the situation in a way that was non-positivist. The first part (the knowledge 
sections) attempted to broaden the definition of relevant data and the second part 
(methodology, clinical reflections and conclusion sections) attempted to develop a theory 
to generate better questions, better data and richer understandings. These understandings, 
developed in refraining the clinical situation, have been dependent upon different kinds 
of explanatory logics; comparative, developmental, descriptive and theorising 
explanations. (Mason 1996 p i36)
Comparative explanations
In the early sections of the thesis, I suggested that the explanations of health and disease 
were not perhaps the ‘science’ that I believed them to be, but instead were merely 
perspectives fashioned by the science of the day. By tracing the history of tonsillectomy I 
suggested that justification for tonsillectomy was continually reformulated according to 
the scientific viewpoint of the day. This reformulation ensured its survival as a procedure 
in a way that made one at least ask the question; Are there other influences at play here 
that ensure the survival of tonsillectomy? I tentatively posed the question, could some of 
these influences be arising from a social process to fulfil a deep rooted need for magic, 
for risk, for sacrifice for whatever? In support of this, I showed how a similar operation, 
an adenoidectomy, and other surgical procedures, carried with them hallmarks of practice 
that suggested that they may not be so dissimilar from medical practice in other cultures 
that we regard as ‘primitive’. I extended this approach to draw comparisons between an 
outpatient visit and a visit to a temple.
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Developmental explanations
To arrive at a developmental explanation, I have tracked how and why I came to consider 
only positivist knowledge as worthwhile and worthy of attention. What were the 
educational processes that encouraged such a process? What role did the institutions have 
in achieving this? What might have been the purpose underlying such a transformation? 
The logic of explanation was centred on the educational process of rationalising 
knowledge that took place at school, medical school and hospital work but it also seemed 
to me that such developmental explanations linked in with the comparative explanations 
in a way that supports them. For example, the anatomy lessons that influenced my belief 
in what constituted relevant medical knowledge also prepared me as a modem day 
‘priest’.
Descriptive
Mason advocates that all accounts are to some extent descriptive and “involve the 
construction of some kind of explanatory account of what is going on in a particular 
social location, or of the operation of a set of social processes.” (Mason 1996 pl36-138) 
The section Reflections on Clinical Practice offers explanations of the clinical scene in 
terms of ‘groups’, ‘power’ issues or the use of ‘space’, and I have come see these as key 
explanatory factors that underpin my understanding of what happens in the clinic and in 
hospital. The comparative, developmental and descriptive accounts cannot be regarded as 
robust explanation of social processes but I see them as constituting sufficient evidence 
from my perspective to disturb some firmly held assumptions. I have come to see 
comparative and developmental explanations as strategic frame experiments to assist in 
developing exploring social processes in the medical environment.
Theorising explanations
Finally, I relied upon theorising explanations for “any qualitative data analysis should 
have a wider relevance to some explanatory body of knowledge or social interpretation
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and in this sense all explanations are theoretical explanations ” (ibid). In this sense, a key 
part of my thesis rests upon a theoretical framework that suggests that positivist 
explanations do not have to necessarily compete with qualitative explanations as the only 
credible definition of truth. Instead the problem is seen as a paradigm puzzle in which it 
becomes necessary to explore which set of paradigmatic assumptions serve the situation. 
The limits that define the terrain of inquiry are illustrated by two clinical examples. In an 
emergency, when the patient is unconscious, a positivist approach to treatment would 
seem not only appropriate but obligatory. In the kind of situation faced by David, a 
constructivist approach that explored the importance of giving voice to data from other 
perspectives seemed to be more appropriate. In between these two strategies the shifting 
sands of what constitutes appropriate understandings and appropriate action invite me to 
explore each clinical encounter as a unique situation. In attempting to give theoretical 
shape to this spectrum of possibilities, I have produced a series of decision-making 
frameworks which are reproduced together in Figure 8 .1 have drawn attention to the way 
these four frameworks reflect the main paradigmatic positions of positivism, post 
positivism, critical theory and constructivism. I have also drawn attention to the 
connection between these frameworks and Torbert’s leadership styles (Torbert 1991 
p304). It follows that these four frameworks might depend upon a logic of explanation 
that is dependant upon theory but also illustrate the way that data, in the form of 
explanation here, may be theory dependant. Such a view suggests that limitations should 
be placed upon the importance of these frameworks. Of course there are many questions 
that remain unanswered, for example, how is the appropriateness of the framework 
determined and who decides this?
As I developed as a qualitative researcher, I came to understand that I was utilising a 
variety of explanatory logic, consequently many explanations, especially those dependant 
upon comparative and developmental logic, were in my opinion insufficiently explored 
and insufficiently shored up with data. When I re-read the thesis, I notice how I start to 
enter interesting areas, start to uncover explanations and then seem to stop. Furthermore 
such inference is not especially well connected with data and I may have produced an 
account that is not be sufficiently credible to others. Consequently, I ask myself as a
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researcher, what could be the reasons for my insufficient and inadequate exploration of 
social phenomena?
Firstly, I now appreciate that I relied too heavily on the notion of privileged 
epistemological position. I tended to assume that, as a doctor, I was in a special position 
to observe, to notice, to comment about what was important and failed to substantiate this 
standpoint with data. In this respect my research process may have reflected my clinical 
process. Clinical consultations are short, dependant upon rapid and unsubstantiated 
inference, and in qualitative research terms lacking in time to develop substantial inquiry. 
I am suggesting my clinical behaviour (short consultations) is at odds with the research 
task (in-depth explorations). The second reason for this attitude may have been the data 
rich environment I was exploring. So many ideas and inferences were being generated by 
a qualitative approach that there was a tendency, hard to resist, to skip over them with 
insufficient critique. Thirdly, there is the argument already put forward that it may have 
been necessary to reduce criticality to shift paradigm. Finally, I spent much of my time 
trying, at a theoretical level, to integrate qualitative approaches and quantitative 
approaches without abandoning a medical science that I saw, on a day to day basis, as 
very effective. This puzzle may have distracted me from an in-depth exploration at a 
qualitative level because it implied the need, as I initially saw it, to abandon the benefits 
of a positivist approach.
What was the role of data in this construction?
The main body of the thesis is claiming a multi-paradigmatic perspective that includes 
critical theory and constructivist and in this respect the principal source of data were my 
own interpretations. This makes sense at one level because what was needed was a 
personal paradigm shift from positivism, but the self referencing nature of reflective 
practice may easily lack convincing transparency to others. Nevertheless, I began to 
recognise, as I shifted towards constructivism, the need to relate inference more closely 
with data, not only to produce a more credible account, but also to lay open the process of
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explanation to permit more effective critique. Although there were attempts to do this, I 
acknowledge in retrospect that it was not done well.
Has my data constituted evidence in a literal/ circumstantial sense or does my data 
represent evidence of something else in an interpretive sense? In the early part of the 
thesis most of my data is interpretive and suggests a widening awareness of social 
processes in the clinical environment. An example of this is to be found in my suggestion 
that the social process of surgery may be evidence of some underlying process e.g.magic 
or sacrifice. Later on, my understanding of group dynamics, of power relations between 
patients and doctors and other issues are at least partly supported by evidence from the 
inquiry group and interviews. Nevertheless, I recognise as a qualitative researcher, that 
the extent to which my interpretation is disconnected from data needs constant attention.
When did the construction and development of theory take place?
Did the theory come first? No, for when theory comes first this involves stating clear 
hypotheses at the beginning so that “the analytical task is to develop and match up data 
against these clear hypotheses.” (Mason 1996 p 141-143) I didn’t do this because I 
wanted to reach beyond my knowing practice. Using theory that I understood to do this 
might have been constraining rather than liberating. Also it may not always be possible to 
solve certain puzzles using frameworks in which the puzzle is set. I set the puzzle as one 
of positivism in context (essentially a positivist approach in itself) but reconfigured it to 
one of understandings in terms of non-clinical processes (essentially a constructivist 
approach). Some loss of criticality may have been a pre-requisite to resetting the problem 
in this way in order to make progress.
Did theory come last? In some respects yes and in some respects no. Such an approach 
involves scrutinising data to develop “explanations to make them fit.” In one aspect 
theory did come last. It was during the resubmission that I fully appreciated, with 
sufficient clarity, the three layered conceptual model I have outlined in this thesis. On the 
other hand the research was constructed in such a way that the theory was implicitly built
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into the research from the beginning. I was working as a clinician within an espoused 
positivist or post positivist environment (the clinic) and working as a researcher within an 
espoused constructivist environment (the postgraduate research group at the University of 
Bath). This dialectic suggests that theory, data generation and data analysis developed 
simultaneously. Such an approach needed to devise a method of moving back and forth 
between data analysis, processes of explanation and theory construction. This was 
inherent in the separate groups of clinic (data and interpretation), Hospital Inquiry (data 
and interpretation) and Postgraduate research group and supervision (theory generation).
Was the data illustrative or constitutive of my explanation?
I used data from the clinic, the hospital inquiry group and from three interviews to 
support my explanations. From my perspective as a reflective practitioner, the most 
important data was that obtained on a day to day basis in the clinic. I notice how hard it is 
to demonstrate that such data, usually but not always interpretive, is authentically 
illustrative of any explanation I offer. This is especially difficult given the time 
constraints of the clinic, which limit the opportunity for inquiry in the moment. In the 
end, much of the data I present from the clinic and the hospital inquiry group was data 
that generated some change in practice or challenged some change in practice. Since 
most clinical interactions do not result in a change of practice, the data was not 
representative of what took place most of the time in the clinic. Since the purpose of this 
thesis is to present a credible account as a qualitative researcher, I felt the need to give 
more emphasis to data that supports the practitioner/ research role (how I inquire as a 
reflective practitioner/ researcher). Although good research and good practice are not 
mutually exclusive, I notice that the demands of good practice are not necessarily the 
demands of good research.
I used the data in interviews in a number of ways. Initially the purpose of the interviews 
was to illustrate with data certain explanations that I believed were present in the clinic 
i.e. how patient thought about issues in ways that led to the development of the decision 
making frameworks. A good example of this, I would propose, is the use of the term ‘gut
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feeling’ that all three interviewees highlighted as important in making decisions. The 
interviews, separated by an interval of nearly four years, show a progression from a semi­
structured format to a more open texture. In the interview with David, there are sections 
o f the interview where I ask him to authenticate my interpretation and models of decision 
making. The interview with Valerie is much less directive, so that issues arose much 
more spontaneously, for example the phenomenon of power and space in organisations. 
The later interview suggest that I was beginning to be more confidant in handling 
interpretation lightly rather than seek confirmation of interpretation through interview.
An interesting question to ask as a qualitative researcher is whether the explanation could 
have been developed without the use of data? In certain respects it had to. The first part 
of the thesis, concerned with the reappraisal of knowledge was developed by searching 
for explanation without ‘data’ in the credible qualitative sense. This was achieved by 
multiple conjecture whilst holding onto theory (positivism) more lightly as other theories 
were evaluated. I cannot think of another way that I could have achieved this and I am 
still left wondering what precisely were the conditions necessary for this to have 
happened.
How reliable is my report?
Reliability is judged on the basis of consistency and judging reliability depends upon the 
paradigmatic perspective of the researcher. To the positivist this report is unredeemingly 
unreliable. Nothing in the report constitutes ‘evidence’. A constructivist might see that 
report supports the notion that the hegemony of medical truth should be challenged, 
recognises the connection between power and knowledge, and makes the argument for 
non-biomedical data to be included in the overall explanation. However, all these 
positions are embedded within constructivist ontology anyway and do not necessarily 
support my claim of a widened ontology.
As a qualitative researcher, I notice that the multi-paradigmatic perspective has set me a 
difficult task. In order to be more reliable there is an argument that I should have stuck
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carefully to a recognised methodology that was reliable so my findings can be clearly 
demonstrated to reside within a certain paradigmatic perspective. This approach, I 
believe, might have constrained my awareness of ontological position developed, I sense, 
by switching back and forth from positivism to constructivism, from the clinic to the 
research group. So I ask, by producing a report that scored highly on the reliability 
criteria, would such a report have been valid. Would it have led to a multi paradigmatic 
perspective that permits me today to accept positivism and constructivism? Probably not 
but I do not know for certain.
I cannot finish this section without asking the question, what is missing in terms of 
reliability? When I read this now I am struck by the attempt to portray my position of 
espoused mutuality with the patient. Where is the irritation I feel sometimes as I sit in the 
clinic, where are the lapses of unilateral power as I pull the shutters down on mutuality 
with the patient and impose treatment? Where is the sense of exhaustion in trying to 
maintain a reflexive approach in the face of a busy clinic and irritated reception and 
nursing staff? These are areas of exploration that I notice I have been hesitant to develop 
and which I would now see as raising concerns about reliability. Any further 
development of this thesis would, and should, explore such important issues because such 
feelings an attitudes are constitutive of my clinical encounter.
Can I demonstrate that my analysis is valid?
Assessing validity means asking the question; Did I measure or explain what I claimed to 
be measuring or explaining? In tackling this issue it is necessary to consider the validity 
of each of the component processes that make up the research; validity of methodology, 
validity of interview(s), validity of data, validity of interpretations, explanations and 
conclusions.
Methodological validity suggests a logic of method well matched to the social 
phenomenon requiring explanation? Assessing this suggests a standpoint outside the 
position as researcher and outside the social phenomenon under investigation. Such a
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superior standpoint might exist but I cannot claim this understanding. Instead, I look for 
coherence between the two processes. It seems to me that the clinical task as reflective 
practitioner means exploring understandings on a variety of perspectives on a situation; 
the perspective of the patient, the perspective of the doctor, the perspective of others such 
as nurses, relatives, parents etc on the disease. In addition it means illuminating all the 
non-clinical processes that determine how these perspectives interact with one another. 
The research task represents an attempt to place these perspectives in paradigmatic 
context by understanding the assumptions that circumscribe each of these viewpoints and 
looks to integrate them together. I would therefore offer the argument that a multi-theory 
research approach (an awareness of paradigm) was coherent with a research task that 
required a multi-theory practice.
How authentic or accurate were the interviews of what I wanted to show? I believe that 
the interviews were representative of what I wanted to show in a number of senses but 
fell short of genuine validity in others. I would hope that they demonstrated evidence that 
I was
□ taking seriously data generated from paradigms other than positivist in the biomedical 
explanation; for example all three interviewees acknowledged the importance of 
taking time to make major decisions and relying on the qualitative process o f ‘gut 
feel’ or ‘intuition’.
□ an awareness of power issues; these are implicit within the structure of the interviews 
(David’s interview was fairly structured, Patrick less so and Valerie’s virtually 
unstructured) as well as within the text.
□ an awareness of assumption by raising the level of inquiry with questions like “do 
you agree that”, “what is your reaction to my assertion that” and occasions when 
mutuality was at least approached when David and I touched on the subject of how 
patients and doctors can obtain personal and meaningful insights through illness.
In contrast, I do not believe they produced reliable evidence of other social processes 
that I touched upon e.g. the place of risk, the place of surgery as transition processes from
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youth to adolescence, from fertile adulthood to infertile adulthood, from life to death or 
of the place of magic or sacrifice in a way that is perceived as valid.
Data in the form of interpretations, suggested explanations and conclusions were obtained 
from four situations; clinics, interviews with patients, hospital inquiry group and the 
postgraduate research group. Which set of data do I perceive as more valid? The data that 
might be perceived as the most transparently valid was the interview data because the 
transcriptions enable others to audit the connection between what was said and 
interpretations and explanations that arose from this. This was useful but in one respect I 
regard the interviews as illustrative of and supportive of interpretation that took place 
much of the time in the clinic. I would argue that the reflective practitioner interpretations 
made in the clinic, adjusting and testing practice, was of central importance but 
demonstrating this is not easy. In retrospect greater attention should have been paid to 
this process. How could this have been done? I would now consider making video 
recordings of my clinics and those of others. These could be shown to an inquiry group 
comprising the patients concerned, medical staff (nurses, doctors) and not just the 
postgraduate group in order to develop understandings. In doing this again I see the need 
to pay greater attention to the inquiry process of the group as it sought to make inference 
from data.
I have been impressed by the importance of interviewing patients who I had looked after 
as a means of exploring what has happened. Nevertheless, the weakness, as I now see it, 
of relying solely upon this method lies in the fact that for much of the time we are 
working at a level of espoused theory. Without data of what happened at the time (e.g. a 
recording of the consultations) and the perspective of others, it is much more difficult to 
explore theory in use. This is particularly relevant to consider because I have used two 
techniques of interpretive validity that have been criticised in qualitative research. Firstly, 
a claim that I have a special standpoint that grants me epistemological privilege because I 
am a doctor. I failed to be clear about distinguishing between claiming a special 
standpoint as a doctor (which I believe is justified) and claiming that my interpretations 
grant me epistemological privilege (which I see as unjustified). Secondly, claiming my
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respondents have special epistemological privilege, This problem is not adequately 
addressed by checking interpretation with patients, so called respondent validation, 
because such a position means introducing other complexities; for example how free 
were the individuals to speak? A counter argument rests on two points. Firstly, they were 
the only other people present, which limits the opportunity for triangulation unless video 
analysis is sought. Secondly, when your life is threatened, it may be a unique case and 
such individuals may be able to claim epistemological privilege.
Have I fulfilled my responsibility to produce good quality research?
I have come to realise that I chose a very difficult area of research and I have struggled to 
produce good quality research in a way that is transparent. The reason lies in the nature of 
such an account. Its basis is a personal account that justifies a transformation in what I 
perceive as relevant epistemology and useful methodologies to create a new personal 
ontology. This transformation has not been easy and may be a reflection of my lack of 
willingness as a researcher to let go of cherished ideas but it may also be a reflection of 
the pervasive nature of the positivist viewpoint.
What kind of generalisations can I make?
Generalisations have been classified into two types; empirical generalisations and 
theoretical generalisations. (Mason 1996 p 152) Empirical generalisations are dependant 
upon validity of sampling, so perhaps it is sampling strategy that largely determines 
generalisability. Since the sampling strategy was sometimes illustrative, sometimes 
typical or sometimes indicative of a change in practice approach, it is unlikely that others 
would consider this work robust in this respect. In terms of theoretical generalisation, I 
feel on stronger ground. I have used a three level research concept of positivist, 
constructivist and researcher that may deserve wider attention. The emphasis in the thesis 
on theory also reflects the considerable difficulty I have experienced in developing a 
credible theoretical position that allowed me to pay attention to qualitative data whilst 
continuing to honour the importance of positivist medical approaches.
422
In considering generalisability, I am obliged to consider for a moment the medical 
research environment in which this study was undertaken. How well does this study 
match up at a theoretical level with the approach that might be adopted by others in 
medical research? How well does it match up to other qualitative research approaches in 
the medical literature? There are three points to consider here. Firstly, how circumscribed 
do I propose to make this search; how wide is my field? Is it fair to simply look at 
qualitative research undertaken by other ear, nose and throat surgeons in the United 
Kingdom? Alternatively, should I extend the search further and review all qualitative 
research undertaken by any healthcare worker, psychologists, public health researchers 
or social scientist? Secondly, since the field of qualitative research is moving rapidly, do 
I consider the theoretical approach adopted by mainstream qualitative medical research in 
1998 or the position in 1991, when I embarked upon the study? Thirdly, do I examine 
research output between these years? I propose to look at all three positions in the 
following manner. Firstly, to look at current research methodologies in primary care from 
a methodology textbook published in 1997. Secondly to examine the qualitative research 
from the last eight years that has found its way into mainstream reference sources. 
Thirdly, to examine qualitative research from the Cochrane collaboration, which is a 
world wide research database of systematic reviews, reviews of effectiveness, controlled 
trials register and methodology databases, and an organisation that claims a position of 
research quality.
What is the present position in terms of methodology in primary care? In answering this I 
have consulted a contemporary textbook on research methods in primary care. (Carter & 
Thomas 1997). The spectrum of methodologies considered suitable include
□ observation,
□ interviews (unstructured, semi-structured and focused),
□ ethnography
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□ pathography. (Parthography is “more or less the use of detailed description of 
diseases in individual cases to enhance an overall understanding of people and their 
diseases.” (Bradley 1997)
Bradley advocates that many of the skills needed to become a good ethnographer are 
already possessed by those in general practice and justifies this by arguing that general 
practitioners are familiar with;
□ taking case histories as a main investigative tool;
□ taking social and personal histories,
□ allowing patients to express the meaning of events
□ seeing patients in their cultural context
□ already belonging to the community under study
□ open minded (few pre-conceived) notions
□ open to the unexpected.
(ibid)
He sees these skills as components of good ethnographic research. He suggests that with 
some adaptation “mainly as regards the extent to which the respondent is helped and 
encouraged to respond to the interviewer in a way that ignores his or her status as a 
doctor”, (ibid) these skills can be reconfigured as an ethnographic research methodology. 
The constructivist might argue that this is an unjustifiable simplification for it is not 
possible to ‘ignore’ the status of a doctor in any situation, be it research or otherwise. 
Bradley’s approach suggests adherence to some features of the dominant biomedical 
paradigm, which Gordon identified by seven basic premises.
□ Scientific rationality
□ Emphasis on individual autonomy, rather than on family or community
□ The body as a biochemical nachine
□ Mind/ body dualism
□ Diseases as entities
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□ Emphasis on the ‘visual’
□ Reductionism and the seeking of universal s 
(Gordon 1988)
At heart, Bradley’s approach suggests continued separation of researcher from 
researched, by looking to exclude the bias generated by the ‘status of the doctor’. If 
separation of researcher and researched is the ontological perspective (essentially post 
positivist), what social phenomena does he consider are the objects of research? Bradley 
argued that qualitative methods are thought to be good for
□ study of explanatory models
□ comparing different perspectives of different groups ( e.g. doctors and patients)
□ identifying social networks
□ study of medical pluralism
□ study of deviance
□ understanding behaviour of social groups.
(ibid)
If research into these components of social phenomena form the basis of qualitative 
medical research, what sort of output has been generated in surgery in recent years by 
such an approach? On a Medline search just over 116,000 research articles on surgery 
had appeared over the last five years, of these 434 claimed a qualitative component to the 
research project. The basic methodology employed by the vast majority of these studies 
turn out to be structured or semi-structured interviews to develop explanation.
A significant proportion have employed closed question interviews over the phone to 
ascertain satisfaction following treatment. These ranged from satisfaction after breast 
implants (Coleman-EA, Coon-SK, et al. 1995) to satisfaction with pain relief following 
surgery. (Kleinbeck-SV & Hoffart-N 1994 )The use of semi-structured interviews was 
also widespread. These were also used to establish patient preferences for treatments 
(Bretones-Alcaraz-JJ, del-Pino-y-Pino-MD, et al. 1997; Stem-EB, Ytterberg-SR, et al.
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1997; Bjerre-BD, Johansen-C, et al. 1995; Francke-AL & Theeuwen-I 1994) or the 
organisational quality of the service (Burkey-Y, Black-M, et al. 1997; Evans-D & 
Farquhar-C 1996; McComas-J, Kosseim-M, et al. 1995; Van-Damme-R, Drummond-N, 
et al. 1994; Mellor-J & Chambers-N 1995). A number of studies used semi-structured 
interviews to develop ‘themes’ that could become the focus for other research studies 
(Karlsen-B 1997; Jankowski-S, Videka-Sherman-L, et al. 1996; Kristensson-Hallstrom-I 
& Elander-G 1997; Carter-BJ 1997; Schaper-AM, Hellwig-MS, et al. 1996). Of more 
interest were a few studies used semi-structured interviews in an exploratory manner to 
investigate patients perceptions such as the role o f ‘faith’, or ‘turning moments for 
recovery’ after major illness or surgery (Shih-FJ, Chu-SH, et al. 1997; Shih-FJ 1997; 
Camp-PE 1996). A relatively small proportion of studies departed from the semi­
structured interview methodology and employed ‘in depth’ interviews with small 
numbers ( n=3 to n=29) to generate ‘themes’ or ‘content analysis’ largely identified by 
the researchers themselves. These included attitudes of mothers towards pain in their 
children following surgery (Gedaly-Duff-V & Ziebarth-D 1994), breast reconstruction 
and expectations (Kasper-AS 1995) and the ‘experience’ of living with chronic liver 
disease (Wainwright-SP 1997). One study examine non clinical influences affecting 
treatment decisions in dentists (Kay-EJ & Blinkhom-AS 1996), and another explored 
coping strategies of work pressure versus family life pressures in general practitioners 
(Rout-U 1996). One interesting study sought to explore the significance o f ‘subjective’ 
symptoms, without any physical signs, of women who as a consequence went on to have 
a hysterectomy (Marchant-Haycox-S & Salmon-P 1997). Open ended interview 
methodologies were much less common and were described in a variety of ways; open 
ended, extensive or structured open ended. These generally concentrated on satisfaction 
with treatment or services (Miyata-R 1985; Rossen-BE & McKeever-PD 199) and one 
explored cross cultural attitudes towards pain (Kodiath-MF & Kodiath-A 1995). I found 
two studies that had utilised focus groups. These groups were used to generate ‘concepts 
and themes’ that were then incorporated into action. One charted the start of a self help 
group (Cury-SE, Ferraz-MB, et al. 1995 ) and the other a pilot study to developing semi­
structured interview methods for a main study (unspecified) (Flanagan-PJ, McGrath-MM, 
et al. 1995).
426
The only example that appeared of a more co-operative inquiry methodology that 
appeared in the Medline search was a study to examine factors that led to an empathetic 
approach in physician consultations (Suchman-AL et al 1997). Twenty one physicians 
recorded on video a single consultation. Transcripts were made of these and both the 
transcript and video shown to all twenty one doctors. A group discussion led to a 
consensus of agreed themes at the end of which an empirically derived model of 
empathetic communication was developed.
The final method I proposed to consider the current position of qualitative medical 
research was a review of methodologies in qualitative research found in the Cochrane 
database of controlled trials. The title ‘Database of Controlled Trials’ suggests a positivist 
paradigmatic position but the organisation has an espoused purpose in developing high 
quality qualitative research in the medical field. In this database (Cochrane 1998) 
qualitative research that overlapped certain areas I have attempted to cover in this thesis 
was found. These include;
□ patient/ physician communication (n=21) Review (Stewart 1995)
□ how data presentation can determine choice (n-5) (Mazur 1997; Llewellyn 1995; 
Mazur 1994; Mazur 1993; O Connor 1989)
□ patient’s perspective in disease (n=4) (Pearlman 1997; Rodriguez 1996; Simpson 
1995)
□ care giving and researching (n=l) (Cattorini 1993)
□ power and empowerment in the clinical setting (n=2) (Kubsch 1997; Davidson 1997)
□ relationships with other healthcare professional. (n=>100) Review (Zwarenstein 
1997)
The methodologies employed in these articles and reviews were;
□ observation with ‘category analysis’. Such categorisation enabled statistical analysis 
to be undertaken.
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□ questionnaires, largely structured
□ focus groups,
□ intervention effects
This last methodology, intervention effects, involved a baseline assessment followed by 
randomisation (with controls) and post intervention assessment. For example, in the 
review on patient/ physician communication eleven of the twenty one studies utilised this 
approach to assess the effect of a variety of approaches on communication. Interventions 
included seminars, training sessions and information packages. This approach, with a 
study design that is positivist in conception, was felt by the author to be more valuable 
than studies using a methodology based on observation alone.
From this brief review, it would seem that most qualitative research in mainstream 
medicine in the last few years appears to be positioned fairly firmly in the post positivist 
paradigm. Institutions such as the Cochrane Collaboration, an influential agency that 
defines quality in medical research, places significant emphasis on the importance of the 
defining control groups, the procedures of randomisation, statistical handling of data, 
replicability and the generalisability of results even in qualitative research. Such a 
methodological approach contrasts with the approach adopted in this thesis.
How have others responded to my research and explanations?
On the few occasions I have chosen to explore some of these ideas with my colleagues, it 
has produced varied results. In a study day for trainee general practitioners I was asked to 
discuss a number of apparently simple clinical scenarios. With the approval of the course 
supervisors, I chose to highlight some of the problems generated by such clinical 
situations by drawing attention to models of power. For example, one situation was to 
discuss what should be done when a patient “demands antibiotics for sinusitis.” The usual 
approach would be to discuss the evidence in the literature for and against such treatment 
but instead I expanded the interpretation of the situation to ask questions about power 
issues. The feedback given by the trainees to this approach was mixed. Whilst three
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quarters felt there was a place to discuss such issues, a quarter felt it was inappropriate 
and that literature evidence alone should form the basis for treatment. One talked of “too 
much philosophy and too little medicine” but there were others who said that it was about 
time such issues were raised as believed they formed an important part of medical 
practice. Overall, this response was disappointing because I had perceived such a group 
as open to a discussion of non-clinical issues-still making assumptions! In the course for 
trainee surgeons at Oxford, I have started to suggest the importance of non clinical 
processes like ‘power’ in decision making and the response is generally less favourable. 
Barely half consider an understanding of power as important in the clinical encounter. 
Recently, I was asked to spend a session on the subject of tonsillectomy with some senior 
surgical trainees. Instead of the usual approach based on recent literature reports, of 
which there are plenty, I chose to view tonsillectomy in a historical and cultural context. I 
used the operation of tonsillectomy as an example to show how theory reconfigured itself 
in the face of disconfirming data to maintain the concept of tonsillectomy. We then 
explored power issues surrounding listing for tonsillectomy in adults and children and 
linked this with power issues surrounding medical knowledge and medical organisations 
in general. To my great surprise, the feedback was remarkably positive. I wondered 
whether it was because all of the trainees were involved in seeing patients with tonsillitis, 
usually perceived as a straightforward problem but in reality not, that such an approach 
had touched a nerve. However, by the time I had read the feedback, they had all gone 
home and it was too late to ask them further questions. In that moment I appreciated that 
all the old problems encountered in this research were still there; assumption on my part 
about what I was expecting from them, and short experiences that limit the opportunity 
for inquiry.
What I have learnt from undertaking this thesis is the argument that it may be necessary 
for good practice to hold onto paradigmatic positions more lightly. Consistent with this 
position is the view that any interpretation within this thesis must be regarded as a 
standpoint that ought to be challenged, so I welcome dissent. After all, as Foucault 
maintained, resistance to knowledge generates further understandings. I have also learnt 
to really appreciate the unique situation of each clinical encounter, a pre-requisite, it
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I would like to start with my family. I do not want to acknowledge my family’s help in 
preparing this work out of a sense of duty, but do so out of a sense of thanks and love. I 
have a busy job, which makes great demands on family time, and I was undertaking 
research that I didn’t need to do. It was, if you like, an indulgence. And yet, they were 
always very supportive and for this I am genuinely appreciative. Julia read sections of my 
thesis, and her perspective as a lawyer, MBA graduate, and my partner, gave me much to 
think about that was invaluable and impossible to obtain from anyone else. My children 
Rachael and Laurie were amused to see that I have quoted experiences with them in the 
thesis. Watching them grow and seeing how they learn, gave me a unique opportunity to 
look at my own attitudes to learning, which made me appreciate how much of what we 
believe are ‘truths’ are simply learned perspectives. I occasionally tried on ideas with 
them and they gave me feedback with the honesty that only your children can give you. I 
forgive the groans that occasionally arose when I went off to the word processor instead 
of playing football or tennis. I hope they forgive me.
Peter Reason and Judi Marshall have taught me to take intellectual risks. I have never met 
two academics prepared to so often entertain the extraordinary in the interests of 
discovery. It takes courage to take a position, which can be ridiculed, and I saw them 
frequently do this in my defence and that of other students. Their special qualities came 
out when we met up after I had been asked to resubmit. It was a difficult time for me and 
perhaps for them but their optimism that the process could be interesting, coupled with 
their belief that I had something interesting to say, will always be with me. I am very 
grateful to them.
The members of the Bath University Postgraduate Group have become over the years 
good friends and as the months go by I hear of their PhD successes. It is impossible to 
give credit to the innumerable ideas were generated by being part of this interesting 
group.
I would also like to acknowledge the patients with whom I worked but especially David, 
Patrick and Valerie. They all showed great courage in facing their problems and their 
willingness to research their thoughts and feelings with me is something I will always 
remember.
My colleagues at work were very tolerant of what I was trying to do. The odd one I know 
thinks that I have Tost my marbles’ and one or two wonder what on earth I am getting up 
to. One colleague in particular has to be acknowledged; my good friend Robert Slack. I 
am extremely fortunate to have in Robert Slack an opened minded and honest colleague 
who seems so ready to enthusiastically engage with any enterprise in the department. I 
always welcomed what he had to say.
The Wessex Regional Health Authority provided some funding for the degree with some 
valuable professional leave and I am very grateful to them.
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Richard: David thanks very much for coming. I um, cough, umm I am actually not 
quite sure how to go,
David: All right.
R: but I, I would just like to kind of recap your history and that means we first met a 
year ago
D: That's right
R: and that was 18 months I think after you'd first had your tumour 
D: That's right
R: your tumour in your sinuses 
D: Diagnosed Valentine's day 1991.
R: That's right. You'd had radiotherapy, you had initially done very well and then when 
we met a year ago we discovered there was a recurrence.
D: That's right.
R: And we were faced with a dilemma, at least you were,
D: Mmm 
R: about what to 
D: Mmm
R: in terms of further surgery 
D: That's right
R: and radiotherapy was on the cards.
D: Yep.
R: Or the other was to try chemotherapy but I think Hugh ruled that out.
D: Yep
1
R: The final alternative was to umm decide that umm that you would have no further 
treatment and that you would carry on with life and deal with the symptoms as and when 
they occurred.
D: That's right.
R: What I (2) what I am very interested to, to try and understand from is you is how, 
how you came to that decision.(2)
D: I think it's (2) it's not a decision that (1) actually comes out the moment that you're 
given the news and to understand a decision like the one I made, you have got to look 
back. Some of the things I am going to say to you are (1) so obvious it's just not true. 
Others might sound slightly bizarre actually but they, I'll, I'll tell you just the way it is.
R: That's, that's great thank you.
D: I think (4) in making any sort of decision, especially a momentous decision that 
might affect your life or your death, you draw on (1) all the years of experience that 
you've had in many, many fields and the decision that you make isn't based upon what 
you have been told, it's a lifetime's experience and I think (2) when I was about 7 years 
old, I was asked by a farmer to clear out a bam, he was a family friend and he was going 
to give me half a crown to clear everything out of his bam
R: Laughs
D: And at 7 1 wondered up to, I’d shifted all sorts of stuff about and I wondered up to 
what looked to me like a little package on the floor and I picked it up and I walked with it 
and I walked for about 14 paces and then I went doing and stuck to the ground. I got 
hold of it and I tried to lift it and I pulled and tugged, couldn't budge it at all and it was a 
half hundredweight weight of one of the com weighing machines and I thought how very 
odd. And as life has gone on, I, I had a, a landrover turn over on me and 6 men in Earls 
Court Arena and I picked the landrover up off these blokes and tossed it (1) adrenaline 
just fired up immediately. And when I was out in Singapore there was a religious sect 
out there and the blokes get knitting needles and stick them through one cheek and out 
through the other and they don't bleed and pull the knitting needles out and there's no 
scarring. And they hook meat hooks on the back and believe it or not drag great weights 
up the road and it doesn't tear the flesh and they don't scar. And (1) from being in my 
early twenties I thought well (2) this is very odd
(Coffee delivered)
D: I thought that's (1) that's very odd because there's obviously something more to these 
people than there is to us and I started to get interested in quite a few of the Eastern 
religions and read quite extensively on the Eastern religions and the power centres within 
the body uhhh and the fact that they believe in the power of the mind is probably the 
greatest power of all so I, I had already got a background of (3) I wouldn't really say 
wanting to believe in the power of the mind but I recognised it was there and I, I believe 
that obviously the mind controls the body, it's got to control the central nervous system, 
it's got to control the immune system and I have also got a great belief that uhh every 
disease that there is on earth, the answer can be found in the trees and in the ground so I 
(3) when I decided not to have surgery (2) there was that sort of knowledge permeating
2
around in my head. Also having served 10 years in the Marines, I've seen death in all 
sorts of guises many many times and it doesn't particularly frighten me umm I got to 
believe that I've got a responsibility to carry on for friends and family but for me 
individually, it's not a great problem I don't think.(3) I think the other thing that uhh 
horrified me about the sort of surgery that I was offered (1) and uhh
R: This was at the Marsden.
D: Yeah, yeah. (2) and the sort of state it would have left me in, I mean, to to have all 
the sort of tissue removed between the roof of your mouth and the base of the brain 
doesn't leave much of a bloke left,
R: No.
D: and I have always again believed that life is all about communication and and being 
able to look somebody in the eye and getting a feel for them and when you look at 
somebody
R: Mmm
D: they say that the eyes are the mirror of the soul and it's true you know . Life, life is 
made up of many many things but I believe that communication is one of the most 
important things and I certainly wouldn't want to give that up (2) so I, I, I was left 
actually having thought about it long and hard (1) umm (1) with the decision that perhaps 
my family didn't like very much at first, I'm sure they didn't, but uhh for me it was the 
only way out. I think other (1) things have come into play as far as I'm concerned as 
well. I believe that the prime responsibility for life, whether it be any facets of it, rest 
with the individual. I don't think you can go along and ask a doctor or a surgeon to be 
responsible and totally responsible for your health. I think you've got a great input into it 
yourself. I think that anybody who does go along to a doctor and says, well, "here I am, 
take me, do what you will, you can make me better and it's nothing to do with me" I think 
are making a big mistake actually. (1) Uhh (4) At the same time as I was being treated 
for cancer (1) I also had a friend in Exeter who was also treated for cancer and I think he 
actually, you know the uhh the short time when they gave overdoses of radiation
R: Yes
D: I think he caught one of those, got cancer of the nasopharynx and uhh he died, died 
shortly after I had finished radiotherapy but uhh his wife asked me if I would go down 
and see a spiritualist faith healer in Wales ,(2) don’t know about that.
D: I asked her initially if, if, if Trevor had seen him, this is the bloke that had the cancer 
of the nasopharynx and she said "oh yes he did" and said bloody good advert then, he's 
dead (1) and she said yeah, when he went down, he did say to Trevor immediately that 
there was nothing he could do for him (1) his allotted life span was up he was going to go 
out and help him to go out painlessly which all seems fairly bizarre at face value but 
apparently Trevor's mother went down there with glaucoma and came away cured and his 
daughter who's 21 went down there with a Bran's cyst in the jaw, I don't know what that 
is, but uhh apparently she was going to have to have it operated on and that cleared up so 
I thought in for a penny, in for a pound. So I went down to see this chap and uhh I, I had 
what he terms as 'healing' off him (1) and felt considerably better (2) umm. At that time
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the (2) tumour hadn’t manifested itself again, it was after radiotherapy but before (1) 
umm I got it in the neck and the (1) just in front of my ear there (2). But I had got great 
problem with my left eye. The vision was down to (1) no more than 5% I reckon at that 
time. It was blood shot all the time and it was acutely painful, very, very dry, uhh, 
extremely light sensitive and after one visit to this bloke, it was all right again. Slightly 
blood shot but visions (1) I'd say 95% again and I thought, that's fairly odd, {laughter, )
R: Mmm
D: Very odd in fact. (2) From there, I took a lot of time off work, had 3 months work 
out actually and I started to read all the great Eastern religions again, brought books all 
over the place and I started to have a look at spiritualism. Umm and it was fascinatingly 
similar to a lot of the Eastern religions (4). From the reading of the books, I eventually 
(2) put a little bit of credence in what was uhh being said and I tried to see this faith 
healer that I had initially seen down in Wales again, it's a long way, he's an exceptionally 
busy man, people come from all over the world to see him and uhh it was getting more 
and more difficult to see the bloke so eventually I went locally to the spiritualist church 
and umm they have been giving me healing down there on a (2) weekly basis for about 
(1) 10 weeks now (1) during which time I have improved enormously. You, you can 
probably see the lump in the side of my neck, I don't think that's huhh, since you last saw 
me I don't think you'd see a great difference in that.
R: I think there is virtually no difference since I last saw you.
D: There was an incredible difference, I had a heck of a lot of stress around uhh 
December. As you know I've gone bankrupt and one thing and another and I had to sell 
my house. My house was falling through and uhh (1) the whole thing was going array
and it put me under enormous pressure. I got this terrible aching in my neck and this
thing bloomed, it really did and it was only once all the aggravation had gone away, I 
could sort of put my mind on getting it all together again that it started to recede a bit but 
uh (3) that's basically it. If, if there's anything you would like to ask me I would be 
delighted to answer.
R: Very much so, thank you. Umm what it seems to me you are saying that umm whilst 
you you hear what is being said to you medically
D: Mmm
R: when we, when we discuss treatment etc 
D: Mmm
R: that it is important for you to place that in the context of your own life and your own 
beliefs
D: That's right.
R: that you, you're not the kind of man I think I would expect to be told what to so.
You, you take information and you decide how you are going to use it.
D: That's right.
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R: I think that's (2), I think that the way a lot of people feel but what suddenly, why I 
wondered about
D: Mmm
R: and I would very much like to ask you was, and, and I, I really only realised it when I 
was talking to you was that there is a world of a difference between sitting down and 
rationally working out in your head what is the right thing to do
D: Mmm
R: and I think, I got the impression quite quickly that you decided you weren't going to 
have any conventional surgical treatment,
D: That's right.
R: That the, that the notion of continuing as you were was acceptable to you but you 
weren't sure how you feel about that in everyday life, how you feel your family would 
cope
D: That's right.
R: and I, I got the sense that you needed to test it in day to day living for a few weeks to 
see what happened. Is that fair or not?
D: Huhhhhhh.
R: If for example,
D: I, I think I had almost made up my mind immediately I was, as I said earlier, not 
frightened of dying, I was a bit concerned about how painful it would be
R: Right.
D: Umm, (2) very concerned for Linda and she, she, she is a very strong woman, she has 
been a marvelous support to me and she really has, she's liv' lived every day with it and 
she, she has been terrific. She's not cracked up at all.
R: You're, you're one of the few couples I've come across where their relationship 
seemed to be enhanced by this sort of problem.
D: Mmm.
R: Most it manages to destroy.
D: Mmm.
R: Very impressive, please go on.
D: That uhh, I think that was one of my main concerns (2) that ooh crickey, balancing
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the books and deciding. I suppose one of the other things that figured quite largely with 
me is that I've got a massive life insurance policy so even though I had gone bankrupt at 
the time, it, it, this didn't figure in the decision. It was a comfort to know that if I did die, 
Linda would be looked after and looked after very, very well. So there, there was that 
element of it and there was also the huhhh, I, I've seen a couple of horrendous deaths 
actually. I had a friend of mind, won't say, won't, won't give his name, who had a stroke 
at the age of 61 and he was married to a woman who was 20 years his junior (1) and from 
having this stroke the relationship, as you say, just went and she treating him in the most 
appalling way and it, it, it, the poor bloke
R: Mmm
D: he, he couldn't communicate properly, paralysed down one side and {"imitating 
groaning noises") as he tried to talk and she used to talk for him all the time and uhh he's 
slobber down his shirt and she would go "Geoffrey for goodness sake look at the state of 
you". And this poor bloke got lower and lower and lower and eventually starved himself 
to death and wouldn't take a pill or anything, he just stopped eating and I looked at that 
and I thought, no that's not for me. That's existing on the worse possible terms that you, 
you could and I also watched my father in a teaching hospital in Sheffield, for a year he 
had every possible test that you could every devise I think uhh he finally went out with 
lymphoma (I) but again I looked at him and I thought that this is blood cruel that you've 
got this bloke, he, he uhh, he's like a trapped rat, he's been (1) having needles stuck in 
him and things up his bum and all sorts of things, the poor bloke was in great distress for 
a long, long time (1) and, I wouldn't want to go like that either.
R: Right, so that, that, for you that's a big issue, how (1) the, the, the process of 
succumbing would be.
D: Yes that's right.
R: Because umm, (2) I've said, I mean I, I kept asking myself time and time again, what 
would I do if, if faced with your dilemma because you were, we're the same age virtually
D: Mmm
R: and umm, and to cover that, that kind of hits you as a doctor, you, you, if you see 
somebody who is very much older 
D: Yeah, {laughter)
R: and sort of say well that's, that's not my problem but I, but we were the same age and 
I keep asking myself, what would I do and I couldn't really (1) put myself in your 
position. I could kind of work out what I thought I could do and I asked lots of friends 
what, what they would do
D: Mmm
R: I asked without mentioning your name, I 
D: Mmm
R: would describe the situation and how would you resolve it. (3) It struck me that,
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umm that it wasn't something you could work out in your head 
D: (Long intake o f breath.)
R: but it, it seems to me talking to you that, quite a lot of, of it has been worked out in 
your head.
D: Huhh. I, I, I don't think it's so much worked out Richard. I think it's uh as I said 
before, it's a lifetimes experiences and you draw on them and umm, even though 
something hasn't affected you directly,
R: Mmm.
D: it's every day sort of what could happen to you and huhh 
R: Right.
D: you pull them all together (2) and it helps you to formulate decision and I think (1) 
obviously a year on the decision I made was incredibly right.
R: Yeah
D: And I, huh had I not made that decision I would have been up to Royal Marsden and 
they, they would have had the knife in me and umm, I'd have been in a fairly poor state, 
in fact I'm quite sure that had I had that operation I would be dead now.
R: Right.
D: I'd have just given up. (1) Whereas I think uhh, I'm reasonably confident that I've got 
quite a reasonable life span in front of me now.
R: Mmm
D: {Laughter.)
R: Was, was there at moment at which you, by the way I would agree 
D: {Laughter.)
R: very strongly, I am very struck by how well you are. Was there a moment at which 
you, you thought ''yes, I know what to do".
D: {Intake o f breath). (2) When making my decision?
R: Yes. It's the, it's the processes by which you got there that I, I am very curious to 
understand.
D: Huhhh, I, I, I think perhaps I don't understand some of it myself. I think there's, 
we've all got a bit of an inner voice, women call it female intuition, men scoff at it, huhh, 
but it's there and there was something within me that said "no that's not the route to go, 
you go.."
7
R: Did you, did you talk to that inner voice at all? Did you find yourself having a, a 
dialogue with it?
D: No
R: You just listened to it.
D: I just listened.
R: And what do you see, what do you see, where do you see that inner voice coming 
from?
D: Well huhh, I, I meditate a lot now and I have done ever since I last saw you (1) and 
uhh, I'm getting, much, much more successful at meditation and (2) there is no doubt in 
my mind, if, if you go for spiritual healing, the healer will tell you that he draws on a 
power, nothing to do with him as an individual he can't do anything,
R: Yeah.
D: he's just a conduit, for (1) this power that comes off the ether as they describe it (2) 
and I've seen, one, two, three, four, five different healers now on various occasions, all 
from the same sort of areas. One was a crystal healer, uhh, I believe, that, that they do 
aroma healing and all sorts of rubbish but, I say rubbish, it's not rubbish, but they all say 
that the power comes from the same source and it's something that's tangible, you can 
actually feel it. Uhh. Have you ever watched anybody have healing or
R: I haven't no.
D: been involved? It, it's quite the incredible experience and uhh (1) one that I 
recommend (laughter) actually. But, you, you will get a healer and they will come and 
stand behind you and just put their hands on, on your shoulders for a couple of minutes 
and within second you can feel heat powering into your body now, i' i' i' it's not just body 
heat, you can actually feel the heat coming into your body and then they'll start, they'll 
hold their hands either side of your head about 6 or 7 inches away and they tell me that 
this is on the extremity of the aurora, the aura rather, and they, they follow it down your 
body and if you sit with your eyes closed, you can tell exactly where their hands are and 
just this, the heat that is generated by the hands,
R: Uh-huh.
D: is, (1) well it's beyond description really (2) and every, everyone that you see (1) 
you'd have an exactly similar process which says to me that there's, there's got to be 
something in it. It's uhhhm, it's evidential, it's there, you can, it's tangible, you, you, it's 
not a case of saying well it's a placebo effect and uhh (1) I just want it to happen, it, it 
does happen and I, I've talked to different people who have been waiting for healing and 
they all talk about the same experience and it, it's marvelous how many people you see 
that are cured of a wide range of illness and diseases so (2).
R: Your experience of all that, umm, much of that, although I suspect the stage was set 
for an interest in spiritualism
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D: Without a doubt
R: Yep.
D: Without a doubt.
R: But a lot of that occurred after you'd decided 
D: Yes
R: and were, it seemed to me, umm a development of what had gone on 
D: Mmm
R: but umm (1) was, was something you did after you'd decided but, I, I just picked up 
an interest in what you said about your inner voice, which
D: Mmm
R: as you say, women have but men are inclined to dismiss 
D: Yeah
R: that you listened to that.
D: I, I tried, I tried meditating. When you said the stage was said you were dead right I,
I used to try meditating as long ago as when I was 23, 24
R: Right.
D: and I used to put half an hour a day aside and I wasn't very successful with it because 
I hadn't read anything on it, I really didn't know where to get any information on it so I 
just used to sit there and (2) right where are we now please.
R: Yes
D: And uhh, it, it, it didn't take me very far but umm (2) yeah, I, I, huhhh, I think it's true 
to say that even when I first got the news I'd got cancer and I was having radiotherapy, 
umm I began to look inwardly a lot more than I had for many many years umm (3). And 
cert', certainly within business actually, I, now and again I used to listen to the inner 
voice, I didn't want to do something and say go on, no that's the right way and all
R: Right, I see. I', would you listen to the inner voice if it gave you umm advice that 
was irrational or contrary to what you might expect to do if you sat and tried to work it 
out?
D: If it was strong enough, yeah.
R: Yes. What would you do if there was a conflict? Which would you listen to?
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D: Mmm, crickey that is difficult. I think I'd go for the inner voice.
R: Right.
D: I think I've huh gone off the gut for a great percentage of my life you know, you, you, 
you look at something and you think is it right, is it wrong, oh crickey, can't make a 
decision. The first thought is yes it was right, let's go for it. And it, it ,it ,it works the 
majority of the time I think.
R: Did you find that there is a difference between (1) what you think is the right thing to 
do and the inner voice? Do you sometimes wait until the two are in harmony and then go
D: {Intake o f breath.)
R: do you find that they, they do match up with one another if you wait, or not?
D: I think I almost always convince myself. I find all the arguments that the inner 
voice'd use and present those and (1)
R: Right.
D: probably convince myself that it was right in the first place. {Laughter.)
R: {Laughter). Right. A, a thought occurred to me. When you first had the problem 
diagnosed and you were having radiotherapy.
D: Mmm
R: Did you start to think "what would I do?" if this problem comes back.
D: Mmm
R: So you, you were already starting to formulate in your own mind some kind of 
strategy
D: Yeah.
R: if there was a recurrence.
D: I didn't expect it to come back after I'd finished radiotherapy actually but during the 
course of the radiotherapy which I found very hard to cope with for the first few sessions
R: Mmm.
D: I certainly thought then, well you know, if this doesn't work (1) what's the road, how 
do we go forward, uhhh so I, I was already contemplating the fact that it may not work 
and I might have a fairly short spell to sort things out so yeah I had given it some thought.
R: But had you already, had you thought about the choices between further surgery and 
between deciding not to do anything or had
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D: No not at that stage.
R: No.
D: I, I thought if I was, if I was going to shuffle off it would be the radiotherapy failing, 
I'd already been told that surgery was almost impossible and it
R: Right.
D: Uhh, and that if it failed it would be exponential growth and (1). I mean it, it was 
fairly well advanced actually when, when they started radiotherapy. It was through the 
side of my nose and into the uhh (1)
R: Eye.
D: into the eye and it's pretty painful.
R: Right.
D: so and uhh I think I knew what to expect with that.
R: What, how do you think you'd have coped if you'd met a surgeon who hadn't 
discussed with you the option of doing nothing? (1) Perhaps 'nothing' is the wrong word, 
of treating it conservatively or with alternative, none traditional (1) medical methods?
D: (Intake o f breath.) Hooh crickey. That is a difficult one.
R: Could you have been sucked into the system do you think and , and not allowed your
own choices or do you think you would have, you'd have, you'd have blocked that?
D: Yes I would, without a doubt. I think uhh (2) if, if, if you, you look at structured 
Western civilisation there are all sorts of organisations who would dearly love to run your 
life for your and (Laughter)
R: Right.
D: and try to on regular basis and, and I'm cognoscente of the fact that you, you could be 
aware of it all the time, uhh, so no I, I wouldn't be forced down any particular route I 
don't think.
R: Mmm. (2). I'd very much welcome some feedback about the part I played. I mean 
D: Mmm.
R: (2) umm (1) How did you view our relationship and the discussions we had? What
was, what was the good thing, was was the bad thing, what, what, what
D: Well there, there, there was', there wasn't a bad side to it Richard, I was absolutely 
delighted that you were frank with me. Uhhh. I think you, you, you were very kind in the 
way that you put it. You, you didn't pull any punches but it wasn't brutal whereas the 
bloke at the, the Marsden Clinic, I mean that was a (1) disgusting carry on. Uhhh
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R: Mmm
D: No, I, I, huhh, in all things I like honesty and in coming to see you, I asked you what 
the prognosis was and you told me. You told me probably the kindest possible way that 
you could without pulling any punches and I was very, very grateful for that. Umm. Had 
you not told me in that way and had I not found out for a fair length of time, I think I'd 
have been a bit annoyed actually.
R: Right.
D: Because at least it gives you a chance to well (3) I don't know, put, put yourself in 
order, start to fight it, start to make your decisions but in, in my view it was exactly the 
right way to treat it and the right thing to do.
R: Right. And I, I don't mind you, I really don't mind you being critical in any way 
because I'm interested to learn but would there be anything that you would have done 
differently or uhh is there anything that I failed to understand.
D: No. No, not at all. I think (3) there was just one, one, one element when I, I started 
to tell you about going down to see this bloke George in Wales
R: Yes, I know, I remember that.
D: "Don't Dave, don't tell me". {Laughter.)
R: Did I?
D: Yeah, yeah. ( Laughter). And I thought well, come on Richard that's a bit closed 
minded. {Laughter).
R: Thank you. I think the trouble is, umm, I, I, I, I will try to be more open about these 
things. It's very difficult. What, what ends up umm is people start asking advise about 
whether or not they think
D: Yeah.
R: they should go but the trouble is, I have no experience at all.
D: No
R: I don't, I don't know anything worthwhile about the set up 
D: Mmm
R: and I (1)1 am careful to only claim any kind of experience or knowledge or expertise 
in rather a narrow area but I am aware that there are, there's much more
D: Mmm.
R: to the whole business of disease, medicine and life with the narrow perspectives that,
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the the Western tradition probably gives us 
D: Mmm
R: but I have to be very careful about claiming to be an expert.
R: That's right. {Laughter)
R: But, but, I, no I, I do sense that.
D: (Laughter.)
R: I remember thinking that I haven't handled that very well and that I, I certainly havn't 
been discouraging to you but I don't think I was being very outwardly encouraging and 
the other thing is also, I do see some people spend large amounts of money whizzing 
around trying to find treatments
D: Mmm
R: and, and again, one doesn't want to be part of umm that the practice that does that,
D: It's very hard. I mean, you, you, you have to depend upon your ability to cure people 
and if you weren't positive in that approach and you thought that you weren't going along 
the right route, you, obviously couldn't, couldn't function properly but uhh, (2) I, I'm not 
trying to sell spiritualism to you or spiritual healers but they certainly won't charge you.
R: Umm.
D: If you want to make a donation 
R: You can.
D: a small donation, you can.
R: Right.
D: but they'll never ask for money. Umm. If you make a donation, they're they're 
normally quite emphatic that they will only take it if you can really afford it and by small, 
I'm talking about £10 for a healing session
R: Right.
D: which is not a lot when they have probably given over an hour, an hour and a half of 
their time to you.
R: Right.
D: Uhh, huhh. (4) It is a very holistic approach I think and again when you, when you 
go for spiritual healing, they will never say to you the medical profession is wrong, don't 
go there. They always say well what we are doing is ancillary so
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R: Mmm
D: for goodness sake carry on seeing your doctor.
R: Mmm, that's the way I view it I have to say.
D: Yeah, which is fair enough.
R: Can I be very explicit in directly answering me about some ideas I've got about health 
and how to (3) and I'd be, I'd be very grateful if you think I've got it wrong.
D: Yep.
R: It seems to me that if we (2) take ourselves, that, that, we'll let that represent that as 
the doctor and that as the patient {demonstrating with objects on the desk), that, (2) I 
know a lot about the disease and the surgery
D: Mmm.
R: and that it is a much more valid and easier process it seems to me to make a good 
decision on the part of the patient, to take the knowledge that I have about disease and 
enable the patient to transplant it into the context of their life
D: Yep.
R: than it is for me to take that, their lives and try to transplant it in the context of the 
disease,
D: Exactly.
R: so that I (.) regard myself as being an educator about disease and treatments and 
D: Mmm.
R: and that it is (.) a skill in communicating this properly that it is up to you to place that 
in context and accept or reject as much as you want.
D: That's right.
R: That seems to me self evident although it's amazing how many doctors have trouble 
understanding this
D: {Laughter.)
R: The other more (2) complicated an issue that I have been experimenting with is the 
idea that you have, there's not only a lot of head knowledge about the treatment and your 
own life but you have a lot of what we call experiential knowledge.
D: Mmm.
R: I think you call that your inner voice.
14
D: Mmm.
R: And that, that we dialogue with one another 
D: Mmm.
R: on the basis of head knowledge 
D: Mmm.
R: but it is necessary for you consult your experiential knowledge 
D: Mmm.
R: and listen to that 
D: Mmm.
R: in order to make sense and to come to some kind of decision about what to do. It's no 
good being entirely rational about all this. That you had to, you had to experience, no, 
you have to kind of consult the experiential side of you to see if that, if it makes sense in 
terms of day to day living.
D: That's right.
R: I think the thing I really want ask you is, because I suddenly realised (.) and I have 
asked you this question already and but I, will ask you again that when we had a 
discussion about what the right thing was to do, it seemed to me you did fairly quickly 
come to the conclusion that the most appropriate way forward was for you to, to carry on 
as it were without any surgical treatment, that it was one thing sitting in a clinic and 
deciding that that was the right thing to do
D: Mmm.
R: but it was necessary for you to away and (.) see what it felt like on a day to day basis 
with the knowledge that this thing still existed in your head
D: Mmm.
R: How would, how are you going to cope with it? How was your family going to cope? 
D: That's right.
R: In other words you had to go away and experience this decision 
D: That's right.
R: before finally deciding that it was the right thing to do. I don't want to put words into 
your mouth but I did sense that we talked and we quite quickly decided the right thing to 




R: and you came in, I remember thinking there's a strong feeling now that this is the 
right thing to do
D: That's right.
R: and that, that it had taken a few weeks of living with the decision before you, you felt 
certain you were right. Is that fair?
D: Huhh. Ac', actually it was a fairly amusing time for me {laughter), I know that 
sounds ridiculous but it was. When we left here, Linda was in tears and she was very, 
very upset, she didn't know where she was going to go and I said come on, I'll buy you a 
drink and we went down to the pub, got, got her a stiff drink and I had one, came out and 
got in the car and she said you've not fastened your seat-belt up. I said well I don't do 
things like that anymore. She said what do you mean, you're breaking the Law. I said, 
well (1) there are no laws really, if I'm going to shuffle off in a year I'm now going to 
bloody well please myself for a year and we went home and we had the first of my 'Dave 
C's Dying Parties'. Rang round all the friends and said uhh {laughter), said that's it lads, 
if we're going to shuffle off you'd better all get round here and uhh literally within an 
hour of having left you, I'd got a house full of people and we had an enormous piss-up 
that went on 'til about 2 o'clock in the morning. Everybody had a fabulous time and uhh 
( i ) i  think in a way that was my way of breaking everybody into the news and getting 
them laughing and looking at it in the right sort of context in a light sort of way rather 
than uhh being told in hushed tones that C’s on his way out. (I) And I think again (.) the 
circle of friends that I have helped me enormously because they didn't sort of walk round 
talking in hushed tones and they weren't you know sort of talking behind back hushed 
'How is he today? and all the rest of it'. They
R: Mmm.
D: They were up front about it because I was up front about it, they sort of said well 
R: Your openness made them open.
D: Yeah.
R: Yes.
D: What the bloody hell do you feel about this then Dave? How can you feel? I, I've 
talked about it a heck of a lot over the last year to all sorts of people because I find most 
people are very, very frightened by it and it, it, it helps people if you can talk to them and 
relate your experiences to them. Because I think in, yeah, in that sort of 4 or 5 weeks 
between saying no, no I'm not going to have the operation and seeing you again (1) umm
R: You suddenly felt comfortable with the idea
D: Yeah.
R: and, in a, in a way that you hadn't (1). It struck me as, as it's all very well talking
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about these things 
D: That's right
R: but then the moment you leave the room or you find yourself alone, you think, am I, 
am I doing the right thing?
D: That's right.
R: But that sense of uncertainty seemed to go.
D: Yes it did. I uhh, huhh, I talked it through with Linda obviously 
R: Right
D: Uhh (2) and it wasn't something that really she could make an input on. Decisions 
like that are very personal, you can only make them yourself. But I think she was not 
happy to see me go either route but uhh (4) on a spiritual level, I think she was quite 
relieved for me not to have the operation because she having known me for all the years, 
she knows what that would have done to me mentally uhhh (2). And I think in fairness, 
she's got lots of faith in me, she's got none in spiritualism at all or that, or all that sort of 
thing but uhh, I've been a reasonably strong minded individual most of my life and
R: If you'd found though that we made a decision in the
D: Mmm
R: clinic or at least you'd made a decision to do nothing 
D: Mmm
R: as the right thing and you'd gone home and you'd suddenly found that (1) it was 
forever there, forever destroying your ability to enjoy yourself
D: Yeah.
R: and it was wrecking your family and that the idea of doing nothing was in living 
terms unacceptable, do you think you might have revisited the idea of surgery and said 
well OK go for it kind of thing.
D: (Long intake o f breath.) I think I would have, huhh, if it, I mean no', nobody likes 
pain. If it had become extremely painful
R: That would have been different, yes,
D: I think
R: moving the goal-posts.
D: Yeah, 1 , 1 ,1  don't know whether I would have reconsidered it or not. I'd like to think 
that I wouldn't because huhhh, in coming to the decision what I was actually saying is
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that I prefer life as I've always known it 
R: Yes.
D: and I'm not prepared to carry on with uhh a much depreciated life form, not being 
able to communicate and all the rest of it so I think had, had I considered it through pain,
I would have thought it was a fairly cowardly thing to do and had I, had I actually had 
that operation and woken up (2) with the bits of tissue missing that they said would be 
missing, even if I had been slightly more comfortable, I think I would have been very 
disappointed in myself.
R: Mmm.(3)
D: Not because I think it's bravado but we've all got to go out a some time and huh, not 
being able to live, I don't know, 6 months pain
R: Mmm
D: to cop out and have the operation and then live with perhaps, 10 years of uhh (1) a 
life that you're not really enjoying, wouldn't have been a fair trade I shouldn't think.
R: Do you feel there's anything you want to say?
D: (4) Mmm (1). Yeah, I wouldn't like to be your shoes {Laughter) because it was, it 
was very, very difficult. I know (1) you're dealing with all sorts of people from all sorts 
of (.) walks of life all sorts, all sorts of intellectual levels and whilst this might be all right 
for me, (1) there are an awful lot of people who come along and say 'Doctor, please 
doctor, you tell me what to do'. It must be very difficult when you have this sort of 
evidence to say well, mmm, that's all right for some and not for others but who are the 
some and who are the others?
R: I try very hard not to tell people what to do.
D: Mmm.
R: Because I think it's so difficult to know 
D: What's right.
R: begin to understand the complexity of other peoples minds but I am very struck by 
the dignity of most people but you should also realise that I learned a lot from you. I 
have, I think, I mean, there are perhaps 4 or 5 people I can look back and think, gosh you 
profoundly influenced me and you are one of them and ummm each one of those removes 
to some extent the fear of death because at some point, I am going to have to confront 
these kind of issues
D: That's right.
R: Like you, the idea that you are immune from all of these problems is of course untrue. 
So it, if I see people like yourself handling it umm in an incredibly open way
18
D: Mmm.
R: it's umm, it's very, very kind of reassuring and it helps remove for me in particular, 
death etc and umm (1) people like you are very unusual and they provide great insights 
into what's happening and I am incredibly grateful to you. I, I've got at least as much, 
perhaps more out of talking to you than you have and that, that isn't, that's genuinely 
meant.
D: Good, I'm very pleased.
R: Thank you very much, it's very kind of you.
D: No problem at all. If  I can be any, of any further assistance, then please give me a 
ring. I don't mind at all.
R: Thank you very much. Well, what, what might happen is when I look at this film or 
another doctor or maybe when my research group what this they'll think 'Richard, gosh 
uhh, he should have asked this, this is a fascinating question.
D: Mmm.
R: Umm and or you didn't pick up on something that David had said.
D: Mmm.
R: seemed to you important. If it is in order, if you didn't mind I might just drop you a 
line.
D: No problem.




Patrick: Are we on now?
Richard: Yes. (3) Umm (3) I think, I think we umm (1) we ought to get on film a 
couple of things that we talked about beforehand
P: Yes.
R: about negotiating umm (1) this interview and how it was set up and umm one of 
the things that I (.) wanted to make clear was that umm the issues that we are going to 
discuss and we haven't fully negotiated what those are, were ones that we (.) we 
would be doing in a collaborative way and I'm not somebody researching a particular 
topic and you're the researched because I (.) umm I think you indicated that you were, 
were really interested in some of the things that we might have wanted to talk about. 
Is, is that
P: That, that's true yes.
R: OK. And uhh you are fully aware that this is umm part of my PHD.
P: Yes.
R: And that I have gone through some people who may, who are, who are possibly 
going to be involved in looking at it which includes my secretary who will be typing 
out the transcript and they'll uhh, they'll be my supervisors and my examiners.
P: Yes.
R: And, if I, if anybody else is going to look at it then that will be negotiated with 
you.
P: Fine, that's uhh understandable.
R: Thank you for accepting this and that at any time stop this and the camera and at 
any time you can tell me that, that what's just been said is uhhh doesn't go beyond us.
P: Right.
R: And that I'm going to provide you with a transcript of what's going on and the 
same applies
P: OK.
R: That's just to let you know that. I just wanted you to be sure about that.
Umm (3) right well the, the agenda. (Laughter) What do you ummm 
Do you have anything in particular you would like to talk about before I
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P: Well, I think you will know me from discussion in the past that I, as a victim of 
cancer, would be very interested in, in the subject, in regard to myself. Circumstances 
have recently arisen whereby I had the misfortune to have what my doctors described 
to me to be a recurrence of cancer and I have actually gone in the face of the 
professional advice given me in not having follow up uh radiotherapy. That in itself 
is a subject which uhh I am happy to discuss with you because I think there are some 
messages there which uh are worth (.) analysing umm. I didn't disregard my doctors 
advice easily. Uhh but I have uhh a fairly long history now of uh related illnesses, in 
fact I've had three illness. Perhaps it would help if I (.) uhh just very briefly go over 
those three illnesses to define the, the linkage between
R: Yes that would be great.
P: Because uhh, it's very important in analyzing my umm behaviour as it were which 
uhh was uhh perhaps unexpected in regard to my doctors concerning the latest or the 
last umm problem of cancer. So let's just go over the, uhh very briefly over the, the 
history.
R: Background, yes.
P: Right, uhh eight years ago, I had the misfortune to have umm, uhh a diseased 
testicle and that umm problem uhh was uhh overcome. The, the testicle was removed 
uh it was, there were no uhh problems relating to that but what is significant about it 
and what may have linkage with uhh other illness to follow was the fact that my 
immune system was uh severely uh damaged uh because I had been fighting this 
problem for some months.
R: Was it damaged by the treatment?
P: No, damaged simply by fighting the diseased testicle. That was my 
R: Oh right.
P: view as to what happened and to illustrate the difficulty associated with immunity. 
I remember
going to hospital uhh to have uhh the testicle removed and feeling how relieved I was 
to go to hospital because I didn't have to go to work
R: Laughter.
P: I was so tired and exhausted 
R: Right.
P: Umm and uhh secondly to illustrate the point uh the doctors at the time uh were 




P: and I would measure that personally as being a good indication as to how uhh 
poor my immune system was at that time. Two years later, I had the misfortune to be 
diagnosed as being a cancer victim with a tumour on my neck, on my right hand side 
of my neck umm. This was uh uh removed and radiotherapy was prescribed and 
taken uh. The problem arising from that particular illness was that umm I understood 
from your good self that uhh (1) there, there was likely to be a primary, a primary 
which caused that cancer in my neck and uhh a very thorough uhh investigation arose 
to find where that primary was located. Huh there were many suspicions of it being in 
the throat or throatal area and because it wasn't found umm the uh radiotherapy was 
actually directed uh uh heavily in that area just in case of uh there being a lurking 
tumour, tumour for want of a better expression umm but nothing was found. So it 
remained somewhat inconclusive uh although I was told, again by your good self, that 
umm probably uhh the, there was no primary, it was a spurious outbreak of uh uh uh 
a cancerous tumour. Uhh I suspected that that might be to help ease my umm, my 
worries into the immediate future and I still felt some apprehension about there being 
a primary uh, uh and I think that's understandable in that situation. Uhh and uhh it 
was also believed that the tumour arose from when my immune system uhh was 
severely disabled from two years previously because uh the tumour was believed to 
be in the order of 2 years old when removed and that fitted that particular umm 
scenario rather well. Now I did carry a worry about there being a primary. And, with 
justification one should not just walk away and ignore that possibility so I actually 
undertook a policy of keeping fit
R: Right.
P: uhh in that period and I, I'm now going back of course some six years 
R: Uh-huh.
P: and uhh, I did in fact undertake regular until quite recently uhh not great strenuous 
exercise but measures to try and keep myself fit.
(I read somewhere, exercise, raising the pulse wuite sharply, may have the effect o f 
preventing cancer cells circulating in the bloodfrom attaching themselves in blood 
vessel walls. So this exercise was targeted to increase pulse rate specifically-note 
added by P  when reading transcript)
Uhh so you can see that I was carrying concern about uh that primary. Now, uhh (.) 
at the time that this uhh search had been conducted, I did raise uhh with yourself uhh 
the possibility of it being a cyst which was on my scalp at the time. Uhh this you 
dismissed as being uhh quite improbable and that uh since since that particular time it 
had been discarded by doctors also, or disregarded by doctors as being umm uh 
unlikely and indeed I think three doctors including my own GP uhh uhh stated that 
(1) his judgement was that it, it would not be the cause or could not be the cause. The 
degree of umm, of uhh risk factor in that is difficult for me to judge but I came away 
feeling that it was, it was very improbable, very improbable. However, the cyst uhh 
had been with me for 20 years uhh and it had been growing progressively (.) uhh and 
it uhh it played on my mind over the subsequent years uhh. I saw my GP twice in 
fact, uhh to be reassured that it was not a problem. The second time I was umm, a', 
anticipating that response and I felt “there's one very easy way of resolving this 
problem and that is to have it removed” reasoning the need for “cosmetic surgery”,
3
and my doctor, my GP, agreed with that. He indicated to me that the level of priority 
would be quite low uh but he had a budget to balance and that therefore it wouldn't be 
immediate. I, I asked just how long it would be and he indicated a couple of months 
which I thought was not unreasonable to wait. However, that two months extended to 
six months and I heard nothing from him uhh, and uhh again I worried about the uh 
the cyst it, it increased to the level where I decided to uhh to go my uhh uhh uhh 
medical insurance company and seek their approval at having it removed uhh and 
they agreed. Uhh I was rather doubtful that they would agree because of the nature of 
it without there being any substance to believe that it was cancerous in any way.
They did agree and within two weeks it was removed. Umm and uh I was greatly ha', 
relieved about that. I felt that whether it was uh a problem or not, it uh was now 
removed and I could umm uhh relax a little more. Still mindful of that primary uhh 
but I could relax a little more. It was the only, the only umm aberration as it were on 
my (.) body that uh uh I could possibly be suspicious of and now it um it had been 
removed. Uhh you can understand umm that uh, oh I ought to explain that uh umm 
the doctor who removed the cyst, a Dr B umm believed that the cyst had actually had 
a life-span of a mere two or three months (1) uhh and this prompted him to actually 
send the cyst away or to have it examined for possible cancerous tissue and umm, 
indeed it was cancerous, it was cancerous. Huh, now you can understand, I think, that 
umm at this moment if we freeze this moment in time uh there was I worrying about a 
cyst, being reassured by all of my doctors that I had no umm cause to be alarmed 
about it in any way and suddenly (.) uhh it is cancerous and I'm right. Umm, the uh, 
the confidence in my doctors at that point in time dropped quite uhh considerably.
And that's not to say that I wasn't respectful of my doctors and what they'd done for 
me uhh but I did feel at that moment. I remember saying to myself “I, be careful here; 
you're going to have to protect yourself in this situation and be very much involved in 
the decision making.” I think that's a natural reaction for any patient to make.
(Being “right ” boosted my sense o f willingness to take an independent stance on 
decision making. That is to say, it gave me a private inner confidence as distinct from  
a “confrontationaT’ confidence. Note added by P when reading text)
R: You mean in terms of further treatment and what you've decided to do..
P: Well, well at this time, the, the further treatment really didn't uh, didn't play a part 
it was simply that umm uhh what had been revealed to me was the uhh, and I was 
convinced the primary by this time,
R: Mmm.
P: If you, you consider the history and my, my conviction about this umm cyst, you 
can understand that when it was found to be um uh cancerous, I was less surprised 
than that doctor
R: Right.
P: uh and uh I felt that it was indicative that uh, uh where the difficulties associated 
with cancer, it's behaviour the diagnosis etc, that the great difficulties involved in it 
uh that I should um I should be mindful myself of uh the, those difficulties and the 
doctors do have limitations in terms of their judgements. Uhh I know it was a broad 




P: Uh, uh there followed a period which was a little vague to me but umm, clearly uh 
the question of radiotherapy into the area uh arose which um I should have perhaps 
anticipated as being a natural uh development having found it to be cancerous but I 
actually didn't think that because my view was that um, and it fitted perfectly, that 
this was the primary, it had been sitting on my head now for 20 years and umm (1) it 
had, it, it, it had been removed at a specific point in time in it's twenty-first year if you 
like uh and found to be uh uh cancerous and my logic to this was that yes it, it uhh 
embraced the period when the cancer in my neck occurred. It was logical to me that 
uhh, with a disabled immune system the window of opportunity had opened and 
perhaps I was lucky to simply have one tumour arising from it. Huh but that uh you 
may disagree with, with me on this Richard, I felt that my immune system now 
healthy and my fitness designed to keep it that way
R: Yes
P: was enough to (.) keep that primary in check. Uhh, the day it was removed I can 
assure you absolutely it looked exactly the same as it had done the year before and the 
year before that
R: Right.
P: and I was confident if it had been left, it would have been on my head a year later 
looking exactly the same. When I say exactly the same, it was uh growing larger uh 
progressively but that rate of progression had not changed. Umm, uhh, I think the 
fact it was growing was one of the factors which lead me to feel very suspicious about 
it. (1) But there we have a scenario there, we have an interesting situation which I've 
now created for you and the question of radiotherapy then arose uhh now when that 
uh, umm was raised, I'd already been through radiotherapy as you well know, I know 
what it uh, it uh, it does. I know what a brutal form of treatment it is and necessary it 
is in the right circumstances but, but here I was being asked by my doctors to undergo 
further radiotherapy treatment in an area where the tumour was, where the cyst had 
been, now removed of course, the, the bulk of the risk had been taken away and in my 
view based upon my logic relating to the history of that um cyst was that umm if it 
had been left it would have continued sitting on my head doing nothing, passive, in a 
passive state controlled by my immune system. Now that's a non medical man's view 
(1) based upon me knowing my body and understanding the history in detail. I am 
very conscious that doctors can not always hold uh that depth of understanding.
Many of the things Richard that I've told you about, my earlier cancer I am sure you 
will have forgotten understandably but I havn't forgotten, I live with it every day 
virtually. Now, my reaction to this situation being confronted with umm uhh, it, it 
was absolutely impossible question. Uh, if, if, if I was told, and this is very 
significant, I was told in a follow up consultation that umm the cancer in the cyst was 
not related in any way to my previous cancer, it was a spurious development of 
cancer for the second time
R: Were you?
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P: Uhh, now if you, if you put that to one side as, as being, as being a statement uhh 
and that uhh there uhh was a need to uhh have radiotherapy into the area where the 
um where the um cyst had been (1) uhh now after that consultation I went home and I 
was shocked because it wasn't what I expected from my doctor at all. I expected 
there to be some (.) recognition that I was right, now I, I'm not trying to be (1) suggest 
that I know better than my doctors here, they may well have had more information to 
work on that I had and I'm sure they did but it was not a logical outcome for the 
circumstances that, I'd, I'd defined and uhh uhh it's interesting because umm I think 
uh, I, I understand trauma a little more now because trauma to me is being in the 
situation where you have a problem which you can not control uhh yet you wish to 
take it over and solve it for yourself and I think when umm you're life's at stake, and 
I'm not suggesting my life was at stake here, in fact, I was, I was arguing for the 
opposite - not to have radiotherapy treatment, to avoid radiotherapy treatment for two 
reasons. Uhh it would um take a large piece of my uh, my hair off of my head and 
umm it's one thing to go bald, it's another to have radiotherapy and have hair removed
(This was where my definition o f trauma, here described, began. What I  declined to 
say directly in the interview was that I  saw the “new cancer ” diagnosis to be 
(possibly) a diagnosis o f convenience leading to the “need” fo r  radiotherapy 
providing protection fo r  the doctor as much as fo r  myself This is where the urge to 
take control is seeded-note added by P  when reading the text)
R: Mmm.
P: The difference visually is umm, is (.) quite umm, quite different.
R: Yes.
P: Secondly, uhh and umm I'll come back to the detail on this a little later but 
secondly uhh it would involve radiation into the uh into the brain. Now this would 
have been very light I understand uhh but I take the view that any radio, uh 
radiotherapy, radiation into the, into any part of the body uhh, in order to do good as 
to do bad as well and when the brain to me a very sensitive organ, it may be a very 
resilient organ I think but to me it's a very sensitive organ uhh and I wonder (1) uhh 
and this is, this isn't a, a criticism of doctors here, whether in fact doctors in 
prescribing uhh radiotherapy (.) uhh whether they truly take into account the long 
term effects uhh. I think there is a umm uhh a uhh sense of concern about the present 
and the immediate future
R: Mmm mmm.
P: uhh but the long term future is very much on the back burner and by that I mean 
there is no statistical indicator to suggest that damage in my case would be very 
limited. And, I worry about conditions later in life such as uhh Alzheimer's disease or 
Parkinson's disease which might be brought forward by 6 months or a year or two 
years arising from uhh radiotherapy into the brain. Now I don't think any doctor 
could actually uhh, you may uh, you may contradict me here but I, I would doubt 
whether (.) uhh any statistical evidence uhh could reliably be extracted relating to the 
umm the advancement of a disease that is impending anyway. Therefore statistically
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it would be very difficult to (.) to determine.
R: To illustrate that yes.
P: So that concerned me. It concerned me because I felt that doctors would, do tend 
to think about present and the immediate future rather than the (.) distant future uh uh 
uh and again, perhaps I'm wrong. Perhaps I miss judging my doctors here but this 
concerned me about having radiotherapy. Umm the, the very fact that the umm uhh 
the uhh cyst was so umm uhh unaffected prior to be removed and it was the same as it 
had been previously, uhh and it had been removed remember here by chance and 
found to be cancerous as far as doctors are concerned but I'm concerned with my, 
with my uhh concept of what had been happening here. It was quite different. I had,
I had a story, I had uhh a series of uhh of interlinked events which uhh I was quite 
happy with. (1) The day I walked out of the uhh con', consultation roo', room, room 
uhh having seen my doctor and being told of the (.) need for radiotherapy, I went for 
a long walk.
R: Mmm.
P: I went for a long walk because I always do when something as traumatic as this 
problem arises in my thoughts, and this is how I've come to understand trauma a little. 
My thoughts reject everything else, as it were, they were simply put at lower level 
and my thoughts uhh centred upon uhh the statistical evidence, the, the supposition, 
the, the uhh sense and feel about this whole uhh enterprise which uhh was about to 
lead me I felt in the wrong direction and after uh uh uh a couple of hours of walking I 
found myself able to think very clearly when I go for long walks. Umm I, I, I decided 
that umm no, I couldn't go ahead with radiotherapy because it wasn't necessary. I had 
first, I first of all reasoned that umm the probability of getting cancer for the second 
time was that the odds were so high that umm I found it very difficult to believe.
Now I have to be careful with myself here because I'm not a doctor, I can't (.), I can't 
make judgements upon the possibility of umm, of uhh uhh uhh cancer developing uhh 
but what I can do is (1) and umm what I did and this took a long time to get round to 
this my thoughts rolled these problems around endlessly uhh. I decided that I could, I 
could work out some sort of umm (.) some sort of (.) bad luck factor because I, I'm 
not a doctor and I decided that uh my bad luck to get uhh cancer for the second time 
in the period between the age of 55 and 60 (1) uhh, that, that specific period
R: Mmm
P: uhh was in the order of (.) one hundred to one and if you like Richard, I'll tell you 
how I arrived at it. Ok, I decided uhh that I, I, I felt that I had to be very responsible 
about this and I wanted to remove any comfort factors that, that one is inclined to 
build in to steer the argument into umm, uhh into a form that would be uhh acceptable 
to me. I wanted to be realistic about it. So the first thing I had to do was to get rid of 
the risk factor because I could, I couldn't deal with the risk factor so I had to relate to 
umm (.) purely and simply to this bad luck factor. I decided that umm if you were to 
take uh uh umm, I'll ask you to, to give me your opinion. I decided that if I took a 
thousand men between the age of 55 and 60 and monitored their health in that period 
then 10 of them would have some form of cancer, any form of cancer - leukaemia, 
whatever, uhh quite well removed from uh the, the, the problem that I have but it
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seemed that that was the only way to do it 
R: Right.
P: to get as wide umm a uhh range of cancer uhh because otherwise I couldn't 
believe my own figures and I felt ten in a thousand would be
R: I can, I can see how you arrived at (1) two cancers
P: Uhh
R: Is that one in a hundred?
P: Well it uhh uhh, well, well
R: Sorry I don't mean to break into your flow there
P: No, it's very simple, exactly as I put it to you. I imagined the likelihood of cancer 
associated with that many, many people
R: Right.
P: you know people in the media we know.
R: I see, right.
P: I simply, I extracted the probability of how many would umm uhh fall victim to 
cancer.
R: Oh I see, ten in a thousand is one in a hundred 
P: Between, that's right.
R: Yes
P: Ok between the age of 55 
R: Yes
P: A thousand, I had to use a thousand because uh 
R: Yes
P: it seemed more pragmatic to do that otherwise if you start getting down to lower 
figures you distort the figures
R: Yes
P: so a thousand seemed to be a reasonable number. Uhh now this is pure 
imagination. You may say to me, absolute nonsense.
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R: No, no.
P: Ten in a thousand felt right to me so my first bit of bad luck was that I was the one 
in a hundred victim of cancer. Then I looked at the tumour, at the umm at the cyst.
R: Right.
P: Now uhh now my argument was (1) that if you take those odds a year before or 
two years before or 8 years before, that you would have found cancer cells.
R: Mmm mm.
P: Umm and uhh if uhh the diagnosis was correct, then and bear in mind the cyst 
looked exactly the same the day it came off as, as it had done in previous years, umm 
1(1) decided that the risk factor sorry not the risk factor the uhh the bad luck factor 
here if it exists for twenty years would be, and lets take a year that seems reasonable, 
one year uhh because uhh it might have been active for some little while unknown to 
me, although it looked the same, and it's surface it's not in the body, it's not invisible 
in that sense uhh so I decided that the risk factor, sorry not the risk factor the uh the 
bad luck factor for that would be one in twenty years
R: Alright.
P: twenty to one. I was uhh very tempted to then uhh say well we have two, if the 
doctors are right, we have two risk factors, sorry, I said it again, two umm bad luck 
factors uhh a hundred to one and twenty to one and when one is working with umm 
uhh probability figures uhh one is entitled to multiply the two together
R: Yes
P: Uhh I felt that was unfair actually because umm uhh I just felt that was unfair and 
I, I, I didn't do that. If I had of course, the, the uhh the bad, uhh the bad luck factor 
would have been two thousand to one
R: Yes.
P: Uhh now umm I had now (2) satisfied myself I had tangible figures to relate to I 
felt and even though they were bad luck figures rather than uhh risk this figure which 
a doctor would arrive at, I felt comfortable with it and uhh from that moment on, I 
really felt uhh confident that uhh there was no need for uhh radio (.) therapy and that's 
only part of the story because of course I had interviews with uhh my cancer 
specialist.,
Many discussions on the subject of probability of recurrence arose or relating to it. 
There was the assumption that it was indeed an independent separate umm cancer but 
I won't go into that at this stage.
R: May, may I explore that with you?
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P: Yes by all means.
R: I, I know your background is mathematical and so if we had quite a discussion 
about probability and I like the way you've handled it umm I mean I can see what 
you've done but at the same time you use the word "feel right" quite a lot
P: Yes
R: so it seemed to me that you used, and I don't want to put words into your mouth 
but I get a sense that you are using the, these intellectual statistical mathematical 
arguments to, and, and you have trouble getting data but you've used this until you've 
got a solution that felt right.
P: Yes.
R: Is that right?
P: That's right.
R: Until you were happy?
P: Well I, yes I was, I, I was uncomfortable uhh I couldn't live with the idea of 
opposing my doctors (.) who were adamant about it being uhh an independence uhh 
generation of new, a new cancer uhh and in confronting that with umm uh a rather 
umm broad vague feel factor.
R: Mmm.
P: How can you relate one to the other? Well, there's no contest. I, I, would, I 
would have had to have taken my doctors opinion. I had to find something that I 
could uhh I could quantify
R: Mmm.
P: in a way which would uhh give me umm a uhh power if you like, the power to say 
'no, I don't think that it's appropriate that I have uhh radiotherapy because I'm 
confident uhh there's not going to be uhh regeneration. So this, this is still a risky 
thing for me to do
R: Yes.
P: of course because uhh OK the, the uhh cyst has been removed, perhaps there are 
cancer cells still lurking in the injury and this was pointed out to me uhh several 
times by my doctors but I felt (1) that uhh, and this is where I'm now beginning to 
broach into umm into regions uhh where I'm not qualified to umm express opinion, I 
felt that my immune system and I've got great confidence in my immune system, uhh 
would in fact uhh be able to deal with those problems. I'd, I felt that and if, if there 
was any, any non statistical umm sense of confidence uhh in all that I say it was the 
belief that my immune system would deal with any (.) cancer cells that might have 
remained in that injury because I could not put any, any uhh umm bad luck factor or
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risk factor or any factor into that but I felt sure (.) uhh there, there was in fact of 
course the background uhh knowledge that it had looked after the cyst as I saw it for 
20 years and therefore the risk was extremely low and I was happy with the figures 
that I produced.
(Always in my mind were the dire consequences o f being wrong, in spite o f my firm  
conviction that this was not a new cancer and, further, my immune system was 
capable, as it had been fo r  some six years, ofpreventing further secondary tumours 
forming.
As I  stated earlier my confidence was private and within me rather than 
confrontational Before becoming confrontational it was necessary fo r  me to have the 
opportunity to explain the fu ll case history and present with it my own logical 
conclusions.
Regretable, Dr B was not prepared to spend his time listening and as a result I  
continued to carry my conviction and my worries within m yself-note added by P  on 
reading the text)
R: You are saying so many interesting things I have trouble keeping them all in my 
mind, a lot of things I want to ask you but umm and this doesn't directly follow from 
what you've just said, it just goes back a couple of minutes to a moment when you 
said you felt powerless umm, in fact, umm to, to do what you felt to be the right thing 
and (1) I get a sense that what you needed to do was translate the medical knowledge, 
the information you're getting from the radiotherapy and the general surgeon whom 
you saw into, into a kind of language that you understood, seemed to be able to make 
an intuitive decision
P: Yes
R: that you felt comfortable 
P: Yes.
R: with.
P: Yes, well that's,
R: A method of empowering yourself
P: Well yes indeed and I regret very much not asking more questions but umm this is 
another weakness in, in a doctor patient relationship, particularly with cancer I think.
R: Right.
P: Uhh the contact that uhh (.) a patient has with his specialist is limited to perhaps 
20 minutes uhh in a fortnight
R: Very little time.
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P: Yes, yes, how umm it is understandable that uhh you may have a list of questions 
to answer but the asking one question may lead to the generation of further questions 
to ask and to expect the pat', the patient to actually umm ask all of the right questions 
to satisfy himself or to understand is very difficult. I never felt that I had the full 
story. I, I'm sure I, I would have asked umm uhh Dr, Dr B more about why he 
decided that this was uhh umm uhh a new cancer.
R: Mmm.
P: But I, but I can't remember getting any, any information back but I honestly can't 
remember asking the questions either umm but I'm sure I would have done uhh, 
therefore I'm, I really didn't know why (.) uhh he had come to the conclusion that it 
was a second cancer, other than to say he must have been uhh uhh consistent with my 
other doctors sure that the uhh cyst on my head could not have generated the new 
cancer in my neck.
R: Do you, do you get a sense that the system is set up to make it (.) difficult for you 
to ask questions?
P: I, no don't think that at all. I think, that it, it, it's just a weakness in, in the, there's 
another point uhh, there are three points which concern me about uhh doctors. Uhh 
and umm I had thought about these before seeing you because I thought they might 
come up. Uhh I have raised two of them al', already. Umm uhh one is the uhh is the 
long term problem
R: Yes
P: the fact that uhh I, I'm suspicious that my doctors uhh are concerned about the 
present and the immediate future and I understand that,
R: Yes
P: I understand that very well uhh but, but there is a long term uhh factor as well 
and that's of more, more concern to the patient that to the doctor. That concerned me. 
Uhh and that's an argument for being careful about uhh, umm recommending 
radiotherapy perhaps but there's another bigger, deeper and more profound problem 
which is that uh
R: This is the second one?
P: Uhh uhh umm I was coming to the third one actually. The, the second one is, is 
that uh uh the uhh consultation time that uhh the patient has, the opportunity to, to 
explore with doctor his full (1) medical condition.
R: Mmm.
P: Uhh that's umm that's very limited and I went away often I accepted it 
R: Mmm.
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P: and oth', other patients accept it because you, you as a doctor uhh in a, a year for 
example will see what, a hundred and fifty different patient? Perhaps even more and 
maybe less that's very uhh conservative but you have to share your time with
R: You may be surprised if I tell you it's more like three or four thousand.
P: Well you have to share your, your three hundred and sixty five days amongst 
those three or four thousand patients
R: Mmm.
P: uhh many of uhh of whom will have very serious illnesses because of the nature 
of your the work you're in. Uhh you also have a home life uhh therefore the umm the 
thinking time that you can give to your patients uhh and the interchange that you can 
have with your patients is extremely limited. The patient however, has all the time in 
the world. Not only that, he is traumatised to the point where he excludes all other 
thought and his thoughts centre on his problem and they roll around the brain 
endlessly. I know, I've been through it.
R: Right, well I mean, sorry, sorry to interrupt but what I was suggesting to you was 
that perhaps that is, that is the way the organisation is set up to prevent too great an 
interchange in discussion with quite difficult emotional issues which might include 
(1) cancer
P: Yes, that's right.
R: I mean that's certainly emotionally it's not intellectually the xxx thing to do but if 
your whole day is, is uh like that it can become exhausting and I, I just wondered if 
you had a sense that the way things are set up is to prevent too deep the discussion.
P: No, no, I, I think I, I, I have to say that of all of my doctors that they, they applied 
their time and their thoughts in the best way possible to help me.
R: Right.
P: I always felt simply that the number of patients you see, which is far more than I'd 
realised actually, is so great that your time of necessity has to be shared.
R: But I just, I didn't want to give you a sense of not being umm of being less 
important because you're part of the greater number
P: No, no.
R: But just the reality of it is
P: Oh yes I understand that, no, I, I have no, no gripes about this. I think, we have 
how many doctors to the population? One in, I have no idea but one in a thousand is 
it? I'm not sure.
R: Umm.
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P: Fully qualified doctors.
R: In primary it care it's about one in one and a half to two thousand.
P: Yes I'd agree with that. Uhh it is a reality. Uhh it is a reality which I have to 
accept. I'm not complaining here Richard but it is another weakness.
R: Yes
P: And, and therefore and the point I'm really coming to is 
R: Is this the third one?
P: No, no it's still the second one, you, you're racing ahead of me. No the point that 
needs to be made about this one, I've already made the point about the umm uhh the, 
the Alzheimer's disease
R: Yes.
P: and the fact that doctors, I suspect, don't give the consideration to 
R: To the long term.
P: That's one factor. This factor is that the doctor is unable to provide this time and 
thought, due to his work load. It is more likely the patient feels, and I do as a patient, 
that he has a greater privilege of information than the doctor has
R: Mmm mmm.
P: because of the fact that I have lived with my condition, I have after all been within 
the body, the diseased body over the protracted period
R: Right.
P: and all those details are at my finger tips, they go round my head so often they are 
at my finger tips. I can remember everything. My doctor can't. That means that uhh 
the patient has an advantage, it, a minor advantage, but he has an advantage, which he 
should use uhh uhh to uhh his best interest. Now uhh
R: Can, can I ask you, you, you say that's medical information that is
P: No, no.
R: sometimes ignored? It's not in the conventional sense.




P: And the sharp edges being the detail, the subtlety, the little things which often get 
missed
R: Right.
( I  think this is very important. When a patient raises a point or asks a question, i t ’s 
asking will contain many motivating elements.
(a) He may be asking a logical question strictly within the framework o f the current 
dialogue.
(b) He may be asking a logical question outside o f the current dialogue, relating to 
matters unknown to his doctor-thought to be too loosely connected perhaps to be 
worthy o f raising with his doctor, or too lengthy to describe, or too complicated to 
describe
(c) He may be demonstrating an understanding, or lack o f understanding, o f what 
may have been previously said.
The point being made here is, in my opinion, there are, in responsive behaviour, 
clues, which i f  identified can be more revealing and diagnostically helpful- added by 
P  on reading the text)
P: or not even raised by the patient but are there if you, you had time to probe by 
asking questions.
R: Do doctors miss those?
P: They miss them but the patient doesn't and if the patient is an aware patient 
R: Yes
P: they're meaningful. If the patient is an unaware patient, they, they're not.
R: The, the reason why I asked the question I have done is that I, umm, very much 
developed a sense that (.) when patients tell you something umm like they 
instinctively feel like you did that the, the uhh cyst as you called it on your head was 
a tumour, that whilst that is nothing more or less than a, if you like, a piece of 
information from, from a patient that is medically unsophisticated
P: Yes
R: I think it's, I'm beginning to realise that it's important to regard that as a piece of 
medical information as important as a blood count or, umm an appearance under a 
microscope. That is actually telling you something because patients have sensors 
inside giving information about how they work.
P: Well I think that's part of it.
R: Is that really that




P: It's, it's an instinctive feeling umm but often if you look at instinct, it is related to 
subliminal thought which is not easy to, to analyse. Umm uhh I remember the other 
day I was thinking about why was I so convinced about umm it not being necessary 
for radiotherapy (<coughing) and I couldn't recall why I was so convinced but really it 
was based upon uhh real facts or real uhh supposition of events I think such as the 
uhh the umm bad luck factors.
R: The statistical construction.
P: Yes and, and then eventually and this is umm this is how the mind works as I see 
it uh all the thought processes were in trauma. They rolled these facts around so 
many times that eventually you don't have to think about them any more. You carry a 
sense of conviction but really the conviction is related to the fact that you have uhh 
uhh analysed all o f those, all of that information, all of the subtleties and probabilities 
if you like uhh and they produce uh uh uh a figure which is your confidence figure 
and you don't have to relate to it any more
R: Mmm.
P: because I, I found that that's what I did. Initially I rolled all of the facts around in 
my head, I thought very deeply about them. I went over these, these probability 
figures, same, same word again uhh
R: I know what you mean.
P: but event', but eventually I didn't have to do it anymore because I, I felt a 
conviction that was founded upon those earlier thoughts.
R: So you turned, you turned an intellectual, a series of intellectual processes
P: Yes.
R: into a feeling.
P: Well into a, yes, into a sense of confidence 
R: Right.
P: which had a value to it which was very positive.
R: Right.
P: Uhh, I, I think you know uhh that you could, you could have a range of (1) senses 
of confidence ranging from nil to ten
R: Yes
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P: and I was around the nine and a half.
R: Right. (2) Do you look upon it (1) umm I, I think I know what you mean and I, I 
have umm begun to think that this happens both in myself and in others for quite 
some time. I look upon it as uhh a dialogue between your umm your sort of 
intellectual reasoning
P: Yes.
R: and your gut feeling and, and eventually umm
P: I was going to say uhh the gut feeling to me is intellectual reasoning.
R: OK.
P: Uhh but 
R: xxx(unintelligible)
P: Well I think it's pragmatism. In my case I felt that it was always based upon some 
sound reasoning, but I am prepared to accept that there are fringes
R: Right.
P: to, to this whereby the unconscious thought plays a part in making contributions 
uhh and they may be related to subtleties uhh umm some of them almost long 
forgotten. Richard I'm going to tell you another thing which you umm you will have 
long forgotten but I haven't and this one of those subtleties, one of the pointers which 
you knew about at the time, it was a pointer, it was sitting in my mind somewhere, it 
was positive and helped this umm sense of confidence at the end of the day and it 
goes back to the uhh, the illness I had with the uhh diseased uhh uhh testicle. At that 
time, as part of the uhh uhh medication, I was given an antibiotic. Uhh I'll just 
challenge you to remember that.
R: No I don't.
P: You don't. I wouldn't expect you to.
R: Well I wasn't, I wasn't looking after you in that process.
P: Umm but you were. I had mentioned it to you.
R: Did I?






R: You'd been, you'd been given an antibiotic as uhh part of the treatment.
P: I'm going to explain it first of all 
R: Yes.
P: and then you'll understand the meaning for this, for me saying this.
R: OK.
P: I, I was given uh an, an antibiotic to help the recovery following the removal of 
the testicle.
R: Yes.
P: Uhh I was asked beforehand, as one always is, uhh was I, I, did I react to uh 
antibiotics and any particular antibiotics. I had never reacted to antibiotics before but 
I did react on this occasion. I had a swelling on the right hand side of my neck uhh
R: mmm
P: not on the left hand side.
R: xxxfunintelligible)
P: Umm if I had swellings on the right-hand and left hand side, I would have 
dismissed it but it was on the right hand side only, not the left hand side. Now umm 
I'm not a medical man but I would make a judgement that umm if the gland in the 
right are effected then the left must also be effected but maybe there are medical 
reasons to uhh, to uhh discount that but I thought that was very significant uhh
R: Some years later you, your had your tumour there.
P: That's right. That might have been a pointer, an indicator that uhh a tumour was 
already present at that time. That's what I felt and I explained that to you at the time 
and umm I was rather surprised that you didn't actually pick this up. Perhaps you did, 
I mean we're talking body language now uhh and but anyway umm that uhh that 
hinges back in my memory as being another of those fringe indicators
R: Yes
P: almost long forgotten but which umm has a small contribution to the overall sense 
of confidence.
R: Well in, in my defence the idea that an antibiotic would trigger off a reaction in
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uhh in a tumour that was to develop some years later umm (.) as far as, as far as we 
know
P: Yes.
R: I mean, you're going back 
P: You say as far as you know you see.
R: Yes, yes.
P: Umm.
R: Anyway, that wouldn't fit in with any conventional medical framework and, and 
that, that's the response I'm giving you. I think umm I'm become, becoming a lit', 
little less ready to accept conventional
P: Yes.
R: framework.
P: Well OK it's interesting that you say that.
R: I think that I am more open about that now.
P: O, OK it's interesting that you say that. I understand why you say that Richard 
and I thinks that's uhh why you made that judgement umm all those years ago but you 
can understand more perhaps recently than then because of my history and, and the, 
and the outcome of the recent uhh situation. Looking back on it
R: Mmm.
P: I have doubts about whether my doctor at that time was in fact fair in dismissing it 
uhh, it, which is the opposite of your view now. You're saying well may, maybe, 
maybe that, that the convention thinking about such matters uhh needs to be looked at 
umm uhh perhaps umm perhaps in a more detailed way. And I'm saying the opposite 
to you now
R: Mmm.
P: because of umm of the recent history.
R: Well I'm the product of my own conditioning as well.
P: Yes of course.
R: When when I go to medical school and I'm taught to look at things in a 
conventional way
P: I understand but I understand that
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R: It is very hard to suddenly back off and challenge that.
P: Yes.
R: umm and say well perhaps there are alternative ways of looking at the world that 
enables you to take the piece of information and fit it into your frame and try to make 
sense of it.
P: Yes, yes. I'm not trying to drive you into a defensive position on that.
R: You, you can do that if you want. I, I don't mind. You know you can.
P: Umm but I think it's, I mention it 
R: Yes
P: Because we're being frank and because umm I'm, I'm, I'm sure you would like to 
hear from me not just the obvious but umm the intangible facts in this. Those that are 
difficult to reach and describe and define.
R: Very much so yes and, and umm can I just make it clear to you that I, I don't want 
you to feel that you can, you need to censor anything. I'm much more interested in, in 
hearing what you really have to say without (1) uhh you may think it's uncomfortable 
for me to take, I, I can take that and without there being a sort of sense of filtering 
things I really want to say this to Richard but I'm I'm not sure that uhh that I want to 
Richard that much.
P: Right.
R: There's a couple of things where we may get into that.
P: OK, I didn't come into this interview Richard I assure you with uhh with any 
intention of protecting you from my opinion that might {laughter).
R: Alright.
P: I'm sure you wouldn't have reacted unkindly anyway to anything I say.
R: Is this OK then.
P: Yes that's fine.
R: What we have done so far.
P: Yes, no problem at all.
R: You, you said there were three things.
P: Ahh yes, yes.
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R: Can I go back to that.
P: Yes we can.
R: Unless there was more you wanted to say about that.
P: No, No, I'll just reiterate to say that one is the concern for old age related to 
treatment. I think doctors tend to think of the present
R: Sure, yes.
P: and the immediate future. Uhh the second is the limited time that umm the doctor 
has with his patient in consultation and therefore the communication factor that uhh 
arises, the poor communication factor, uhh coupled with the fact that the patient 
knows his body, carries with him umm uhh a greater uhh knowledge of the history of 
his condition that can be the envy of the doctor because
R: xxx
P: within, in, within that knowledge would be all sorts of clues, subtle clues which 
will be helpful in the diagnosis. The third one is much more damaging I'm afraid. It 
is the fact that uhh if you looked at, I now define to you the uhh the bad luck factors 
which I have uhh uhh umm calculated to help me generate confidence
R: Yes
P: and I have to umm I have to say this, uhh, when it comes to uhh umm deciding 
when a doctor decides that umm radiotherapy is appropriate uhh I think it's it 
normally the decision is obvious because the tumour has been removed radiotherapy 
is necessary. But there will be the occasion, and my (1) case is perhaps a good 
example where the probability that the, the probability taking into account of all of 
the medical factors involved essentially, is that the risk of recurrence is low (1) and I 
would ask the question "How can a doctor, no matter how low the risk, not 
recommend radiotherapy?" because he has to protect himself.
R: Mmm.
P: The protection of himself in this case is of course against a uhh a uhh accusation 
made perhaps if he were to be wrong uhh and you've mentioned to me that you see 
uhh three thousand patients a year
R: Mmm.
P: the odds of three thousand to one to me would be odds to take the chance not to 
have radiotherapy.
R: Sure.
P: but a doctor can't and I suspect and I, I'd put a sharp edge on this that uhh doctors
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prescribe radiotherapy not so much for their patients but for themselves.
R: Do you think, do you think they could extend that idea to treatment in general but 
there's a tendency to try treatment so that you'll
P: Oh yes, I think that's true but I think with cancer the, the, the umm radiotherapy 
argument is perfect
R: Mmm.
P: example. It illustrates the difficulty between the doctors who, because he doesn't 
choose to prescribe radiotherapy set against those odds of one in three thousand 
whatever,
R: Right.
P: will see more than three thousand patients in his lifetime, statistically he is 
destined for court action against you (him).
R: Do you think it is possible to open that issue up for negotiation?
P: Yes I think so but it, uhh you'll see {laughter) this is where I come back to my 
problem with the umm decision that I had cancer of a different type, spuriously 
regenerated when so obviously there, there, there, there appeared on the surface to be 
an association with the previous cancer.
R: Right.
P: That is uhh uhh this is, this is very unfair on you uhh uhh Richard and I'm going 
to be very unfair. I'm going to say what I, what I think because that's what you want. 
(1) To decide that I had uhh cancer of a, of a new generation, independent of the 
other, against those long odds, could well be an act of convenience (1) because it 
changes the perspective on uhh whether radiotherapy should be uhh administered or 
not.
R: What do you mean by that? Could you just elaborate a little?
P: Well OK, if I look logically at my, at my umm uhh cyst which had been sitting 
there for 20 years.
R: Right.
P: It looked the same as it did the year before, the year before that, and it had been 
left, I was convinced in my mind, there was statistical evidence that it would have 
been exactly the same in a year's time as it was being cared for by my immune 
system. I was being protected by a strong immune system.
R: Mmm mm.
P: And uhh uhh this is not uhh something I'm, I'm constructing uhh simply to level
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an argument, I felt that way from uhh the day that uhh you and I parted after umm my 
earlier
R: Treatment.
P: treatment that's right.
R: On the neck.
P: On the neck, that I, that there could be a primary and that umm I should uhh 
simply to protect my good health, uhh exercise to maintain a good umm immune 
system
R: Mmm.
P: to protect me against that possible tumour and that possible tumour, as I now see 
it, was in fact that cyst and therefore the removal of the cyst would eliminate it. 
Controlling the possible risk of cancer recurring but it wasn't that it was going to 
occur anyway because it was being taken care of by my immune system. Uhh there 
might well have been a time at some point in the lifetime of that cyst when it would 
reach a point where it would be, if you like, self generative and become a real threat 
to my, to my health. But why should that suddenly be in it's twenty-first year?
R: Right.
P: That's the argument.
(3)
R: Your, there's (1) on the one hand you just proposed there was an argument that 
doctors do things to cover themselves and I umm actually agree with you and I think 
that does, that does go on and it's certainly one of the things that needs watching and 
managing.
P: That's not actually a criticism of doctors, it is the pressures on them that is doing 
it,
R: And it doesn't come across as a criticism 
P: Yes




R: for why people behave like that and I think you're right. It's very, very umm
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perceptive of you to pick it up. Umm but at the same time I, you had a cyst that you 
brought to my attention but I didn't operate on
P: Yes
R: and, and yet I wasn't, I wasn't covering myself. After all, there are two things 
about removing that cyst from my point of view. One is that it would be extremely 
easy for me to do and secondly I would have got paid to do it. Which actually brings 
out an issue for me because I
P: Excuse me Richard. I think that's a different issue because you were at that time, 
and I can understand, believing that this was not the source of the cancer and I can 
understand the medical argument
R: Arguments for it.
P: Yes, were in fact against that being the case, supported by the fact that three other 
doctors said exactly the same thing with the same conviction so I understand that.
Uhh the problem arises when the, when it's removed and it's found to be cancerous 
then in fact we have to decide uhh why it's cancerous. Is it
R: Yes
P: associated with the previous cancer? It's always been cancerous and it caused the 
previous tumour? Or it is another, it is a spurious event which has created a new 
cancer. So these, these are different analyses as far as treatment is concerned.
R: So what you're saying is that people have decided to go ahead with radiotherapy 
to cover themselves as it were and therefore they construct an argument
P: That's a terrible thing for me to say.
R: xxx
P: But yes.
R: They construct on argument based around the idea that, that this must have 
undergone malignant change in the last two or three years
P: It was another factor, another factor which created the envelope of confidence. (2) 
This might have been the case
R: Right.
P: and if it, if it had been the case then my argument uhh relating to the truth of the 
history of that uhh cancer, would carry and there would be no need for radiotherapy.
R: Right so you, you in other words you were able, am I right in saying, you were 
able to, to see through the the uhh the constructed world of medical knowledge to see 
why, why that had been done because you were, you were given a series of arguments
24
that created a good medical reason for going ahead with radiotherapy but you were 
able to see that that was a constructed world because doctors were then able to do 
what they really wanted?
P: Yes.
R: without entertaining other possibilities 
P: Yes.
R: because you felt were the genuine ones.
P: Well I thinks that's another arm to this actually which is that radiotherapy, sorry if 
you had a tumour, Remove it-radiotherapy!
R: Yes.
P: That it is a progression without uhh uhh evaluation of circumstances that every, 
every tumour removed uhh has to be treated with radiotherapy, not quite as literally 
as that because there, there will be circumstance but there will be that rather cold, 
dispassionate view of it.
R: Yes
P: And that umm, it would be chemo, chemotherapy or radiotherapy whichever 
would be appropriate to apply, without considering the detail that I, that I had gone 
through.
R: Mmm.
P: Uhh and therefore I think, if you freeze that moment when I was told that there 
was a separate cancer, how withdrawn I think I would have become as a result of that 
and why it would drive me into those thought, thought processes to justify why I 
should disagree with my doctors and I don't disagree with doctors lightly.
R: But, no, but, the, the way you did that, it seems to me, was that you (.) saw 
through the reasoning that was being presented to you
P: Yes.
R: and you decided that, it, that, that the sort of umm the medical world that was 
being constructed
P: Yes
R: for you by doctors 
P: Yes.
R: was actually not legitimate as far as you saw it.
25
P: Yes, yes but remember, I also had a very powerful umm uhh nudge in that 
direction
R: Right.
P: arising from the fact that umm this cyst which my doctors had said was not 
cancerous, was cancerous.
(This was the key to giving me confidence in challenging my doctors. Not in an open 
confrontational way-but enough to say ‘no ’ to radiotherapy-added by P  on reading 
the text)
R: Right.
P: Uhh and, and therefore the umm the uhh opinion of my doctors suddenly became 
slightly different to the way it had been previously.
R: Well that's what I was going to ask you. What provided you with the impetus to 
challenge that view ? and, and
P: But, but Richard you're, you're putting it to me as if there are single elements in 
this. But there are not single elements, they are a collection of different elements. Big 
elements and small elements which produce a collective picture but if you don't have 
medical umm knowledge, that's all you can do - put together a picture that represents 
your situation in the best way umm possible and that's really all I have, I have done 
and I agonised over that because I haven't had the medical knowledge to counter 
balance my own uhh argument but in spite of that, I was still prepared to say "No, it 
would wrong to have radiotherapy". The, the, the evidence that I have uhh 
constructed, bearing in mind uhh as I was very careful to say to you that I calculated 
on risk factor, on, on umm on bad luck factor rather than risk factor, all of this uhh 
was very important, was very important and my thought processes only brought this 
to a conclusion after rolling it round in my head for an awful long time.
R: Right it, so all these, you, you, you've taken me to task over, not taken me task 
that's the wrong way to say it, pointed out that it wasn't single factors but it was a 
collection of factors, it was a pattern,
P: Yes, Yes.
R: if you like.
P: It makes it look as if umm it's without reason.
R: Well I don't see it like that but if you want to amplify that,
P: Well no I, I think uhh I'm well I think that all the decision making, all uhh 
confidence uhh factors if you like are truly related to reality in some form or another 




P: Uhh and therefore when you try and analyse why you felt so confident, you will 
never get a clear picture because there will be elements which umm are there which 
have been steering you but which have not uhh been umm uhh tangible enough even 
to analyse.
R: Right.
P: I hope that makes sense.
R: Umm (2) I, I suspect it's one of those umm ideas that are quite difficult to 
communicate exactly to somebody else but I, I get a sense that you (1) you try and 
describe it in your own mind as much as you can
P: Yes.
R: and then suddenly the, the, the picture becomes clear umm.
P: Yes but you see, it's a very complicated picture. Let me, me go back to that 
R: Yes
P: Radiotherapy-the antibiotic situation-I wouldn't necessarily recall that as an 
“item” umm it would be a “plus” in my brain
R: Right.
P: which is tucked away somewhere. It's just a label- it is no longer, no longer 
associated with the antibiotic, it's just a “plus” and I'm counting on all of the plus's 
and counting all the minuses
R: Right.
P: and I find that the pluses are greater than the minuses.
R: Right.
P: That's the best way of putting it I think.
R: I'm, I'm getting umm a, a picture of somebody who, and I taking umm I taking 
you back to the moment when, when David the surgeon said you should have 
radiotherapy and you were kind of semi-shocked at
P: Yes.
R: that point. So you go away and, and then uhh think about it then you meet Hugh 
P: Yes.
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R: who reinforces the idea that radiotherapy is appropriate.
P: Yes well I quite agree.
R: So you have a strong body of medical opinion 
P: Yes.
R: based on the way doctors see things 
P: Yes.
R: suggestive of treatment but you've going away and taken all the various elements 
of the diseases that you've had, the little plus points
P: Yes
R: the little minus points and you've constructed an alternative world 
P: Yes.
R: that suggests that treatment is inappropriate.
P: Yes 
R: Am I, am I 
P: Umm
R: am I on the right track 
P: Yes 
R: or
P: Yes but I'll just add to that we're not talking of one more plus against the minus 
sign, we're talking an overload of plus signs as opposed to minus signs. In other 
words, in other words this is not marginal, this is, this is uhh
R: Definite,
P: very much yes. And that's important. Uhh I will be, I will be sitting on the fence 
otherwise it would have to produce an overwhelming number of pluses as opposed to 
minuses. As, as far as uhh uhh uhh (1) Hugh
R: HughN.
P: N is concerned, uhh I, I really don't know how you doctors communicate with one 
another. I know you do a lot of writing of letters to each other
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R: Yes
P: uhh and that worries me because I think umm uhh there is a need to have verbal 
contact uhh in order to communicate detail uhh and I rather got the impression, and I, 
and I had nothing to support this, umm I rather got the impression that umm uhh 
Hugh would have simply taken David’s view of the cancer, in, in, in a very broad 
way
R: Right.
P: and would simply have supported it because David had umm made that decision.
R: Right. (2) All right, umm I, I can answer that
P: No, well I don't expect you to, no I don't want an answer to it.
R: I simply don’t know.
P: No.
R: Umm (1) but we have a situation where, where what you wanted to do in the 
world that you constructed now conflicts with, with the medical world
P: Yes
R: that's presented to you. Is that right?
P: Absolutely, yes.
R: So how, how, how does, how do you decided to take one rather than the other?
P: Well it's very difficult you see because it's, it's a question of uhh it's a question of 
confidence uhh in, in conviction. It's, it's the number of pluses as opposed to 
minuses.
R: Right.
P: Uhh and umm I mean if you, if you uhh, if you were to have a hundred percent 
pluses uhh I would thump the table and say "No, you're wrong"
R: Right.
P: but uhh I didn't have one hundred percent pluses, I had enough for me to say "I 
think it would be wrong for me to have uhh radiotherapy". There are other factors in 
this which umm I havn't gone into. For instance when I spoke to uhh Doctor N, he 
gave me umm uhh he told me that uhh because it's of a surface nature, uhh he will be 
able to, to detect the recurrence of umm tumours uhh within a period of two to three 
months.
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R: Right, very easily.
P: Right uhh now umm that's actually important because if you remember, when I 
did my umm my umm bad luck factor on that, I used a year
R: Right.
P: uhh I used a year because umm I didn't want to build in any comfort factors uhh 
to, to falsify the situation to my own advantage
R: Right.
P: so I, I always try to err against myself to be sure. Now that actually helps to uhh 
R: Because you're more confident.
P: yes, to, to create a great confidence. If, if I hadn't done that, I would have again 
you know, I would have (.) doubted my own figures. I had to do that. I readjusted 
the figures many times, as you can imagine, until I, I felt that I was well inside the 
uhh, the umm the margins.
R: Did you, did you reach a moment when suddenly it was the right thing to do? Do 
you remember that?
P: Uhh.
R: And if so,
P: Well I, I had to uhh I, yes I did, I, I walked for two hours after seeing Doctor umm 
Doctor B when he first told me
R: And that was before you saw Hugh N.
P: That was before I saw Hugh but uhh the need for radiotherapy was then (1) as it 
were, on the cards uhh and umm after rolling it around my head, of course I already 
knew that the cancer cells had been found, you appreciate, this was, this was a, a 
follow up umm consultation. Uhh after walking for two hours, yes I came up with a 
decision not to. I have to say this Richard as well. Uhh I, I rolled those facts through 
my head many times uhh and often after consultations with uhh Doctor B and Doctor 
N because they, uhh I had frequent consultations with them into the recovery period 
uhh and umm every time I walked away uhh my confidence was hit but within an 
hour of rolling those facts around
R: xxxfunintelligible)
P: not just that, even stronger, I even felt stronger than that. Yes.
R: So when you, when you interacted again with that medical world 
P: Yes.
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R: which was giving you (2) huhh quite a compellingly different view 
P: Yes




P: Yes, my world being based upon logic 
R: Yes.
P: I understand that and probability uhh relating to a cyst which had been sitting on 
my head for twenty years and that, that's the crux of the matter. It doesn't really 
matter about the umm about whether it, it, it is related uhh cancer or not if you, if you 
and dis', dismiss that if you wish uhh, it was the same as it was uhh the day it was 
removed uhh uhh as it was a, a year before and two years before and the probability 
of it suddenly becoming a threat to me (.) uhh seems very unlikely. But that's just one 
single element, there are many other elements.
(This is misleading. It was important to me that the evidence supported the view that 
this was not a new cancer. The cysts appearance in remaining unchanged strongly 
supported the “primary ” theory to me-added by P  on reading the text)
Coffee delivered.
R: I wanted, I wanted to ask you if this interview was what you expected?
P: Uhh I, I rather hoped it would be like this. Uhh I thought perhaps it would be uhh 
you ask the questions and me responding largely with yes's and no's and uhh I, I felt 
that I was not being able to get over to you all of those subtleties which umm which 
are built into the interchange that happily we've had so far. Umm because otherwise 
umm you have to remain on umm gener', generalities. Whereas the truth is actually 
detailed and uhh and the subtleties of uhh of uhh understanding and how could I 
possibly convince you uhh without going into those details such as the, the uhh uhh 
the antibiotic uhh situation that arose which was very meaningful to me and I, I was 
surprised, as I've said, that umm that it wasn't to you uhh but then I often found that 
with, with many points that I might raise in, in consultation with doctors that uhh 
where I thought I was saying something significant umm it proved not to be from the 
doctors point of view uhh but, uhh, uhh and of course I hold it as being important and 
that's the difference. Uhh I might be uhh I might be uhh swayed by a doctor picking 
up a point that I thought was quite important and would mean something to me as a 
result of this reaction to it umm but I would still hold the umm the views that I held 
about importance which my doctor might not have.
R: Can I respond to that?
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P: Yes.
R: Because I think you are, you are taught to look at medical problems in a very 
particular way
P: Yes.
R: and if the information that comes across doesn't immediately fit into the slot that 
says "I need this kind of information there" there is an inclination to disregard it.
P: Yes
R: And part of that is the time thing. The average consultation is actually 7 minutes 
which is not a lot of time for somebody to come into the room, be seen and discussion 
of the problem, discussion of treatment options, little bits of kind of socialising, bye 
bye. All of that has to be done within 7 minutes.
P: Right.
R: I suppose in a way you could argue that you only have time to look at one view. 
]P: Yes.
R: Can I, can I take you right back to the beginning on this?
P: Yes of course.
R: It was a question of when you were describing your, your story you uhh came in 
with a striking phrase and, and I would like to just freeze that moment in time and a 
lot of the discussion we've had subsequently has been around that. I, I am struck by 
how many different doctors you've seen, many of which, including myself, have 
failed to take seriously the problem. So I wanted to ask you, what your, your feelings 
were towards the doctors at that point and that includes me.
P: Well I had tried, I did try to, to give you a uhh a view on that
R: Yes.
P: my confidence in doctors at that point was affected.
R: Yes I've got that but I, I wondered whether or not uhh I slightly sense that you're 
holding back because I, I would have been quite angry actually I think.
P: No, uhh I've never felt angry about it because I have always felt that the, the 
doctors have always, all my doctors have given every impression that they have 
worked very hard to assist me. Uhh uhh that's every doctor umm and that I have 
reason to be grateful to them for, for a variety of reasons. I wouldn't, I wouldn't 




P: I, I can't, I'm, I, uhh I find it difficult to get angry, I have to pretend to be angry. 
It's the only way that I can umm I can uhh often as it were uhh secure the reaction I 
want. Because getting angry, it's not in my nature to be, no umm I'm genuine about 
this. I, I felt no (.) anger towards any doctor towards that. The nearest I would have 
got to being resentful to doctors was certainly hearing that umm uhh this was a 
separate generation of cancer.
(Resentful because this seemed against the odds, so unlikely. I  never secured an 
understanding o f how this was arrived at as it was put to me as a statement o f fact. 
With Dr B such matters were not negotiable. “He was the driver-I was the 
passenger, ” best describes all his consultations-added by P  on reading the text)
R: Rather than a confirmation of the previous..
P: That, that's right. You see, I couldn't be angry about that because I couldn't be 
sure. My, my doctor might well have been right I just felt strongly that he was not 
but, but I, I couldn't get angry on something that might prove to be true.
R: Did you feel angry with yourself for not advancing your own belief system
P: Uhh well.
R: more forcefully.
P: Well, that does raise the question, I have to say that with Doctor B I was 
particularly disappointed. My last consultation with him was very uncomfortable and 
this was six months down the road into the recovery period. I haven't mentioned this 
part-having had the cyst removed and deciding not to have radiotherapy, I agreed 
with Doctor N, who also believed that I should have radiotherapy, and maintained 
that view until very late into, into the recovery period. Uhh I umm (1) having uhh 
spoken to him in detail, sorry I've lost my thread for a moment here.
Uhh let me recover that.
P: I've just lost it completely I'm afraid {laughter.)
R: To put you on track, I was asking you about whether you felt angry with yourself 
P: Yes.
R: a lot.
P: I, no, I, I
R: For not advancing your own.
P: No, umm actually I'd moved on from that umm and uhh I was describing wasn't I 
I think the umm
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R: Yes.
P: Yes I was about to, until I lost my way, I was about to tell you that umm during 
the early period of umm of uhh recovery after surgery, umm (1) I uhh (1) I was told 
uhh, gosh I've lost it again, I don't know why I've done that, umm forgive me I'm 
sorry
R: That’s O.K.
P: What was I going to say was that in the early stages the injury failed to recover 
and
R: You mean when, umm the incision.
P: Yes that's right.
R: That's right.
P: That's right. It uhh a scab formed and I was very sensitive about it. Umm I uhh I, 
I left it, I didn't touch it. I was very meticulous about that uhh and umm it tended to 
weep and uhh because of course it forms a scab in it's own right
R: Mmm.
P: it got larger and larger and my first uhh, I can't quite remember why, but my first 
uhh contact with uhh uhh may, maybe it wasn't my first contact with uhh Doctor 
Newman but umm I remember seeing, seeing him at the three month point which 
would have been in January, January 1996 after the, the cyst was removed in umm 
September 1995 umm but he removed the umm uhh the scab as it formed, which had 
been there since uhh uhh the umm cyst had been removed and it was full of pus. (1) 
And it hadn't healed at all. And uhh he warned me that this could be an indication 
that umm uhh there were uhh cancer cells present uhh. That umm (2) that worried me 
to the point where I decided that I had lost the battle, that I was wrong and that I 
should indeed have radiotherapy.
R: Mmm. A big minus had appeared.
P: A big minus Richard, wiped out all of those plus signs {laughter) I'm afraid. Uhh 
so
R: Can I say you're an electrician? I don't mean you're electrical but, but 
P: Yes.
R: sorry an Electrical Engineer.
P: Yes.
R: it's interesting you use plus and minus signs.
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P: I suppose yes I understand you picking that up.
R: Yes.
P: So I actually agreed to have radiotherapy. That's important because I think you 
have to see another dimension of me here - because I was willing to respond and 
umm react to a situation that was going against me.
R: Mmm mm.
P: Uhh you havn't actually raised the religious factor here which does surprise me 
because uhh there is the, the blind belief factor which many people carry, (1) 
particularly when uhh their health uhh, is, is seriously threatened, life is threatened.
R: Mmm mm.
P: Uhh (1) I could throughout all of this have had the view that umm I was being 
protected by the good Lord uhh o', on a bind, blind belief. Let me just dispel that, I 
don't believe in God uhh and umm I have no hangups about that whatsoever. Uhh I 
am a pragmatic person, uhh and I think you will know from what I've said that uhh all 
I have put together had been based upon pragmatism so there is, there is no religious, 
no, no blind belief element in this at all. Hence uhh, it was, it was umm easy for me 
to make the decision to have radiotherapy wasn't what I wanted to make but I decided 
that uhh I had lost uhh the, there was no way back (1) uhh the argument was clear uhh 
so I agreed to have radiotherapy. (2) And interestingly (3) the, the, the injury, was 
cleaned, it was uhh redressed and uhh the time it takes to arrange radiotherapy is uhh 
about umm or was for me about twenty days and uhh two days, I had warnings before 
this mind you, but two days before this radiotherapy, uhh the scab was coming off 
and there was uhh every indication of healthy skin beneath. (1) I cancelled 
radiotherapy, I contacted Doctor N and asked for uhh an urgent consultation with him 
and uhh as a result of that we resumed our uhh agreement that he would see me on a 
regular basis and I wouldn't have radiotherapy. So I was within two days of 
radiotherapy - it makes an interesting story doesn’t it?.
R: Do you think that the two are connected, the decision to go ahead and the fact that 
it suddenly?
P: No, no I don't think so at all. I think that the, the amount of pus inside, I have 
thought about that since by the way and I have wondered whether in fact there were 
cancer cells present and they were wiped out by my immune system as far as I'm 
concerned if they were
R: And that's what the pus was, that's what the pus was - the immune system 
working.
P: Is that your professional view?
R: Uhh no, not necessarily.
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P: Hold on, you, you, you're putting words into my mouth. No, I (1) I didn't think 
about that because umm no it never occurred to me that that might be the case. I 
simply felt that the amount of pus there uhh was inhibiting the, the umm the healing 
process.
R: Ah right, yes.
P: Nothing more than that and umm (1) I was delighted when, of course, when uhh 
the healing process revealed itself because I was back on course and all my arguments 
had uhh had been justified and that really was the turning point I suppose, if I were to 
look back honestly. Umm but the reason why I mention it to you is because I want 
you to realise that umm uhh I wasn't being umm I wasn't blind to radiotherapy uhh I 
was open to the arguments if they w7ere strong enough.
R: Yes, Yes, the system was still flexible.
P: Uhh yes and therefore if the argument had been strong enough in the beginning, I 
would have had radiotherapy, against all of the (<coughing) uhh structures of uhh of 
reasoning which I put together. Uhh I think that's an interesting point. I think I've 
come to the end of that uhh of that uhh.
R: I'm, I'm aware that I'm largely asking you questions
P: Yes.
R: and uhh umm and I've very much enjoying it, the answers in this sort of dilemma. 
Is there anything uhh (2) you want to change that a bit, and ask me some questions?
P: (<coughing) Well not at all Richard. I think the, the story is with me rather than 
with you umm and what uhh has been said has uhh prompted from me uhh the sort of 
umm criticism if you like that I would uhh I would wish to umm level uhh in these 
exceptional circumstances.
R: Right.
P: Uhh these things would never be said to you under normal circumstances. It is 
because we are sitting down being honest with each other and you are asking me to 
tell you my true feeling, my honest feelings about uhh my uhh recent history and 
because I think I have something interesting to say to you and my motivation that I 
think is that perhaps there is something to be, to be learnt from it. Uhh I, I worry 
particularly about the many people who may be walking around today who, who have 
had radiotherapy for example
R: Mmm mm.
P: and umm who are saying to their friends "What a marvellous doctor I've got and 
radiotherapy is wonderful" when in fact if they hadn't had radiotherapy they would 
be just as healthy.
R: Right. (1) How do you think you got (.) to the point where we can talk so
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openly?
P: Why we can speak so candidly? Well I think there's uhh, there is a very obvious 
uhh umm answer for me on that and that is because umm our relationship goes back 
uhh six years uneventfully. You've not been in the picture over the uhh the recent 
problem with the cyst.
R: Mmm.
P: Although you have a relationship to it because umm it was there and it was 
considered at the time, that's as far as your involvement with my recent problems uhh 
go and uhh as far as my relationship with you is concerned, I really have no (1) no 
uhh problems because umm at the time that you treated me, the decisions you made 
uhh I accepted. I had no complaints or objections in fundamental terms in what you 
recommended for me
R: Right.
P: and therefore you, you, you occupy a special place if you like. Umm also I 
remember very well that uhh when I first had cancer, the day will never be forgotten.
I umm I, it's long forgotten as far as you're concerned but uhh you told me, you told 
me the truth, the absolute truth. I umm I uhh you asked me about that later. I said to 
you (2) I thought you were too brutal to me to give me the truth in that particular way 
but you were right. It established an honesty and understanding between us which 
umm I think, uhh has been very important to me.
R: Mmm.
P: More important during the treatment you gave me of course but now I reflect 
upton that and I feel that I can speak easily to you on such matters.
R: Yes. (2) Yes umm it is tricky because it does feel, it does feel brutal to, to be 
honest and I, I use the word cancer and explain that that's what you've got and I try 
and do it quite quickly actually. I try and do it within a minute or so
P: Yes
R: because otherwise you get into a dynamic of uncertainty and people are not really 
sure what's going to happen because that bit has to be, be quite kind of punchy, quite, 
very clear. In the interests of being clear has got to be precise and quite clear but it 
does feel brutal. But I, I have learnt that it immediately produces a climate of honesty 
because later on, as is the case with most of the people you encounter when they are 
cured, they believe you although it has a little sting in the tale as far as you're 
concerned, is that, when, when you are discharged and you've finished treatment, the 
level of honesty goes into the bit that follows and people actually continue to believe 
you.
P: Yes.
R: And if you've beaten around the bush from the word go and been unsure and
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cagey about the worst of the news, they are very uncertain about whether or not they 
have been cured. Although it's things that you have said make me wonder whether or 
not that is the case because (2) you, you have on a number of occasions pointed out 
how (1) it's with you all the time. It's milling around in your head.
P: It was, it's not now.
R: Oh right, right, yes you feel free now.
P: Oh yes, yes. Trauma is like that as far as I'm concerned. My definition of trauma 
is uhh that you have an insoluble problem with uhh, of umm uhh great severity to you
R: Mmm.
P: and uhh the degree of that trauma relates to the umm the uhh exclusion of other 
thoughts directly related to that uhh and uhh it was quite normal I, I felt, for me to roll 
those facts around but this is, this is part of the self preservation umm uhh inbuilt uhh 
instinct in us I, I, I would suggest
R: Yes
P: that when our lives are threatened, we take control. And that's very interesting 
actually Richard, because umm I thought about this the other day uhh. It might be 
just interesting to reveal how I feel
R: Mmm.
P: about uhh an injury. If I were uhh to go into hospital with a broken leg 
R: Mmm.
P: umm I wouldn't ask very much of the doctor. I would probably just say "well 
when will I be up and about again, uhh when can I walk?" and umm " is it going to be 
very painful" uhh and that would be the end of it. I would wait patiently for the uhh 
leg to repair and I'd be away. If however it was uhh gangrenous, is that the term?
R: Gangrenous.
P: Gangrenous uhh then I would say "well doctor, how many legs have you repaired 
like this? I mean, are you proposing to take it off? If you are, why are you going to 
take it of or if you're not going to take it off, why have you chosen to leave it on"? 
and, and uhh questions of that type. If however, it, it, it became gangrenous to, to 
threaten my life, I would say "doctor I want to take over, I want to make the 
decisions, I couldn’t take the decisions". But I'm talking about instinct here, not 
reality. I'm talking about instinct. I would want to take over
R: Right.
P: because it's my life that's at stake and at the end of the day, I think we all feel like 
that. Uhh yes can trust uhh umm the doctor, you can trust whoever you like but if it's
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your life at stake you can only trust one person and that's yourself.
R: Right.
P: That's, that's a, a, that's an instinct uhh uhh I'm referring too, not uhh the reality 
that we have to face in life and that's where trauma comes from. It comes from the 
fact that we can't uhh always control our situation and if there are no answers, trauma 
is, is, is simply exacerbated.
R: Yes, I umm, I would although I, I have got the wrong end of the stick in some 
ways umm from my own view because you've given me uhh two or three scenarios in 
which you demonstrate that there are shifts between uhh as far as decision making is 
concerned between the patient and the doctor
P: Yes, yes.
R: in, in dramatic ways. I, I was under the impression that when, when your life is 
threatened with say meningitis or umm peritonitis or something like that, that people 
would umm would feel very happy for the doctor to take control in a situation where 
they feel very uncomfortable and uncertain and say umm “you take over” and that's, 
that's the sort of model I have in my own mind but you are challenging that.
P: You're talking despair doctor.
R: Right.
P: You're not talking uhh (2) I think once you've gone through the trauma and 
realisation that you can't do
R: Right.
P: you can't solve the problem then, then you, then you fall back on despair and it, 
that's when your doctor surely umm uhh is allowed to take over because there's 
nothing else left. (2) I think there's a difference.
R: Could you elaborate that a bit more?
(This part o f the text covering trauma and despair is at best misleading and is 
certainly not explored in enough depth here to clarify the contradictions which are 
arising-added by P  on reading the text)
P: Yes, I, I will try and do so as long as there is hope and uhh but the possibility of 
salvaging the situation, saving you or I
R: Yes
P: and you want to take charge 
R: Right.
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P: but if you reach the point where it is lost, then you are in distinct despair and I 
think then you can only rely on others and that's a mental state I think.
R: Mmm.
P: Uhh I think that's uhh, not sure if that's a clear definition but umm.
R: I think what you're saying is clear to me but I am also thinking that in a way, 
neither of us have ever reached that point
P: Yes
R: of despair.
P: I've perhaps been closer than you on this.
R: Um uhh yes, what, what made you call me doctor suddenly?
P: I don't know, I don't know actually. I really don't know. Umm, (1) no I don't 
have an answer to that. I suppose it is because when I refer to you, (I rarely talk 
about what happened to me outside of my home) I refer to you as, as Doctor Canter 
rather than Richard.
R: Right.
P: I think that's it is just a throwback to that and I picked it up once you see and I did 
it again
R: Yes, yes, I think you picked it up as an expression 
P: Yes.
R: Uhh despair 
P: Yes 
P: Yes, yes.
R: OK umm (3) I'm, I'm lost now. Oh yes, yes, you, you've been closer to despair 
P: Yes
R: than I have.
P: Yes, yes.
R: So you've got, you've got some insight. Is there anything you want to add?
P: Umm (2) I would say just to complete my story
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R: Mmm.
P: uhh the uhh the healing process then continued. Having been within two days of 
radiotherapy. I look back, I look back uhh uhh at that you know, aghast uhh I was so 
close to uhh that commitment into radiotherapy. I would be sitting here now under 
the camera with a, a very large and prominent bald area here had that been the case 
and I would, I've said, uhh be worried about uhh the long-term future
R: Mmm. Mmm.
P: and perhaps if I'm destined to have Parkinson's disease it would be advanced.
Uhh (1) my uhh (1) visits to see Dr N now continued uhh and uhh (3) he remained 
concerned about umm uhh me not having radiotherapy. He actually uhh agreed with 
me uhh negotiated with me even uhh that uhh he, he wished to take samples from the 
area and have them tested for umm uhh cancer cells on condition that I would have 
radiotherapy if he found any. We're now six months down the road, the cyst has been 
removed six months, that [the test] was carried out and I was confident there would 
be none because the healing process was also umm uhh advanced. There were other 
difficulties that arose, there was, there was bio', biological contamination which umm 
uhh caused uhh a hiccup and in fact the final scab wasn't removed until 15 months 
after the cyst had been removed, a very worrying time for me throughout that uhh.
My cyst was in my mind (.) very nearly all the time. How I managed to do a day's 
work, I'm sure I've no idea but umm
R: No.
P: because I did constantly think; “have I made a mistake here? Am I deluding 
myself?” But if I went back through these arguments, I came out with a very positive 
feeling about them.
R: So that's evolved, that got stronger as time
P: Well it did yes umm and eventually as I've mentioned to you, I, I didn't do that. 
The, the, the collective umm confidence factor had detached itself from those figures 
and, and I, I just carried the
R: The confidence.
P: the confidence. Yes. I think that's important because uhh (1) there is a tendency 
to think that confidence is just based upon some background umm uhh umm (2) hope 
or sense when really it is based upon real judgements
R: Mmm.
P: uhh and allowing for those fringe things which play an important part but add to 
the pluses or minuses whichever the case may be.
R: When I, when I sort of reflect on what you've said about, about (1) taking umm 
points of the history that the patients may regard as important and doctors perhaps 
don't, I, I find myself wondering how a doctor (1) juggles and certainly, this is, this is
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what I find in my own practice (1) being authoritative and expert and knowledgeable 
and somehow communicating that but at the same time being collaborative and taking 
(1) umm notice of what patients say. In umm, and in fact there is this particular 
comment you made about Hugh N following what somebody else said.
P: Yes.
R: I, I do regard Hugh as actually being a very, very umm kind of collaborative 
consultative umm doctor
P: Yes.
R: and maybe he could tell you a bit more about that 
P: Right.
R: I, I,
P: Can I just elaborate on that?
R: Yes.
P: Because umm I, I wouldn't uhh, I wouldn't level this as a criticism of Doctor N, it 
is the system I'm, I'm referring to. That's why I made reference to better 
communication.
R: Yes, yes.
P: Uhh that isn’t good enough uhh it uhh words on paper can say so little. You 
would have to write long letters to uhh, to even cover the uhh the salient points about 
a umm a uhh diagnosis if you like.
R: Yes
P: And therefore it would not surprise me if the system was such that Doctor N’s 
reaction to treatment, or perhaps his conclusion as far as treatment is concerned, was 
simply based upon the information passed to him from the specialist doctor.
(This is what I  believed and it discouraged me from discussing in fu ll detail my inner 
convictions about the needfor radiotherapy with Dr N. I  think I  regret that now- but 
please remember I  had the cooperation o f Dr N  and this was progressing to my 
satisfaction, namely that radiotherapy was in suspension. Only whewn it became 
evident that radiotherapy was not necessary, did I  openly conradict the view that this 
was a new cancer to Dr N. Dr B had, at this time, no further involvement as fa r  as I  
was aware- the last consultation with him had been six months before-added by P  on 
reading the text)
R: Mmm.
P: May I ask a question? Do you actually talk to other doctors?
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I mean uhh uhh there's obviously a social level but do you, do you have conferences 
where you talk about your patients?
R: Yes.
P: You do.
R: Yes. Umm either formally in, in multi-disciplinary Head and Neck Clinics when 
the, there is a problem. Whereas in your case, umm from a conventional medical 
point of view, treatment has been clearly very straightforward but sometimes uhh 
there are situations where there are a number of alternatives that are availiable which 
is the most appropriate way forward but I think a great deal of informative, informal 
discussion takes place at coffee, in theatre, over lunch about cases that are bothering 
you . So the, the sort of thinking all the time about a problem that you describe about 
yourself, takes place umm, as a doctor I feel, with patients who are not straight 
forward. Especially, especially if things are going wrong so that the same model of 
trauma that you look describe, I recognise. Things have gone wrong and you find 
yourself thinking about them all the time and that will involve running it past others 
to get a general view; it is part of the mutual support system.
P: Do you ever disagree?
R: Oh yes.
P: And how do you deal with umm a umm a treatment when you are in 
disagreement?(2)
R: Well there's some, a disagreement as I see it which may be genuine or artificial, 
you may ask artificially disagree with somebody to generate a more interesting 
argument so one doctor will find themselves adopting a view just to really uhh to, to 
draw the argument out
P: Yes.
R: to make sure that all the issues are stored.
P: But is there a mechanism when you are in disagreement 
R: Mmm.
P: for uhh resolving that through a third party if you like which would be a logical 
thing. If I was organising umm a umm a uhh hospital
R: Yes.
P: with multi uhh specialist uhh officials involved, I would uhh wish to do that 
because at the end of the say, if two people are in disagreement uhh it, it clearly calls 
for a third party uhh at least one third party to uhh uhh polarise the decision.
R: It's often the patient, the patient may be presented with (2) with uhh alternative
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views and say that these are two alternative views.
P: That's dreadful to put to a patient because that just leads to trauma. You surprise 
me.
R: Umm the, the patients are very happy to go down that aisle. They do recognise 
that no particular perspective
P: Mmm mm.
R: is uhh is clear but (1) those kind of disagreements often arise out of judgements 
about what, what kind of outcome is acceptable. For example if you have a tumour of 
the throat you may have a judgement to make about one form of treatment which will 
give you a higher chance of cure but leaves you without the voice box versus the 
other
P: I understand, I
R: course of treatment that gives you a small chance of recovery but you keep your 
voice box.
P: That's slightly different to what, to what I thought would happen.
R: I know.
P: I know what you're saying here is uhh the risks uhh the consequence, the 
consequence of umm this surgery as opposed to that surgery is that you will loose 
your voice box or whatever.
R: Yes.
P: Now that's, that's not quite the same thing as what I'm referring to. It's where you 
have umm uhh uhh a disagreement as to the nature of the problem uhh surely there is 
a higher authority as it were or a third party
R: Oh yes.
P: to take your umm your, your uhh umm your individual opinions too.
R: That's surprisingly uncommon actually.
P: Oh is it.
R: Yes, which may itself be worrying perhaps there should be more views around 
and that's generally resolved by further opinion from a major centre.
P: It is, yes, yes.
R: from a major centre.
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P: But would be on a, on a, on a casual basis rather than a formal basis?
R: Well, it, it, may be formally referred or informally.
P: And how would that be triggered then? If you were in dispute with another 
doctor, would you, would you say I can not agree with you. I, this must be taken to a 
higher authority. Is that how it's done?
R: Umm it's never actually happened to me umm personally but what I would do is 
make it clear to the patient that there is umm a difference of opinion as to what the 
most appropriate way forward is here and that in order to, to help we would, we 
would suggest referral to another centre umm to get uhh, an alternative perspective.
P: Right.
R: I, sus', I guess, I mean I haven't (1) I've never really encountered that, it's 
surprisingly uncommon. That may as I say come as a surprise to you and it, it, I 
suspect it probably arises out of personal disagreements and personal dislikes that 
have got in the way of professional advice. What you're looking at is a dispute over 
who's got the bigger car or who's got the bigger house.
P: Really.
R: Yes
P: That would please no patient, I'm sure.
R: No, I, I mean but I hope mercifully they are uncommon but I suspect that that's 
kind of outside baggage getting in the way.
P: Right. One thing I haven't uhh spoken of uhh although you alluded to it a little 
earlier is my, my background. I, I am uhh an Electrical Engineer, I've been an 
Electrical Engineer uhh pretty well all of my life. I, I had the good fortune to be a 
creative Electrical Engineer uhh which has made life very interesting for me.
R: Right.
P: And uhh it's interesting because I remember, as uhh, there is a parallel between 
diagnosing the uhh the faults of complex machinery and uhh with uhh uhh diagnosing 
human problems, illnesses, uhh at least I think so. Umm machines nowadays are very 
complex umm uhh the machine I've been working on recently as no less than a 
thousand sensors and umm a hundred prime movers and valves etc etc. The whole in 
computer control is a very complex entity. In my early days I used to make mistakes 
if machines failed
R: Yes.
P: by gathering all of the diagnostic information, and of course the good practice is 
to take everything, take every scrap of information you can.
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R: Yes
P: Many of these machines umm are so expensive and are so important umm uhh in 
their operation, they can't be stopped. They have to be repaired on uhh a basis of 
understanding what to repair.
R: Mmm.
P: Therefore diagnosing problems can be uhh very uhh very important, very serious 
undertaking and I can remember in my early days, I used to take these facts uhh and 
I'd look at them {coughing) I would umm I would tend to take the primary symptoms 
uhh and ignore the secondary symptoms and I would come to conclusion uhh and uhh 
the machine would be stopped and I would investigate and I would find I was wrong 
uhh and the machine would be uhh inoperative for an unnecessarily long time whilst 
the real fault was found and put right. I'd then look back at the diagnostic information 
and I'd find that those details would fit perfectly and if I had not ignored them 
because they were not mainstream to the problem, I would have put my finger on 
precisely the problem. (2) In later life, I've learnt to do that, not to make those 
judgements. But I noticed that in younger engineers, they still do it. And it's very 
interesting because there are occasions when I've looked at the facts and uhh I think 
of the detail and I uhh I see the complete picture and whenever that happens I've 
always been absolutely right. Uhh now I think that umm that training as it were, has 
been helpful in umm the uhh definitions when I've, I've given you
R: Yes, yes.
P: applying to my medical condition.
(Here the importance o f detail is being exposed. It may be this detail, which changes 
probability into certainty (or probability into improbability) whether in a machine or 
in the diagnosis o f human illness-added by P  on reading the text)
R: I, I'm, I can immediately draw parallels with that model and the way you have 
reacted in a, in a couple of ways but uhh it seems to me that perhaps the strongest 
point to be made is that is has enabled you to challenge the nature of being an expert. 
Is, am I right?
P: Yes that's correct. That is right.
R: Yes
P: That's helped me more in the face of opposition because there have been times 
R: Yes.
P: when I've done this and it's very rare this actually happens 
R: Yes
P: because usually you do find the problem very quickly. And of course there is the
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danger, if you look at the primary evidence rather than all the evidence 
R: Yes
P: On the occasions when I have spotted the problem from looking at all of the facts, 
I've gone back to the other engineers that I've had along with me and been absolutely 
sure that I've been right, enough to over-ride them and if you like, to take a very 
arrogant stance on the, on the matter
R: Mmm.
P: which I wouldn't do I mean unless I was absolutely sure, always absolutely right. 
R: So you, you challenge one belief system after you have...
P: But, it, one, one would only do that if one was absolutely sure.
R: Yes.
P: uhh and there is certainty in certain circumstances, it doesn't happen very often of 
course but umm occasionally it does. Now I'm sure it does marry with the uhh with 
saying the diagnostic judgements which uhh, which you have to make. And it brings 
me back to the patient again
R: Mmm.
P: who has that detailed knowledge and all those subtleties which he carries that 
umm may seem too peripheral to uhh be uhh important but which add that little 
details that umm can be the difference between being right or being wrong.
R: Your own experience taught you that that works.
P: Yes
R: You said you are a pragmatic man and therefore you've been able to translate that 




R: You, you made the point earlier on about the fact that you weren't religious.
Were you, were you religious or do you have a religious background?
P: I uhh, I uhh, I, yes. That is to say, my parents were always God fearing and uhh 
yes, I went to Sunday School and I think I was about 18 before I decided that umm no 
this, this world is a random world and that umm I, there are no advantages, there's no 
purpose. Life is life we have evolved. I, I accept that umm there are questions that I
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can't answer but I don't attempt to and I agree that people try to answer the 
unanswerable and I think that's being pragmatic again. It's umm it's looking at the 
uhh the reality and making judgements and avoiding making judgements where there 
isn't evidence to make judgements.
R: Mmm.
P: That's how I view in a handful of words, the world I live in.
R: OK. Do you have a sense that we're slightly running out of steam on the 
discussion?
P: I think we're coming to the end of the body of uhh what we're saying. We're now 
down to peripheral matters. It's uhh really with you Richard if you wish to uhh 
continue or (2)
R: Well I, I umm, yes. I don’t want to exhaust the process. I was umm, I was going 
to ask you, a couple of points had occurred to me. We, we mentioned names on the 
films of a couple of other doctors
P: Yes
R: so umm, I think we agreed beforehand that I would produce a transcript 
P: Yes.
R: and that I'd like to show you that,
P: Yes OK.
R: Because these documents umm get seen others at the clinic umm. Umm and that 
uhh that we will produce a transcript, which, which we will look through 
independently and then I'll send you some of my thoughts on this.
P: Have great difficulty in eliminating yourself though Richard, I might, I might say 
{laughter). No I mean umm uhh as far as uhh remarks made about doctors, I'm only 
joking.
R: No, no, no, no you {laughter) it's perfectly all right to say what you, what you 
want on the uhh transcript and I, I'll send you it, I'll send you mine
P: Yes
R: and if perhaps you could uhh you could send it back to me 
P: Yes
R: and umm and.
P: OK thank you.
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R: I think we'd better go for lunch.
P: Yes, OK that's fine.
R: It is 1.30.
P: Well is it as you expected? Let me ask you that question.
R: Ahh more so. I mean I, I, I umm (2) we uhh this interview arose out of kind of 
half a discussion we had a couple of weeks ago didn't it.
P: That's right and left me actually, not knowing just how you were going to 
structure it. Uhh (I) you would not be surprised that of course I have thought about it 
uhh and I have, I have obviously had to look across the wide spectrum of how you 
might present, wish this to be presented either a yes/no uhh uhh situation or whether 
in fact you would wish me to go into detail. So I have actually obviously thought 
about the detail uhh and that's been quite important because some of things I have 
actually push', pushed to the back of my mind. Uhh but I, they, they, they have umm 
been umm drawn back to, to the, the forefront as a result of umm me thinking about 
life.
R: What, what I mean I deliberately 
P: I hope that doesn't falsify my because 
R: No, No.
P: it's a natural process of umm preparing myself 
R: Of course.
P: towards what would be a rather searching uhh interview, whatever form it might 
take.
R: Well, it, it, it, there was, it was deliberate initially not to have any, any kind of 
structure umm (1) uhh that I presented in that we, the idea was to negotiate
P: Yes
R: the structure.
P: Yes, I understand also why you didn't want me to say too much at that time 
because we could never have gone through this again
R: No, it's a one off.
P: It's a one off isn't it.
R: Yes
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P: That's right, yes, that's right. That uhh that tape is still turning. 
R: (Laughter). It is working. OK thanks a lot.




R: Thanks very much Val for coming.
V: That's all right.
R: You, you've asked me to have a little discussion at the beginning about what it is
that I'm trying to do. That's why I'm going to start, start off by talking. I think we were 
going to also learn from this about what it is that you would like to get out of our chat 
because you, you have an interest in talking about this as well?
V: Mmm.
R: as well and, I, I will also address the question of confidentiality on video and if, if,
if it turns out that things are unacceptable
V: Mmm.
R: you can always switch it off or
V: Yes.
R: either at the beginning, middle or end or at a later stage. I, as you know, work as
a doctor. I work within a medical framework in which I obtain medical information and 
try and advise in the most appropriate sense. What I'm, have been interested in looking at 
is what people do when doctors and patients with information that may be not medical in 
the strictest sense of the word, but maybe important in terms of determining what they do. 
And that involves trying to decide if, if that happens and if it happens what are the 
circumstances that bring this kind of evidence into the discussion. Do doctors permit 
patients to bring this in? Do they restrict access in all kinds of ways? Does the whole 
business of being, being in a conventional western framework of medicine make it very 
difficult for patients to make decisions. That involves looking very much at myself and 
how I handle this. What do I do with this information? Do I disregard it? Do I pay 
attention to it? Do I pay lip service to it? Do I, do I pretend to pay attention to it? But 
all the time underneath it, ignoring it but in a more subtle way. That sort of thing, but also 
asking patients how they construct images of their own illnesses and how they apply 
medical information in the conventional medical sense in terms of making the decision 
themselves. Is that clear? Is it?
V: Yes, that's fine.
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R: Good. So, we are going to begin this well actually perhaps the best thing to do
would be to
V: You're talking about it particularly within the realms of decision making?
R: I suppose so. That, that is the point at which a decision is made that, that forms
the, the focus for, for thinking about these issues but of course these issues enter into a 
clinical context at all times without necessarily a decision being made. And yourself, what 
would you like to get out of this discussion?
V: I don't know. I am very interested in an area which I think the National Health is
beginning to address and that is what the patient themselves is happy with in terms of 
treatment even though that may not always be the best in terms of whatever clinical 
measurement is available. That which might make the patient feel much happier and, in 
doing so, would allow them to relax and be more receptive to what ever treatment they do 
have and may end up perhaps producing a better result or perhaps in the patient having a 
better quality of life in their own terms.
R: mmm,
V: that's part of it.
R: OK.
V: And the other part of it I think is the, the awe in which the medical profession is
still held by people generally, most of all by patients, prevents many people from feeling 
that they can address issues about their treatment with their doctors; indeed they rarely 
have the information to do so. The language of the medical profession is very technical 
and specialised, whereas the concerns of patients are usually voiced very much in terms of 
their feelings, intuition and fear of consequences. In addition fear of the unknown plays a 
large part in a patient's comfort and it is rare for this to be dealt with in a supportive way 
by staff without underestimating a patient's ability to understand what is going on.
Patient’s fears or enquiries are likely to be addressed to the staff, who are readily 
accessible to them, the less qualified grades of nursing staff. Although these nurses are 
often most sympathetic to patients, they too have little or no access to doctors and in 
passing messages up the chain of responsibilities they can get distorted and delayed.
These worries are often not passed on to doctors in a way that will produce the required 
information. The ‘named nurses’ system of allocating specific nurses to patients 
throughout a stay in hospital depends greatly on the ability of the nurse and can be 
frustrating for patients since to some degree it blocks access to someone who may be 
more sympathetic; but most of all in the several stays in three different hospitals I have 
experienced recently this system is very unpopular with nurses, who simply don't operate 
it.
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Although much has been done to make hospitals more friendly places, including breaking 
down what seemed fearsome hierarchies of anonymous staff, according to all the patients I 
have spoken to, it doesn't help if they are left not knowing where they are. Not wearing 
uniforms and white coats and nurses being apparently more on one level and known by 
their Christian names, not having matron and so on does not help if they don't know where 
they are in relation to staff. They need to know who to speak to if they want a real 
difference and who is accountable for their daily welfare. They need to know that even 
more when they are really ill because they have no choice but to put themselves in the 
hands of a system which they feel will be watching out for them and have its own checks 
and balances. They need to know who can begin to make decision making, at least in part, 
accessible to them in a real sense.
It is most important for patient's wellbeing to feel that they have ownership and some 
control over their illness and that they can do things or behave in ways which will help 
themselves. The degree to which this is possible may relate to their recovery.
R: Right, there is
V: Is it a bit muddled?
R: No, no, not at all. I was thinking that there appeared to me to be quite an overlap.
V: Yes.
R: With what we're both interested in and, would that be fair?
V: Yes and I would like to feel that I could do something about things from a patient's
point of view, particularly in the area of chronic disease as opposed to sudden or 
temporary medical cases. I think the treatment and quality of life of the chronically sick 
are much neglected because they're always there, they are never cured and the diseases 
sometimes progress very slowly. It is an unattractive area for medical research to address, 
an unrewarding one for Social Services because patients go on and on depleting resources 
and for hospitals because they continue to return to take up beds.
Most of all it is depressing for the patients themselves because the syndrome they are in is 
one they are mainly powerless to do anything about and they are cast in the position of 
having to take continually without being able to return. There is little relationship between 
their lives in hospital and those outside and medication and all the gadgets that tend to go 
with it these days become the continuing theme, their stability. This cannot be good but it 
would take major shifts in the system to change it.
Finally, I think that nursing the chronically sick is something that must affect the staff, 
particularly nursing staff. Those who do not have full and rewarding private /social lives 
which support them in their work must be affected by a situation in which patients rarely 
recover and get better.
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R: Mmm.
V: Every way you look at it, chronic illness is a problem and a depressing one but it is
so much more to the people who really suffer it because they, they are, in relative terms, 
used to being neglected. Sudden, life threatening or "fashionable" illnesses like cancer, 
heart attacks or aids are paid a lot of attention in the press and attract immense amounts or 
research money, while many chronic diseases cause more suffering to more people for 
longer lengths of time, cost the health services much more, but get little attention. It 
makes no sense. If I had had a choice at the beginning of my life as to whether I might go 
through life with the same progressive illness or be healthy until a sudden heart attack and 
die at a younger age, I may have chosen the latter.
{There is also another dimension flagged by the word fashionable *, which is the social 
context in which diseases are perceived and therefore their sufferers. In the way that TB 
was perhaps the dominant fatal disease o f the 19th and earlier 20th centuries, its victims 
were often portrayed in a heroic context in the culture o f their time, as in La Traviata. 
Although one can easily imagine and indeed have read novels, etc. about protagonists 
with cancer or aids, it is difficult to imagine the same o f chronic bronchitis, multiple 
sclerosis or one o f the motor neuron diseases. This is not a thought out point, there is 
obviously a matter o f degree with all o f these things, but there is already writing on this 
subject and it definitely affects the way the medical profession, as well as friends and 
family, view patients.)
R: Right.
V: I've got a very nice GP who works with me patiently, explains everything and
discusses issues of treatment with me. He gives me a fair amount of responsibility in 
managing my illness and when I need it he will take surgery time to talk. Usually I talk to 
him on the telephone and as a result I take very little of his time considering how ill I am 
and I call him out possibly once a year. However, there are things missing: there is no-one 
to tell me to stop, to take a rest and no-one to assist if me when I ’m trying hard to keep 
going - particularly if I am trying to continue to work - and ones own inclination is often 
to push oneself way past sensible limits. The home-care services are no use to me, 
although I qualify for them, since they can only give help during working hours and you 
have to be at home at the time. There is also the extraordinary rule that they are not 
allowed to do any cleaning and for, say, asthmatics, this is perhaps the single most serious 
need. I have seen elderly sick people worn down and resigned to living in relative filth, 
when they have always been proud of their homes.
R Could I, I, I need to get your permission on video to transcribe this onto text,
V: Right.
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R: And I, I would ask you to look at a copy and make comments, if that's all right
with you and then I would also look at a copy and make comments and we can exchange 
it and have a look at the comments that we each make.
V: Mmm.
R: Obviously in the process of doing that, my secretary will, will hear what goes on.
She's a medical secretary who will discrete. My supervisors, as well if it's OK with you
because I think that I would like this to form part of my thesis.
V: Mmm.
R: My examiners as well; they will want to read the text and certainly would want to
comment on it and after, after th a t, I am not sure whether or not it's going to be an 
accessible thesis, you can decide about that. But at any rate, all the identifying features 
like your name, are taken out.
V: Mmm.
R: Val, is that, is that acceptable? Can I just check that the camera is working before
we carry on?  I think it would be, I think it would be helpful for me because I don't
know your full medical background. If you could outline what your medical problem is 
and I think the more difficult decision you've had to contemplate. Would that be helpful?
V: If you want me to talk about that, that's fine.
R: Thank you,
V: Would that, that help you?
R: Yes it would because I
V: Well I have bronchiectasis, which was first diagnosed when I was thirteen, which
was the first time I was given any decent medical attention. It started as asthma when I 
was a baby and I evidently had chronic bronchitis by the time I was 5. I was put into 
hospital when my mother died, I was just thirteen, and they found that I had bronchiectasis 
and pneumonia and I was given antibiotics for the first time. (My mother died of stomach 
cancer having been treated for indigestion for years) We had been unlucky with our GP 
and this was changed when we moved house. About 1969, after leaving art school, I was 
declared disabled and I think there was no great expectation that I would work much. I 
spent long periods in the Brompton Hospital in those years. In fact after teaching part 
time in an art school, I threw the card away and got a very good job in the National 
Portrait Gallery. But I was ‘economical with the truth’ in my medical.
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Lungs
To bring things up to date: my current diagnosis is bronchiectasis in both lungs and COAD 
(chronic obstruction of the airways disease). This combination means that I cannot have 
sustained oxygen therapy and I now have a Brompton PacK - a sophisticated positive 
pressure respirator - which I sleep on for about 8 - 1 0  hours a night. I have also been 
assessed for a double lung transplant. I would be above average risk for this operation 
and at present I have not made any decision to go ahead. (There is a lot to be said about 
how I am expected to make that decision.)
Twice, at about ages 14 and 2 6 ,1 made decisions against my doctors' advice: the first 
completely instinctive and the second on the basis of my observations of other patients and 
my own quality of life. These and the decision I yet have to make about transplants I will 
deal with separately in order not to make this background too long.
Brain
Treatment for my lung condition is now complicated by the fact that about 2 years ago, it 
was discovered that I had a parasagital arachnoid cyst on the top of my brain, the pressure 
of which had slowly paralysing my right side for many years. I had been complaining about 
not being able to lift my legs up, difficulty walking and general loss of strength and 
exhaustion for some time, for several years at least, but it had all being progressing so 
slowly that it was, it was not diagnosed.
I think I'd been compensating for the symptoms for some time because I had been 
examined several times and did not exhibit any obvious neurological symptoms. People 
thought it might be lack of oxygen to the muscles etc. I thought it might be old age and 
so life had got extremely difficult, with the combination of problems, you know, for me to 
move around and I was constantly totally exhausted.
Although to have a diagnosis and to know that what I had been going through was not 
some kind of neurosis was partly a relief - 1 could relax and "give myself permission" to be 
tired - to have something wrong in my brain was terrifying. I remember during the early 
hospital treatment years in my teens, when after having my tonsils out they took out my 
adenoids and then started on the chronic sinus problems. Even having metal cannulas (?) 
pushed through into the sinus's from the back of the nose seemed so close to my eyes and 
what was behind that I found it very frightening. Also it is all out of one's own control.
So, cutting out the problems of lack of money for urgent operations locally and press 
headlines, I went into the National Hospital to have the cyst drained as that seemed to be 
the only way. I wasn't allowed to have a full anaesthetic because of my lungs and the 
position of the cyst on the motor and sensory nerves was such that the surgeon would only 
do the most minimal drainage procedure and would not risk a biopsy. He drained 15mls 
of the fluid inside the cyst, which held in total, I gather, about 60mls, on the day of the 
operation.
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Three days later he decided to aspirate another lOmls. About three hours later that 
evening I had a massive epileptic fit. I was locked in the loo and suddenly enough 
electricity to kill a large oak tree just surged vertically through my body and I was 
completely rigid in a position that I could not normally even push myself into. It just went 
straight through mainly my right side and I felt all of it like a massive electric shock until I 
lost consciousness. Fortunately I'd screamed as soon as I felt slightly fimny in that split 
second it all had happened and the last thing I heard was someone saying the door was 
locked. They got me out and a nurse afterwards told me that I was blue all over and not 
breathing. They couldn't get oxygen into me with the squeeze bag because my teeth were 
clamped - but whatever they did they got me back conscious within about 20 minutes, 
telling me they may have to do an emergency brain operation.
The next day the surgeon told me that it was a provoked fit and I would be unlikely to 
have another, they would put me on epilepsy pills for a while. They did not listen to me 
about the extreme pain - they were assuming that I meant some kind of pins and needles 
and later I gathered my experience was rare.
They sent me home after a further 3 days. I rested with some friends for about a fortnight, 
and was being brought back to stay at home with my sister and on the way back between 
Bristol and Bath I had another seizure in the car. Umm and I couldn't speak and it was 
affecting my throat as well as all my right side and umm I managed to sort of say ‘hosp’ 
and get taken to hospital by my friend and umm there - Do you want all this?
R: Yes, that's very helpful.
V: The duty House Officer, although I told him I was under Dr X, sent me home
because he said there was no surgical neurology person there and to ring my doctor. I got 
home and my doctor was on holiday and the locum wasn't there and I rang the National 
Hospital because it was a Friday afternoon and I thought, I know what's going to happen 
here, they're all going off for the weekend as it was Friday. So umm anyway, I spoke to 
umm Dr Y at the National and he said "I want you to have a scan straight away and come 
here" and I thought the last place I want to be is on the motorway. He said is there one 
down there. I didn't know. Anyway the doctor finally spoke to Dr X, my doctor, my 
locum fortunately; umm all this was late morning, early afternoon and by 5.O'clock Dr X 
said he wanted me back in the RUH urgently. It emerged that he didn’t know that I had 
had the operation. His SHO met me and the he actually came down to see me himself 
and I was speaking to him for about 5 minutes and I went into another major fit. I had, 
sorry, I had had two more fits during the afternoon getting stronger and umm I was in this 
last fit strongly conscious but unable to speak. I was on Phenytoin and Diazepan, for five 
and a half hours, four of which they could not get any Carbamazepine since pharmacy 
was closed. I finally got into the ward just before midnight. Umm but all of that was 
excruciatingly painful and I, I’ve learned since that it is very unusual to feel serious pain or 
to stay conscious and I presume, they presume it is because the cyst is on the sensory and 
motor part of the brain.
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R: Why, why there was so much pain.
V: Yes. But I literally felt all the electric shocks which were going through my body.
Anyway that complicated the issue of whether to have transplant surgery. I haven’t had 
any fits since the second lot because I'm on quite a good dose of 2 epileptic drugs and it 
took quite a while to get stabilised. It took a while for me to feel, you know, safely 
confident to go in for the transplant assessment and then I was immediately told I probably 
couldn't have one because of the epilepsy, although they'd known that before they got me 
in there. They stopped all the tests that were booked because they did not want to waste 
the money, but in the end they did not get a positive ‘no’ from a couple of surgeons so 
they went through with all the usual assessments except for the final invasive one, and they 
were all fine. I mean this is when I'd psyched, I don't want a transplant and I'd psyched 
myself up for weeks about it and I'd got into hospital and that afternoon the, the day I 
arrived, I suddenly told myself, yes I thought you wouldn't get one. So it's, it's been very 
up and down and it was only the year before that I had the that I'd acquired epilepsy which 
of course after the second lot of fits is a permanent state and I shall be on the drugs for 
ever. So it is a second sort of chronic umm problem and it will, without doubt, complicate 
the transplant possibilities because the epilepsy drugs and the anti rejection drugs don't suit 
each other. They have had one or two patients go into permanent epileptic fits and die 
literally during transplant either under the anaesthetic or afterwards. So I am there at the 
moment and I am still working nearly full-time.
R: Yes. Very impressive.
V: And umm I, I've been through and I've got used to my prognosis if I don't have the
transplant so I don't know how much more I can stand.
R: Do you want to clarify that?
V: Basically I have to clarify the consequence of having the transplants as well as not
having them.
R: mmmm
V: Is that what you want me to say?
R: But you ask me, you asked me if it's what I want you to say.
V: I don't want to be entirely indulgent but I'm certain I want you to get what you
need out of it.
R: Well thank you, but, but I feel the same as, as well.
V: Well shall I quickly sum up the two things about having it or not? There is
evidently what they call a 70% success rate with lung transplants roughly at the moment. 
To clarify that what they mean by 'success' is actually survival within the first year and 
the 70% goes down to 60% if you've got bronchiectasis because I gather, I learnt this 
when I went to Harefield, it's more dangerous to cut the lungs out when they have adhered 
to the chest wall and there is a lot of bleeding which they find difficult to control etc and 
as they say I'm over 50, and I say I'm a very young 50 and I'm only 52 but this umm this 
age thing also becomes a huge problem which I really feel has major implications. In 
addition, with the problems with the epilepsy drugs, it probably doesn’t give me much 
more than a 50% chance. By the time I'm 60 I won't be able to have a transplant at all 
anyway.
R: I didn’t know that.
V: I'm down to 60% possible likelihood of survival in the first year already and then
there's the problem of balancing the epilepsy drugs and having more fits and all the rest 
which, you know, I reckon in real terms possibly takes me nearer to 50% likelihood of 
survival in the first year. And then I asked the surgeon ‘out of the 70% who usually 
survive the first year, how many of those are still in hospital?’ and he sort of stuttered a bit 
and said well he was sure these figures are available somewhere (laughter) and I said ‘well 
you guess, you're, you're a transplant surgeon, how much do you think?’ And he said ‘well 
about a third.’ And that is a huge proportion of 70% down because in order to be in 
hospital these days you have to be pretty ill.
R: Yes
V: And I know they send transplant patients out as soon as they can, so the
consequences of the, that proportion off my 50% does not seem very attractive. The 
main reason I don't want one isn't the fear of the operation at all, it's the side effects of the 
drugs. I've been on long-term steroids before and came off them about three times 
because they have such bad side effects with me. As well as being on steroids, there is 
cyclosporin, which is the main anti-rejection drug and has some similar side effects as 
steroids but it also has others: cancer, fatal infection due to lack of immune response, 
osteoporosis and kidney failure, yeah they are big things. That's leaving out all the little 
ones. I mean what is one letting oneself in for? He then said after that chronic rejection 
syndrome sets in. At the moment it's a little over 2 years and but that on average patients 
live with it up to about 5 years and then between and 5 and 7 years during that time there's 
a steeper drop and that's the sort of average time for fatalities. Well what are we talking 
about? The suffering that would be involved in going through those side effects and really 
feeling rotten on the anti-rejection drugs.
The longest surviving patient I've spoken to, and she is in her 11th year, nearly 12th year, 
and she is, she is bright and she talks you up as she obviously would, but she's got 
osteoporosis badly, she's got kidney failure and I don't know how long she's had them. To 
me I feel as though I can survive. I've got used to it. I, I did feel after seeing him that I
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would come out, get myself into some clean air, possibly stop working, although I don't 
know about that as it has huge social and personality implications with me because I live 
alone and I, I, I felt that I'd could do at least as good as the 10 years and I wouldn't have 
all the side effects of the drugs or the constant control or hospitalisation in Harefield. So I 
went back to see Professor Z at the Brompton and I said, ‘what, you know, what's the 
situation?’ He said, ‘well you're not going to be in a very good state after about 9 or 10 
years from now if we take the progression that your disease has made over the last I think 
7 years, which are well recorded. If you progress at the same rate, you won't be in any fit 
state really in 9 or 10 years time’ and I said, ‘well what do you mean by that?’ And he 
said, ‘well you won't be here’. So I said, ‘OK’ and, and he said ‘it could be considerably 
less than that if you get bad infections and frequent infections. ’ So anyway I asked him,
‘is it mainly infections that governs the deterioration rate? And he said ‘yes’. And I said, 
‘well I want to know how I would die because I sort of want to plan, I want to know what 
other people are going to have to put up with from me and I want to be prepared to be, 
you know, able to control as much of it myself as I can and be in little of the pain that I 
need to be.’ He basically said, ‘I wouldn't.’ I said ‘I was hoping my, my lungs would put 
such a strain on my heart in turn I would have a heart attack’ but no such luck. He said ‘it 
would gradually be more and more of a strain on my heart and I'd get more fluid around 
my heart and lungs and gradually the heart would be less able to pump the blood around 
the body and the organs, the other organs wouldn't get what they needed and they would 
all gradually begin to fail and then I would get, you know, less and less with it and a bit 
sleepy’ and so I understand that. It's a long process again and it goes back really to the 
point about the long chronic illness argument. Umm I still think maybe I can do better 
than what he says but I, I don't know. I know I've already got through so far so that's it.
R: Thank's Val. There are lots of questions I want to ask you but the one of the
things that I noticed, was when you described it all that you use a lot of very conventional 
medical terms and a lot of the medical language. I mean it's a very sophisticated 
description and I would think from a medical point of view, you're extremely well 
informed. Is that how you view it all? Is that how you construct it in your mind?
V: If s the way the doctors tell me.
R: Does that, does that fit in how you'd like to see it or have you just found?...
V: Yes in a sense that I want to understand the doctor’s language so that there is less
of a divide between us. I think it's also completely umm unconscious result of having 
spent a long time and a lot of my life in the company for short minutes with doctors and 
listening within hospitals and things and not everybody would necessarily listen and pick 
up things like that but I do. I don't think one can underestimate the umm knowledge that 
anybody with a chronic illness gets of their illness and they certainly have a very, very 
strong idea of what is going to be good for me and what isn't and it, it quite often is right. 
It usually, it's, well it's always based on experience obviously because I wouldn't, but it's 
all usually based on experience also of at least one doctor that I'm in contact with either at 
the hospital, or my GP who is fairly experienced at the same time. And I sometimes get
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sent to different doctors or am in a strange hospital if I'm somewhere else and umm and 
they have a completely different way of dealing with me which actually is, is very 
distressing
R: Mmm
V: And it's very distressing if a doctor won't listen to you at all about what you know
is good for you for instance and there are doctors in all, all hospitals and all surgeries like 
this and they are usually slaves of either the latest medical text book or the one where they 
trained. Most doctors keep up to date and they've got a hell of a lot to keep up to date
with but I just, I mean there are contradictions now between the Brompton I had a
short time in hospital in the RUH last year
R: Yes
V: having treatment and I got, am, am now on a respirator, I have been for the last
year, which has made enormous difference to me and I don't think I would be at work 
without it. It is the Brompton Pack and it's a positive pressure respirator but it is a special 
one that's built to respond - it responds to my own breathing. It suits bronchiectasis 
patients because it, when I breath, different bits of my lungs will stick together and I don't 
have a regular breathing pattern, although set to basic pressure, inspiration and expiration 
times, will alter with my breathing. Anyway, the doctor down here was absolutely 
convinced that a positive pressure machine like this would push all the infected sputum 
down to the comers of the lung where it would then fester, you know, and
R: Create problems?
V: create the usual problems. Well in fact it doesn't. I've never had such clean lungs
and it's cleared them out. It clears out at the ends of the, you know, the ends of the 
alveoli, the sacs that are there, but I don't know what's still down there but it clears it out a 
lot. And also before this, Frusemide has had an enormous effect on my lungs and, and 
that's the second story. About six years ago in the winter I had what appeared to be heart 
failure which my GP put me on Frusemide for, with immediate relief of all symptoms. 
After two or three months he took me off Frusemide and as soon as I was off, I felt awful 
again and my lungs were very wet and, and my breathing was worse and I said, ‘you 
know, can I go back on it?’ and he said ‘yes OK.’ But he sent me also to be checked out 
by the heart consultant at Bristol Royal Infirmary. They couldn't find anything wrong with 
my heart, there was no evidence of heart failure afterwards but I had all the classic 
symptoms when I was initially put on Frusemide. I went up to the Brompton for my next 
appointment and this doctor just wouldn't listen to me saying that I had been much better 
and had had fewer infections since being on Frusemide. He wanted me to go on steroids 
again and I had really bad side effects from steroids and quite frankly, if I'm on steroids for 
very long I'd go and throw myself off a bridge. I've been on three times before with the 
doctors at Brompton. They've all agreed for me to come off and he wants to try it again 
in larger doses. Umm and I say, ‘well I'm actually a lot better on Frusemide. I want to
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stay on Frusemide through the winter and just see how much my infections are reduced 
because they certainly seem to be reduced over the summer.’ And he said ‘well you can 
stay on this if you like, but you're going on steroids as well.’ So umm I said, I said to the 
consultant, ‘if you put me on steroids and I stay on Frusemide and I have a better winter, 
you're going to say it's because of the steroids and I'm going to say it's because of the 
Frusemide and you won't know which, which is which, what's had the effect.’ Anyway he 
wasn't going to change his mind so I went back home fairly stressed by this interview. I 
went to my GP and said ‘I wasn't happy with it,’ and he concurred and let me stay on 
Frusemide without the steroids and I did have a much better winter. Went back, asked to 
see Professor Z, my usual consultant the following spring and said, ‘look, I've been better. 
I've had a better winter, I've only been on Frusemide’, and this had been going on by the 
way over a period of a couple of years by then, which I had been saying I was better on 
Frusemide. I told him everybody said that it was not doing me any harm, so I could stay 
on it, but there was no reason at all why it should be doing me any good. Anyway, I saw 
Professor Z and I told him this story and said that I had been significantly better and had 
fewer infections and I said ‘the other doctor wanted me on steroids’ and he knew, he's 
known for a year, I didn't want to be on steroids. Anyway, half way through this story he 
started to grin and he said, ‘I think there's someone down the corridor who'd like to meet 
you’ and he took me down to one of the Registrars who was doing research into the salts 
in the lining of the lungs
R: Mmm mm.
V: because the balance of salts in the lungs affects the efficacy of the, the, working
and moving phlegm from the lungs in a continuous way. And, I mean, one of the things I 
found that the Frusemide also did, it's much easier to cough up sputum. I could clear my 
lungs much more easily and there was much less of it. I went to see him and he was most 
interesting straight away and said, ‘yes you're right, you know, it affects the lining of the 
lungs’ and of course Professor Z being bright, realised immediately that Frusemide would 
affect the salt balance in the body, not just in the kidneys or wherever, you know. He 
made the connection but only after 3 years, you know, the relative arguing, they suddenly 
decided I was right. Umm and that was from what I felt and, I mean, what I'd observed. 
But I have to say that the, the registrar doing, who was doing the research is still at the 
Brompton, did say that it was unusual for patients to observe themselves umm in an 
objective way accurately. I don't know whether that's right or not. He said most trials, 
most studies with patients had not reflected what their accurate clinical state was and 
that's when my other interest comes in, in a sense that maybe doesn't matter if they feel 
better.
R: Umm yes. Sorry, I'm dying to ask you lots of questions.
V: Go on shut up, shut up!!
R: No, no Val. You mustn't do that, you mustn't think that because what you're
saying triggers off lots of questions to me obviously. Ok, I'm interested in that moment
12
when you, you find that what you feel is instinctively the right thing for you to do. When it 
comes up against the conventional medical explanation, although you seem to me to, to go 
into the conventional medical explanation and handle yourself pretty well by putting 
forward logical medical arguments for what you're doing. Is that actually what you're 
thinking?
V: No I don't at the time
R: Right, how do you think of it?
V: The Frusemide thing, what I've just said? Afterwards I was told that, you know, at
the time when they all decided, well a few people decided, I was........
R: When you had to decide whether or not to have Frusemide and steroids over the
winter, you said, ‘well if I'm better at the end of it’
V: I know, that's umm, that's fairly logical. Anyone could see that if you're doing two
things at once
R: Right.
V: both of which were supposed to make you better, you wouldn't know which it was
would you? I mean this, this happens with a lot of drugs now umm and uhh I think people 
are much better at watching themselves
R: Than they used to be?
V: Mmm.
R: Where, where, where is the source of your certainty about what's good for you?
Where does that come from? You said experience?
V: Well it comes down to gut in the end. It's gut reaction based on experience and
umm weighing up the odds umm and the choice to have at the time. Further -  it is gut 
reaction based on a lot of experiences, of feeling really ill from medication.
R: Ok that's interesting. When you take, take that, how do you, how do you get it
into the equation?
V: That's an interesting one because that's what I've got to do about the transplant in
the end. I have a friend whose daughter, who's one of my very, very good friends and 
who's been great support to me for some years her daughter is a councillor with London 
Underground. So when I went up to London to be assessed for the transplant, I actually,
I asked her if she'd come and see me and I said ‘how do you decide between two things 
that seem as bad as each other? Because I mean the time that Professor Z was giving me,
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not that I realised this then, and the kind of death he's described, is not that significantly 
better than the transplant except that of course it’s much less invasive. But basically I 
asked her ‘how do you decide between the two things, neither of which is very attractive?’ 
And umm she came down in the end to something th a t.....
R: She said?
V: to obtain all the information you can about both, you know, both treatments.
R: Yes
V: and the consequences of, consequences of the treatment and think them over for a
time and my gut reaction would come up. That always happens with me. Somehow, you, 
you begin to know exactly what you want to do and you then start thinking of the reasons 
why. I mean there's a, I mean it's very instinctive thing or intuitive thing I mean I'm quite 
intuitive about most decisions I make about things anyway. Anyone who thinks like that 
makes decisions fairly quickly usually and then has to substantiate the reasons why.
R: But you... so once you, once you collect the information, you allow an intuitive
decision to develop? Once you've developed that intuitive gut feeling decision, you then 
construct an explanation based on the evidence you have collected?
V: That's not quite right, you, no, I'm not closed at that point. It usually turns out to
be the right decision. You then say, ‘well Ok, well why, why have I made that decision? 
Why does that seem to be the one I want?’ and you look at it again and that time the logic 
falls into place but also at that point I will still at any time listen to further arguments from 
doctors because my construction might not be right. Or something may have happened to 
change things. But you see, there was, there are two other things that have happened in 
my life in terms of big decisions. One was when I was fourteen and I remember little 
about it, I didn't know why, I did it; I did not consciously formulate any reasons why at 
the time - 1 just heard myself saying ‘No’. But I, I, I'd had a GP all my childhood who did 
nothing but give me Franol tablets and tell me not to go swimming and keep warm and he 
gave my mother indigestion tablets all the time for a bad stomach.
We moved when I was 10 years old and my mother was investigated very quickly and it 
turned out she'd got fatal stomach cancer which had gone on for too far too long to do 
anything about. And when she died I was put in hospital and by then I'd got bronchiectasis 
as I said, but from then on I did get regular hospital treatment and when I was 14,1 was, I 
was still taking Franol, which was a white tablet. And one day on a visit to the clinic I was 
given another white tablet to take, a small one, and was told that I'd got to take it 
regularly. It was most important I should take it at the same time each day and nothing 
more than that, they told me nothing about it and there was no reason or precedent that 
would make me refuse it. And I was, you know, frozen. I would not take that tablet and 
I didn't know why. I went back home and my father had not been unable make me. My 
aunt also visited but I didn't take that tablet. I don't know why. I went back to the clinic,
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he questioned me very kindly, over some period of time. I don't know why I wouldn't 
take that tablet but I wouldn't. It was Prednisolone, which I realised much later that had I 
gone on it permanently then, I would have been dead long ago.
You know, I've got very strong feelings about the use of steroids and in hospitals and 
elsewhere. In fact it became necessary much later in fact at the Brompton for me to agree 
to go on steroids when I knew slightly more about them because I was very bad and so I 
said, ‘Ok I'll go on them.’ By that time I knew a little bit about them and I'd seen people 
on them in the wards and I was on them for about 15 months. They kept saying yes, yes 
continue. I was still getting asthma, and it was no better. I put on a lot of fluid weight, 
my hair was growing very thickly, my eyebrows were joining up with my hairline. I'd got 
swollen knees and ankles and indigestion problems and I just couldn't see how anybody 
could think that this was good for me and the answer to my lungs. Finally a young 
houseman that I saw in out-patients listened to me and thought and said, ‘well I think 
you're right’ and had the guts to go to the consultant and say so and I got off it. But 
basically that happened twice. I went on ACTH and gave myself injections through trips 
to Paris, etc. and you know, and I, I took the ACTH and went and got off it and that 
happened twice because they were so convinced that it was going to help me. It never did 
help me and the third time came when I was very ill again. I couldn’t walk down the road 
at all. They insisted that it hadn't helped me before because I hadn't had enough of it and 
I'd got to have higher doses and I said ‘No’. That was the only time I had actually said 
‘No’ to treatment in advance, other than the time when I was fourteen.
So the Brompton then said, ‘all right, you can get a second opinion’ and I was sent to 
UCH for a second opinion. They said exactly the same: that I needed higher doses and I 
went back and I still said ‘no’. This felt scary, because to cut oneself off from the one 
place that had always helped me, when I couldn’t breath was no light thing to do. I felt 
misunderstood and didn’t know what would happen. By pure luck, somebody that I was 
in contact with put me in touch with a Consultant in the Edgeware group of hospitals. He 
was the consultant chest physician, Dr A-B, who is dead now unfortunately. He was 
using ordinary antibiotics and other chest drugs, bronchodilators and things in conjunction 
with auto-hypnosis; but only on patients who were not on steroids. For some reason it 
didn't work if you were on steroids. He accepted me and all that and I, I was in hospital 
for about 10 months. I had lots of chest infections and I had lots of antibiotics and drugs 
and went through quite a time and learnt to do auto-hypnosis straight away and I did it all 
through the time in there and saw several other patients in the same situation and from that 
time on, I, I didn't have a pure asthma attack ever again. I mean, I still do it, not often 
enough, but from that time on I've only had asthma and exacerbated wheezing in 
conjunction with infections. Before that, in my childhood and later, I was having horrific 
asthma attacks, you know, umm triggered not by infection, who knows what and umm I 
was wheezy all the time. Whereas from then on, I was only really wheezy with the 
infections and obviously the bronchiectasis was slowly progressing but it wasn't this 
overlay of panic wheeze and other things. I think he was quite remarkable and he appears 
to have been totally lost from the record books which I think is a great loss, you know. It 
is a completely harmless, calming technique.
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I have also since that time tried various alternative things like the Alexander technique or 
various alternative medicines at various times to just keep myself in as much as an erect, 
mobile, flexible state as I can, because that's also what's important. When people are just 
sitting all the time, especially with chest disease, you become very immobile and rigid and 
pained, with an infection, I mean. I find I just get up and move, twist my body, you don't 
have to do very much. You can put on a slow record and be slightly moving, as long as 
you move your arms and chest around, then the phlegm for instance will come up, it'll all 
get moving and I've seen patients sitting in hospitals, not eating any of their meals eating 
cake, eating God knows what. The doctors come round on their rounds, the patient's very 
bad. The Sister's saying oh they're not eating their meals, you know, and they're sitting 
with oxygen masks and it's, it's a sad state, when I was in there - Which is the one in 
Hampstead, the bottom of Hampstead?
R: Royal Free?
V: Royal Free. I was on the 7th floor there and there was a particularly bad case of a
lady stuffing cakes between her oxygen mask like this, not eating any of her food and I 
couldn’t stand it. I just used to walk out and walk down seven flights of stairs and get the 
lift up again several times, morning and afternoon, because walking down takes very little 
breath, although I can't do it anymore without getting out of breath. I mean, until you're 
really bad you, you can go down them very easily and the important thing is to keep your 
body, your whole body, in a state that can deal with things so that, I mean, I paid for all 
the alternative stuff. I paid with energy and exhaustion to keep going to work and things 
but I think unless your, your mind and social life, and I'd rather go out to supper with 
friends and cheer myself up and collapse when I get back and perhaps have a bad day the 
next day and recover than stay in for two more nights and get depressed. Getting a taxi 
doesn't hurt you. I don't know, I’ve just said a lot of silly things.
R: No, no not at all. Why do you say that?
V: Well we were talking about decision making and why I was so convinced. I
haven't managed to keep a train of thought have I, lack of oxygen is very good at killing 
off your train of thought. Take me back where you want me to be. I haven't asked you at 
all. Why don't I ask you some questions?
R: Well you can if you want.
V: No it's all right, you can carry on.
R: I, I'm interested in the way you react to the medical profession as a whole.
V: Well for instance, that last thing, I mean I think they're past it these days but I
mean, you know, the nurses and the doctors not to have known what a woman like that is 
doing and saying no cake or something is ridiculous.
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R: I, I didn't mean it like that.
V: Sorry.
R: I meant in a sense that you, you submit yourself to an organisation and the doctors
and hospitals and everything that goes with it - do you do that willingly?
V: That's a good question. Not usually, I . ... it used to be quite willingly
R: Sounds as though there's an element of wariness about that.
V: Hospitals are not such benevolent places as they used to be - such helpful or
nursing places as they used to be and I think it is probably a quite conscious policy which 
hasn’t been thought right through. I think that a lot of what is wrong with the nursing 
profession in terms of patients experience and nursing experience is that they are no longer 
taught to nurse. And I found it quite ironic that this is the case in a period of time when 
doctors on the whole are becoming much more aware of the value of various, you know, 
therapies at any rate you know making patients feel better generally about themselves. 
Nurses, like doctors, vary tremendously as people and the changing, more technical, 
university training is intended to attract a wider group. Also, with the shortage of jobs 
and the break up of tight family groups, many people will be attracted to nursing who may 
not have any experience of caring for people. I believe it is something which can be 
taught, but it is no good teaching without understanding why - its therapeutic value; it is 
something which should make up a large part of the ethos of nursing courses. You know, 
the last ward I was on, the sister never smiled once, none of the nurses smiled, they didn't 
say good morning in the morning. It's very rare now for the nurses just to go round, sit on 
the bed and chat and see how you are and it is not because they never have the time -  they 
do - but they talk to each other, often over the heads of patients. The system of actual 
having a nurse you know....
R: Attached to you?
V: to patients doesn't work at all. Most nurses don't want to do it and usually they'll
get out of it if they can. I mean, in my experience, it might not be wrong as an idea, but 
it's not something that's working very well and I think that for the to nurses feel a joint 
responsibility for patients is much better. I mean the nurses often take better care that way 
anyway. If you have a named nurse who couldn’t care less, or is off duty for four days the 
day after you are admitted it is hard luck. I mean if you've got nurses, who are bright and 
cheerful and talk to you and see how you are, I'm talking about very ill patients as well, 
and you know tuck you up or help you eat; I mean some patients do need help. A lot of 
patients are elderly and I've seen a hell of a lot of that. The nurses also resented how other 
patients felt. There was one patient I remember. That's one thing that I, I'm most 
frustrated about being in hospital, is that I see elderly patients not eating, maybe can't 
reach their food or don't want too, they're too depressed. Nurses really don't like it if
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another patient gives some help whereas I, I forged several really good friendships with 
older women on the wards I've been on through doing that and I've been aware that I'm 
not necessarily popular for doing so. It is extraordinary, the close, albeit temporary 
friendships that are made between patients in hospital to the extent that their closest 
anxieties and experiences will often be shared within a couple of days of being in the next 
bed. They will be informal and clear about their worries when dealing with authority they 
may never ask the right questions of the nurses or doctors.
R: mmm
V: Yes, and I, I kept... I mean there are a couple of partially sighted patients and pure
accident that I'm running Green Park Station and the Society for the Blind and Partially 
Sighted is one of my tenants. It's been pure accident that I've overheard their name since 
and they've not been happy about going to Day Centres and that sort of thing and I've 
gone out with a Blind Administrator for the day and in one case persuaded a lady that I 
got to know quite well in hospital, by being quite cheeky, to go to the day centre which 
gave her husband a break. That was a connection between hospital and outside umm in a 
friendly way which I just wonder whether something like that can't be worked somehow 
into the system even in a voluntary way
R: That may be possible. Well, why do you say hospitals have become less friendly
places, less supportive?
V: I think it's because the nursing training has changed so much.
R: Why do you think that?
V: I don't think it's, I don't think doctors have changed that much, umm, I think, no,
doctors have changed a bit and it's for the better but the, the whole atmosphere of the
ward depends on the nurses part and I, I've told you before about my story in the
National Hospital where I was on the surgical ward and talked to patients in a friendly way 
but as for the nurses, the whole time I was in there, they didn't to me. I mean fortunately I 
talked to my doctor. I mean the only friendly thing I remember from that experience was 
holding the hand of a wonderfully warm South American woman doctor who was a 
patient in there and she had a great smile and she was South American and Latin and 
warm. She was that kind of person. It wasn't because she was a doctor.
R: Right.
V: and a patient, and the horrendous experience I had of this woman that came in the
bed opposite me. Who was almost completely disabled in every respect except that she 
could hear and speak but she was blind She was only visited once by another disabled 
person who had come a long way. She was totally ignored and I discovered after two 
days that she didn't know why she was in there. I was appalled and I asked whether she 
wanted to know and she said ‘yes she thought she ought to know.’ She was dressed daily
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in these very dark glasses but she had nice eyes, which I told her, she’d had no idea. On 
the ward nobody had talked to her except one male doctor who was really good and he 
was on what-you-call-it? He was just in the National for a month’s training.
R: On attachment.
V: And going back to something Park.
R: Northwick Park?
V: Northwick Park. He was a wonderful nurse and they're so rare nowadays. He
used to, used to bath her and get her out of bed some mornings but when he did it, he 
talked with her the whole time, he chatted a lot. He moved her around in a, you know, in 
a really caring way. Umm the others, you know, got her undressed, got her strapped up 
and stuck her in front of the television that close and I said ‘that well she really couldn't 
see’ and all those nurses all day, all were behind the desk observing the acute patients just 
back from the operating you know ward, operating theatre section of the ward. They 
were behind the desk and they were chatting among themselves and the doctors. They 
never chatted to anyone else. That's the extreme end of it. But I think it's less satisfying 
for the nurses as well when you don't have a warmer and caring atmosphere. Mostly umm 
the nurses that train nowadays have less experience of nursing in real life, in their outside 
lives. It ends up with them not getting real satisfaction in their jobs.
R: Mmm.
V: I think people in many cases need to be taught to care and they need to be told,
shown how to care. I mean they're not used to dealing with, you know, bed pans and 
things like that. I mean I could get down to very basic things. When I was fourteen and 
first in hospital, I got out of my bed and went across and held an old lady up behind the 
curtain because she's in a position that she can't go to the loo, you know, and she's been 
left there for hours, lying down flat over one of the old metal bedpans. The most tiny 
things that I mean, to me, most of them are instinctive. A lot of people, they're not 
instinctive to it and it's not their fault and I think people need to be, nurses need to be 
taught how to care for people and the other thing, the whole thing of actually making the 
ward a cheerful, you know, engaging place is, is you know....
R: So do you, do you see a relationship, or am I just putting words into your mouth,
between the more technical side to medicine and the ability to care? The more technical it 
is, the less there is a medical need to care?
V: I don't think it's necessarily the case but it's umm it is the case that nurses now are
taught very much I presume the technical side of caring for people and umm you know, 
very much less important, if any, is put to the personal caring for people and they have so 
much to do as well.
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R: Yes.
V: That it doesn't allow them much time for that maybe but yes, I mean it is but I also
think that some people, they've got it automatically and some people haven't.
R: Right.
V: But in the, the training's not picking up perhaps the larger number that haven't.
R: Whereas it used to in the past.
V: It, it, it used to in the past because a lot of, I mean.... when I first went into
hospital, my bed was made 5 times a day. Matron came round to see if you're Ok. There 
are no matrons and although everybody went weak to their stomachs with some matrons 
you know, Matron actually checking up was not a bad thing. And although you don't 
want your bed made 5 times a day, you do want it comfortable if you're ill. You don't 
want rough sheets under you. You don't want things sticking into you. You know, when 
somebody's bed is made and they're really ill, it's a caring thing. I know it sounds daft to 
most people probably, but they sit out and they chat while they're doing it and they're put 
back in and their pillows are made right and those few minutes
R: It's a social time.
V: It's a social time and they're made comfortable and they're cared about and if that
happens a few times a day, it's good thing.
R: Does that make it more difficult for you to present yourself as an individual with
individual wants and wishes?
V: No of course not. It gives you time to actually do this.
R: If the system doesn't do that, does it become more difficult?
V: Yes, oh yes because if the system doesn’t give you the opportunity it will also be
underlining that it is not required to in the nurses and doctor’s minds, and they will not 
make any attempt.
R: Is it that the system depersonalises you? Do contradict me if you want. Is it part
of the system, part of making you a medical problem? Would that be so or not?
V: Yes, it does objectify patients in that way. Patients are not part of the whole social
unit o f (orderlies), nurses, doctors and managers and I think this increases the medical 
problems as well, by taking away responsibilities from the patients. It not only 
disempowers them in social sense, but separates from their illness in a way which creates 
anxiety and makes the illness itself the only way they can get attention. This surely can’t be
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a good model, but it is one which is continued outside the hospital, which can make some 
patients want to come back.
R: Right.
V: I think that if people are less happy and not cared about, they're not going to get
better happily and they are not going to feel, they're not going to feel in a physical state 
where they feel like getting better. I mean, I know that there's always been this argument, 
it's a bit like prisons, if you're too comfortable in there, you can't get rid of people.
R: Yes
V: They'll want to keep coming back. Ok that's a real problem but I don't see why
that problem can't be addressed umm head on. Why should you make people 
uncomfortable in hospital and dying to get home in order, you know, to have them back a 
few days later with something more seriously wrong with them?
R: Ok, I'm sorry to interrupt because I do, I, I really want to push some things that I'd
love to check out with you. One is this.. .it's, it's occurred to me from what you've said
that if hospitals become less overtly caring and it becomes more difficult for you to present 
to the system non medical bits of information
V: Mmm.
R: it's a way of simplifying a problem so that you then become somebody with a lung
problem without everything else bolted onto it and simplifying the problem is one way of 
dealing with the problem.
V: Mmm.
R: Now do you think that's a fair construction?
V: Yes-that is what I meant about abjectifying the patient and making the illness that
only point of interaction. (Freudian typo left there - 1 thought it was quite good!-Val)
but it misses a whole lot of things because
R: Right.
V: a person with a lung problem, a happy person with a lung problem
R: Sorry I'm not saying that, that's a good thing.
V: No I know you're not. I'm trying to, it's a bit difficult with this. The point is
somebody who is happy gets a bad case of whatever it is and goes into hospital.
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R: Yes.
V: is treated well and comes out. It'll be an experience which will you know,
gradually fade in their memory and they will deal with it in a healthy manner. Somebody 
that has a problem and goes into hospital and really when they're in there they are not 
made to feel welcome, they are not nursed, although they are feeling really ghastly and 
they aren't able to tell the doctors and nurses all the things that are worrying them
R: Yes
V: around it, will not get the information and everything else that they need to know
about the illness. Patients have worries and even though they might be silly ones, that a 
nurse could answer in half a second while they're making the bed.
R: Yes.
V: They've got to get rid of those worries and they've got to really feel more positive
in themselves generally and if they don't they won't get better so well, so I mean I think it's 
actually useful. If we are making everything more umm technical and ignoring the other 
side of people, people's worries about their illnesses, it's, it's I think making more 
problems in the end and if I think it's affecting, I think it affects the nursing staff and it
makes them much less happy in their work. (These ‘worries’ all the time are standing in
for more complicated issues.)
R: Right.
V: You can see it.
R: Yes.
V: And you know, all they're worrying about is whether they've done the last bit and
when I was on the chest ward, what's most important to me is to get about eight hours on 
my respirator at night. Sometimes it was half past twelve before I got my last injection, 
you know, intravenous injection because they have so many to do on the chest ward and 
you know, you're woken up at six for the next one. I’m only in hospital when I’m at my 
worst, when I most need the respirator but even here the technical (medication) is working 
against the caring (making sure I get enough oxygenated rest.). It's, there are, I don't 
know, I mean they may be very short of staff and all the rest and I don't know, that's 
neither here nor there. I said this to Dr X. He had a really, really lovely Indian SHO who 
you probably know, who used to come into the ward very softly. I noticed by the way 
that all the staff always called him by his Christian name not his surname which they didn't 
do with most doctors but he would sit on you know, sit on the bed, he would smile at you. 
I f  he came into the ward and caught your eye, he'd smile and say ‘hello, good morning’ or 
something. All the other doctors, especially the young ones, they're terrified. They've got
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steel on the heels of their shoes or at least they've mostly got hard shoes. They come 
across a ward, clack, clack, clack, all the way over. They ignore everybody's eyes. They 
never meet an eye and they go to the bench and thing, whatever and write it down and 
then they go and see their patient and it's a kind of total funnel tunnel. It's impersonal and 
all the rest and you can't, I mean, it, it's been like that for donkeys years and I'm sure it's 
it's; partly in the beginning for doctors a kind of mixture of fear and apprehension and all 
quite human things as well but it's also to do with esteem and arrogance and the different 
position in the hierarchy between the nurses and doctors. I don't think it should be 
perpetuated you know when they come in. I think it should be dealt with and I think all 
doctors should wear shoes that do not make a terrific noise when they walk across the 
wards, especially at night.
R: What, what does that tell you about the hierarchy for the position of patients in the
ward then?
V: Oh well patients are there to be seen when the doctor’s ready and only then.
R: You said ‘doctors’ Are doctors on top and then nurses? Where do the patients fit
int o all of this? Underneath, in the middle, on top?
V: Well I mean, none of them would be there if it weren't for patients but I don't think
they remember that
R: Laughter.
V: I don't know where they fit. They're there. I suppose they are. I mean they have
to be underneath, but it's not a, it's not the same logical thing, as nurses and doctors are all 
employed for patients.
R: I interrupted your train of thought on this. You were talking about doctors going
through the ward making noise. That's what prompted me to ask a question. What is 
walking through a ward noisily at night saying about the environment.
V: I don't think, I don't think they think that consciously. I don't think uhh, I think
there probably is a lot of apprehension in young doctors first going onto the wards. It 
must be pretty scary and I also know that quite a lot of you know, the way I mean, if you, 
you are experiencing seeing terrific pain and suffering or whatever, they would need to
protect themselves and build up their own way of coping with it.
R: Yes
V: and I'm not talking about myself at the moment, and they see it repeatedly all the
time and they have to develop a way of dealing with it. They have, I mean, you can't react 
to that as maybe I would or a patient would every time so they develop different ways of 
dealing with it I think
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R: Mmm.
V: according to their own personalities. For some it is easier for patients to meet than
others.
R: But I am suggesting that the organisation may allow a doctor to behave in certain
kinds of way because, although you say it's a thinking process for a doctor to walk across 
the wards noisily at night, the organisation somehow permits that as an acceptable act.
Yes, there may be reasons for that as you say.
V: Well they're allowed to wear whatever shoes they like. I suppose lace ups or
whatever.
R: Well I, I, I mean... I meant that there may be reasons why the organisation permits
an unfeeling attitude to develop
V: Mmm.
R: as a protective mechanism but that, that was your suggestion because it would be
exhausting to cope with suffering all the time.
V: Well I, I was taking that into account.
R: Yes, well it's uhh
V: Well I, I mean considering the number of years I've been going in and out of
hospitals, I've only really realised since that dreadful experience in the National how much 
doctors do vary, not only in their ways of dealing with people but, you know, adequacy in 
their techniques in every way - and nurses. They vary as much as any group of people 
outside do. Maybe not quite as much but there ought to be a way, I know, I hate to say 
this but that Registrar who came to take the second lot of fluid out of my brain at the 
National. I saw him walking across the ward, not doing as I thought he should be doing 
on a crowded ward, to take the fluid out of my brain with no curtains drawn. I should 
have said something. I wanted to say something but even I, with all my experience and 
what you say, you know, I couldn't.
(At the Nationalwhen I  saw the registrar who was coming to take the second lot o f fluid  
out o f  my brain, walking across the ward towards me, not doing as I  thought he should 
be, I  was terrified andfrozen. I  had the strongest gut feeling that I  should not submit to 
this - this man should not be a doctor and he didn’t know what he was doing. Numerous 
contradictory rationalisations crowded through my mind as to why I  should not stop him 
- on top o f which was a fear it would be more dangerous to try. The status quo, the 
institution - the best hospital - would prevail. This self conscious, arrogant young man 
was coming towards across a ward crowded with visitors, with a piece o f gauze already
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soaked in dark brown flu id  - drying rapidly - in one hand and a kidney bowl with syringe 
already set up with needle in the other. It was about 5.15pm, there were five visitors at 
the bed next to mine, three opposite and others elsewhere. He made no attempt to close 
the curtains round my bed and told me come and sit on the end o f the bed next to him. I  
was aghast. I  should have said something but I  couldn’t)
R: Why?
V: Because I wasn't sure that I was right and because I believed that my consultant
who was supposed to be good would not let that man do it if he was not good enough.
R: So you had belief, an intrinsic belief in the system?
V: Yes, it was a young consultant. As far as I knew I was in the best neurology
hospital in the country - if not Europe. This man surely would not be in his position if he 
were not pretty special. My consultant had spent about ten to fifteen minutes chatting to 
me, leaning against the wall near the desk, before lunch. During this chat he told me that 
this procedure was not a problem unless of course (he mimed) you pulled the fluid off the 
brain too quickly. In which case you might cause a thrombosis - a stroke - or similar. He 
departed with a friendly grin saying he would ‘get one of his boys to do it.’
(I desperately hoped in advance that it would not be the one who came. (He had two 
registrars.) The man in question had personality problems that were openly discussed by 
the nurses, who said that he constantly told them he did not have enough confidence, this 
they did not believe since he behaved so arrogantly. He looked and dressed as though he 
might be a slick dealer in the 1980s stock exchange.
He had brought me the consent form fo r my operation on the night I  arrived. He had not 
expected me to read it and was very impatient when I  tried. It was impossible for me to 
read it with him fidgeting and I  capitulated to the system since I  knew there would be no 
alternative, but I  asked him what would happen i f  the operation went wrong (neither my 
neurologist or surgeon had told me about the risks o f brain surgery.) He simply grinned 
idiotically and said “We 11 make it better”. I  gave up and he produced a fountain pen 
with red ink in it fo r  me to sign - in the circumstances it looked like blood. He then tried 
to get an Indian - possibly Sikh - woman to sign and gave the same responses when she 
could not understand it. She was unhappy and refused until her husband came in later.
I  have since decided that although my consultant was or is supposed to be very bright - 
the pathologist husband o f the woman next to me had looked up his “form ” - he was still 
in his thirties and he probably lacked experience both o f casework and o f leading his 
team. I  know that registrars have to gain experience, but he was unaccompanied and I  
think in view o f the state o f my lungs the consultant should have taken particular care. 
Then Ifee l guilty fo r  even thinking that.)
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I've since formed the opinion that Ok, you know, he may be a brilliant technician and 
brilliant surgeon but he has not had enough experience of leading a team and he talked to 
me for twice as long in the morning, the consultant, as it took the guy to take the fluid out 
of my brain, he could have done it himself while he was talking to me. That sort of thing, 
you know, happens, you know. I suppose nobody's going to learn unless you're allowed 
to do things but....
R: But what stopped you? What, what actually stopped you?
V: I don't know, it was a complete nightmare because as soon as he'd done it and I'd
realised he'd done it practically in a second or two and I thought, am I still sitting here 
because the consultant had told me in the morning that of course you can't draw fluids out 
of the brain quickly like that.
(I think I  thought his personality was too unstable and I  consciously spoke to him very 
calmly and quickly drew the curtains myself to shut out his audience, while he was telling 
me not to bother it would be over in a couple o f minutes. I  sat down on the edge o f the 
bed dreading it. He took ages to fin d  the right place along my scar, when he did he 
dabbed it cursorily, once, with the said piece o f gauze without resoaking it and set about 
getting the needle in. When he was satisfied he pulled the flu id  out very quickly - as 
quickly as I  would think you could get flu id  through a needle - and pulled it out and 
showed me it triumphantly. I  was sitting in shock actually thinking “Am I  still here?. ” It 
was bright (arterial) redfluid andfrothed to fil l  the entire syringe. He said “there you 
are - lOmls. ” And I  thought it was considerably more. I  said, still calmly “I  thought 
brain flu id  was a sort o f  grey colour and he agreed it was but said there was a lot o f  
blood in this. I  wanted someone else to see it but I  couldn’t move.)
R: Yes
V: The consultant said, you know, do it slowly. I had a long conversation with him
and then suddenly this man comes in and does that.
R: Why did you allow it to happen?
V: Are you saying it's my fault now?
R: No, no, no, not at all. Can I clarify that? I don't think it's your fault.
V: No, it's a joke. I know what you're trying to say but I can only say that most
patients, without my, my experience would have been even less likely than I would to have 
objected.
(Reasons: There was my belief in the system, considerably reinforced by the fa c t that I  
was in the specialist hospital in the field. Also my choices about the management o f my 
illness over the last twenty years has meant that I  have not been in hospital much in that
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time, most o f my experience o f hospitals until then was earlier in more rigorous times. I  
personally think that procedure should not have been done outside a treatment room with 
a n urse present, but knew nothing about neurology and it all seemed outside what I  knew 
about.
It s eemed to me that the problems associated with the cyst in my brain were in all senses 
completely outside my control. It is important to me to fee l that I  have some control over 
my illness so that I  can act in ways that will not make it worse, and i f  not healing will at 
least make me fee l better or more comfortable. With the brain there was nothing I  could 
do. I  had tried to exercise my weak legs to make them stronger, but all it did was totally 
exhaust me. The messages from the brain were not getting through. I  think this long and 
steadily worsening experience had already created a sense o f powerlessness.
A ll this was reinforced by the way the ward in the National was run. It took only 
immediate pre-op and very ill post-op patients who were mostly too ill to talk to each 
other. The nurses when not performing necessary tasks were always at their station,
talking to each other or the younger doctors. There is the (story o f the paralysed, blind 
woman opposite me who I  found out did not know why she was there because no-one had 
told her. She, with all her limbs strapped down, wearing dark glasses and stuck two feet 
in fro n t o f the television all day, with a perfectly active mind and voice ignored, 
epitomised to me the unpredictability and sense o f being wholly out o f  control o f oneself 
experienced by neurological patients.
When I  had the major seizure about 3 hours after the withdrawal o f that flu id  there was 
even in those split seconds as it happened a dreadful inevitability about it. The pain was 
o f an order which I  had not thought possible - it was inhuman. Electrical current not 
related to ones shape or previous sensations enough to fe ll a huge old tree. The next day 
it was all played down and my anger was too deep and confused to be expressed.)
R: Well what I'm suggesting....
V: But how could I have got round it? You tell me. Apart from just objecting then
and making a fuss. You see, every patient thinks if they make a fuss then all the staff are 
going to lay into them from then on because they don't like people who make a fuss.
R: Yes.
V: The nurses don't like it, the doctors don't like it. In actual fact it's possibly the
reverse. If somebody does come in and demands to be treated properly in hospital 
nowadays, they usually make sure they are because they know this person's going to make 
a fuss if they don't, but that's very rare. Nobody knows that and I, I didn't even feel, I 
mean, knowing it and feeling it is two quite different things. I didn't even think that until 
later. I've been over that moment so many times and I'm not over it now -  after nearly 
two years it is still a emotional drain on me and although I have wanted to write and 
complain I have been unable to do so. I also think that the surgeon should not have
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allowed him to do it in my case. I think, why should I think that arrogantly but I think that 
with lungs as bad as mine, that they should have taken extra care. Umm I wasn't even told 
beforehand that you know, there was a possibility of strokes or epilepsy with brain 
operations anyway.
R: So Val, you seem to suggest that not only was there the hospital, but behind that
there was, there was a kind of surgical institution that's giving authority for them to do 
things to you.
(sorry did not really answer you here but there is another point)
(I don ’t know whether I  can take that any further but I  would say yes, and the thing that 
made it worse was the degree o f blinkered specialisation that was going on, not only did 
they not take regard o f my situation with very bad lungs, but they could not even write up 
my respiratory drugs properly the whole time I  was there, in spite o f several times asking 
fo r  them to be corrected. This in itself caused me some degree o f discomfort, before 
starting on my brain.)
V: Oh yes, that's the trouble, the arrogance but on the other hand you see, I don't
believe that in breaking down a, a hierarchy in a visual sense, say by uniforms
R: Yes
V: or some other basic way is going to help. I think it has, you have to maintain a
structure where there is a clear line of authority and there's a clear means of working.
R: Right.
V: and I, I think you have to absolutely have that. If you haven't got that the patients
will feel more insecure and I think terribly so. I don't like not even knowing who the staff 
nurse is, I don't like not knowing who the sister is on the ward. Basically if you're a 
patient, you'll probably never do it, you'll probably never talk to them but the feeling that 
somebody there is actually, you know, responsible
R: Yes
Y: for what's going on helps you, it's a helpful feeling.
R: Yes
V: It's still quite frequent that you'll get a sister who never talks to the patients at all
now.
R: So the structures are, you're saying are both, both helpful and inhibitory in some
ways so
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V: No they're not inhibitory on the patients sides. I mean, the structure itself and the
line of, line of authority is good. What, what's built up behind them is a kind of an 
assumed position within institutions
R: Right.
V: Which I don't think is necessarily that conscious anymore in people but it, it, it's
habits, die-hard and the habits can be ways of thinking not just doing things.
R: Mmm.
V: and umm I just think that if, I know that there's a cut off point where doctors, as
I've said just now, need to protect themselves from breaking down in, you know, 
emotionally for what they see all the time but they still have in some respects to look at 
every patient as a person
R: Right.
V: and you actually find quite often that the consultants are better at doing that than
the younger doctors because younger doctors are more terrified, they're more worried 
about the consultant than the patient. Now they're much more worried about doing the 
right thing you know.
R: The Consultant? Sadly we're having to watch the time a bit. Val can I, would it be
Ok to sort of wind up a little. Is umm, I have a sense I've slightly pushed you on certain 
points. Has that been Ok?
V: Well I haven't minded. I have a sense I haven't talked about what you want.
R: Why?
V: You know, I didn't know what you wanted, I just covered, done my own thing a
bit.
R: Well umm I, I think you've said some really fascinating things.
V: I think there's a very big deal within the medical profession about patients being at
all involved in umm either the way of running things or taking decisions about anything 
within hospitals I mean from their own actual treatment to you know
R: To the way hospitals are run and all the rest, yes.... Can I clarify one thing? You
have no fear that what you said has not been interesting, it's been fascinating but I, I, I also 
have a slight anxiety that there have been moments where I've pushed a little bit to kind of
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explore in a bit more depth what you've meant about certain things but also to check out 
some of my own interpretations. Is that right?
V: Yes
R: You felt it appropriate. Ok. Right. Is there anything you wanted to add?
V: No, I mean on my own, I actually w ant, you know me, I'll probably never get
round to it because while I'm working, I'll never have the energy
R: Yes.
V: I'd love to write something...
R: About your experiences.
V: I'd love to do something about my experiences, the experiences of chronic illness
patients.
R: Right.
V: particularly in hospitals and I'd love to do something about the use of steroids
which I have to say, I didn't quite finished because I, I think they're still used far too much 
and asthma is getting more and more common in children and I know that there, 
everybody is saying that inhaled steroids are not as harmful as swallowed steroids which 
is, which is undoubtedly true. But the really long term effects of being on inhaled steroids 
are not known yet, and doctors and I thoroughly, this is where nursing comes in again, I 
really feel that doctors feel there is nothing they can do for respiratory patients and I don't 
know whether it's the same in other areas with steroids use . The doctors are very 
frustrated when there's nothing they can do for people and I sympathise completely
R: Yes
V: and umm they feel they've got to do something and steroids are a way of slightly
minimising etc etc but last time I was in hospital, there was a girl, 25, had brittle asthma 
and she'd been put on steroids had asthma again, this always happens, asthma again, the 
doses got higher, asthma again, the doses got higher, she was on 80mg a day and they had 
to get her off it. Once they'd got it right, they couldn't get her off it. She'd have asthma 
again. What do they do when she has another huge attack you know, it, it's, it's not the 
answer. Steroids are not the answer I believe and I think they've grown in popularity 




V: I think nursing is part of it and I think, I know that sounds crazy, but I think with
asthma it's a terribly scary thing to get, especially probably for children but I didn't actually 
panic about asthma until I was in my 20's and I felt quite safe until then oddly enough but 
when it's a scary thing, if everything around you seems out of control umm it's terribly 
important that it's brought back into control and you feel as though there's somebody, or 
people around you who are caring and are not going to miss anything and you get you 
know, you feel safe. I actually think that really good nursing can play a part in
R: mmm
V: in the asthma treatment, by that I mean perhaps more than ever been done even
unconsciously in the past.
R: Val, I, I'm sorry,
V: That's it.
R: No, no it's not that. We're just starting to run into a problem of time really. I have
to pick up my little boy from school.
V: I thought you were....
R: Can I just check the - yep it's all gone. Absolutely fine.
THE END
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